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Preface
The present volume offers a selection of papers presented at the Eleventh In­
ternational April Conference “Ambiguity and the Search for Meaning: English 
and American Studies at the Beginning of the 21st Century,” which took place 
in Kraków on 23-25 April 2008. The occasion gathered specialists in English 
and American studies from several European countries and the United States, 
continuing the tradition of triennial meetings held in Kraków since 1978. It 
has become a tradition for each successive April Conference to attract more 
participants than the previous one; in 2008, 138 linguists and literary scholars 
met in Kraków and 120 papers were read.
This volume contains a selection of 37 papers on literature and culture. 
The authors address one of the main dilemmas facing the literary scholar: 
how to position themselves towards the issue of ambiguity in literature. The 
universality of the theme resulted in a variety of critical approaches, starting 
from Terence McCarthy’s staunch defence of definite meaning in Malory’s 
Morte Darthur to Robert Rehder’s celebration of ambiguity in Modernist poetry 
and art. Elinor Shaffer reminded us of the significance of William Empson’s 
Seven Types of Ambiguity, whose 80th anniversary of publication comes in 
2010, for the development of English studies. The articles span over 600 years 
of writing in the English language from Malory to Banville, from medieval 
romances to George Harrison’s songs. To quote William Empson, who was 
a silent presence at the conference, each of them marks an attempt at “teasing 
out the meanings of the text.”1
1 William Empson, Preface to the Second Edition of Seven Types of Ambiguity, 3rd ed. (London: 
Chatto and Windus, 1956) x.
We would like to express our gratitude to the Advisory Board, who refereed 
the papers for publication and provided many valuable comments for the authors 
and editors. Our thanks go to Teresa Bela, Joelle Biele, Julie Campbell, Ben­
jamin Colbert, Marta Gibińska-Marzec, Aleksandra Kędzierska, David Mal­
colm, Irena Przemęcka, Krystyna Stamirowska-Sokolowska, Lisa Vargo and 
Anna Walczuk. All the errors that may have found their way into the text are, 
of course, the responsibility of the editors.
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The Editors would like to express their sincere thanks to the Faculty of 
Philology of the Jagiellonian University, as well as to the Institute of English 
Philology, for subsidizing the publication of this volume.
This volume is dedicated to the memory of Robert Rehder, an eminent 
scholar, a distinguished poet and a great friend, who not only participated in 
five of our conferences, but also generously shared his poetry with us. His 
presence will be sorely missed.
The Editors
Elinor Shaffer
Clare College, Cambridge 
School of Advanced Study, University of London
Seven Times Seven Types of Ambiguity: William 
Empson and Twentieth-Century Criticism
A crucial year in modem literary studies was 1928, when William Empson 
(1906-1984) wrote Seven Types of Ambiguity (published in 1930). That was 
eighty years ago. If Empson was always “brilliant,” and later in life perhaps 
“brilliant though idiosyncratic,” it has increasingly been borne in upon literary 
historians, looking back on the last century, that William Empson was the most 
brilliant English critic of the twentieth century. His reputation was created by 
that first book, but his later work would bear it out.
As a Cambridge undergraduate, he had taken the first two parts of the 
Mathematical Tripos, and turned to English Literature. Cambridge was a place 
of intense interest and intellectual ferment at the time. When Empson came 
up to Magdalene College from Winchester in 1925, the names in the air were 
Wittgenstein and Russell, and in the wider literary world, T. S. Eliot (who would 
come to Cambridge in 1926 to deliver his lectures on The Metaphysical Poets)', 
but in the relatively new University subject of English Literature (separated 
from Classics only in 1913) there was by 1926 an array of talent whose names 
would become even better known as the decades passed.
The beginning of this fruitful period might be put even earlier: for in 1918 
I. A. Richards and C. K. Ogden collaborated on The Meaning of Meaning. 
Frank Kermode (2009), in a recent collection of his reviews, comments on the 
era thus begun, also referring to Noel Annan’s memoirs, Our Age: Portrait 
of a Generation, where the historian and former Provost of King’s College, 
Cambridge defines a generation of post-World War II figures, comparing them 
with their post-World War I counterparts. In the earlier period at Cambridge 
(and here I speak of English studies), were to be found not only I. A. Richards, 
F. R. Leavis, and amongst the keen students, Empson himself, Queenie Roth (to 
become better known as Q. D. Leavis), Muriel Bradbrook (to become a noted 
Shakespearean and Mistress of Girton), Kathleen Raine (to become known 
as a leading Blakean poet -“seer”), Jacob Bronowski (a mathematician who 
would later become a celebrity through his television series, The Ascent of
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Man), Hugh Sykes Davies (who would be an English don in Cambridge for 
the rest of his days), the novelist Malcolm Lowry, whose novel Under the 
Volcano would become a kind of classic, “E. E. Phare,” who became better 
known as Elsie Duncan-Jones, an articulate critic who went to Birmingham to 
teach, and many others who played a role in the intellectual life of the Union 
(the debating society) and of the various periodicals edited by students such as 
Experiment and Granta (the world in which Empson first, as a mathematician, 
came to know the literary crowd and then published his earliest essays). In 
any undergraduate generation, it is students from a variety of different subjects 
who play a role in the “public life” of the University; think of Jonathan Miller, 
a medical student, who (in the generation of the late 1950s) became most 
famous for his role in student cabaret.
Of the Cambridge luminaries of the post World War I period, no doubt 
the most important for Empson was I. A. Richards, his mentor at Magdalene, 
whose obituary he later wrote for the London Review of Books. Richards’s first 
lectures on The Principles of Literary Criticism, to be a major book, were given 
in 1924, when Empson was still a mathematics student; he heard only some 
(two, he said) of the lectures of 1929, which became the widely influential 
book Practical Criticism. But Richards also became Empson’s Director of 
Studies at Magdalene College when he changed his subject from mathematics 
to English, as well as his supervisor (Cambridge parlance for “tutor”) for 
Part I of the Tripos (a second-year examination). Thus he had demonstrations 
of “practical criticism” at first hand. The shoe may have been on the other 
foot; for the examples of poor reading by students given in Practical Criticism 
were far outstripped by the brilliant readings of Richards’s best student. As 
Kermode (2009: 22), not given to unconsidered enthusiasm, writes in a book 
of his recently collected reviews, “And indeed, at this time Cambridge was 
virtually the world.”
In 1930 Empson gained his degree in English, a First-Class Degree with 
Special Distinction, and was elected to a Bye-Fellowship by his College, Mag­
dalene.
It is striking now to realize to what extent that was a beginning point for all 
our thinking about English Literature as a university subject, both theoretically 
and in practice. When I arrived in Cambridge in the mid-sixties, many of 
those people were significant figures on the scene still, notably Dr Leavis, and 
those who opposed him. E. M. Forster was at King’s. The New Criticism, 
which had taken root in the United States as the reigning doctrine, was the 
product of Richards and his interpreters; John Crowe Ransom in his 1941 
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book The New Criticism acknowledged Seven Types of Ambiguity as a model, 
much to Empson’s dismay, as he disclaimed any wish to distance himself 
from the author’s intention or from historical circumstances. In an otherwise 
respectful review of Cleanth Brooks’s Modern Poetry and the Tradition in 
1939, he had already summed up his final judgement: “the things Mr Brooks’s 
theory excludes cannot be excluded in practice” (Empson 1987: 342). The 
New-Critical duo Wimsatt and Warren, whose ban on biography (in “The 
Intentional Fallacy”) became a shibboleth, were only shaken off as followers 
of Empson when Empson himself deployed biography so cunningly, and not 
at all biographically, in Using Biography (published in 1984, the year of his 
death). When later it was suggested he was also a forerunner of continental 
Deconstructionism, he was equally quick to demur. It was not easy to remain 
independent of his own impact. In Cambridge when I began to teach, “Practical 
Criticism” was a compulsory examination paper in the English Tripos; a strong 
option was Basil Willey’s “Moral Sciences” paper, originally influenced by 
Richards’s 1924 lectures {Principles).
However, there was one notable absence. William Empson himself was 
not in Cambridge at that time, and had not been there since 1930. Almost 
immediately on his election as Bye-Fellow a scandal had erupted: in July 
his bedder (College servant) discovered contraceptives in his room, and after 
a hearing he was deprived of his Bye-Fellowship by the College Council and 
required to leave Cambridge. Richards, who might have been able to prevent 
this heavy sentence, was away in China at the time.
In the same year, Seven Types of Ambiguity was published by the Hogarth 
Press, where Virginia Woolf and Leonard Woolf took the young man’s side, as 
did many others, against the Magdalene action. His assured academic career 
removed at a stroke, his reputation was nevertheless made.
Casting about for what to do, he was recommended for a Chair of English 
at Tokyo University, a three-year appointment; here begins the other career of 
William Empson, in the Orient. Returning from Japan to live in literary digs in 
Marchmont Street in London, he eked out a living by reviewing, published his 
first book of poems, and wrote a second brilliant critical book: Some Versions of 
Pastoral (1935). This is perhaps the most attractive of all his books, with grace 
and acuity tracing the pastoral element from Shakespeare to his revelatory 
chapter on Alice in Wonderland.
After this annus mirabilis, he accepted an appointment in China, at the 
National Peking University; and here I. A. Richards was instrumental in ar­
ranging it, for Richards’s interest in the promotion of Basic English in the Far 
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East had taken him there and he wanted Empson’s help. Empson arrived in 
time to experience the invasion of China by the Japanese, and to teach English 
through thick and thin, in considerable danger. When he returned to England 
again it was to a country itself about to undergo attack, and he joined the BBC 
as a Far East expert.
When I arrived in Cambridge, then, Empson was (from 1953 to 1978) 
Professor of English at Sheffield University, and I had the good fortune to hear 
one of his later lectures, on Coleridge (which was my own thesis topic), and 
I will never forget the slightly shambling, mandarin-bearded figure who played 
acutely to the galleries, fishing dramatically for famous quotations which he 
had stored on little slips of paper in all his pockets and in his trouser turn­
ups and which in any case he knew by heart. Indeed, he was renowned for 
his phenomenal memory for poetry, teaching in China during the Revolution 
in makeshift rooms without books, and later, in 1971-72, in Oxford giving 
one of his Waynflete Lctures on Donne’s manuscripts during the blackout of an 
electricity cut - for which gallant feat he received a standing ovation (Haffenden 
2007: 560-61). Empson not only had a phenomenal memory for poetry, he was 
a brilliant, unpredictable lecturer even when not in dangerous circumstances; 
as he noted of the Buddha’s Fire Sermon, “On one occasion when the Buddha 
was preaching, the magic of his words became too much for him and he rose 
forty feet in the air, but he shouted down to the audience begging them to pay 
no attention; it would be over in a moment, and wasn’t of the smallest interest 
compared to what he was saying. Any lecturer can sympathize with this point 
of view” (Notes, Empson 2000: 142-43).
Empson’s criticism never lost its fine edge, and new modes of ambiguity 
kept bubbling to the surface. “Seven” types were not sacred - or rather, the 
number 7 was sacred, but did not limit the possible types of ambiguity and 
certainly not the number of ambiguities. In 1961 his book Milton’s God took 
on a set of formidable critics and scholars whom he felt were endangering 
literature and literary criticism by their open espousal of a Christian point of 
view, beginning with Eliot, whom he had much respected, but whose public 
conversion to the Anglican Church in 1927 just after his Cambridge lectures 
had, in Empson’s view, conjured up a group of avowedly “Christian critics,” 
who he felt were sacrificing both literature and humanity to a sectarian interest. 
Far from backing down in the face of his well-placed antagonists, he carried 
the controversy further in his writings on other seventeenth-century poets, John 
Donne (whose use of the new scientific outlook he was the first to engage with) 
and George Herbert. Just as he would not concede the ground to the New Critics, 
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so he would not concede it to the neo-Christians. He maintained a humanist 
position which now had been extended and enlarged by his experience of Taoist 
and Buddhist world views in China and Japan.
It was also in the Waynflete series in Oxford (where some of the antagonists 
to his views, such as Helen Gardner and John Carey, were leading figures) that 
he gave a lecture entitled “The editorial choice of a text of a poem: examples 
from Donne and Coleridge,” an apparently dry title, in which Empson displayed 
his ability to combine original insights into the poet’s text and mind with the 
traditional tasks of the editor, which was exemplified also in his edition of 
the same year (1972) of Coleridge’s Poetry: A Selection, in particular of “The 
Ancient Mariner,” with its 100-page introduction. Here he carried his battle 
against the neo-Christian critics onto new ground.
There is still no more acute comment on Coleridge as poet and thinker 
(in my view) than Empson’s analysis of the difference between “The Ancient 
Mariner” in the text of 1798 (published in Lyrical Ballads') and that of 1817 (in 
Sibylline Leaves) with the marginal glosses added, which subtly repositioned 
the poem in line with Coleridge’s return from Unitarianism to Anglicanism. 
The neo-Christian critics were busily trying to win Coleridge, the youthful 
radical and Unitarian, for the Anglican interest, by reading his own later, more 
conservative stance back into the poetry written in his early period. Empson’s 
brilliant reading restores the young Coleridge’s poem.
Empson’s first essay on this theme was “The Ancient Mariner,” a sub­
stantial review essay that appeared in the Critical Quarterly in 1964 (Empson 
1987: 297-319). His introduction to the new selection from Coleridge’s poetry 
is virtually a small book in itself. The book made a considerable stir, and gave 
rise to some disagreements with Empson’s co-editor David Pirie, varied press 
responses, and Martin Amis’s support at the time for the restoration of the orig­
inal pantheistic version of the poem.1 Later criticism came from Jack Stillinger 
in his Coleridge and Textual Instability: The Multiple Versions of the Major 
Poems (1994) from the influential point of view of the new “pluralistic concept” 
of the text (that is, the view that “the text is paradoxically constituted by all 
of the authoritative versions one after the other”) (Haffenden 2007: 569). This 
editorial principle is, of course, inapplicable to a case where precisely what is 
under consideration is the successive historical alterations in the text. J. J. Mays 
adopted a non-committal position as the editor of the variorum poems in the 
1 Haffenden (2007: 563-574) gives a summary of the controversies over the text of “The 
Ancient Mariner.”
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Collected Coleridge. But none does full justice to the brilliance of Empson’s 
readings of “The Ancient Mariner.” Empson made the point that Coleridge’s 
antagonism to the slave trade made the guilt manifest in the poem political, 
which has been elaborated by recent New Historicist critics.2 Empson points 
to Coleridge’s “submerged politics” as well as his submerged and excessive 
feelings of personal guilt. To make its effect the poem had to leave the nature 
of the guilt unspecified and beyond any immediately visible cause.
2 See Ebbatson, Kitson and Keane.
3 See also Shaffer (1975) on Coleridge’s knowledge of the new “higher criticism” of the Bible 
at the time of writing “The Ancient Mariner.”
Perhaps the most insightful review was by Charles Rosen, the distinguished 
American pianist and scholar of Romanticism, who grasps Empson’s witty 
but profound point that “‘The Ancient Mariner’ warns us of the awesome 
consequences of religious guilt, and it is in this sense a deeply antireligious 
poem” (Rosen 1973: 12,28). Haffenden thinks Empson’s major contribution is 
his stress on the neoplatonic daemonography in “The Ancient Mariner,” which 
is not Christian and not “mere” pantheism but animism - the more primitive 
state of fear and superstition. This, of course, accords with the interest of 
Coleridge as a schoolboy, famously reported by Charles Lamb, in Thomas 
Taylor’s translation of the Neoplatonist philosophers. In a recent book Platonic 
Coleridge, James Vigus has explicated the uses Coleridge made at different 
times in his life of these texts.
From the first review in Argufying, and more fully in the substantial In­
troduction to the re-edited text Empson burrows his way into the period, into 
the nascent Romantic movement and its interest in “unusual states,” and into 
Coleridge’s own states of mind, his groundless feelings of dread and guilt 
throughout his life, to reread this poem as it presented itself in 1797.3 Such 
a reading would include Coleridge on the biblical criticism of the Unitari­
ans and of the German higher critics as he experienced it in the 1790s and 
laid the groundwork for his later, informed and imaginative ways of dealing 
with its querying of the dating and authorship of first the Old Testament, then 
the New - far from the kind of outright rejection that these dangerous doc­
trines met with in the Church of England until 1891. Empson on superstition 
and its psychological states meshes finely with “the mythological school of 
criticism,” which arose in response to the “higher criticism” (Shaffer 1975: 
chaps. 1-2).
Most important in Empson’s view - and still vital for the understanding 
of the poem in its time and in itself - is the pantheistic argument of the poem. 
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Coleridge was deeply affected by the debate over pantheism, which in Germany 
had seen Spinoza and after him Lessing castigated as a pantheist (and therefore 
as an offender against Christian views of the overlordship of God); his own 
bent in the early Romantic years was towards pantheism, or the spirit that dwelt 
in all nature, “the One Life within us and abroad,” as one of his finest poems 
puts it. The Mariner’s whole experience is within nature, creating the “natural 
supernatural.” It is this birth of the divine terror within and through nature 
that is sublime. The poem’s permanent power resides in this. Only later, as 
Empson saw, did Coleridge, turning back from Unitarianism to the Church of 
England and struggling to come to terms with Trinitarianism, feel called upon 
to reinterpret his own poem through the more orthodox doctrines represented 
by the marginal glosses of the 1817 version, a position still defended by some 
powerful voices bent on reducing Coleridge’s early radicalism and his later 
trenchant criticism of the Church and relocating him in an Anglican mainstream 
that with Wordsworth marched staidly down the Victorian age.4 Thus Empson 
was peeling the later interpretations off the poem to retrieve the original as 
written in 1797. Empson the editor, like Empson the critic, always read as 
a poet. It was as a poet reaching for Coleridge’s original vision that he went 
beyond his merely editorial function.
4 See, for example, Seamus Perry, “Empson’s Coleridges” in Some Versions of Empson, ed. 
M. Bevis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 104-130.
“It is the intellectuality of the creature that turns a state of need into a state 
of pleasure” (qtd. in Haffenden 2005: 191). This crux of his aesthetics lay 
in his rational humanism, and he turned it first against I. A. Richards’s be­
haviourism, which Richards had taken from the psychologist John Watson, 
making his Theory of Value merely a behaviourist, unconscious gain: a form 
of involuntarism. He never turned against Richards personally, but very early 
on he became aware of his major disagreement, the one that most directly 
leads to Seven Types of Ambiguity, with Richards’s distinction between “mean­
ing” and “emotional responses,” that is, the notion that a given passage had 
one “meaning,” while other responses were merely “emotional.” Empson later 
turned the same argument against Christian stances. “Ambiguity” permitted the 
loosening of this unitary and limiting claim without letting slip the quest for 
critically justified interpretation.
Empson arrived early at the fundamental strategies of ambiguity. He had 
already given a talk on ambiguity as early as 20 January 1929 and published in 
Experiment in February 1929 the analysis of Shakespeare’s Sonnet xvi, which 
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would go straight into Seven Types. Further comments he made on an essay on 
Valery and Hopkins at the time show that Freud also entered into his thinking 
on ambiguity, as the Seventh Type (that is, opposites or full contradiction) 
explicitly acknowledged.
A major influence which sometimes goes unnoticed was the book co­
authored by Laura Riding and Robert Graves, A Survey of Modernist Poetry 
(1927), with its elaborate multiple readings of Shakespeare’s sonnet cxxix, 
“Th’expence of Spirit in a waste of shame.” Empson annoyed Graves and 
Riding by crediting only Graves as a source; only much later did Empson 
admit that he had first been struck by a passage in Graves’s On English Poetry 
(1922), in which Graves attributed two separate meanings to the phrase “mine 
eyes dazzle” in the famous line in The Duchess of Malfr. “Cover her face; 
mine eyes dazzle; she died young.” Graves had argued that “dazzle” does duty 
for two emotions at once, “sun-dazzled awe at loveliness, tear-dazzled grief 
for early death.”
Graves, in another book, Impenetrability, or the Proper Habit of English 
(1926), cited the brilliant double possibility in Keats’s line in “The Eve of 
St Agnes,” where Madeline is “clasped like a missal where swart paynims 
pray,” which may be interpreted as either “fastened with a clasp of holiness” or 
“held lovingly in the hands,” if the Paynims (pagans or heathens) are converted 
Christians, or as “shut and coldly neglected” if the Paynims are unconverted 
(qtd. in Haffenden 2005: 1.219). Empson said he had cited the later book by 
Graves and Riding that offered the analysis of a full poem (the Shakespeare 
Sonnet), rather than the earlier examples of single lines, but had first got the 
idea of fruitful ambiguity from the earlier book by Graves alone.
Moreover, Empson in rejecting Richards’s notions of the “equilibrium” 
brought about by poetry (Richards’s version of Kant’s more systematic account 
of the aesthetic effect of “harmonizing the faculties”), finally stood closer to 
Graves’s notions of conflict, both mental and societal, which are to be resolved 
but also represented in poetry: “the poet [...] must stand in the middle of the 
larger society to which he belongs and reconcile in his poetry the conflicting 
interests of every group” (1925).
In Seven Types of Ambiguity he espoused a version of this “conflict theory,” 
if only to reduce the directly Freudian element:
There is a variety of the “conflict” theory of poetry which says that a poet must 
always be concerned with some difference of opinion or habit between different 
parts of his community; different social classes, different ways of life, or modes of
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thought; that he must be several sorts of men at once, and reconcile his tribe in his 
own person. (qtd. in Haffenden 2005: 228)
While his view of it was primarily psychological, still the element of political 
and social differences is made explicit. It is here that his mode of practical read­
ing through the subtleties of ambiguity not only maintained the free-thinking 
and enlightenment elements strong in Richards, but suggested the possibility of 
entering a larger arena of conflict. He is still, like Graves, speaking of “his own 
society;” yet through the subsequent widening of his political and his cultural 
horizons well beyond Cambridge his grounding in values he had located in his 
own mode of reading his Renaissance texts did not play him false. It is here 
that one may ask whether, and even suggest that “close reading” may indeed 
develop through Empson’s later work into a mode capable of dealing with the 
ambiguities that beset cross-cultural interpretation, the ambiguities of today.
As so often, Frank Kermode made the most judicious summing up of Emp­
son’s place as a critic. Despite the fact that he had had his own disagreements 
with Empson, over Donne and Herbert, both their general positions and spe­
cific readings, (though he found some of Empson’s views of Donne - that 
“POEM” was written from the vantage point of the planet Venus - peculiar, 
and doubted Empson’s stress on Donne’s adherence to the “New Science”). 
In an essay “William Empson: The Critic as Genius” he wrote, shortly after 
Empson’s death:
At a time when there are so many models and techniques that can be got up 
and assiduously applied, there are individual and eccentric gifts which remain the 
prerequisite of the best criticism; and Empson possessed them in the degree of 
genius. Second, there are at the moment attempts to enlist him posthumously in the 
ranks of a theoretical avant-garde; one sees why, but he does not belong there, and 
would have said so with his customary asperity and emphasis.
(Kermode 1989: 3-4)
Another voice that would come to carry weight was that of Christopher 
Ricks. Ricks greatly appreciated his insights, and helped establish a friendly 
circle at Oxford. He attempted to elect Empson to the Professorship of Po­
etry, which Empson twice withdrew from competing for, on the grounds that 
Sheffield, which had permitted him to refuse the duty of Dean on grounds of 
ill-health, would be surprised to hear he was up to the arduous job of Professor 
of Poetry. Ricks’s befriending of Empson may well have been a stratagem in 
his own battle to restore Milton’s reputation against Leavis’s attack, but that 
it was also a genuine and lifelong admiration can be seen in the brilliantly 
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Empsonian style of Ricks’s Milton Lecture at Christ’s College, Cambridge in 
2009, the 400th anniversary of Milton’s birth.
Other interesting critical opinions, apart from the extended battles with 
Rosamond Tuve over George Herbert and with Helen Gardner over Donne and 
Milton, were voiced by the waspish John Sparrow, who had been at Winchester 
with Empson, and would later become Warden of All Souls, Oxford, writing in 
1930 of the probable consequences of Richards’s Practical Criticism that the 
ignorant opinions of students reported in that book would in time lead to inter­
viewing “crossings-sweepers and barkeepers” on their views of Shakespeare 
and Milton. This is indeed just what happened in the aftermath of the Constance 
school of reception studies that places stress on the “reader” as opposed to the 
author when (nearly half a century later) random passers-by were interviewed 
in the U.S. as to the meaning of texts (N. N. Holland, Five Readers Reading 
1975)! Italo Calvino in his novel If on a Winters Night a Traveller brilliantly 
parodied the variety of extremes into which a “reader-oriented” criticism fell. 
Empson always remained dedicated - for all his own wit and inventiveness - 
to the attempt to understand the author’s processes, the author’s struggle not 
only to express his own thoughts, but also to imagine his effect on his own 
audience. As Empson (1981: 28) put it,
At bottom, you are trying to imagine the mind of the author at the moment of 
composition, but this may be too hard taken alone, so you need to remember that 
he was intensely concerned at that moment with whether the words he had found 
“expressed” what he was trying to say, that is, whether they would have the effect 
he wanted upon the audience he was imagining.
And this committed the critic also to attempting to understand the historical 
context which the author and his imagined audience inhabited. In short, “am­
biguity” was not to be cheaply bought by mere ignorance, nor by the alteration 
of meaning or response over time. But the author’s mind included a place for 
an audience response - set into the time shared with the author yet unreadable 
in advance for his own text might change it. Thus there is an ambiguity or 
unavoidable tension in the writer’s own intention. Often Empson’s witty sallies 
are based on unexpected but accurate historical “placing,” for example when 
he attributes T. S. Eliot’s reliance on “moral paradox” to the fact that Eliot “was 
young in the great days of Oscar Wilde” (Empson 1981: 30). And often he is, 
with great subtlety, disambiguating.
Empson’s development of the idea of ambiguity and its uses included 
a moral dimension. To draw this out fully would take more time and space than 
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we have here. But it has recently come to light again in a dramatic way through 
the story of one of his students and self-styled disciples, James Angleton. 
Angleton, a student at Yale, learnt of the art of reading a text according to 
the notions of the New Criticism, and he was especially taken with Empson’s 
notion of the ambiguity of any prose statement. He corresponded with Empson 
(among other poets and critics), edited a journal and wrote poetry, and after 
graduation he went to work for the OSS in counter-intelligence. He began to 
apply the methods of the New Criticism to the dark matter of spotting double 
agents. He was encouraged by his superior Norman Holmes Pearson, who had 
himself been an instructor at Yale before joining the OSS. Angleton became 
an “expert” in winkling out turncoats and traitors (or “moles”) by analyzing 
their prose statements. He made serious errors, which may perhaps be traced 
to the way he transformed Empson’s flexible notion of “ambiguity” into a kind 
of lie detector, claiming that “read with sufficient care, all texts, no matter how 
thoroughly encoded, would yield at least two messages: the overt meaning and 
the hidden meaning’ (qtd. in Hawkes 2009). Angleton’s overzealous application 
of his method, however, led to accusations of treason. Reviewing Angleton’s 
travesty of Empson’s theory, Terence Hawkes points out that Empson himself 
rather than using ambiguity as a clue to separating the “true” from the “false” 
was willing to entertain the possibility that conflicting statements might both 
be true. In a striking statement, which undoubtedly points both to his extensive 
experience of war and politics in China, Japan,and Britain, but also to everyday 
life in any company, Empson wrote of the need for irony, or a special kind 
of ambiguity in moral matters:
[PJeople, often, cannot have done both of two things, but they must have done 
either; whichever they did, they will have still lingering in their minds the way they 
would have preserved their self-respect if they had acted differently; they are only 
to be understood by bearing both possibilities in mind. (qtd. in Hawkes 2009)
This is an extraordinarily generous yet characteristically acute insight, and 
does much to explain people’s life experiences, their own self-images, and the 
capacity for responding to an idea of the better that still resides within the less 
good. For Empson, it is also a moral insight that the lifelong reading of literary 
ambiguity may induce and confirm.
William Empson was and remains a great original mind, a singular figure, 
founder of schools he would have shrugged off, and the finest critic - at root 
a poet - writing in the English language in the twentieth century. After all the 
schools and systems have passed away, the unique and unmistakable style of an 
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individual mind remains, to remind us to continue to comprehend the humane 
enjoyment we experience in poetry. T. S. Eliot in his last lectures suggested 
that there was a great succession of poet-critics in English, from Philip Sidney 
to John Dryden to Samuel Coleridge to Matthew Arnold, and, in the twentieth 
century, he strongly implied, the mantle fell upon himself - but he could not 
altogether suppress the name of William Empson, putting him aside only on 
the grounds, he intimated, that Empson was as a poet not quite up to the mark. 
However posterity may judge of that, William Empson is in the best company.
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Robert Rehder
Meaning and Change of Form: Eliot, Pound 
and Niedecker
This is a passage from a well-known poem:
Twit twit twit
Jug jug jug jug jug jug
So rudely forc’d
Tereu (Eliot 1952: 43)
Four lines, six words, one repeated three times, another, six, a three-word phrase 
unconnected to the other words and all the other words without any syntax. As 
the poet says: “I can connect / Nothing with nothing” (Eliot 1952: 46). Another 
contemporary passage:
Hang it all, Robert Browning,
there can be but one “Sordello.”
But Sordello and my Sordello?
Lo Sordels si fo di Mantovana.
So-shu churned in the sea.
Seal sports in the spray-whitened circles of cliff-wash,
Sleek head, daughter of Lir,
eyes of Picasso
Under black fur-hood, lithe daughter of Ocean;
And the wave runs in the beach-groove:
“Eleanor, ¿Xivctuc and iXettrXic!” (2/6)1
1 Ezra Pound, The Cantos, New York: New Directions, 1996. References are given in paren­
theses. The first number is that of the canto; the second, the page.
Eleven lines, three languages, five sentences or almost sentences, there is more 
syntax here, but perhaps also more disconnection. The individual lines or 
sentence units are tightly knit, held together in part by the alliteration and 
consonance of s sounds and what appears to be a discussion of two subjects: 
Sordello and the sea. This turns out not to be the case. The first four lines are 
about Sordello: Browning’s Sordello, Pound’s Sordello and the opening of the
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Provencal vida of Sordello (71180-71255). So-shu is a corrupt Japanese form 
of Shiba Shojo, a Chinese Han dynasty poet, Ssu-ma Hsiang-ju (179-117), who 
is criticized by the poet Li Po for creating foam instead of waves. Pound took all 
this from Ernest Fenollosa’s notes and quotes him as saying,“Shojo stirred up 
decayed (enervated) waves. Open current flows about in bubbles, does not move 
in wave lengths.” None of these items of Chinese literary criticism is clear from 
“So-shu churned in the sea,” nor is it at all clear that this is literary criticism, 
and using a Japanese name for a Chinese poet is especially hermetic. So-shu’s 
churning is metaphoric, the seal’s sporting is real, but, despite the beauty of the 
description why there is a seal here is obscure. To say, as Terrell does, that the 
seal is one of the forms that Proteus takes in the Odyssey does not explain it. Lir 
is a Celtic sea-god that Pound has borrowed from the Mabinogion. Eleanor is 
Eleanor of Aquitaine (1122-1204) the wife of Louis VII of France and then of 
Henry II of England, the political complications of whose marriages contributed 
to the Hundred Years War, which is why Pound associates her with Helen of 
Troy. The two Greek epithets, ¿kivauc; and ¿kinxkii, “ship destroying” and 
“city-destroying” are Aeschylus’ puns on Helen’s name in Agamemnon (689).2 
The construction of the line implies that the three names are what the sea says. 
The poet has compacted ten different subjects: Robert Browning’s Sordello, 
Pound’s Sordello, Sordello of Mantua, a mediocre Chinese poet, seal, Celtic 
sea god, Picasso, waves running up on the beach, Eleanor of Aquitaine and He­
len of Troy. Browning’s Sordello is related to the real Sordello (and Pound’s), 
but otherwise there is no real connection between the subjects. There is no 
argument, no syntactical relation, the subjects are merely juxtaposed.
2 The glosses are based on Terrell 1980,4-5.
The breakdown or break up of the sentence, the fragment as a unit of form, 
the absence of syntax, and the freeing of individual words are things that we see 
again and again from about 1920 on in poetry and prose, and it is as if they were 
chosen to prevent any conventional narrative from establishing itself, to mark 
the flow of time and impose a new space of unity. Eliot’s “These fragments 
I have shored against my ruin” appears almost as a declaration of method. This 
view of the nature of things as incomplete and unfinished is one that recognizes 
that the world and the individual are constantly changing and that this poses 
a problem of unity and continuity.
As Synge said to Yeats,“Is not style bom out of the shock of new mate­
rial?” (Yeats 1953: 323). The new material in this case was the new awareness 
of the complexity of mental events that involved a more vivid awareness of 
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consciousness - thinking, memory, fantasy, dreams - and the unconscious, and 
of the amorphousness of experience, such that this experience could not be 
expressed in the old forms. The awareness was accompanied by an inability to 
believe in religions and systematic philosophical interpretations of the world 
and the increasing acceptance of scientific explanations that, because they were 
partial - fragmentary - tentative, subject to revision and impersonal, did not 
answer questions about the value and purpose of human life. The old answers 
no longer answered the old questions. There was a problem of meaning, of 
the way people understood themselves and their world. Poetry - and all art - 
became an “irregular metaphysics.”3
3 Marcel Raymond, De Baudelaire au surréalisme, Paris: José Corti, 152, 11. Richard Black- 
mur’s version of Raymond’s phrase.
The new awareness of the complexity of mental events, the inability to 
believe, and the acceptance of technical, hypothetical and partial scientific 
explanations combined to change (and increase) the feeling of time passing. 
The increased sense of the uniqueness of every object made it harder to connect 
them and created feelings of separation, isolation and alienation - between 
individuals and between the individual and the surrounding world. The fragment 
is a metaphor. As these feelings are inter- and inner connected, it is probably 
incorrect to think of them as separate or distinct. “I know better than to claim 
any completeness for my picture,” says Emerson. “I am a fragment and this 
is a fragment of me,” he declares, significantly in his essay, “Experience” 
(Emerson n.d.: 83). “Only connect” is Forster’s imperative in Howards End 
(1910) and two sentences later he writes “Live in fragments no longer” (Forster 
1953: 174-75). To feel that you and your world are different every moment is 
unsettling, to say the least, and calls into question fixed and static explanations. 
Disconnection is what happens when we are unable to find a relation between 
things. Juxtaposition means putting things side by side without interpreting 
them and is a way of relating them to more other objects than is possible 
using ordinary syntax - this disconnection is the name of new connections, if 
you like. This new material demands new forms, new ideas of unity, wholes 
and relationships. Nietzsche saw the relationship between belief and form. He 
comments in The Twilight of the Idols (1889): “I fear we are not getting rid of 
God because we still believe in grammar.” (Nietzsche 1968: 38).
The first Cubist paintings were the landscapes Braque painted at L’Estaque 
in the summer of 1908. After they were rejected by the Salon d’Automne 
(Matisse was a member of the jury), Kahnweiler included them in a one- 
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man show of Braque’s work in Paris 9-28 November 1908. Louis Vauxcelle, 
reviewing the show (14 November 1908), states, “He despises form, reduces 
everything, sites, figures and houses to geometric complexes, to cubes.” Matisse 
had drawn a sketch for him showing him how Braque’s paintings were built 
up out of “petites cubes.” Matisse later denied the story, but it is probably 
true (Golding 1968: 21; 66-67).4 The first reference to cubism is by Charles 
Morice in an article attacking Braque (16 April 1909) for being “on the whole 
a victim-setting Cubism aside - of an admiration for Cezanne that is too 
exclusive or ill-considered.” The term became common usage in the press from 
April 1911 (Golding 1968: 26; Richardson 1996: 450 n. 2). At the beginning, 
Braque and Picasso hated the word because they thought it did not describe 
what they were doing, but they ended up using it, although they never took it 
very seriously and Picasso once told an interviewer, “There is no such thing 
as cubism” (Richardson 1996: 105).
4 On Matisse, cf. Richardson 1996: 101.
That the initial reaction to Braque’s and Picasso’s paintings was (and for 
many, is) one of rejection, that the early reviews were unfavourable and that 
cubism began as a pejorative term, shows the deep resistance to new art. Frank 
Stella’s black paintings were first exhibited in a show called “Sixteen Amer­
icans” at the Museum of Modem Art in 1959. I read all the reviews. After 
a few cursory remarks on the other painters, every single reviewer spent the 
rest of the review attacking Stella’s paintings. No one liked them. They are 
now recognised as a major event in the history of painting and hang in major 
museums around the world. We resist change and resist self-knowledge even 
more. Very simply, art brings new material to consciousness and most of us find 
this difficult to accommodate. There is nothing harder than self-knowledge.
Golding calls cubism “perhaps the most important and certainly the most 
complete and radical artistic revolution since the Renaissance.” None of the 
changes of the past five hundred years “has so altered the principles, so shaken 
the foundations of Western painting as did Cubism” (Golding 1968: 15). “If 
social and historical factors can for a moment be forgotten, a portrait by Renoir 
will seem closer to a portrait by Raphael than it does to a Cubist portrait by 
Picasso” (Golding 1968: 15). Cubism is “a completely new pictorial language, 
a completely new way of looking at the outside word, a clearly-defined aes­
thetic” (Golding 1968: 17).
The new style was the creation of Braque and Picasso, who were joined 
in 1911 by Juan Gris. Braque and Picasso explored its possibilities for roughly 
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seven years (1908-1914) before moving onto other things, but the style has 
had a lasting impact. Richardson declares: “No question about it, Cubism 
engendered every major modernist movement” Richardson 1996: 106). Objects 
were reduced to stylized abstract shapes and calligraphic signs, to a sum of more 
or less disconnected parts. “In cubism,” said Picasso, “you paint not what you 
see, but what you know is there” (Richardson 1961: 14). Cubism involved an 
abandonment of perspective, what Braque called “la fausse tradition.” He said:
The whole Renaissance tradition is repugnant to me. The hard-and-fast rules of 
perspective which it succeeded in imposing on art were a ghastly mistake, which 
it has taken four centuries to redress; Cezanne and after him Picasso and myself 
can take a lot of credit for this. Scientific perspective is nothing but eye-fooling 
illusionism; it is simply a trick - a bad trick - which makes it impossible for an 
artist to convey a full experience of space, since it forces the objects in a picture 
to disappear away from the beholder instead of bringing them within his reach, as 
painting should. Perspective is too mechanical to allow one to take full possession 
of things. It has its origins in a single viewpoint and never gets away from it.
(Richardson 1961: 10)
Braque and Picasso wanted multiple viewpoints, a single image showing all 
sides or many sides of an object or person simultaneously. They dispensed with 
the vanishing point of traditional perspective so that infinite space is represented 
as finite and this brought the object closer to the viewer. They painted depth 
out of their pictures so that everything is near the surface within reach of the 
beholder. Mass, volume, weight and tactility were their values. Braque said he 
wanted “to make people want to touch what has been painted as well as look at 
it” (Richardson 1996: 105). “This was,” he said, “a means of getting as close to 
the objects as painting allowed. Fragmentation allowed me to establish a spatial 
element as well a spatial movement” (Richardson 1961: 10). Braque generated 
what he called “une espace nouvelle” (Richardson 1996: 47).
Some scholars make a distinction between analytic (1908-1912) and syn­
thetic cubism (1912-1914). The categories were not taken very seriously by 
Braque and Picasso, but were used by Kahnweiler and Gris. Kahnweiler in 
his Der Weg zum Kubismus (1920) describes Picasso as combining or synthe­
sizing different views of an object into a single image (Golding 1968: 114) 
and he records Gris as saying in 1920, “My aim is to create new objects 
which cannot be compared to any object in reality. The difference between an­
alytic and synthetic Cubism lies precisely in this” (qtd. in Golding 1968: 104). 
The change began with the first papier colle. It is worth noting that Braque 
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refers to his method as “fragmentation” and that the painting demonstrates 
a new relation to objects. Showing different perspectives in different points 
of view and all that you know about an object means including imagination 
and memory. Moreover, in view of Eliot’s “These fragments I have shored 
against my ruin” (echoed by Pound in Canto 110/801), it is significant that 
the painters thought of themselves as taking the object apart and putting it 
back together again.
Braque was the first to introduce sign painter’s lettering into his paintings 
in early 1910 and stencilled letters and numerals in the spring of 1911 (Golding 
1968: 92). He explained them as follows: “Again with my usual desire to get 
as near to the reality of things as possible, I started to introduce letters into 
my pictures. These are forms which could not be deformed, because being 
two-dimensional, they existed outside three-dimensional space; their inclusion 
in a picture allowed one to distinguish between objects which were situated in 
space and those which belonged outside space.” Braque also introduced trompe 
I’oeil nails with shadows into three of his 1910 still lifes (Richardson 1961: text, 
plate 13). As the paintings were becoming increasingly abstract this was a way of 
nailing them to reality. For all the radicalness of their views and their readiness 
to break with convention, both Braque and Picasso rejected abstraction and 
there was some polemic on the subject in the early days of cubism. Although 
the painters Gleizes and Metzger in their book, Du Cubisme (1912) declared: 
“The painting imitates nothing and [...] must justify its existence in itself [...] 
Yet we must admit that reminiscences of natural forms cannot be banished, at 
least not yet.” The critic Hourcade called it un-French (1912): “our tradition 
calls for a subject and the originality of Cubism lies precisely in its rejection 
of the anecdote in order to rediscover the subject” and “it is absolutely false to 
say that all these painters are turning their backs on nature and want to produce 
only pure painting” (Golding 1968: 34).
Braque’s family had a house painting business and before he became 
a painter Braque had spent three years as an apprentice learning the trade. 
He could do lettering, marbling, wood-graining and every kind of decorative 
effect and around 1912 he began to use all these techniques in his paintings 
to give them the illusion of reality, but as with the trompe I ’oeil nail and its 
shadow, he wanted both the illusion and the real. The reality of Braque and 
Picasso is psychological, composed of objects and fantasy. “In cubism you 
paint not what you see, but what you know.” Braque showed Picasso how to 
use these techniques and by summer 1912 they were both using wood-graining 
in their paintings. (Richardson 1996: 59-60, 246; Golding 1968: 104). After
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1912 they began putting things other than paint in their paintings. Braque saw 
that despite the radicalness of the changes they had made, they still respected 
the basic medium: paint and in autumn 1912 he began adding sand to his 
paint (a habit he would continue to the end of his life) and he experimented 
with ashes, sawdust, metal filings, coffee grounds, tobacco and grit (Richard­
son 1961: 17). He also dispensed with the traditional varnishing of a finished 
painting. If he wanted a passage to shine, he would mix varnish with the paint 
which gave him the possibility of two different tone values for the same colours 
(as well as different colours).
Early in 1912 Picasso started using Ripolin, a shiny house paint, in his 
pictures, and he made the first collage, incorporating a piece of oil cloth printed 
to look like chair caning into a still life. Braque made the first papier collé at 
Sorgues early September 1912. He had bought in Avignon a roll of wallpaper 
that simulated wood-graining and pasted three pieces into his still life, Fruit Dish 
and Glass. “This discovery,” Richardson (1961: 17-18) comments, “meant that 
Braque was able to cross the traditional barrier between sculpture and painting, 
because his picture became what he and Picasso called a tableau-objet, neither 
mirror-image of nature nor wall decoration, but an autonomous object with an 
identity of its own.” Braque declared: “After having made the [first] papier 
collé, I felt a great shock, and it was an even greater shock for Picasso when 
I showed it to him” (Richardson 1996: 249). This is the resistance of the artist, 
who is after all like us in so many ways, to the new, which is why the genuinely 
new is so difficult and so rare. As Golding (1968: 180) emphasizes, “what is 
most remarkable is that in the period before the war, of the Cubist painters, only 
Picasso, Braque and Gris made any extensive use of collage and papier collé.” 
The new was a frontier the others could not cross.
According to Richardson (1996), until Braque showed him Fruit Dish and 
Glass, Picasso had not realized the consequences of his piece of oilcloth with 
the chair canning:
An object could now be presented by some foreign element that was an equivalent, 
as opposed to an image, of itself. A piece of newspaper, for instance, could stand 
for a newspaper; it could also signify anything else the artist wanted it to signify. 
Drawing could then function simultaneously and independently to indicate volume 
and integrate the real element (the piece of newspaper or wallpaper) into the com­
position. Furthermore, by enabling color to function independently of form, papier 
collé made it easier for Picasso and Braque to introduce positive color into a cubist 
composition. And since scissors make for a sharper edge than a paintbrush, they 
could now achieve much sharper contrasts of color, tone and texture.
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Forty years later when Picasso saw Fruit Dish and Glass in Douglas Cooper’s 
collection he exclaimed: “Le Salaud. He waited until my back was turned. 
(Cooper’s chateau was not far from Avignon.) I’ll stop at that wallpaper shop 
and see what they have left.” The story shows not only the rivalry of the two 
painters, but also that the shock and force of the new was still present.
Braque said papier colle gave him “a kind of certainty” and enabled him 
to “ground” things. He had also talked of keeping “certitudes,” certainties, 
a sufficient number of realistic elements in his paintings so that viewers would 
know where they were. By early 1913, Picasso had put a postage stamp in 
a painting and was using strips of cloth, pieces of paper and occasionally bits of 
tin or zinc foil. Gris glued a small fragment of mirror to his Le Lavabo (1913) 
(Richardson 1996: 249; Golding 1968: 104). The idea of collage (including 
papier colle) is that of incorporating already existing objects with their own 
purposes into a work of art such that they both represent themselves and function 
as metaphors. They stand for the real, emphasizing the work’s material existence 
at the same time manifesting its status as a work of imagination.
The poets began around this time to put materials of different kinds into 
their poems. They wrote about objects in new ways and wanted to get closer 
to them. Events and things were seen in a different perspective related to the 
rejection of grammar. There is no doubt in my mind that “The Man with 
the Blue Guitar” (1937), despite Stevens’s denials, refers to Picasso’s “The 
Old Guitar Player” and that he is thinking in the poem about the nature of 
representation in Picasso’s paintings and the unity of the person. Section XV 
begins: “Is this picture of Picasso’s, this hoard /of destructions,” “a picture 
of ourselves ...?” Stevens has borrowed Picasso’s statement that a picture is 
a “hoard of destructions” (Rehder 1988: 150-51; 311-12, n. 10). Quotation is 
the technique that allows poets to come closest to the painters’ collages and 
The Waste Land is the work that establishes it in poetry. Facts of different kinds 
(historical, scientific), depending on how they are used, and the use of foreign 
languages can also be said to be analogous to the various foreign elements 
(newspaper, wallpaper, sand) that the painters used.
Eliot quotes from a deliberately heterogeneous variety of texts - poems, 
plays, scripture, autobiography, opera and popular songs. He quotes in six 
foreign languages: Latin, Greek, Italian, German, French and Sanskrit as well 
as English. He quotes Augustine and the Buddha in translation. Moreover, he 
sometimes quotes without marking it as a quotation and often paraphrases, 
echoes or rearranges his source. He includes many onomatopoetic words. He 
also deliberately changes the quality of his own language in passages that are 
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sometimes almost pastiche or imitation, and which can be seen as comparable 
to the painted wood-graining of Braque and Picasso. Eliot learned about the 
imitation of other styles from the instalments of Ulysses published in The 
Little Review (March 1918 to December 1920) (Ellmann 1959: 456). Quotation 
allowed the poets to refer to different past times, which the painters could 
not do so easily.
Pound in The Cantos like Eliot quotes from a great variety of sources 
in many languages, but is more radical than Eliot in trimming his citations, 
sometimes to a single word, and like Eliot he includes a variety of voices and 
frequently changes the tone and quality of his own language. He goes further 
than Eliot in that he includes more visual elements: there are framed signs 
(34/171, 71/418), and Canto 22/103 shows a framed sign with a black dot as 
a nail and the twine holding it up which reminds us of the trompe I 'oeil nails 
of Braque and Picasso and their inclusion of signs and fragments of news­
paper. Canto 75 gives the score of a piece of music. He arranges letters as 
notes on a scale in 82/545 and imitates Renaissance musical notation in 91/630. 
There are Egyptian hieroglyphics (93/643, 646, 647, 651), the crudely writ­
ten name of the Persian poet Firdausi in Persian script (77/494), hieroglyphic 
drawings (97/700, 701, 702) and he puts a Maltese cross in the margin of 
Canto 42/210 to imitate the sealing of a document. Pound, unlike Eliot, uses 
letters and different kinds of documents. The most important visual element 
is the Chinese characters that begin in Canto 34/171 and become increasingly 
numerous. Pound asked for more characters to be added to the later cantos, 
but New Directions and Faber ignored his requests because they would be 
too expensive.
The Cantos is a poem without a plan, or rather, Pound keeps changing his 
mind about the plan. He writes to Felix Schelling (8 July 1922): “Perhaps as the 
poem goes on I shall be able to make various things clearer [...] I hope, heaven 
help me, to bring them [“the colours or elements” he wants for the poem] into 
some sort of design or architecture later” (Pound 1971: 180). This was before 
the publication of the first set of thirty in 1930, even so the idea of the form 
coming later is very strange. However, in February 1939, after the publication 
of 51 cantos, roughly half the poem, he writes to Herbert Creekmore: “As to 
the form of The Cantos: All I can say or pray is: wait till its there. I mean wait 
till I get ’em written and then if it don’t show, I will start exegesis. I haven’t 
an Aquinas-map, Aquinas NOT valid now” (Pound 1971: 323). It is as if not 
being able to see the world as an interpreted whole, he could not decide on 
the order of his poem.
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The Cantos are a search for form. The poem’s order is improvised. Pound 
made it up as he went along; however, at the end, he declares: “And I am not 
a demigod, /1 cannot make it cohere” (106/816). He is like Eliot at the end of 
The Waste Land surrounded by ruins. He could not find the form of his own life. 
An “Aquinas-map” was his aspiration - a systematic, complete and logically- 
connected interpretation of the nature of things, but there is neither a religion 
nor a philosophy in which Pound could believe that could provide such an 
interpretation. Instead there are intermittently recurring would-be redeeming 
moments of illumination that are between moments of vivid perception and 
religious experience. The Commedia remained an ideal, but he could not achieve 
Dante’s integration and so was left with disconnected bits and pieces.
The Cantos are the autobiography of a poet who had a profound resis­
tance to self-analysis. This is one reason for the radical fragmentation and 
disconnection of the poem. That it is an autobiography is one reason why 
Pound did not settle on any particular plan. He needed to keep the poem 
open to whatever happened to him next. Although Pound constantly but ir­
regularly uses the first person and describes episodes from his own life, most 
of the poem is composed of other peoples’ stories told by a story teller with 
a deep resistance to narrative who employs a variety of techniques to make 
his stories discontinuous and incomplete. He keeps changing stories so as to 
avoid self-revelation.
Pound justifies this radical disconnectedness in an article on obscurity in 
the New Review (August-September-October 1931): “Certain kinds of depth are 
obtainable only I suppose with a concision that produces an apparent obscurity. 
The test is probably: precision. If the phrase is exact the obscurity grows steadily 
less with increased attention of the reader” (Stock 1970: 376). It is significant 
that Pound says “the phrase” instead of “the sentence.” To commit himself 
to a complete sentence or sustained narrative is too much like self-revelation. 
He shortens his phrases for greater immediacy and to hide himself - often, 
I believe, from himself. He focuses on objects and their qualities.
In one of the three cantos that he wrote and published in 1912 before 
starting on the present cantos, Pound addresses Robert Browning: “say I take 
your whole bag of tricks and say the thing’s an art form:”
Your Sordello, and that the modem world
Needs such a rag-bag to stuff all its thought in,
Say that I dump my catch, shiny and silvery
As fresh sardines slapping and slipping on the margin of cobbles?
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Pound suggests these lines in a preface to Selected Cantos (1966) as perhaps the 
best introduction to the poem, clearly equating a particular view of the world 
with a particular literary form (qtd. in Alexander 1979: 135). The idea is that the 
world is not an ordered or coherent whole, that its objects are thrown together 
randomly, willy-nilly, stuffed like rags in a bag or dumped like fish on the 
pavement, that the only form that accurately represents it is that of the rag-bag, 
one that contains a variety of disconnected, fragmentary, disparate materials. 
This is the antithesis of “an Aquinas-map.” To which may be compared Aaron 
Copland’s statement that “Sibelius does not live in a 20th-century world. He 
is a hangover from the 1890’s [...] his ruminations on life and man are [...] 
conclusions arrived at from old-fashioned premises, premises that no longer 
hold water in our time” - another call for new forms appropriate to the new 
circumstances (Copland 1968: 39).
Valéry, considering what he terms “La Crise de l’esprit,” asks: “Et de quoi 
était fait ce désordre de notre Europe mentale? - De la libre coexistence dans 
tous les esprits cultivés des idées les plus dissembles, des principes de vie 
et de connaissance les plus opposés. C’est là ce qui caractérise une époque 
moderne." Writing in 1919, between the publication of Pound’s draft canto 
with the metaphor of the rag-bag (1912) and The Waste Land (1922), he sees 
the culture as defined by being composed of disparate, unrelated elements - 
fragments. He shares Pound’s idea of the rag-bag. Not only the culture, but its 
individual works (regardless of form) are composed of fragments:
Dans tel livre de cette époque - et non des plus mediocre - on trouve, sans aucun 
effort: - une influence des ballets russes, un peu du style sombre de Pascal, -- 
beaucoup d’impressions du type Goncourt, - quelque chose de Nietzsche, - quelque 
chose de Rimbaud, - certains effets dus à la fréquentation de peintres, et parfois le 
ton des publications scientifiques, -le tout perfumé d’un je ne sais pas britainnique 
difficile à doser.
And he adds that within the components of this mixture one will find many 
other elements (Valéry 1957: 991-92).
Cubism is a major change in art, but it is part of another major change, 
probably equally important, if not more so: abstraction. Cubism involved ab­
straction and many of the subjects of Braque’s and Picasso’s 1910-11 paintings 
are very difficult to make out, even when the titles provide a clue, but, as the 
titles demonstrate, neither painter wanted to forsake the real world. Kandin­
sky did. He painted what he considered the first completely “non-objective 
oil painting” (location now unknown) in 1911: "Bild mit Kreis" (Roethel and
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Benjamin 1982: 38, 391). Thereafter, his best works are abstractions. What 
is the subject of an abstract painting? One answer is: paint - colour, texture, 
form. Another answer is: amorphous feelings. Abstractions may be said to be 
an attempt to get to the origins of things, to primitive, unorganized feelings. 
Kandinsky’s own answer is informative. He declares in Uber das Geistige in 
der Kunst (Concerning the Spiritual [or Intellectual] in Art, 1911):
When religion, science and morality are shaken, the last two by the strong hand 
of Nietzsche, and when outer supports threaten to fall, man turns his gaze from 
externals in on himself. Literature, music and art are the first and most sensitive 
spheres in which this spiritual [intellectual] revolution makes itself felt.
(Kandinsky 1977: 14)
The shaking was also done by Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau and 
others. For Kandinsky, as for Pound, the old world-view is no longer valid 
and a new one must be created. Abstract paintings represent the inward gaze. 
The painter paints the inner not the outer world. The work of the Dada group 
that met in the Café Voltaire in Zurich in 1916, and André Breton - the ideas 
set forth in the two surrealist manifestos (1924, 1930) and Qu’est-ce que le 
surrealisme? (1934) - and the work of the artists who rallied to his ideas, were 
also efforts to get closer to the stream of consciousness and the unconscious 
by rejecting the old conventions.
During this same period (1907-1912), Schoenberg composed a series of 
works - the Three Piano Pieces, Op. 11 (1909), Das Buch der hangenden 
Garten, Op. 15 (1908-1909), Five Orchestral Pieces, Op. 16 (1909), Er- 
wartung, Op. 17 (1909) and Pierrot lunaire, Op. 21 (1912) - that negated 
all the established principles of musical structure of the last three hundred 
years, and that, after an eight-year period of silence (1915-1923), enabled him 
to invent an entirely new musical language. Dissonance is not resolved, the 
form is obscure and not meant to be grasped, and there is no harmony in the old 
sense - these are all statements with implied meaning about the nature of things.
The work of Lorine Niedecker (1903-1970), a major American poet who 
has been largely overlooked, is a particularly interesting example of change of 
form, although she is trying to put things back together. Known for her very 
short lyrics, she writes to Cid Corman (14 February 1968):
I’ve been going thru a bad time - in one moment (winter) I’d have thrown over all 
my life (if one can) years of clean-cut, concise short poem manner for “something 
else” (still don’t know what to call it). (Niedecker 1986: 153) 
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The letter is dated nine months before the publication of North Central (1968), 
her third book that included her first five long poems: “Lake Superior,” “Traces 
of Living Things,” “My Life by Water,” “Paean to Place” and “Wintergreen 
Ridge” - and after the composition of the first two poems. Even then she was 
still in a state of indecision. That Niedecker thinks of “My Life by Water” as 
a longish poem gives an idea of her sense of scale. Consisting of nine three- 
line stanzas with very short lines (46 words), it is only just over a page in 
length. She wrote three more long poems: “Thomas Jefferson,” “His Carpets 
Flowered” (on William Morris) and “Darwin.” Four of the first five are clearly 
autobiographical. The last three are biographical, about other people, but, in 
one sense, the form is the same, that of the individual human life, which is 
conceived as a series of unique moments. This is the form of Wordsworth’s 
autobiographical poem and a definition of what it means to be an individual.
There are a few glimpses in Niedecker’s surviving letters of her thinking 
about this major change of form. She tells Corman (18 February 1962) that 
he and another poet friend:
Have thrown off the shackles of the sentence and the wide melody. For me the 
sentence lies in wait - all those prepositions and connectives - like an early spring 
flood. A good thing my follow-up feeling has always been condense, condense.
(Niedecker 1986: 33)
The sentence is “the wide melody,” a spreading, overwhelming flood pushing 
out the boundaries of the poem such that she must condense to impose limits, 
boundaries, and make it shorter and clean-cut. For Niedecker the sentence is 
a long form. Stanzas are not enough. All a poem’s words must be within the 
magnetic field of the sentence’s grammar.
Seven months before the letter to Corman about “something else,” she 
is thinking about changing, but searching without finding. She writes to her 
neighbour, Gail Roub (20 June 1967):
Much taken up with how to define a way of writing poetry which is not Imagist 
nor Objectivist fundamentally nor Surrealism alone -[...] I loosely called it “re­
flections” or as I think it over now, reflective, maybe. The basis is direct and clear 
- what has been seen or heard, etc. [...]- but something gets in, overlays all that 
to make a state of consciousness.
Imagist is Pound, Objectivist is Zukofsky. Zukofsky was a former lover and 
one of her closest friends, Pound is the poet he admired the most. Her concern 
at the start is to separate herself from what others are doing. She needs to be 
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independent and has an instinct about what direction to take. Niedecker’s early 
poems show her experimenting with the ideas and techniques of surrealism. 
She uses the three terms as a kind of shorthand to denote what she does not 
want. She has her own purposes and is determined to go her own way.
The tendency of all so-called imagist poetry, Pound’s imperatives and 
Zukofsky’s theories, is to a minimal presentation of a thing seen. It is a way of 
avoiding the sentimental, a discipline for managing emotion. Niedecker wants 
the object, but she also needs the context of its perception and what the mind 
does to make it meaningful. She begins with “the basis,” “direct and clear,” 
but this is finally not enough - she needs the something that “gets in,” that 
“overlays all,” the perceiver’s “state of consciousness,” mood, associations, 
reflections. Unlike Pound and Zukofsky, who want to remove the perceiver and 
focus on the object, Niedecker wants to include the state of mind of the act 
of perception, but to do so without long descriptions of thinking or feeling. 
She does this by building sequences, as a series of images necessarily brings 
us closer to the process of seeing and forces us to consider the relationships 
between objects and their context. “I used to feel,” she tells Roub in 1967, “that 
I was goofing off unless I held only to the hard, clear image, the thing you could 
put your hand on but now I dare do this reflection” (Roub 1996: 86). Meaning 
demands longer, more comprehensive structures, like sentences. Although she 
is part of the tradition of the long poem of fragments inaugurated by The Waste 
Land, Niedecker wants to integrate her fragments. Like the Cubist painters, she 
has no interest in “metaphysical speculations.” Unlike Pound and Eliot, she 
can believe in the world as it is; scientific explanations however incomplete 
are enough. She is perhaps unique among major poets in being able to accept 
without difficulty a materialistic interpretation of the world.
“Thomas Jefferson” and “Darwin” are poems that try to establish how their 
protagonists found meaning in their lives. With Jefferson she is interested in 
his sense of beauty, his abilities as an architect, his curiosity about the world 
and his relations with other people. His politics are taken for granted. The work 
is composed of nineteen short poems, usually of two or three stanzas and very 
short lines. Three sections (II, III and XIX) are of short three-line stanzas and 
four (VIII, X, XII, XIV) are of two-line stanzas, the other twelve each have 
their own form. This variety of forms and multiplicity of sections indicates, 
I believe, a recognition of the uniqueness of each moment of experience and 
the problematic nature of any statement about unity of character. The details of 
Jefferson’s life - and small details are of the greatest importance in these small 
poems - are drawn, for the most part, from Jefferson’s letters. She abridges, 
MEANING AND CHANGE OF FORM: ELIOT, POUND AND NIEDECKER 39
condenses and paraphrases Jefferson in the seven poems in the first person. 
The rest are in the third person (VI can be seen as combining the two). The 
alternation between I and he means that we see Jefferson both from the inside 
and the outside. (Multiple perspectives are a characteristic of Braque’s and 
Picasso’s cubist paintings, and their 1911 portraits show the subject as a sum 
of many parts).
The result is a series of more or less self-contained short poems that are 
neither only images nor anecdotes and not exactly moments. Four and sixteen, 
for example, are slightly out of time, or, rather, cannot be assigned to any 
specific time. Each poem is a new beginning - this is a major advantage of 
a longer poem in sections - a new attempt to show Jefferson as a person, not 
trying to summarize him as a whole, but considering his many-sided character 
one or two facets at a time. Consequently, the sum is greater than the parts 
and presents us with the form of a human life that although all of a piece, is, 
within limits, open to change, heterogeneous, contradictory, amorphous, and in 
a state of tension and process. The form of “Thomas Jefferson” is essentially 
that of Wordsworth’s autobiographical poem, except that Wordsworth feels the 
need to write connecting passages where Niedecker condenses and deliberately 
leaves spaces between the units and avoids trying to impose a single form. 
Wordsworth in all the major MSS of his long poem also leaves spaces between 
verse paragraphs. Wordsworth’s need to analyze in order to understand his 
feelings causes him to describe at length and mark the nuances. Niedecker 
wants to denote them by a single word, phrase, image or metaphor. She works 
to a different rigour. Too many words get in the way.
The fourth poem is a good example:
Latin and Greek 
my tools 
to understand 
humanity
I rode horse
away from a monarch 
to an enchanting
philosophy (Niedecker 2002: 276)
Niedecker maintains a nice balance between a minimal definiteness: Latin, 
Greek, tools and monarch and the abstract generality of understand, humanity 
and enchanting philosophy. The first stanza is a statement, the second, an image. 
The stanzas end with rhyming abstractions. They are not connected and anyone 
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who knows anything about Jefferson knows that his philosophy was that of 
the Declaration of Independence’s “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” 
the Bill of Rights and a view of rural life that owed something perhaps to 
the classics, but probably more to Rousseau. Jefferson’s heroes were Bacon, 
Locke and Newton, not Plato and Aristotle. He studied Latin and Greek like 
most educated men of his time, but he thought “Their acquisition should be the 
occupation of our early years only” and they would certainly not be useful “to 
all men” (Jefferson 1984: 1423-24). Niedecker constructs her own Jefferson.
Latin and Greek as “tools” remind us of Jefferson’s practical side and his 
skills as a handyman and inventor. Their specificity is set against the abstract 
generality of “understanding humanity” in the same way that “I rode horse / 
away from a monarch” is set against “an enchanting philosophy.” “I rode horse” 
is old fashioned. Niedecker makes “away from” into a destination. “Enchanting” 
suggests the delight, beauty and temptation of philosophy, almost as if Jefferson 
were under a spell. She converts mental events into physical metaphors (tools, 
rode, horse) and transfers the action to an abstract never-never land.
Niedecker does not worry about connection. The individual parts of 
“Thomas Jefferson” (and most of her longer poems) are only loosely con­
nected. The sequence matters, but it is a personal rather than a necessary order, 
psychological, if one likes, rather than any other kind of logic. “Thomas Jeffer­
son” is vaguely chronological, if one overlooks the composite nature of most 
of the parts, “Darwin” is emphatically not. Eliot in The Waste Land juxtaposes 
different kinds of material, different languages, different textures, Niedecker 
rarely does this. She puts things side by side not for simple contrasts or to break 
the narrative in any obvious way, but because she thinks the relation of the parts 
is self-evident. This is her economy, her Occam’s razor. The sections are loosely 
connected and composite because she believes in the irregularity and angular­
ity of life, and the fluidity of consciousness. She has found her new forms in 
the stream of consciousness. She writes longer poems in order to get more 
ideas into them, more meaning. “Thomas Jefferson” is not like Wordsworth’s 
autobiographical poem composed of moments that are located in space and 
time. Many of them refer to or imply several different times and places. When 
this happens in Wordsworth or Proust, the events are connected by memory. 
There is no suggestion of this in Niedecker. The individual units are collages. 
The citations can be compared to the newspaper and wallpaper pasted into their 
paintings by Braque and Picasso. Her units assemble and compact different mo­
ments. They resemble Braque’s new spaces. She has Braque’s desire to touch, 
to put her hand on things. Like Wordsworth, she writes longer poems in order 
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to include many moments and reflect on their relationship, and on the form of 
a human life as a whole. Unlike Wordsworth, in her autobiographical poems 
she is not worried about wholeness and does not feel divided, and in the poems 
about others, that all the events belong to one person is enough to unify them.
Niedecker’s “Darwin” differs from “Thomas Jefferson” in that it confronts 
Darwin’s major ideas and in that she uses the same stanza form throughout: 
three stair-step lines, the second inset from the first, the third, from the second 
and a fourth line indented half-way between the first and second. This fourth 
line usually establishes some kind of conclusion and the form creates a definite 
rhythm for the poem as a whole. Most of the specific events mentioned occurred 
on Darwin’s around the world voyage on H.M.S. Beagle (1831-1836).
This is the fifth and final section:
I remember, he said
those tropical nights at sea -
we sat and talked 
on the booms
Tierra del Fuego’s 
shining glaciers translucent 
blue clear down
(almost) to the indigo sea
(By the way Carlyle
thought it was most ridiculous
anyone should care
whether a glacier
moves a little quicker 
or a little slower
or moved at all)
Darwin
sailed out
of Good Success Bay 
to carcass - 
conclusions -
the universe
not built by brute force
but designed by laws
The details left
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to the workings of chance
'Let each man hope
and believe
what he can’ (Niedecker 2002: 298-99)
Niedecker has spliced together part of Darwin’s letter of 1861 or 1862 to 
P. G. King, who had been a midshipman on the Beagle', “the remembrance of 
old days when we used to sit and talk on the booms will always to the day of 
my death, make me glad to hear of your happiness and prosperity” and King’s 
comments to Francis Darwin on the pleasure his father used to take “pointing 
out to me as a youngster the delights of tropical nights” (Darwin F. 1958: 134).
The language describing the Tierra del Fuego glaciers appears to be 
Niedecker’s own elaboration of Darwin’s. He writes in The Voyage of the 
Beagle'.
In many parts, magnificent glaciers extend from the mountain side to the water’s 
edge. It is scarcely possible to imagine anything more beautiful than the beryl-like 
blue of these glaciers, and especially as contrasted with the dead white of the upper 
expanse of snow. (Darwin 1962: 225)
Beryl, according to the Shorter Oxford, is “a transparent precious stone of 
a pale-green colour passing into light blue” and as a colour, “pale sea-green” 
(1831). Darwin marks the contrast between the beryl-blue glaciers and “the 
dead white” snow, Niedecker, between the “translucent / blue” glaciers and 
“the indigo sea.” Shining goes with translucent and both are reinforced by 
clear. The parenthetical almost is a nice bit of imaginary accuracy and causes 
the description to seem more authentic.
The Carlyle anecdote is borrowed from Darwin’s autobiography. He met 
him several times and writes: “His mind seemed to me a very narrow one; 
even if all branches of science, which he despised, are excluded.” “He thought 
it a most ridiculous thing that any one should care whether a glacier moved 
a little quicker or a little slower, or moved at all.” Niedecker omits Darwin’s 
next sentence: “As far as I could judge I never met a man with a mind so ill 
adapted for scientific research” (Darwin C. 1958: 112-14). Carlyle stands for 
the resistance to a scientific view of the world, where by implication the smallest 
details are significant, the “(almost)” blue and the glacier’s “little quicker / or 
a little slower.” Darwin was a master of detail, rigorous and obsessive. “I am 
a complete millionaire in odd and curious facts,” he told Hooker in 1864 (Dar­
win F. 1958: 281). His theories were based on his meticulous collection of 
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materials and experiments. They are his “carcass-conclusions.” Niedecker tells 
the story of the African cat carcass at the end of section IV. She has Darwin 
writing to Lyell. Actually the letter was to his second cousin, W. D. Fox (25 
January 1841): “Don’t forget if your half-bred African cat should die, that 
I would be very much obliged for its carcase sent up in a little hamper for 
skeleton” (Darwin 1986: 2. 279). She condenses and smoothes the sentence. 
Good Success Bay is at the tip of Tierra del Fuego. The Beagle anchored there 
on 17 December 1832.
Niedecker ends the poem with a comprehensive statement on the nature of 
the universe that she takes from Darwin’s letter to Asa Gray (22 May 1860). 
Darwin says that “with respect to the theological view of the question:”
This is always painful to me. I am bewildered. I had no intention to write atheisti- 
cally. But I own that I cannot see as plainly as others do, and as I should wish to do, 
evidence of design and beneficence on all sides of us. There seems to me too much 
misery in the world. I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent 
God would have designedly created the Ichneumonidae with the express purpose 
of feeding within the living bodies of caterpillars, or that a cat should play with 
mice. Not believing this, I see no necessity in the belief that the eye was expressly 
designed.
The standard argument for design had been put forward in his Natural Theology 
(1802) by Paley. His most famous example was that the human eye was too 
complicated to be the result of chance. Paley’s works were set for Darwin’s 
final examinations at Cambridge.
Darwin goes on to say:
On the other hand, I cannot anyhow be contented to view this wonderful universe, 
and especially the nature of man, and to conclude that everything is the result of 
brute force. I am inclined to look at everything as resulting from designed laws, 
with the details, whether good or bad, left to the working out of what we may call 
chance. Not that this notion at all satisfies me. I feel most deeply that the subject is 
too profound for the human intellect. A dog might as well speculate on the mind of 
Newton. Let each man hope and believe what he can. (Darwin F. 1958: 249)
Niedecker has simplified and condensed Darwin’s statements, paring it down to 
its essentials, leaving out his hesitations and doubts, and his further statement 
that his views are “not at all necessarily atheistical” because it can be argued 
that the laws may have been designed this way by “an omniscient Creator.” 
Niedecker gives us a straight forward materialistic view. Her reformulation of 
Darwin is deft and subtle. The universe - this goes way beyond The Origin 
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of Species - is an ordered unity. Brute force is strange as an alternative to 
the six days of creation in Genesis. This would appear to be random force, 
force without laws. “[DJesigned by laws / the details left / to the workings 
of chance” affirms the order without saying anything about the origin of the 
laws. Workings suggests deliberation and purpose, “workings of chance” builds 
a certain amount of unpredictability into the inevitability of laws, structure 
without determinism, with a contingent freedom and variety. At the end of the 
poem, belief is free and Niedecker sees clearly its relation to hope. She (and 
Darwin) leave it up to the individual. By implication the ready made answers 
of religion and philosophy are set aside. Each person does the best they can in 
responding to the difficulties of understanding the world.
Between 1908 and 1922 there are major developments in art, music and 
literature that radically change the nature of representation. The fragment be­
comes a form. Narratives are discontinuous or held together in new ways. 
There is a new sense of what constitutes a whole. These events are a result 
of a change in the way of apprehending the world. The First World War was 
not, as is sometimes said, a primary cause, rather a symptom. If we think about 
causes, the most obvious major change before this is the introduction of the 
idea of quanta into physics. “In writing the history of the intellectual world,” 
Louis de Broglie declares, “there have been few upheavals comparable to this” 
(Broglie 1953: 24). Braque, Picasso and Gris “were intent on interpreting the 
world in new pictorial terms,” which were, as Golding puts it, “anti-naturalistic 
but representational.” “Their vision,” he states, “was untouched by any liter­
ary or romantic considerations, and they ignored all forms of metaphysical 
speculation” (Golding 1968: 177). Every view of the world, however, makes 
assumptions about the nature of things, and although these assumptions are 
often half-conscious or unconscious, they enter into the determination of the 
form of a work of art.
The painting for Braque is an independent, untranslatable object. “To ex­
plain away the mystery of a great painting - if such a feat were possible - 
would do irreparable harm, for whenever you explain or define something you 
substitute the explanation or definition for the real thing.” “You see,” he told 
Richardson, “I have made a great discovery: I no longer believe in anything. 
Objects do not exist for me except in so far as a rapport exists between them and 
myself. In other words, it is not objects that matter to me, but what is between 
them: it is this ‘in-between’ that is the real subject of my pictures” (Richardson 
1961: 23-24). This is another way of saying that he paints his experience, his 
consciousness. He looks for “poetry” in art, a quality which he says cannot be 
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defined. He finds in the process of painting and the completed object a “state 
of harmony between things and oneself’ - a state of mind he himself creates, 
personal and which cannot be shared. For Braque, the painting explains nothing.
The thirteen years before Braque painted the first Cubist picture saw the 
beginning of a revolution in physics, the most important change in the way 
scientists viewed the physical world since Newton’s Principia (1687). The 
equation that Planck wrote for black-body radiation in 1900 marks the end of 
classical physics as established by Newton. This is the radiation emitted by 
a body, regardless of its composition, that absorbs all the radiation it receives 
(and reflects none). Planck had wanted to show that the second law of thermody­
namics that entropy increases is an absolute, instead he had to use Boltzmann’s 
statistical interpretation of that law: that it is extremely probable, but not abso­
lutely certain. Then, in order to make his formula fit the experimental data, he 
also had to assume, contrary to the well-established wave theory of light, that 
energy was discontinuous and moved in small, discrete, intermittent bursts that 
he named “quanta.” At first Planck did not understand the full consequences of 
his theory and later spent many years trying to undo its revolutionary character. 
The person who saw its consequences most clearly was Einstein, then a clerk 
in the Swiss Patent Office in Bern: “All my attempts [...] to adapt the theoret­
ical foundation of physics to this knowledge failed completely. It was as if the 
ground had been pulled out from under one, with no firm foundation to be seen 
anywhere, upon which one could have built” (Pais 1986: 130).5
5 On Planck, see Cline 1987: 31-63; Broglie 1953: 99-121; Pais 1986: 129-134.
Planck’s equation is one of a series of discoveries concerning different 
types of radiation (x-rays, 1895; radioactivity, 1896; alpha and beta rays, 1899; 
gamma rays, 1900; the photoelectric effect, 1905) that showed the instabilities 
of matter and demanded a re-examination of its basic structure. The electron was 
found in 1887/1899, the atomic nucleus, in 1911. These discoveries showed that 
matter is composed of very small atomic and subatomic particles, not exactly 
fragments, as the particles were related by their energies, but the physicists took 
the world apart in a way analogous to the Cubist painters. The direction of their 
research, like those of the artists, was inward. Quantum physics suggests that 
things are discontinuous. At this same time, Freud was beginning his study of 
invisible forces. The Interpretation of Dreams was published in 1899. Dada and 
surrealism are clearly a response to Freud’s work.
Pais states: “The era of the old quantum mechanics [1900-1925] [...] 
constitutes the most protracted revolutionary period in modem science.” Six 
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theoretical papers appeared that were revolutionary in the sense “that they 
contain at least one theoretical step which (whether the [...] authors knew it 
then or not) could not be justified at the time of writing” and where it “was not 
yet clear which parts” of the older physics could be reintegrated in a new frame:
Planck’s [...] discovery of the quantum theory (1900); Einstein’s on the light 
quantum (1905); Bohr’s on the hydrogen atom (1913); Bose’s on what came to be 
called quantum statistics (1924); Heisenberg’s on what came to be known as matrix 
mechanics (1925); and Schroedinger’s on wave mechanics (1926).
“The introduction of probability in the sense of quantum mechanics - that is, 
probability as an inherent feature of fundamental physical law - may well be,” 
Pais writes (in 1986), “the most drastic scientific change yet effected in the 20th 
century.” For him, this revolution comes to an end in 1927 with Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle and Bohr’s idea of complementarity (Pais 1986: 250-51). 
The interest in surrealism tends to fade after this time and the period of radical 
change in literary form comes to an end. The Sound and the Fury is published 
in 1929, As I Lay Dying, 1930 and Absalom, Absalom, 1936, although it can 
be argued that everything is already there in Ulysses (1922) and Manhattan 
Transfer (1925). Heisenberg shows that the presence of the observer limits 
what can be known (The Sound and the Fury presents an interesting analogue), 
and Bohr believes that it is necessary to accept the wave/quantum duality, to 
live with two irreconcilable ways of looking at the same thing. Both ideas can 
be used metaphorically to indicate some of the problems that authors have with 
first person narrators after Proust.
Bertrand Russell, who was very aware of the revolution in physics, sees 
a change in the practice of philosophy at this time. The new philosophy which 
he calls “the philosophy of logical analysis” or “modem analytical empiricism” 
(now usually shortened to “analytic philosophy”) “differs from that of Locke, 
Berkeley and Hume by its incorporation of mathematics and development 
of a powerful logical technique” such that some of its answers have “the 
quality of science.” “It has the advantage as compared with the philosophies 
of the system-builders, of being able to tackle its problems one at a time, 
instead of having to invent at one stroke a block theory of the whole universe. 
Its methods in this respect resemble those of science” (Russell 1945: 834). 
Problems “one at a time” means that it works on fragments. As with the 
new painting, new music and new physics, there is a need to re-establish the 
fundamentals of the subject. This re-thinking can be approximately dated from 
Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics (1903) which sets out to prove that 
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“pure mathematics deals exclusively with concepts definable in terms of a very 
small number of fundamental logical concepts, and that all its propositions 
are deductible from a very small number of fundamental logical principles” 
(Russell 1903: xv). Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica that tries to 
elaborate a formal demonstration of these ideas (the title indicates its ambition) 
is published in 1910. Russell attempts to put mathematics (and philosophy) 
on a new basis, solider and more rigorous, and his logic is, in a sense, a new 
language. He summarizes the consequences of the new physics for philosophy 
in The Analysis of Matter (1927).
Form has a meaning, even if we cannot say very much about it. The Waste 
Land is a poem of fragments, deliberately disconnected and juxtaposed. What 
Eliot says about the state of European culture, the failure of communication 
and relationships, the isolation of the individual, and the meaningless of the 
individual life is unambiguous and helps us to understand the form. The struc­
ture and techniques imply certain ideas and what the words say guides the 
reader in interpreting the meaning of the form, although there is only a very 
limited amount in most cases that can be said. The structure, techniques and 
disorder of The Cantos and Pound’s inability to finish tell a similar story. When 
Schoenberg was hoping Oscar Levant would give the first performance of his 
Piano Concerto, Op. 42 (1942), he jotted down “a few explanatory phrases” to 
help Levant approach the work’s four movements:
Life was easy
Suddenly hatred broke out
A grave situation was created
But life goes on
I suspect that few if any listeners would be able to give such a succinct account 
unprompted. MacDonald, who tells the story, calls it “a fair summary of the 
Concerto’s emotional progression” and goes on to say that anyone who explores 
Schoenberg’s output in depth “becomes aware that a very large proportion of 
his works, from all periods of his career, seem to embody different forms of the 
same experiential pattern” (MacDonald 1976: 217-18). The example suggests 
the limited amount of interpretation that is possible, as well as the idea that 
all of an artist’s works have the unity of his experience. What else does an 
artist have except his experience?
Schoenberg writes: “There is only one greatest goal toward which the artist 
strives: to express himself.” He did not invent a new music for the sake of 
change. “I personally hate to be called a revolutionary, which I am not. What
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1 did was neither revolutionary nor anarchy.” “I am a conservative who was 
forced to become a radical” (Machlis 1982: 137; 243). Pais (1986: 131-32) 
writes that he is struck “by the number of middle-aged men” who played major 
roles in the quantum revolution. “They were not young Turks out to set the 
world on fire, but rather seasoned pros, systematically extending and refining 
work done by their experimentalist predecessors. Revolution was not on their 
minds, it was alien to them.” Picasso told Zervos: “When we invented cubism, 
we had no intention whatever of inventing cubism. We simply wanted to express 
what was in us” (Richardson 1996: 105). Braque said to Richardson: “Cubism, 
or rather my cubism, was a means I created for my own use, whose primary aim 
was to put painting within the range of my own gifts” (Richardson 1961: 9). 
Nonetheless, like everybody else, the artist lives his life in the world and as 
Kandinsky points out, when an intellectual revolution takes place, music, art 
and literature are “the first and most sensitive spheres” in which it “makes 
itself felt” (Kandinsky 1977: 14). “Art,” says Schoenberg (1910), “is the cry 
of distress uttered by those who experience at first hand the fate of mankind 
[...] The world revolves within - inside them: what bursts out is merely the 
echo - the work of art!” (Reich 1971: 56-57). And he has Aaron sing in Act
2 of Moses und Aaron: “You cannot expect the Form before the Idea, / For 
they will come into being together.” (MacDonald 1976: 58, 63). Let each man 
hope - make - and believe what he can.
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Terence McCarthy
University of Burgundy
Ambiguity or “The Eye of Mere Observation” 
in Malory’s Morte Darthur
All undergraduates know that Malory’s great book of chivalric ideals was 
apparently written by a rogue who was at leisure to write because he spent 
much of his time in prison for not living up to those ideals. Theft, attempted 
murder, ambush, rape ... Malory was far too busy committing the seven deadly 
sins to find time to read The Seven Types of Ambiguity. And I am ready to 
wager that you were not expecting Malory’s name to crop up very often at 
a conference devoted to ambiguity. Least of all did you imagine that he would 
be the subject of a plenary paper.
You may not have been reading Le Morte Darthur recently, but most people 
have memories of Malory as not exactly a complex writer. His was certainly 
not a complex mind. His knights and ladies inhabit a world of surface meaning, 
a simple world of clear-cut values, where the good are good and the bad are 
definitely not. There are dastardly villains and exemplary heroes, but there’s 
nothing much in between. Very little is ever a matter of opinion, left open to 
interpretation, as though Malory had had uncommon success in his search for 
meaning, and was able to present everything in its appropriate, unambiguous 
category. The book, of course, is full of strange, bewildering adventures and 
apparently inexplicable mysteries, but once the adventures have been achieved 
and the inexplicable mysteries conveniently explained, meanings are usually 
perfectly clear, and moral significances certainly are. Malory’s world is a black 
and white world where nothing much is ever grey, and I always think that, in this, 
the illustrations of Aubrey Beardsley are splendidly emblematic, even though 
their effete aestheticism is a million away miles from Le Morte Darthur)
The simplicity of this world without nuance explains to a large extent 
the divided opinion that surrounds Malory’s book: Le Morte Darthur is far 
from universally admired. It has survived and been read almost continually 
for over five centuries and several editions of it are available today, but not
1 Malory’s perfect illustrator, I believe, would have been his Italian contemporary Paolo Uccello. 
The next time you mm to Le Morte Darthur, look at some of Uccello’s battle paintings first to put 
you in the mood.
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all teachers of literature regard it highly, not even all medievalists. Some of 
them, of course, regard it very highly, while others, although they are willing to 
accept, albeit grudgingly, that it is one of the great books of the English literary 
tradition, dismiss it rather hastily. Books of adventure are all well and good, but 
there is something insubstantial about Le Morte Darthur, something basically 
unsatisfying. To put it baldly, there is just so little intellectual depth. The soldier­
scholar Sir Philip Sidney claimed that “honest King Arthur will never displease 
a soldier” (Sidney 1965: 127) and in so doing he perhaps characterised Malory’s 
readership with great precision. This is a book for men of action not men of 
thought and, ultimately, there’s something even boyish rather than manly about 
Malory’s enthusiasms and commitments, which explains why Le Morte Darthur 
has always been one of the great books for boys - although, of course, in the 
nineteenth century it had to be bowdlerised first. Even then, it is the ideal book 
for the sort of boy who likes sports and adventure before he turns to more 
intellectual pursuits. And when he does, there is not much in Malory to hold 
on to. Consequently, in an age that values difficulty in literature and in which 
ambiguity is an essential element of the rich texture of a literary work, Malory 
seems sadly out of his depth.
We can go even further: it is not merely that subtlety and nuance do not 
seem to be his cup of tea, Malory seems positively to close his eyes to shades 
of meaning and contradictions, and even the (amusingly ironic) contradiction 
between the ideals he cherished and the turgid life of crime that he lived (or 
the life we credit him with since the biographical identification is not quite 
a certitude) seems not to have given him pause. We might have expected him 
to be the last person to want to be too categorical, just the man to encourage 
multiple, alternative points of view. Au contraire: if anything, Malory is the 
perfect example of the fact that books are the product of what Proust called 
the “1’autre moi” (Proust 1957: 137); the actual life of an author is of precious 
little relevance to his work. Malory the rogue might well have asked us to 
avoid simple-minded judgements, to give him the benefit of the doubt; but 
Malory the author will hear nothing of compromise, excuses or extenuating 
circumstances. And as for ambiguity -1 am convinced that he would have had 
nothing to do with it. It was a word that had only recently appeared in English 
in the fifteenth century. “Precisely,” one imagines him saying. “Newfangled, 
newfangled, that’s what it is!”
Malory’s refusal of ambiguity produces a clearsightedness - or do I mean 
narrowness of vision? - which is disarming for many modem readers, and 
which explains, I would suggest, why his book is patronised more than it is 
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admired. Although Lancelot is fully aware that certain members of the court are 
doing all they can to expose his relationship with Guenevere, he refuses none 
the less to cancel a night-time tryst -1 shall deal with this incident again, more 
fully, presently; for the moment I have one point to make. When, sword in hand 
no less, he is on his way - alone - to keep an assignation with a married woman 
in her apartments at night, Malory writes “and so in his mantle that noble knight 
put himself in great jeopardy” (2. 460). The emphasis is mine but it is hardly 
necessary; the adjective is so astonishingly out of place because there is not the 
slightest analysis of the gap between intention and performance, between what 
Lancelot is intending to accomplish and the nobility in which the author dresses 
him as he sets out to accomplish it. No one asks if in circumstances like these 
putting oneself in jeopardy is a sign of nobility or a downright lack of common 
sense. There is nothing other than a face-value acceptance of a nobility that, 
unquestioningly, is imposed upon us, taken for granted as a given element of 
the story. There is no examination or querying of Lancelot’s nobility, no attempt 
to assess it on a scale of human achievement. Perhaps fifteenth-century readers 
found this unenquiring commitment to goodness more palatable, whereas the 
centuries that have intervened have made us far more at home with a more 
measured honour. We can see the terrible ambiguity of Lancelot’s situation and 
are ready to look it in the face. For Malory, it is something one should not be 
able to see and he sweeps it under the carpet. We have become accustomed 
to flawed heroes. We accept feet of clay. We no longer mind them; perhaps 
we have even come to expect them. Indeed, heroes who have them are all 
the more endearing with that common humanity that our common humanity 
reacts warmly to.
But Malory will have none of this and his refusal to see the ambiguities of 
the situation, his refusal to propose extenuating circumstances proves tiresome 
to many readers, who would prefer a little more authorial discrimination and 
less authorial tyranny. But Malory will not budge. He is not even ready to admit 
that the love of Lancelot and Guenevere, illicit though it might have been, was 
so all-consuming, so entire in its devotion that it can be excused and understood, 
that it can be placed in a category of its own. Of course it is in a category of 
its own, but he will have no truck with that word “illicit.” And there is no 
ambiguity, just the possibility of our misreading, which it is his duty to prevent 
by making things perfectly explicit. If we think we have spotted an ambiguity, 
the possibility of an alternative interpretation, Malory puts us on the right path 
by simply telling us, quite unashamedly, what to think. The search for truth is 
by no means difficult, as long as you can see the truth when it is presented to 
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you. “While she lived she was a true lover,” Malory says of Guenevere, “and 
therefore she had a good end” (2. 426). It is as simple as that.
But this verdict is far too simple for the liking of many readers, who find 
that Malory’s unenquiring mind impoverishes a book which could have been 
otherwise much richer, more deeply human, if Malory had not side-stepped 
the complex moral issues that the narrative material brings to the fore. But 
that is precisely what he does, and although at one point he refers to Lancelot 
as “the truest lover of a sinful man” (2. 530), apparently ready to take into 
account a category where ambiguity might prosper - the best of the sinful - 
this turns out to be no more than a passing glance at a complexity with which 
he never comes to terms, unwilling to deal at length, we must conclude, with 
distinctions his readers are more than likely to misconstrue. For what other 
conclusion can we draw from one of the most famous passages in the book? 
If you have forgotten much of Le Morte Darthur, you have presumably not 
forgotten this. At least, only the slightest reminder will jog your memory. It is 
the incident I have already mentioned.
Events are reaching a climax and Agravain and Mordred, Arthur’s wanton 
nephews, are determined to cause trouble by revealing the adulterous nature 
of the relationship between Lancelot and the Queen. Imprudently, the lovers 
arrange to meet at night in the Queen’s apartments and the troublemakers turn 
up banging on the door convinced they now have the indisputable evidence 
they were looking for: Lancelot and Guenevere caught in flagrante delicto in 
bed together. But there’s a snag: they cannot gain entrance to the room to take 
the lovers in adultery; there is no evidence, and to prevent us from aligning 
ourselves with the troublemakers and sharing their suspicions Malory writes, 
“and whether they were abed or at other manner of disports, me list not hereof 
make no mention, for love that time was not as love is nowadays” (2.460). My 
goodness! What do we have here? Could this be a touch of ambiguity after all? 
Right at the climax of the book. What can Malory be thinking about? Have we 
been too hasty in saying that his knights inhabit an unambiguous world?
Perhaps we have, for Malory certainly does not choose clarity here. Indeed, 
he positively draws our attention to a question that cries out to be asked, and 
then refuses to answer it. Withholding information is not ambiguity; what is 
ambiguous is that we know the answer to the question - Malory has given 
us too much information already - but he wants that answer to be capable of 
an alternative interpretation.
We might wonder what was there to stop him from saying that the lovers 
were not in bed together - since he is so obviously convinced of the honourable 
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nature of their love? Perhaps, as a serious historian Malory feels that he cannot 
distort the truth since his French source text (Frappier 1964: 143, §90) states 
clearly that the lovers were, indeed, in bed (what else would you expect of 
a French book after all?). Except that Malory modifies his French book else­
where when it suits his purpose and is ready to claim that it corroborates what 
he is saying when it certainly does not. There was no a priori reason why he 
could not edit his material here, in line with his own moral standards.
Perhaps we should argue that the source material - the history of Arthur - 
was too well known for Malory to tamper with it, especially over such a crucial 
detail. And perhaps that is true although I am not so sure. Malory was, after 
all, producing an English version of the story because little or nothing was 
available - or widely available in English, and since his “translation” was 
fulfilling a real need, we can hardly claim that the French texts had made the 
story so well-known since very few people in fifteenth century England would 
have been able to read them.
But I believe that Malory makes no attempt to cover up the truth - indeed 
he draws attention to it by withholding the information - because he saw no 
need. The devotion of the lovers in his eyes was entirely honourable and the 
precise details of the private relationship were matters that did not concern 
the court historian or the court. Malory’s attitude of perfect loyalty makes him 
overlook or fail to see accessory details that might cheapen and misrepresent 
something entirely fine. For the ability to see other meanings, the perception 
of ambiguities, is part and parcel not of a richness of meaning and a depth of 
perception; in the Morte Darthur it is a symptom of a poverty of spirit, a merely 
objective point of view that dissects without discernment, and which has lost 
sight of all that is of value in the world. And Malory categorically refuses to 
look with what we might call the “eye of mere observation.”
My quotation, you have guessed, comes from an entirely different work of 
literature, but the point being made, I believe, is precisely the same. It is another 
night-time episode that must be hidden from the eyes of those who will not 
understand. Tess has stolen back to the graveyard to leave a home-made cross 
and a few flowers on the grave of her dead baby: “What matter was it that on 
the outside of the jar the eye of mere observation noted the words ‘Keelwell’s 
marmalade’? The eye of maternal affection did not see them in its vision of 
higher things” (Hardy 1957: 125).
“The eye of mere observation” sees that grave for what it is: a little bastard’s 
grave. And the eye of mere observation is right. But at the same time so 
desperately wrong. A sin has been exposed and duly labelled if you must; but 
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so has the blackness of society’s heart, which is grudging, barren, mean-spirited 
and cold. Of course, the letter of the law is on society’s side, but we don’t need 
telling: the letter killeth.
Malory could have made the lovers blameless and robbed the villains of 
all evidence, but he had no need to do so. In his eyes Lancelot and the Queen 
are innocent (just as Tess is, indeed, a “pure woman”2), and the real evil lies in 
the interpretation of the troublemakers, bent on destruction, but with nothing 
more than ambiguity to use as a weapon. Singleness of purpose and of vision 
is Malory’s ideal; the knowing look of those who see multiple meanings is, 
ultimately, distorted and - what could be worse? - destructive.
2 The novel’s subtitle, of course.
And so rather than claim that Malory creates an unambiguous world of 
surface meaning, perhaps we could consider the matter from another point of 
view, perhaps we could suggest that he integrates ambiguity into his material 
because he regularly associates it with evil. It is the ill-intentioned, ill-thinking 
characters who seek to destroy who can see alternative interpretations only 
too clearly, while those who are truly devoted and loyal to the Arthurian ideal 
see, not with blinkered eyes - that would be the enemy point of view - but 
with eyes that are single-mindedly and finely focused on that truth which is 
the “hyeste thyng that man may kepe,” as another fine knight said in other 
circumstances (Chaucer 1957: 143).
But here I would like to examine one well-known example in greater detail 
to see how Malory exploits the ambiguities of a situation in which, once again, 
Lancelot and the Queen find themselves in danger. It is the episode in which 
Guenevere is lodged with her wounded knights at Meliagaunt’s castle when 
Lancelot comes to rescue her (2. 425-446) and it is of particular significance, 
I believe, in that Malory has taken the incident out of its original context. In the 
French sources it is one of the early incidents of the Arthurian kingdom and is 
part of the Lancelot en prose, the third branch of the Vulgate cycle. Malory gives 
the voluminous Lancelot en prose rather short shrift - the gushing, lachrymose 
Lancelot of the early books was not his kind of hero, a bit too much of a French 
sissy for his taste I suspect - but he retains this episode, which he fits into the 
very end of his history, making it the second of a series of three incidents from 
which Guenevere needs to be rescued.
You recall what has happened here. Meliagaunt has kidnapped the Queen 
(in the absence of Lancelot of course) while she was out Maying with her 
personal bodyguard of ten knights, who, though considerably outnumbered, 
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fight bravely to defend her. They are severely wounded and the Queen gives 
in to Meliagaunt to save her knights, from whom she refuses to be separated. 
They are to be lodged in her chambers, she insists. Meanwhile, Lancelot has 
been informed of the events and, having escaped the ambush which had been 
set for him, arrives at the castle. Meliagaunt - we hardly need telling - has 
cravenly asked for the Queen to intervene on his behalf and Lancelot, itching 
for a fight, is somewhat irritated to learn that the Queen has negotiated terms, 
until she reassures him: “I accorded never unto him for favour nor love that 
I had unto him, but for to lay down every shameful noise” (2. 435). She is 
aware that they live in a world where people are constantly seeking to misread 
the evidence. “Madam ... so ye be pleased I care not, as for my part ye shall 
soon please” (2. 436) says Lancelot cryptically, in preparation for the second 
part of the story, which is what interests me here.
The lovers arrange to meet at night and Lancelot climbs up to Guenevere’s 
window with the aid of a ladder he had spotted earlier. Unfortunately, iron 
bars protect the window, but the lovers are so keen to spend time together that 
Lancelot puts his strength to the test “for [Guenevere’s] love” and pulls the bars 
“clean out of the stone walls” (2.438), cutting his arm to the bone in the process. 
Like the ideal lover he is, he pays no attention to a mere scratch of the sort, 
even when it bleeds profusely, but he “went unto bed with the queen” (2. 438)
- Malory tells us plainly this time, since the ambiguity will be elsewhere:
and he took no force of his hurt hand, but took his pleasance and his liking until it 
was the dawning of the day; and wit you well he slept not but watched, and when 
he saw his time that he might tarry no longer he took his leave and departed at the 
window, and put it together as well as he might again. (2. 438)
Since they all sleep unusually late, Meliagaunt comes to wake the Queen 
and, seeing her bed stained with blood, interprets the evidence according to the 
workings of his own devious mind: the queen has obviously shared her bed 
with her wounded knights, or some of them, or at the very least one of them
- Meliagaunt is almost overwhelmed by the number of possible accusations. 
After all, why else did she make such a point of keeping them with her? What 
a godsend for the caddish Meliagaunt, who can now hope to be upstaged in 
treachery by the queen herself.
The accusation is, of course, preposterous and the wounded knights deny 
it vigorously. Who but a bounder like Meliagaunt could even imagine that “this 
most noble Christian Queen” (2. 461), could possibly betray her husband in 
such a disgraceful manner? But Meliagaunt is so sure that he has read the 
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incriminating signs correctly that he remains blind to all the clues to which 
Malory has drawn our attention. He never dreams of asking where the blood­
stains come from if one of the wounded knights has not shared the queen’s 
bed, and Malory interestingly ignores the logical explanation that is offered in 
a similar incident in one of the French sources - that the lady has had a nose 
bleed during the night. But, as we might expect, ladies in French texts are 
far more worldly and are expert in the art of pooh-poohing accusations of 
adultery; Malory’s Queen is far too honest to lie, just as she is far too virtuous 
to sleep with one of her wounded knights. And when they all deny the charges, 
Meliagaunt never thinks to ask if any other knights have been injured recently. 
He never notices the makeshift repair job on the broken window, and most 
of all he never notices the most telling detail, to which Malory is careful to 
draw our attention.
When Lancelot had returned to his chambers, his friend Sir Lavayne had 
“dressed his hand and staunched it, and put upon it a glove, that it should not be 
espied” (2.438). When he arrives on the scene of the accusation no one pays the 
slightest attention to the glove, no one asks why he has suddenly started wearing 
one. And when Meliagaunt finally challenges Lancelot to combat to prove the 
Queen’s honour, he says “here is my glove that [the Queen] is a traitress to 
my lord, King Arthur.” Lancelot certainly does not throw down his own glove 
in defiance (how could he, of course), but merely replies, a tad tamely: “Well, 
sir, and I receive your glove” (2. 440).
I have had to leave out a lot of the incident but perhaps I ought to add that 
the insistence on gloves stands out in particular for the simple reason that there 
are almost no other gloves (or gauntlets) elsewhere in Malory. In this world 
of knightly challenges, one might have expected gloves to be flying and that 
Camelot would be the centre of a flourishing glove trade. But that is by no 
means the case. All but two of the references to gloves in Le Morte Darthur 
are to be found in this passage, as are the two unique references to gauntlets. 
Gloves and hands are mentioned frequently. When Meliagaunt asks the Queen 
for mercy, he does so with the words “I would no more ... but that ye would 
take all in your own hands" (2. 435-5, italics mine), and she explains the 
situation to Lancelot in precisely the same terms: “for all thing is put in my 
hand” (2. 435, italics mine). Lancelot accepts somewhat grudgingly but they 
withdraw reconciled and “right so the queen took Sir Lancelot by the bare hand, 
for he had put off his gauntlet” (2. 436, italics mine). It is a rare moment of 
intensely felt physical contact at the opening of an incident in which it will not 
be possible for Lancelot’s hand to remain bare.
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The episode as a whole, apparently chosen specifically for this place in 
the story, appears particularly strange. Malory seems to flaunt the possibility 
of alternative interpretations, laying clues and leaving them entirely unseen 
in order to emphasise a singleness of vision which, throughout the book, is 
his ideal. From the point of view of straightforward realism, the incident is 
preposterous. Miss Marple would have made mincemeat of them all. But if the 
clues remain unseen, that is because in an ideal world, there would be nothing 
to see. And after all, there is no evidence to corroborate the infidelity of the 
Queen because, quite simply and unambiguously, the Queen is innocent of the 
charges. As Malory took the time to remind us just before the kidnapping, in an 
evocation of the month of May: the Queen was a true lover and therefore had 
a good end. It was a reminder designed to prepare us for the events to come, 
which take place, of course, while the Queen is out Maying.
But it is with this devotion to the unsoiled virtue of the Queen, which 
looks too much like a determination to whitewash a tarnished reputation, that 
so many modem readers give up on Malory. If this is an example of the depth 
of his thought, and his ability to handle complex and contradictory human 
emotions and loyalties, we are singularly unimpressed. This is simply having 
your cake and eating it; there’s nothing more to it than that. Admittedly, his 
adventures (in small doses) are agreeable and exciting; he creates a world of 
chivalry and mystery that has delighted generations, even centuries of readers. 
But it would be wiser not to try for an intellectual defence of Malory’s book 
when surface meanings remain the ideal. And yet I wonder if we should not 
turn the question around and say that Malory’s Morte Darthur is a salutary 
reminder that a literary reputation can survive, and indeed flourish, without the 
richness that complexity can bring. In other words, ambiguity in literature is no 
doubt a good thing, but you can have too much of a good thing - as doctors, 
dieticians (and other killjoys) frequently remind us. Perhaps literary specialists, 
and admirers of Malory, in particular, should try saying the same thing.
When a single-minded clarity of vision is preferred over the ability to 
see alternative interpretations, this amounts to a rejection of perceptiveness in 
favour of commitment, a preference for goodness rather than cleverness, and 
inevitably it draws attention to a book’s lack of complex thought. No doubt Le 
Morte Darthur would have been more intellectually satisfying if Malory had 
analysed rather than imposed, if he had not done our thinking for us, as though 
we were likely to misunderstand. On the other hand, it is the unambiguous 
commitment to goodness that is the basis of the book’s massive appeal to 
our most basic and powerful sentiments. Le Morte Darthur is a joyous, noble, 
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uplifting book which does not ask us to think or reason, but, in a way, to commit 
ourselves, to join in with its values and enthusiasms, almost to believe and have 
faith. We are not required to examine evidence and sift ambiguities, we are 
called upon to accept and endorse. I would have been tempted to say that the 
response required is quasi-religious if Malory had not shown such a luke-warm 
attitude to religion: Nathaniel Baxter in the Dedicatory Epistle to his translation 
of Calvin’s sermons (1577) condemned his book as “vile & blasphemous” with 
its “vile and stinking story of the Sangreall” (qtd. in Parins 1988: 59), but who 
on earth would have thought of making that accusation other than the strident 
puritan who made it.
I am not saying that Malory’s knights are ungodly but they are not en­
thusiasts. Nor are they philosophers or men of theory. They do not say much 
although they speak to the purpose when they have to. But eloquence, like 
ambiguity, is not seen as a virtue, and they are not overly given to thought. Or 
rather, they do not think deeply but they think justly on all important matters 
and prefer to put into action a code of conduct which they honour to the full. 
They may not be clever but they are good.
This contrast between goodness and cleverness is something two American 
writers have drawn much attention to and in so doing have offered an interesting 
approach to Malory’s book. I am speaking of John Steinbeck, who singles out 
the two words I am using, and, before him, Mark Twain, who used Malory’s 
“novel” - “the first and one of the greatest novels in the English language” 
according to Steinbeck (1982: 304) - for one of his own.
Inevitably, Malory’s refusal of ambiguity and his devotion to face values 
made him an easy prey to the wit of Mark Twain, and A Connecticut Yankee 
in King Arthur’s Court is a witty book, even if many of the jokes have worn 
thin. Twain’s Yankee wakes up in this world of surface meaning and soon 
catches the same disease. When told that a young man is a page he replies 
“Go Tong ... you aint more than a paragraph” (Twain 1982: 15), and the 
accumulation of jokes with old words and obsolete meanings soon becomes 
tiresome. But the basic situation of the clash of cultures is more productive 
and this enterprising, worldly-wise Yankee who finds himself in a world of 
surface meaning discovers an Arthurian kingdom peopled with simpletons, 
“big boobies” (Twain 1982: 20) entirely unaware of what an ambiguity might 
be, “animals” who “didn’t reason,” who “never put this and that together,” 
indeed, “all their talk showed that they didn’t know a discrepancy when they 
saw it” (Twain 1982: 29). They are even ready to believe the literal truth of the 
extravagant adventures they relate - at inordinate length - to each other. The 
AMBIGUITY OR “THE EYE OF MERE OBSERVATION” ... 61
Yankee, with his “eye of mere observation,” of course, recognises them at once 
as “lies.” It goes without saying that, in a flash, he spots the adultery that lurks 
in Guenevere’s heart, even though she, poor soul, is too innocent to realise. 
“It was touching,” he points out “to see the queen blush and smile, and look 
embarrassed and happy, and fling furtive glances at Sir Launcelot that would 
have got him shot in Arkansas” (Twain 1982: 21). That she might, indeed, be 
innocent never occurs to his corrupt mind, and with his superior knowledge he 
soon realises the extent to which he can profit in this world of big children; 
“a superior man like me ought to be shrewd enough to contrive some way to 
take advantage” (Twain 1982: 28), he declares complacently. The people need 
a “new deal,” he says, coining the phrase Roosevelt was to borrow in 1932 
(Twain 1982: 68), but it is “advantage” that always comes first. Inevitably, he 
dismisses the Quest of the Holy Grail for its lack of commercial interest; “there 
was worlds [sic] of reputation in it, but no money” (Twain 1982:49). He delights 
in the ease with which he can assume power, as he casts his mercantile gaze 
- the word “market” regularly crops up - over the kingdom. He is a man who 
knows what things cost but not what they are worth, his assessment of himself 
does nothing to win our admiration: he sees himself as “a giant among pigmies, 
a man among children, a master intelligence among intellectual moles” (Twain 
1982: 43). All we can say in his defence is that in his patronising remarks about 
the simpletons who inhabit Arthur’s world he betrays, malgré lui, an admiration 
that is - one must admit - to his credit: “they were a childlike and innocent 
lot; telling lies of the stateliest pattern with a most gentle and winning naivety, 
and ready and willing to listen to anybody else’s lie, and believe it too” (Twain 
1982: 19). They may be brainless - and the Yankee is very much aware of 
his own brains and makes a point of recruiting “the brightest young minds” he 
could find (Twain 1982: 50) - “Yet there was something very engaging about 
these great simple-hearted creatures, something attractive and loveable,” and 
in spite of all his belittling criticisms “there was a fine manliness observable in 
almost every face; and in some a certain loftiness and sweetness that rebuked 
your belittling criticisms and stilled them” (Twain 1982: 20).
Twain mocks Malory’s world with much relish but in many ways his 
parody is a patent tribute to the great book. He pokes fun at the literalness of 
this unambiguous world and we see the risk Malory was taking in rejecting 
discernment in favour of virtue. His characters are clearly focused on ideals 
and risk appearing merely blinkered and unseeing. When the ideal knight is the 
strong silent type, as all of Malory’s knights are - “he sayeth little and he doth 
much more” (1.124) - when they are prodigal in deeds but sparing with words, 
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they may give the impression that they have nothing to say for themselves and 
are empty-headed. Twain gives expression to criticisms that can genuinely be 
be made, but at the same time he never fails to emphasise the great appeal 
of that simple goodness, which was as unfashionable a virtue for a nineteenth 
century Yankee as it is these days.
When an author makes his heroes good, he must be ready to stifle a yawn. 
The Connecticut Yankee, for all his cleverness, is certainly not what you might 
call good, and it is a consummate irony, of course, that Twain chose for his 
hero such an appropriate name. In the title of the book he is the Yankee, and 
in the narrative itself he quickly establishes himself as “the boss.” Twain only 
rarely uses his actual name as such, but he does have one. His Christian name, 
Hank, is splendidly American, of course - I have never met an Englishman 
called Hank - and his surname, Welsh in origin, fits quite well with his New 
England origins. But it also fits even better - and tellingly so - into Le Morte 
Darthur. His name, you recall, is Morgan, the name of Malory’s arch villain, 
who was very, very clever, but far from good.
Clever, good ... these simple words, as I said, have been borrowed from 
Steinbeck and it is with a few remarks that Steinbeck made in private letters that 
I wish to conclude. Steinbeck’s own Arthurian adventure remained unfinished 
and I, for one, can never quite work out what he was trying to achieve or whether 
he had even made up his mind about what he was trying to achieve. Did he 
merely want to modernise Malory’s language or was he planning to rework 
Malory’s book as Malory himself had reworked his sources? The text that he 
left behind is difficult to classify but during the years he was working on the 
project he wrote letters which are very revealing of the enormous admiration 
he had for Le Morte Darthur, which, he described as “the story of [Malory’s] 
dreams of goodness” (Steinbeck 1982: 305).
The remarks I want to quote - and they seem to have been written with 
quotation in mind - throw a helpful light on Malory’s book and the knights 
who people its pages. “It is the nature of the hero to be a fool,” says Steinbeck, 
certainly not mincing his words, and with an American twang he adds, “Only 
the bad guys can be smart” (Steinbeck 1982: 350). “Cleverness,” he believed, 
“equates with evil almost invariably,” and, using an expression reminiscent of 
Twain’s vision of the Arthurian kingdom, he describes the Morte Darthur as 
“the yearning for the childlike simplicity of a time when the great were not 
clever” (Steinbeck 1982: 351).
This, it seems to me, hits the Malorian nail on the head. The world he creates 
(or recreates, since the narrative material was not his own) seems simplistic and
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is an easy target for the Twains (and the Monty Pythons) of this world. It 
certainly does not offer a complex analysis of the Arthurian kingdom in its 
determination to focus on clearly defined virtues and in its refusal either to 
take stock of contradictions and ambiguities or argue them out. If the evidence 
contradicts deeply held beliefs, it is the evidence that must be explained away 
not the deeply held beliefs that must be questioned, in the way that Edmund 
Gosse’s father, a leading marine biologist but also a devout Plymouth brother, 
pointed out that God put the fossils into creation ready-made, because he really 
had created the world in 4004 BC, whatever those fossils might - with their 
evil ambiguity - suggest.
We are too sophisticated for this sort of thing today, no doubt, and therefore 
we should not take too much of a desire for sophisticated reasoning to Malory’s 
book. Instead, we should respond to that hankering after virtue not cleverness 
among the great of the world, for that is what Malory’s book is all about: the 
importance of goodness in high places. We live in a world where statesmen 
are expected to be clever and we have given up on goodness. We have learnt 
to live without it. Virtue seems to count for little - or should I say nothing 
- among our rulers these days, and where corruption is not rife, self-interest 
certainly is. Self-interest or an expert use of expense accounts, not to mention 
all those fabulous fees for after dinner speeches. It’s all legal of course, oh yes, 
it’s all legal, but it is cleverly, very cleverly, calculated too. Certainly sexual 
virtue in high places has become an irrelevance, but that, perhaps, is a good 
thing. Gone are the days - but only in living memory - when a divorced person 
could not be received at the English court although I am told that a President 
of the French Republic recently had to marry in haste in order to avoid having 
to sleep alone at Windsor castle.
When we turn to the unambiguous world of Le Morte Darthur, to those 
days when goodness and political power went hand in hand (or do I mean hand 
in glove?), we look back with nostalgia and regret for what today cannot be. 
But what am I saying? The regret as we look back is not regret in comparison 
with what is not true now, but with what was not true even then. For Malory’s 
book is a tragedy and a profoundly pessimistic book. Le Morte Darthur is 
not about the importance of goodness in high places. Oh no. In his search 
for meaning, Malory learnt only too well the unambiguous truth. Le Morte 
Darthur is about the impossibility of goodness in high places. And there are 
no two opinions about that.
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The Freedom of Art, The Art of Freedom: 
Sir Philip Sidney’s An Apologie for Poetrie 
and George Puttenham’s The Arte of English Poesie
There are few stylistic categories which have received more critical interest than 
mimesis or imitation. My aim in this paper will be to analyze this category from 
the viewpoint of two prominent pieces of Elizabethan literary criticism from the 
second half of the sixteenth century. Ascribed to George Puttenham, The Arte of 
English Poesie, dated 1589,1 and Sir Philip Sidney’s An Apologie for Poetrie, 
published in 15951 2 , are more than treatises on aesthetic qualities of poetry. I will 
deal here with the notion of freedom of imitating and restrictions connected with 
the application of imitative patterns, in the milieu of the Elizabethan court. The 
focal point of my investigation will refer to the correlation between aesthetic 
and didactic aspects of poetry, understood in the context of moral refinement.
1 During my investigation. I first addressed the original printed text (dated 1589) available from 
the Early English Books Online database (EEBO). For the purpose of this paper, I am using the 
modem edition of Puttenham’s work by G. D. Wilcock and Alice Walker, published in 1936, which 
reprints the original text of The Arte from 1589.
2 The Apologie was probably written about 1580 and was published 15 years later under two 
titles: An Apologiefor Poetrie and The Defence of Poesie. Since I am using C. E. Vaughan’s edition 
of Sidney’s text, I will use the title and spelling applied in Vaughan’s English Literary Criticism.
In his illuminating essay, Heinrich Plett (1983: 599) claims that the ba­
sic features of courtly culture of Renaissance England are “tropical, fictional, 
artificial - and thus aesthetic.” Elizabethan court structure is compared to an 
atom with a very prominent nucleus - the Queen herself - surrounded by many 
spinning electrons (elements of courtly culture), whose shape was fashioned 
on the basis of imitated outer systems, e.g. antiquity and Italian patterns. The 
author reveals that the means of aesthetics, such as irony, allegory and imper­
sonation, were the constituents of courtly culture. These categories influenced 
the behaviour of the courtiers, who had to perfect their life and stylize it as 
a work of art. Therefore, the author’s viewpoint is that the aforementioned 
stylistic categories could be treated as socioaesthetic ones (Plett 1983: 612).
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Following this interpretative line it is not unreasonable to claim that during 
the Renaissance period there were other aesthetic categories which can be 
understood in a broader, social context. In my opinion, imitation is one of them. 
Although their works differ in content and style, both Sidney and Puttenham 
touch upon the philosophy of writing and stress not only aesthetic, but also 
utilitarian aspects of poetry. In order to better understand this difference, I will 
focus on the way both authors treat the notion of the poet, of poetic invention, 
and of freedom in choosing content and form.
Although both works can be treated as texts written in favour of poetry, 
there are huge differences in their style. The difference is understandable, since 
we are dealing with two texts written for dissimilar purposes. Sidney, a courtier 
and a poet, is in fact writing a reply to Stephen Gosson’s The Schoole of Abuse 
(1579). Therefore, although his work is treated as a piece of poetical criticism, it 
was originally designed as a skilful, erudite and rhetorical response to Gosson’s 
claims. Thus, its oratory and classical structure was meant to confirm the 
superiority3 of the author, whereas Puttenham’s The Arte was designed as 
a manual, and, as we gather by the end of Book III, probably also a book of 
conduct in the style of Baldasare Castiglione’s II Cortegiano. Although Sidney 
also found inspiration in this work, it is mainly in Puttenham’s text that we 
come across a set of instructions how to fashion a model poet and courtier 
through poetic means. Therefore, Sidney’s Apologie should be compared to 
an observer’s outlook, while Puttenham’s manual could be treated almost as 
a prescriptive self-help book to follow.
3 Sidney was the dedicatee of The Schoole of Abuse and hence we might treat him as a figure 
superior (not only in status) to Gosson. Sidney’s position was privileged, since he could either 
support or discard Gosson’s claims. We might imagine Gosson’s surprise when he read Sidney’s 
Apologie, as he did not expect an unfavourable reply to his text. An Apologie must also have crushed 
Gosson’s hopes for Sidney’s patronage.
In spite of this functional difference, both authors give similar arguments 
in praise of poetry, i.e. that all great thinkers, philosophers and historians were 
poets or good orators, and therefore these people who are trained in poetical 
art are more privileged or apt than those who are not poets. Moreover, they 
give the same etymology of the word poet which comes from Greek and 
means a “maker,” and they draw a similar definition of poetry. According to 
Sidney (1896: 9),
Poesie [...] is an Art of Imitation: for so Aristotle termeth it in the word mimesis, that 
is to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth to speake Metaphorically. 
A speaking Picture, with this end to teach and delight.
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As we can see, Sidney follows an Aristotelian definition of poetry and he also 
emphasizes the fact that the poet awakens the desire in people to be taught 
virtuous behaviours. In other words, the poet prepares the readers for being 
educated. According to Sidney (1896: 8), the world of Nature is a brazen one, 
“the poets only deliver a golden”
Puttenham (1936: 3) calls a poet a maker, but he also stresses the fact that 
a poet is a good imitator in the sense that he depicts things which are:
Poet may in some sort be said a follower or imitator, because he can expresse the 
true and liuely of euery thing is set before him, and which he taketh in hand to 
describe: and so in that respect is both a maker and a counterfaitor: and Poesie an 
art not only of making, but also of imitation.
In these two initial statements we can see a similar idea of a poet and poetry, 
with different stress put on the notion of imitation. Puttenham talks about the 
creation of things and imitation of existing objects. Sidney adds a didactic value 
of poetry and creation of a better reality, a golden world, Nature improved.
This allegedly subtle difference in viewpoints on imitation is elaborated 
further in both works. Sidney’s text seems to be more miscellaneous, since he 
connects the classical understanding of this matter as it was presented by Plato 
and Aristotle. Plato makes a distinction between good and bad imitation. The 
imitation of existing objects is a mere coping of the imperfect copies of the 
forms. But at the same time there is a type of good imitation which, through 
divine forces, reaches God and heavenly harmony. Sidney combines this view 
with the Aristotelian creative imitation which springs from the poet’s imagina­
tion and gives him certain freedom of choice in the application of content and 
form. Therefore, we can say that Sidney distinguishes three kinds of imitation:
1. Imitation of God and heavenly harmony (e.g. found in King Salomon and 
King David)
2. Imitation of the real things (e.g. historical writings)
3. Imitation of things which may be (where creativity and imagination of 
“right poets” is employed)
The “right poets,” according to Sidney, are those who follow their own 
invention, i.e. they represent the third type of imitation. As Ronald Levao 
observes (1979: 225), “the object of poetic imitation is one that is consciously 
framed to fit the poet’s intellectual needs.” In Sidney’s opinion, poetry does not 
deal with truth. This is why poets must invent, and in the world of invention, 
there can be nothing false, especially if it serves good purposes. Therefore, 
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a good poet depicts things not by what they are, but by what they should be 
(Sidney 1896: 36):
Poets persons and dooings, are but pictures, what should be, and not stories what 
have bin, they will never give the lie to things not Affirmatively, but Allegorically 
and figuratively written; and therefore as in historie looking for truth, they may go 
away full fraught with falshood: So in Poesie, looking but for fiction, they shall use 
the narration but as an imaginative groundplat of a profitable invention.
Sidney’s view is summarised in Heinrich Plett’s book Rhetoric and Renaissance 
Culture. Plett (2005: 121) notices that “a fictional, imagined reality is created 
through an artificial process (ars), the skilful employment of mental images, 
which is capable of influencing reality itself.”
Puttenham’s view, on the other hand, seems to be much more “classical.” 
Levao (1979: 227) argues that The Arte “relies heavily on the Platonic theme of 
controlling our representations by carefully fitting the mind to objective truth.” 
Puttenham insists that the orderly imagination must represent things “according 
to their very truth.” His vision of poetry is much more restricted and he tries to 
convince the poets to have more control over their imagination. According to 
Puttenham, an unbounded vision of the author can provoke monstrous ideas in 
the reader’s mind, and therefore, lead him to evil. In other words, opaque images 
may be misunderstood and later misapplied in real life. Perhaps an echo of this 
attitude can be found in Book II of Edmund Spenser’s Faerie Queene. Guyon, 
a virtous knight exposed to many temptations, needs a guide, Palmer, to control 
his actions so that his “foot does not slide” from the right path. And perhaps, 
following this Puritan cautiousness, this is also the reason why other allegories 
were interpreted - not to allow any wrong conclusions or bad examples.
In this moralising mode which distinguishes good and bad imitation, let us 
look at one of the most stunning passages in Sidney’s Apologie referring to the 
way in which the imitation of the classics should be performed:
Truly I could wish, if at I might be so bold to wish, in a thing beyond the reach 
of my capacity, the diligent Imitators of Tully & Demosthenes, most worthie to be 
imitated, did not so much keepe Nizolian paper bookes, of their figures and phrase, 
as by attentive translation, as it were, devoure them whole, and make them wholly 
theirs. For now they cast Sugar and spice uppon everie dish that is served to the 
table: like those Indians, not content to weare eare-rings at the fit and naturall place 
of the eares, but they will thrust Jewels through their nose and lippes, because they 
will be sure to be fine. (Sidney 1896: 53) 
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In this passage, Sidney addresses the imitators of the classics and asks them 
to use the ancient texts appropriately, i.e. not to misuse the copies so that 
they are inappropriate for the messages conveyed. Through this claim, Sidney 
underlines the fact that imitation, although it can be liberal, must be done 
prudently and creatively. This point can be treated as a response to an ongoing 
dispute included also in Roger Ascham’s The Schoolmaster (1570) dealing with 
how the imitation of the classics should be performed. According to Ascham 
(1967: 56), when referring to classics, the scholar (or poet) should not only copy 
their eloquence, but should leant “all true understanding and right judg[e]ment.”
Just as much as how to imitate, it is important what to imitate. J. W. H. Atkins 
(1947: 113,116) mentions the fact that Sidney’s Apologie is a very eclectic piece 
of literary criticism. Among its sources there are Plato, Aristotle, Horace, Cicero 
and patristic writings. Sidney’s work itself is a good example of how Renais­
sance poets worked. The unlimited use of sources (classical works especially) 
shows that the poet was free to choose the best excerpts and ideas in order to 
convey his message. From the very beginning of his Apologie, Sidney (1896: 
6-7) stresses the fact that the liberty of conceit is the divine force of poetry. 
Therefore, creative imitation does not only mean creating new forms and ideas 
using unbound imagination, but also using the existing sources in a sensible way.
The question of what and how should be included in poetry is another 
issue where Puttenham and Sidney differ. When considering the content and 
form, Sidney insists on the fictional nature of poetry and argues that its crucial 
feature is the poet’s “feigning,” “not rhyming and versing” (cf. Levao 1979: 
228). Puttenham stresses the need to choose the right form to the contents that 
are to be conveyed. Whereas in Sidney’s theory, not practice, poetry eludes the 
boundaries of form, Puttenham places great emphasis on the correspondence 
between matter and style. According to Sidney, versifying is not the key issue 
in the case of poems. It is the invention, the idea which makes poetry. Sidney 
recalls the example of a philosopher who, if he wants to teach, needs to give 
examples. Therefore, when the poet wants to teach the unknown, he needs to 
describe it in words. Poets have the right to create in whatever style and form 
they want because good things can come out only of good components: “for if 
severed they be good, the conjunction cannot be hurtful” (Sidney 1896: 26).
From these examples it follows that although Sidney’s text might be consid­
ered “an apologie for libertie” in the choice of content and form, it also includes 
some contradictions. For example, Sidney (1896: 47-48) attacks playwrights 
for being too “liberal” in not following the Aristotelian unities. He demands 
a correspondence to be maintained between imitation and the actions imitated. 
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Therefore, what was acceptable in the case of poetry is not accepted in the case 
of drama. We will not encounter such a lack of consistency in Puttenham’s text. 
When Puttenham (1936: 66) writes of poetical proportion, metrical patterns 
and decorum, he uses the classical examples and gives precise directions as to 
how these forms should be applied:
For to an historicall poeme no certain number is limited, but as the matter fals 
out: also a distick or couple of verses is not to be accompted a staffe, but serues 
for a continuance as we see in Elegie, Epitaph, Epigramme or such meetres, of 
plaine concord not harmonically entertangled, as some other songs of more delicate 
musick be.
or:
Poet must know to whose eare he maketh his rime, and accommodate himselfe 
thereto, and not giue such musicke to the rude and barbarous, as he would to the 
learned and delicate eare. (Puttenham 1936: 87)
Puttenham uses the classical writers’ rhyming and metrical patterns in order 
to describe possible versification manners in English, and determines which 
of them would be actually appropriate. He also gives standards concerning 
classical distinction between barbarous and sophisticated audience. In other 
words, we talk of two types of imitation - the one of content, and the one of 
form. One influences another, but Sidney stresses the freedom of choice as far 
as the poetical form is concerned. Puttenham sees the form as conditioned by 
the content, being very scrupulous in his advice.
Despite the aforementioned differences between Sidney and Puttenham, 
there is one more shared quality which can be found in these two texts. We once 
again return to the utilitarian aspect of poetry as presented in both works, which 
is in tune with the Humanist - and especially Protestant Humanist - thought, 
and with what Plato stated in his Republic - poets must offer vital contribution 
to the state. Cicero’s “teach, delight, and move” is transferred from the orator 
to the poet (cf. Levao 1979: 225). The poets’ right is to create distilled moral 
concepts: “If the poet do his part aright, he will show you in Tantalus, Atreus, 
and such like, nothing that is not to be shunned; in Cyrus, Aeneas, Ulysses, each 
thing to be followed” (Sidney 1896:19). Sidney (1896: 8) points out the didactic 
function of poetry many times. In the celebrated passage about Cyrus, he says 
that a skilful re-fashioning of the subject should teach people good behaviour:
Which delivering foorth, also is not wholly imaginative, as we are wont to say by 
them that build Castles in the aire: but so farre substantially it worketh, not onely 
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to make a Cyrus, which had bene but a particular excellency as nature might have 
done, but to bestow a Cyrus upon the world to make many Cyrusses, if they will 
leame aright, why and how that maker made him.
This passage highlights the aforementioned issue connected with this text, i.e. 
the fecundity of nature. Nature which is derived from the Latin natus (bom) 
becomes a prolific force which can breed new forms. And these forms can be 
enhanced, or conceived, in the poet’s mind sparked with divine inspiration.
It is not the only power of the poet. His mental abilities allow him to 
deliver cruel things in an enjoyable form:
That imitation whereof Poetrie is, hath the most conveniencie to nature of al other: 
insomuch that as Aristotle saith, those things which in themselves are horrible, as 
cruel battailes, unnatural monsters, are made in poeticall imitation, delightfull.
(Sidney 1896: 24)
Sidney uses once again Aristotle’s argument stating that there is no direct 
correspondence between content and form. “Poetical imitation” is a smoothing 
construction laid over sometimes rough matter. In this way, reading good poetry 
should move one to desirable virtues. We need to see evil in order to appreciate 
the beauty of virtue and later to scorn improper behaviours.
As far as this utilitarian need to lead readers to virtue is concerned, the two 
authors agree. And they are not alone in their views. It is hard to talk about 
Renaissance poetry in terms of purely aesthetic values, although Elizabethan 
preoccupation with art was tremendous. However, it must be stressed once again 
that artistic form was an important dress of didactic guidelines. For instance, 
Puttenham recalls Edward III and the Order of the Garter to illustrate how 
courtly behaviour might be expressed in verse and, at the same time, how it 
can become an example to imitate. Below there is an excerpt from The Arte 
(Puttenham 1936: 103-104) which needs to be quoted at length:
King Edwarde the thirde, her Maiesties most noble progenitour, first founder of 
the famous order of the Garter, gaue this posie with it. Hony soit qui mal y pense, 
commonly thus Englished, Ill be to him that thinketh ill, but in mine opinion better 
thus, Dishonored be he, who meanes vnhonorably. There can not be a more excellent 
deuise, nor that could containe larger intendment, nor greater subtiltie, nor (as a man 
may say) more vertue or Princely generositie. For first he did by it mildly & grauely 
reproue the peruers construction of such noble men in his court, as imputed the 
kings wearing about his neck the garter of the lady with whom he danced, to 
some amorous alliance betwext them, which was not true. He also iustly defended 
his owne integritie, saued the noble womans good renowme, which by licentious 
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speeches might haue bene empaired, and liberally recompenced her iniurie with an 
honor, such as none could haue bin deuised greater nor more glorious or permanent 
vpon her and all the posteritie of her house. It inureth also as a worthy lesson and 
discipline for all Princely personages, whose actions, imaginations, countenances 
and speeches, should euermore corrrespond in all trueth and honorable simplicitie.
For Puttenham, a French motto is a perfect reflection of the lesson King Edward 
gave to his courtiers. The author describes the memorable event in which 
Elizabeth’s renowned ancestor played the role of a moral leader who could pass 
the quintessence of his views in one line of a maxim. “Horry soit qui maly pensé” 
has become a spiritual dictum, a lexical representation of desired behaviour. In 
order to stress the need for giving poetical form to didactic lessons, Puttenham 
improves the standard English translation of this sentence, giving his own, 
more melodious one. David Javitch (1972: 881-82) compares the correlation 
between artistic examples as the one above and the types of behaviour at court 
in the case of Castiglione’s II Cortegiano and in Book III of Puttenham’s The 
Arte. His conclusion is that patterns for writing poetry must be in tune with 
the patterns of courtly behaviour. Following systematic models in poetry, i.e. 
imitation of e.g. ancient prosody, is an example of submissive behaviour which 
can be helpful in being an acquiescent courtier. It serves as a training, as part 
of sprezzatura. The court is an incubator for poetic minds, but through poetry 
the poets can become better courtiers.
Such association can be found, e.g. in Sir John Davis’s poem Orchestra, 
or a Poem of Dancing (1596), which uses the Elizabethan Court as a pattern of 
behaviour delivered in a harmonious, poetic form which later could be treated 
as another pattern to follow. Therefore, we could start thinking of Renaissance 
imitation as a creative, ongoing process, focused on improvement of moral 
standards through artistic tools. From the last example we can observe that 
creative imitation moves from the territory of art into the manner of courtly 
behaviours. Poetry which imitates (or invents, in the case of Sidney) should be 
itself a desirable object for imitation. In this paper I have been trying to argue 
that despite many differences, both Sidney and Puttenham agree that poetic 
imitation in Elizabethan England can be understood as a socioaesthetic category 
linking poetry to the behaviours of the target readers or the writers themselves.
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Pathos, Logos and Ethos'. Rhetorical Duel between 
Brutus and Antony in William Shakespeare’s 
Julius Caesar
According to Brian Vickers, “Shakespeare’s poetic language was nourished by 
rhetoric” (1970:163). It is then hardly surprising that the application of rhetoric 
as an analytical tool for the study of Shakespeare’s works has a long tradition; 
L. C. Knights observes that “the works of T. W. Baldwin, Sister Miriam Joseph, 
B. L. Joseph and Brian Vickers - to name no others - have established beyond 
doubt the importance of rhetoric in Elizabethan poetics” (1980: 2). Taking into 
account the history of the shaping of poetic verse in England, the rhetorical 
perspective seems to be one of the most rewarding approaches towards the 
sixteenth-century literature; as pointed out by C. S. Lewis (1954: 61), “nearly all 
our older poetry was written and read by men to whom the distinction between 
poetry and rhetoric, in its modem form, would have been meaningless.” The 
art of oratory was the axis of the Renaissance theory of composition and had 
a profound influence on the way Shakespeare and his contemporaries perceived 
and employed language. bjjA-1**'
1 Cf. Kennedy 1963, Dixon 1990.
The paper is an attempt at describing the functioning of three rhetorical 
persuasive proofs: logos, pathos and ethos in two speeches of Antony and Brutus 
from William Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. The two orationes from the Forum 
scene (III. ii) are widely ranked among “purple passages,” the best known 
passages from the playwright’s oeuvre and offer the most fruitful material for 
rhetorical and stylistic investigation.
The division into three persuasive appeals, pathos, ethos and logos, is one 
of the basic elements of the traditional theory of rhetoric.1 The technique of 
pathos consists in inducing certain emotions in the audience to secure their 
favourable reaction to the orator’s words. “The audience begins to feel that the 
speaker must be right, and is won over to his side” (Dixon 1990: 25). Through 
pathos a skilled speaker should be able to put the listeners into a receptive frame 
of mind and then manipulate their emotions, “arousing delight or sorrow, love or 
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hatred, indignation or mirth” (Dixon 1990: 25). Through the technique of ethos 
the speaker shows himself good and noble and thus worthy of trust. Aristotle 
(Rhetoric, I. ii. 42) sees this appeal as the most potent, since by displaying 
himself a credible man the speaker may exercise all other persuasive appeals 
much more effectively: “we place confidence in the good to a wider extent 
and with less hesitation, on all subjects generally; but on points where no real 
accuracy exists, but there is room for doubt, we lay even entire confidence in 
them.” Gideon Burton points out in Silva Rhetoricae that using the technique 
of ethos was recommended in exordium, the initial part of the speech, when the 
speaker’s credibility with the audience is established and when the framework 
for the speech is constructed. Finally, the third persuasive proof, logos, is 
based on reason. By employing this technique the speaker draws on logic, 
constructing his utterance on the framework of the syllogism or enthymeme, 
a syllogism without one premise.
2 Traditionally, the references to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Cicero’s De Inventione do not point 
to selected pages, but to particular sections of treatises (book, chapter, section).
3 “Kein Schulrhetorik kann Wesen, Ziel und Gefahren der Rhetorik besser verdeutlichen als die 
Reden des Brutus und Antonius auf dem Forum” (English trans. M. Ch.).
According to Wolfgang Muller (1979: 118), “No school rhetoric may ex­
plain the nature, aim and dangers of rhetoric better than Brutus’s and Antony’s 
speeches in the Forum.”3 The Forum Scene is the turning point of the action of 
the play and a moment of unique dramatic tension: during the funeral of Caesar 
two political opponents, Brutus and Antony, fight a rhetorical duel trying to 
win the plebeians for their political ends. Brutus, one of the assassins, makes 
an attempt at explaining the murder and convincing the crowd that Caesar had 
to be sacrificed for the benefit of Rome. Antony, on the other hand, wants to 
persuade the audience to recognize Brutus as a villain and it is he who wins 
the duel by convincing the crowd to turn against Brutus and other conspira­
tors. Shakespeare arranges the two characters’ speeches one immediately after 
the other. Such planning of the scene results in the intensification of dramatic 
tension and enhancement of its dynamic qualities. The speeches characterize 
Brutus and Antony and become the expressions of their political views. Conse­
quently, the whole scene becomes not only a duel of rhetorical skills, but also 
a confrontation of two strong political personalities.
Parallel as Brutus’s and Antony’s orationes are, there are great many differ­
ences between the persuasive strategies employed by the two speakers. Brutus’s 
speech is primarily based on logos and ethos. Antony, on the other hand, makes 
ample use of the fact that he was allowed to deliver his speech after the assassin 
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and directs his speech to subvert Brutus’s oratio, combining all three persuasive 
strategies. The two orationes differ in the number of rhetorical figures: Brutus’s 
oratory is much more figurative and adorned with numerous figures and tropes; 
“Brutus speaks to the people neatly, clearly, rhythmically and reasonably - 
in prose” (Hulme 1964: 134), whereas Antony relies on “a masterly blend of 
emotional appeal and false logic” (Sanders 1967: 34).
At the beginning of III. ii the plebeians demand explanation for Caesar’s 
death: “We will be satisfied: let us be satisfied4” (III. ii. 1). The people want suf­
ficient clarification to enable them to rest content with what happened to Caesar. 
With the stirred mob gathered in the Forum the speech of Brutus is a political 
necessity. The assassin has to ascend the pulpit and sufficiently explain his 
actions lest the people might turn against him and the other conspirators. In 
order to secure his political position Brutus has to persuade the mob that the 
killing of Caesar was unavoidable.
4 All quotations are taken from the Arden Edition of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar (William 
Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, ed. D. Daniell. The Arden Shakespeare. London: Thomas Learning, 
2005).
In III. i Brutus gives specific instructions as to the shape of the funeral. The 
ceremony will start with him delivering the first speech after which Antony will 
enter with Caesar’s body and deliver his own speech as a friend of the late ruler. 
Cassius opposes the idea to allow Antony to the pulpit: “Do not consent / That 
Antony speak in his funeral” (III. i. 231-32). The conspirator is well aware of 
the oratory skills of Caesar’s “friend” and knows that the speech may turn the 
people against them (“Know you how much the people may be moved / By that 
which he will utter” III. i. 233-34). Brutus ignores the advice and insists on his 
plan. He is determined to speak first and has no doubts that his explanations 
will content the mob while Antony, who will deliver his oratory “by leave and 
by permission” (III. i. 239), cannot alter the people after they have been won 
by his speech. Brutus assures Cassius that the ceremony shall “advantage more 
than do us wrong” (III. i. 242) if the people are given proper explanation and 
Caesar is to be buried with full honours. Brutus assumes that when the people 
see that the conspirators hold the murdered ruler in great respect and praise him 
even after his death they will be more easily convinced that the assassination 
was unavoidable for the benefit of the country and was not dictated by their 
animosity towards the ruler. Brutus gives Antony direct instructions as to what 
he should include in his speech: “You shall not in your funeral blame us, / 
But speak all good you can devise of Caesar” (III. ii. 245-46). Brutus wants 
Antony to deliver a laudatio, a speech of praise, a clear instance of epideictic 
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oratory, which would not go beyond the matter of expressing respect for the late 
ruler and which would not in any way touch upon the moral assessment of the 
conspiracy. A great quality of Antony’s oratory skills is that he is able to turn 
a laudatio into an accusatio (a speech in which the orator accuses somebody 
of a crime) and a deliberatio (a speech in which the speaker tries to persuade 
the hearers to a certain course of action). The speaker mixes the three genres 
of oratory, gradually turning the speech of praise into a strict moral criticism of 
the conspiracy, which compels the plebeians to rise against the conspirators.
Most critics agree that Brutus’s decision to allow Antony to the pulpit 
is his greatest political mistake. Brutus strongly believes that the plebeians 
will understand and accept his reasons for killing Caesar and will share his 
idealist approach. At this point Brutus may be accused of the lack of political 
wisdom and of the ability to foresee the political consequences of his decision 
- he rejects the possibility that Antony will go against his instructions and 
will win the crowd to his side. By doing so he also seems to underestimate 
the manipulative power of rhetoric and to reject the possibility that another 
speaker’s neatly devised oratory may easily outshine his rational explanations. 
The reason for Brutus’s failure in the duel does not consist only in the fact 
that he allows Antony to speak, but primarily in the style of his oratory. As 
observed by Jean Fuzier (1981: 51):
Instead of explaining the political situation which led to Caesar’s murder, and 
justifying this act, if necessary, by a detailed account of Caesar’s encroachments 
upon the secular liberties of the Roman Republic, he speaks in his own name, as 
though he alone were the instigator and author of the killing of Caesar, and he cannot 
bring himself to charge him with anything more precise and more condemnable 
than “ambition”; in fact he speaks like a guilty man who has just realized his guilt, 
and is unable to plead his own cause convincingly.
In this respect one can hardly accuse Brutus of lying and deceit. Muller 
(1979:119) argues that Brutus’s oratio is an example ofgenus iudiciae, a speech 
in which there is no discrepancy between what the speaker believes in and what 
he wants others to believe he believes in. The speaker takes the liberty to speak 
his mind. This would suggest that Brutus is mostly honest in his argumentation 
and the speech he delivers reveals a number of important traits of his character.
Vickers (1979:242) points to the “skeletal purity” of Brutus’s speech, which 
strikes the reader with its “remarkable rhetorical symmetry.” The opening of 
Brutus’s exordium is very effective. In order to win the plebeians’ attention the 
speaker uses apostrophe and addresses them “Romans, countrymen and lovers” 
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(III. ii. 13). The three epithets constitute a figure of tricolon, which in Classical 
rhetoric was often used as verbal ornament.5 However, the address does not 
solely perform aesthetic function. As the communicative effect of these words 
consists in attracting the plebeians’ attention, they establish the speaker-hearer 
relationship and prepare the grounds for the words that follow. The words are 
a part of the strategy of ethos: Brutus lays primary emphasis on the epitaph 
“Romans,” which allows him to highlight the bonds of nationality between him 
and his hearers and suggests that since they are all Romans, the plebeians may 
expect him to be honest and trust him. The strategy of achieving the audience’s 
goodwill is particularly strengthened by the last epithet “lovers,” which in this 
context is semantically equivalent to the word “friends” (Daniell 2005: 253). 
From the very beginning of his speech, Brutus constructs the image of himself as 
a patriot, a friend of the people and a Roman who is able to sacrifice his friend 
for the sake of his country. The epithets are followed with three imperative 
clauses in which the speaker calls the people to “hear” (III. ii. 13) his cause, to 
“be silent” (III. ii. 14), to “believe” him (III. ii. 14), to “have respect” (III. ii.
5 Cf. Burton, Silva Rhetoricae.
15) for his honour, to “censure” (III. ii. 16) his speech and to “awake” (III. ii.
16) their senses to his words. The imperatives perform a number of functions. 
Primarily, they are aimed at silencing the crowd and making it “well-disposed, 
attentive and receptive” (De Inventione, I. xx). By enhancing the exordium with 
such a number of imperatives Brutus also clearly takes over the control of the 
situation and assumes the role of a person legitimately entitled to command 
others. The figure of chiasmus allows the speaker to lay particular emphasis 
exactly on these words, which play a significant role in the development of 
his persuasive techniques. The repetition of the words “hear” and “believe” 
intensifies the force of the imperatives and helps him to attract full attention 
of the people; on the other hand, the repetition of the word “honour” aids the 
strategy of ethos. The imperative clauses used by Brutus also perform several 
persuasive functions: by referring to his “honour” the speaker surreptitiously 
assures the mob of his noble character and continues the construction of his 
positive image. By making himself look like a noble patriot, the speaker wins 
the audience’s favour. His request to be judged is strengthened by the use of 
the figure of paronomasia, a repetition of words similar in sound but different 
in sense, in “Censure me in your wisdom and awake your senses” (III. ii. 
16-17) [italics mine]. The words in which he asks the people to judge him 
are to prove that he is not afraid of their assessment since, as he suggests, 
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he has nothing to hide and the people are bound to acknowledge the political 
necessity of killing Caesar.
In the argumentatio Brutus focuses primarily on logos, using patriotism as 
his main argument. Entering the dialogue with a hypothetical member of the 
audience he declares that he killed Caesar not because the ruler was not dear 
to him, but because he loved “Rome more.” With the comparative form of the 
correctio (non X, sed Y) the speaker reveals to the audience the hierarchy of 
values he wants them to believe he holds: his mother country is for Brutus the 
utmost priority and no other issue or value may outweigh his love for Rome - 
at this point logos is turned into ethos. The speaker explains that the killing of 
Caesar was necessary for the benefit of Rome and for the sake of his country he is 
even able to sacrifice his own friend. The rhetorical power of the word “Rome” 
is further strengthened by the echo of the first epithet from the exordium. In 
a series of rhetorical questions Brutus tries to put himself in the position of 
a tragic hero who has to choose between two equal values: friendship and the 
love for his country. He also tries to present himself as a benefactor of the people: 
the speaker once again uses logos to construct the syllogism: when Caesar 
was alive (minor premise) he posed a threat to the plebeians’ freedom (major 
premise), therefore his assassination secured the political being of the people 
(conclusio). For the audience it becomes much harder to disbelieve the man 
who protected them and to condemn the deed which secured their well-being.
David Daniell (2005: 55) observes that the oratio of Brutus is “so coldly 
effective that at the end the confused want him to have either a statue or 
a triumph or to be crowned Caesar.” The people gathered in the Forum cry 
that it is he who should be Caesar (“Let him be Caesar” [III. ii. 51]) and 
seem to have been completely won by the oratory. The reaction of the people 
reveals the irony of the situation: Brutus killed Caesar to prevent him from 
being crowned and to preserve the republic, yet after the speech of the assassin 
the mob wants to have him crowned as Caesar, ending the republic anyway. 
Daniell concludes that “logical, balanced, heavily patterned, economical to 
a fault, coolly self-justifying in ‘as he was ambitious, I slew him,’ in its self­
consciousness of gesture, the oration matches the individuality, the physical 
shape, of Brutus” (2005: 55). The speech expresses the orator. Brutus hardly 
ever resorts to pathos - he relies more on logical reasoning and presenting 
himself to the audience as a noble and valorous man. He does not try to 
instigate in the audience the emotions of pity or fear; the primary emphasis of 
his speech is laid on the construction of a respectful political and moral image 
of himself and relies on the appeal to the audience’s reason. It is a speech of 
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a politician who wants to convince the people to his ideas through reason and 
by promoting his own integrity. This strategy of Brutus is used against him 
by Antony, who delivers a speech that cunningly undermines the assumptions 
of the first speaker’s oratory.
The oration of Antony is markedly different from Brutus’s. The discrep­
ancies between the speeches concern both the formal aspects of the oratory as 
well as the content. Antony’s speech is three times longer than Brutus’s oratio 
(“close to 1,100 words, against Brutus’s 350” [Daniell 2005: 72]) and represents 
a different type of organization of the speech. Fuzier observes that Antony’s use 
of the art of rhetoric is “less systematic and more devious” (1981: 32). Brutus 
bases his oratory on the combination of two strategies: logos and ethos-, Antony, 
on the other hand, conjoins all three modes of persuasion. Müller argues that if 
Brutus’s oratory may be described as an instance of genus iudiciae, Antony’s 
rhetoric is dominated by ductus subtilis (1979: 127), a mode in which the 
speaker constructs his rhetorical strategies on seeming, deception, and irony.
The first words of Antony’s exordium seem to mimic the opening of Bru­
tus’s oratory. The speaker addresses the plebeians with an apostrophe and asks 
for their attention: “Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears” (III. ii. 
74). Antony, like the first speaker, uses three epithets to address the audience; 
yet, he arranges them in a different order. Antony uses “Friends” as the first 
epithet which is clearly set “against Brutus’s more formal ‘Romans’” (Daniell 
2005: 257). The first word of the second speech “allows immediate warmth, 
and thus access to their [the plebeians’] hearts” (Daniell 2005: 257). From 
the very beginning of the oration Antony suggests close bonds of friendship 
between himself and the people in the Forum; the bonds of common nation­
ality emphasized by Brutus are for him of lesser importance. Daniell (2005: 
257) observes that in Antony’s oratio the “movement from the personal to the 
national is reinforced by expansion: Friends (one syllable), Romans (two syl­
lables), countrymen (three syllables).” The echo of the first word of the speech 
is undeniably the strongest and immediately sets a certain perspective for the 
whole oratory: Antony will employ the suggested bonds of friendship in his 
appeals ofpathos and ethos. The speaker declares that he came “to bury Caesar, 
not to praise him,” which is an open lie: Antony does plan to praise Caesar 
in the next part of his speech; what is more, as was emphasized above, he is 
using the conventional form of laudatio.
After a short sententia (which is a means of the technique of logos) Antony 
repeats the main accusation against Caesar: “The noble Brutus / Hath told you 
Caesar was ambitious” (III. ii. 78-79). Antony conditions the validity of the 
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accusation in Brutus’s nobility - by undermining one of the statements, i.e. 
Brutus being noble or Caesar being ambitious, one subverts the other and that 
is exactly what he tries to do in the rest of his speech, by gradually changing the 
semantics of the words “honourable” and “noble.” Sister Miriam Joseph (1966: 
139) comments on the speaker’s strategy in the following terms: “An outstand­
ing instance of antiphrasis is the repetition of‘honourable man,’ spoken at first 
with apparent sincerity [...], but growing in biting irony.” Antony’s words “For 
Brutus is an honourable man; / So are they all, all honourable men” (III. ii. 83-4) 
weaken moral uniqueness of Brutus, as all the conspirators share the common 
feature of being “honourable” and may be described in similar terms. This par­
ticular effect is achieved by the figure of epizeuxis, “the emphatic repetition of 
a word with no other word between” (Fuzier 1981: 33), which lays particular 
emphasis on the word “all.” The information that Brutus is “honourable” is 
given a number of times and each repetition gradually diminishes the semantic 
strength of the phrase and its positive connotations. The word becomes a neu­
tral, common label for all the conspirators and finally gains purely pejorative 
tone with one of the plebeians asking: “They were traitors: honourable men?” 
(III. ii. 154). At this point the word “honourable” becomes semantically equiv­
alent to the word “traitor.” In his use of the phrase Antony resorts to irony, 
a means of rhetoric defined by Burton as “speaking in such a way as to imply 
the contrary to what one says, often for the purpose of derision, mockery or jest” 
(Silva Rhetoricae). However, the speaker follows the idea of ductus subtilis and 
pretends not to be aware of the persuasive techniques he exercises. The force of 
his use of irony depends primarily on being gradual and so disguised as to make 
the speaker seem perfectly unconscious of manipulating the language. Antony 
relies to a large extent on understatements and craftily manipulates the audience 
to make sure they understand and swallow all his intricate insinuations.
Next, Antony proceeds to refuting Brutus’s accusation. By exercising logos 
he provides a list of reasonable proofs which counter the conspirator’s claim 
that Caesar was ambitious. The arguments advanced by the speaker are, in fact, 
a praise of Caesar and prove that Antony’s initial declaration is false. The list 
of arguments in defence of Caesar is long. Firstly, Antony points out that the 
murdered ruler was his “friend” and always remained “faithful and just” to him 
(III. ii. 85). Secondly, he emphasizes that Caesar’s military campaigns brought 
fortune to Rome and secured the development of the country. Next, Antony 
resorts to the appeal of pathos: “When that the poor have cried, Caesar hath 
wept” (III. ii. 92). The speaker wants to construct the image of a ruler who did not 
put himself above the common people and was compassionate, especially to the 
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weakest. Finally, Antony emphatically resorts to an ocular proof: “You all did 
see, that on the Lupercal 11 thrice presented him a kingly crown, / Which he did 
thrice refuse” (III. ii. 96-98). By referring to the would-be coronation Antony 
ultimately dismisses the charge that Caesar was ambitious and provocatively 
asks a rhetorical question: “Was this ambition?” (III. ii. 98). After presenting 
each proof in defence of Caesar the speaker consistently contrasts his arguments 
with Brutus’s claim: “But Brutus says, he was ambitious, / And Brutus is 
a honorable man” (III. ii. 87-88). The disjunctive words “But” and “Yet” signal 
semantic turns. Antony persuasively contrasts his arguments with the arguments 
of the first speaker; the latter being grounded in the alleged “honour” of the 
orator, the former in common knowledge and ocular proofs. Such construction 
of the arguments plainly undermines Brutus’s points, which turn out feeble 
and false. Simultaneously with the validity of the conspirator’s line of thought, 
Antony deconstructs the positive image Brutus struggles to construct in his 
oratio through the use of ethos.
After refuting Brutus’s arguments Antony denies doing it: “I speak not to 
disapprove what Brutus spoke, / But here I am to speak what I know” (III. ii. 
101-2). One of the first actions Antony performs in his speech is contradicting 
Brutus’s words (in declaring that he does not intend to praise Caesar); after­
wards the speaker consistently refutes the arguments of his political opponent. 
The declaration is an instance of ethos', it is aimed at making a positive im­
pression and constructing his own image as a just and honest person. Antony 
clearly does not want to be considered an orator who exercises manipulative 
techniques on the people, but a speaker who speaks only what he holds true. 
This “self depreciation is meant to pass for tapinosis (belittling or debasing 
device)” and may be understood as a “subtle private joke which Antony enjoys 
while the citizens are contented to take his words at their face-value, and are 
ironically spurred to mutiny not by plain Antony, but by Antony’s image of 
Brutus, the arch-rhetorician” (Fuzier 1981: 41). The strategy ofbelittling one’s 
own skills, depreciatio, which is selected by the speaker, turns out to be a com­
municative necessity. Antony confronts the audience that has already been won 
by the previous speaker and he has to be very careful in his planning of the 
oration. Avoiding open confrontation with Brutus is the best way to confront the 
unfavourable audience. This strategy not only helps Antony in creating his posi­
tive image, but simultaneously undermines the position of the previous speaker, 
who, in the light of Antony’s suggestions, becomes a manipulator and a liar.
The orator uses depreciatio', he denies his own skills trying to prove the 
claim that he is “no orator” (III. ii. 210): “For I have neither wit, nor words, 
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nor worth, / Action, nor utterance, not the power of speech / To stir men’s 
blood” (III. ii. 214-16). Depreciatio does not undermine Antony’s position; 
the speaker argues that he can “only speak right on” (III. ii. 216), without 
resorting to figurative language - once again Antony emphasizes how honest 
and truthful he is in his oratory. The speaker’s words are self-contradictory: 
he claims that he does not possess any rhetorical knowledge and does not 
know how to exercise the manipulative techniques, yet, as pointed out by 
Daniell (2005: 265): “wit (intellectual cleverness), as well as starting a run of 
alliterations, begins a list of the whole technique of good oratory, followed by 
words (fluency), worth (authority), action (gesture) and utterance (eloquence), 
all leading to stirring power.” The enumeratio, which is to prove Antony’s 
rhetorical incompetence, in fact proves his knowledge of the subject and deep 
understanding of what is crucial in the construction of a successful oratory. 
The fact that Antony’s depreciatio is self-contradictory cannot be observed by 
the audience, who are unaware of the intricate manipulation which is exercised 
upon them. The plebeians slavishly follow the speakers, without judging the 
coherence of the arguments, at the same time, various tricks played by the 
orators make them even more susceptible to persuasion.
In his declaration: “I only speak right on: /1 tell you that which you your­
selves do know, / Show you sweet Caesar’s wounds, poor poor dumb mouths” 
(III. ii. 216-18), Antony uses a number of rhetorical figures. To emphasize the 
role of the audience and flatter them the speaker uses polyptotoir. in “I tell you 
that which you yourself do know” [italics mine]; the repetition of the word 
“poor” is the device of epizeuxis, which is “specifically set aside for appeals to 
extreme passion” (Daniell 2005: 265). The phrase “dumb mouths,” which in 
itself is oxymoronic, refers to the “Elizabethan notion that a victim’s wounds 
bled afresh in the presence of the murderer” (Daniell 2005: 265). The wounds 
on Caesar’s body “speak for” (III. ii. 119) the orator. The assassin is imme­
diately identified by the speaker in his very next line: “were I Brutus” (III. ii. 
119). This line functions as another indirect accusation against the first speaker.
Antony also speculates about what the oratories would look like if he and 
Brutus changed places. Using pathos he argues that then his speech “would 
ruffle up” the plebeians’ “spirits and put a tongue / In every wound of Caesar 
that should move / The stones of Rome to rise and mutiny” (III. ii. 221-23). 
Daniell (2005: 265) calls this “an exhilarating rhetorical trick.” The juxta­
position of the opposites: Antony and Brutus, two political opponents, who 
represent markedly different styles of oratory, is constructed around the figure 
of syneciosis, “a composition of contraries” (Joseph 1966: 135). Antony further 
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distances himself from the conspirators, whose positive image is deconstructed 
and reversed. The hypothetical change of places is not necessary, since it is 
Antony who is able to instigate powerful emotions in the audience and it is his 
command of oratory that turns out to be superior. Joseph (1966: 286) observes 
that “this oration is simultaneously excellent rhetoric and excellent poetic, for 
it unquestionably persuades, and it is so woven into the plot as to constitute 
a twofold dramatic peripeteia: Antony’s fortunes begin to rise, Brutus’s to fall.”
This article does not fully describe the complexity of the two speeches, 
which offer enough material for a series of papers. By a close rhetorical analysis 
of the scene the reader is given the opportunity to compare and contrast two 
markedly different persuasive strategies and to draw conclusions as to the 
effectiveness of two contrary styles of oratory. The Forum scene in Julius 
Caesar is one of the greatest tributes to the art of oratory made in sixteenth­
century English literature. As observed by Gayle Greene (1980: 69), “rhetoric 
in this play is a theme as well as style.”
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The Anatomy of Ambiguity: Interpreting 
John Lyly’s Euphues
The Introduction to the latest, modem-spelling edition of John Lyly’s Euphues 
books contains many of the keywords employed by modem criticism to discuss 
this work of Renaissance prose fiction: “ambivalence,” “antithetical pattern­
ing,” “doubleness,” “duality,” “equivocality,” or “the paradoxical conjunction 
of opposites” (Scragg 2003: 6). In general, however, the term used most often is 
“ambiguity,” and it is the lack of its precise definition that seems to be the major 
problem in establishing a common basis for critical discussions of Euphues. 
Ambiguity perceived vaguely as the duplicity of the text, of the reader or of 
the author himself resulted in a wealth of interpretations, and the apparent am­
bivalence of Euphues allowed modem scholars to develop disparate analyses 
narrowed down to selected aspects in the fields of linguistics, literary history 
or sociology. As Janel M. Mueller (1984: 385) points out, this contributed to 
a rather fragmentary nature of the studies on The Anatomy of Wit:
in such ongoing ferment, the lack of any settled critical opinion regarding Euphuism 
as a style or Euphues as a work is obvious. [...] an appreciable amount of the diverse 
critical response to Euphues ought to be accommodated in any interpretation that 
seeks [...] to cope with its genuine complexity.
Not to increase this ferment on the one hand, and in order to accommodate 
different points of view on the other, I will try to make the frequently mentioned 
ambiguity a viable basis for coherent examination by assigning it an exact 
meaning. I will refer to the development in literary ambiguity as described 
by Timothy Bahti, who diagnosed a shift in the assumptions and practices of 
literary theory from ambiguity to the more recent indeterminacy. In brief, New 
Critics such as William Empson or Cleanth Brooks attempted to normalise 
ambiguity as a positive textual quality of the union of opposites. Consequently, 
ambiguity seems to have lost its inherent unruliness, while the new category 
of indeterminacy has emerged:
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the two terms are oriented toward different sites of literary meaning, and bring 
with them different evaluations: ambiguity is found in literature, and represents 
a “value,” a “richness,” while indeterminacy surfaces in interpretation, where it 
introduces “impossibility or unjustifiability” of choice and decision, rather than the 
discovery of some value. Ambiguity is positive, indeterminacy privative.
(Bahti 1986: 210)
As Bahti explains, the preinterpretive ambiguity is a latent quality whose 
function is not perplexity, but complexity; it is not destructive, but constructive. 
The fact that texts are ambiguous, i.e. encouraging mutually exclusive readings, 
does not yet support the claim that they are unreliable. The case of Euphues is 
particularly relevant here. It is a product of an epoch thought to be primarily 
logocentric, and of a culture preoccupied with Augustine’s tenets, especially 
his concept of the world as God’s poem enhanced by antithesis:
just as the beauty of language is achieved by a contrast of opposites [...] the beauty 
of the course of this world is built up by a kind of rhetoric, not of words but of 
things, which employs the contrast of opposites [...] the beauty of all things is 
derived, as it were, from antitheses, or contrasts.
(Augustine’s De ordine, qtd. in Heninger 1994: 127)’
Ambiguity has been the key term in discussing John Lyly’s Euphues: The 
Anatomy of Wit (1578) since Albert Feuillerat’s study of 1910, where he claimed 
that antithesis, i.e. the rhetorical device of setting a counter-proposition to the
1 S. K. Heninger, Jr. (1994: 49) presents Augustinian reading as opposed to deconstructive 
one and argues that it is the former which should be adopted in cultural studies which take into 
consideration the spirit of Elizabethan epoch. To quote here the strongest argument supporting this 
claim, the anti-theological deconstructive reading does not only go against humanistic premises, but 
“would have been heretical in Elizabethan England - as well as treasonous.” Hence, Renaissance 
texts require an approach that would take into account the plausible interpretation and understanding 
of contemporary readers and stay true to the English sensibilities of the latter half of the sixteenth 
century. The juxtaposition of the Augustian and deconstructive thinking is also offered by, e.g. 
Brenda Deen Schildgen in her article entitled provocatively “Augustine’s Answer to Jacques 
Derrida in the De Doctrina Christiana.’’ Summing up the difference between hermeneutic and 
deconstructive reading, she claims that “In both Augustine’s and Derrida’s formulation, there is 
a recognition of the tentativeness of the human interaction with words, but in Augustine’s case, it is 
the potential enjoyment of God that compels human efforts to interpret or make use of them, whereas 
for Derrida individualistic human efforts are a playful and useless end in themselves” (Schildgen 
1994: 395). It is beyond doubt that sixteenth-century readers would opt for the former rather than 
the latter, and authors themselves displayed considerable anxiety about the possibility of using 
their texts for particular ends that challenged the providentialist view of socio-political realities 
(see, for example, David Weil Baker’s Divulging Utopia. Radical Humanism in Sixteenth-Century 
England).
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original thesis, is fundamental not only to Euphuistic style. According to the 
French critic, in its purpose and structure Euphues was ultimately “nothing 
but a greatly extended antithesis” (1910: 412, translation mine). This insight 
encouraged literary critics to broaden the scope of analyses beyond Lyly’s 
prose style and focus on the contradictory nature of literary motifs connected 
with court culture or humanist learning. The antithetical pattern itself became 
in turn “a greatly extended ambiguity” where two disparate interpretations 
of events, situations or notions are ostentatiously played against each other 
by the author. Because of the pointedly intentional attempt to dwell on this 
juxtaposition, one could risk calling Lyly’s prose work “an anatomy of ambi­
guity.” But there is more to the term, which I will try to prove in my article. 
First, however, I would like to outline two main tendencies in the criticism on 
Euphues of the last decades and show how they oscillate between ambiguity 
and indeterminacy.
The Renaissance audience was taken into account as an active agent in 
creating the meaning of published writing, and therefore a series of twentieth­
century analyses, built around “the reader as hero,” tried to define Elizabethan 
readers’ sociological “horizon of expectations” and reading practices. The amal­
gamated ambiguous text was exposed to the indeterminacy of uncontrolled 
interpretations once it was printed and sold to the general public. Many of 
the multiple possibilities explored now by the critics can be contradicted by 
actual recorded responses, scarce as they are. We can only speculate, but court 
ladies learning whole passages from Euphues by heart would probably be 
shocked to hear Theodore Steinberg’s description of their treasured source as 
an “anti-courtesy book” (1977: 38). The English bishops that involved Lyly 
in the Martin Marprelate controversy to write the scathing religious pamphlet 
Pappe with an Hatchet (1589) would not order it from an author who got his 
reputation mainly for producing titillating romances for seedy males admiring 
“the rhetorical effectiveness of erotic writings by fellow men,” as suggested by 
Helen Hackett (2000: 12). And Sir Philip Sidney, who ridiculed Lyly’s refer­
ences to imaginary minerals and animals, would scoff even more at Richard 
McCabe’s alternative name for Euphues: “the anatomy of the process of learn­
ing” (1984: 310).
This is of course not to say that these critical suggestions should be dis­
missed, but our reception of Lyly’s prose work is less varied than it was in 
Lyly’s times. The Elizabethan bestseller addressed a wide-ranging readership. 
As David Margolies explained, there were two implied audiences of Euphues: 
the middle class who ensured Lyly’s commercial success, and the aristocracy 
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who were the actual target readers. The duplicity of possible responses from 
such varied audiences made for Lyly’s ambivalent attitude towards his readers, 
sometimes humble and sometimes patronizing. Hence the humanist idea that, 
if the text passively offered thesis and antithesis, it was the reader’s task to 
generate the synthesis through the process of reading in what Arthur F. Kinney 
(1986: 55) called “the act of triangulation.” In practice, because of the risk of 
indeterminacy, the reader could be always at fault in others’ eyes for ignoring 
either legalistic or subversive hints.
Most recent criticism on Euphues seems to follow Wendy Griswold’s call 
for rediscovering “that forgotten soul, the author, who has been deconstructed 
into oblivion”:
There is no reason why authors, with their intentions, experiences, sociological 
characteristics, and “horizons” of understanding, cannot be treated in parallel fash­
ion to readers: as agents who interact with texts, working to encode meanings 
(which may or may not be decoded by any particular group of readers [...]).
(1993: 465)
The focus on the author characterizes three detailed analyses of Euphues 
that have been published in the last ten years. All of them build on Lyly’s appar­
ent interest in the surrounding world. In Elizabethan Fictions, Robert Maslen 
(1997: 206) treats The Anatomy of Wit as “Lyly’s declaration of his affiliation 
to, and mastery of, a new form of fiction, concerned [...] with a witty imitation 
of the puzzling complexity of contemporary public and private life.” The “puz­
zling complexity” allegedly stands for the Elizabethan world’s own ambiguity, 
which provokes the author to display his vision of the world as a highly con­
fusing place. Maslen (1997: 203) mentions Erasmus’s Sileni as the context of 
Lyly’s “delight in the [reality’s] disjunction between container and contained, 
word and matter, public façades and secret agendas.” He also discusses at 
length the depiction of the same blueprint in human nature, “not some godlike 
humanist intellect but the warring elements and conflicting impulses.” Thus, 
all reality, both on the microcosmic and macrocosmic level, would be treated 
as ambiguous in an untamed way. A later study, Katharine Wilson’s Fictions of 
Authorship in Late Elizabethan Narratives, takes a similar angle and discusses 
writers and readers featuring within literary works as representatives of “the 
authors’ own uncertainty about the role of prose fiction” (2006: 4-15). In this 
reading Euphues is a debut writer, the future moral author who turns out to be 
a mere fool. And Jeff Dolven (2007:239) in turn, claims in his Scenes of Instruc­
tion in Renaissance Romance that Elizabethan writers such as Lyly are acutely 
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aware of the imperfections of the environment that formed them and, as a result, 
“sabotage their own didactic authority, dedicating and in some sense sacrificing 
their works to a protest against the training of their best educated readers.”
The above-mentioned critics read Lyly’s prose fiction as the affirmation of 
the “ubiquity of ambiguity” (tantamount to indeterminacy), based on the idea 
of historia “captived to the truth of a foolish world” to which the characters, 
readers and authors respond in bewilderment. Against this apparent universal 
ambiguity, which in recent decades seems to cater to distinctly modem sensi­
bilities, I would like to set the literary ambiguity that is to be found only within 
the text. As it was acknowledged by Aristotle and the subsequent centuries of 
criticism, ambiguity is the matter of language not reality, and Renaissance hu­
manist culture, where language did not reveal or reflect reality but constituted 
it, was not the one to refute this thesis.
However, textual ambiguity does not automatically eliminate the unease 
of interpretation. I would like to try to prove that Bahti’s theory of a possible 
juncture between ambiguity and indeterminacy characterizes the text-reader 
relationship suggested and built on by Lyly and can contribute towards a stable 
basis for interpreting The Anatomy of Wit in a comprehensive manner. This 
juncture is simply a point of mutual determination between the text and its 
reading. Instead of trying to find the motivation for reading The Anatomy of 
Wit shared by Lyly’s contemporaries, or about his own reasons for writing, 
it seems an interesting idea to focus on the text and investigate the way in 
which it anticipates the indeterminacy of interpretations which may easily 
get out of hand.
Let us therefore focus on the ambiguous text. Lyly’s intention to display 
“the union of opposites” is apparent in his choice of an anatomy, extremely 
popular in the sixteenth century but until recently not even acknowledged as 
a literary genre. Devon L. Hodges in his Renaissance Fictions of Anatomy 
(1985) points out that the primary intention of the authors of both “scientific” 
and “spiritual” anatomies was to offer reliable, consistent scrutiny of reality 
as they saw it in order to tear apart the veils of human fallacies. But once the 
apparent unity of a body is dissected, its parts are displaced, never again to 
form a viable system which the anatomy set out to examine: “the anatomy has 
a paradoxical doubleness: it is a method for revealing order, but is also causes its 
decay” (Hodges 1985:6). The early “spiritual” anatomies, which had a distinctly 
moral character, were concocted to cut away sins in an act of cleansing the body 
from vice. They could edify the reader by simply identifying the disease; but 
employed to heal infinitely imperfect mankind, Hodges (1985: 6) argues, the 
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process would cause not purification, but annihilation. We are led to ask: “Has 
an anatomy or vivisection been performed?”
Nevertheless, Hodges himself admits that this confusing question would 
be unacceptable to, e.g. Andreas Vesarius, the author of the anatomy of human 
body entitled De Corporis Fabrica (1543), who saw the body as a “finished 
product of creation most perfect” and found it intolerable that “the harmony of 
the human body [...] should lie constantly concealed [...] and that the structure 
of instruments so divinely created by the Great Artificer of all things should 
remain unexamined” (Vesarius’s dedicatory letter to Philip II of Spain, qtd. in 
Hodges 1985: 4). It seems that the preliminary assumption of comprehensive­
ness underlies any Renaissance project of anatomising a part of reality, before 
it can be refuted or dismissed in interpretation. The absolute of the divine pur­
pose of creation was sought because it was expected to be present, not because 
people found pleasure in proving that it was not likely to be found.
Such is the case of Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit that practically inaugu­
rated the form of anatomy in England.2 True, Lyly’s work is different from two 
other best-known Elizabethan anatomies, Phillip Stubbes’ Anatomie of Abuses 
(1583) and Thomas Nashe’s Anatomie of Absurditie (1589), in that it is not 
simply a treatise elaborating on a topic, but a plot-driven prose fiction. Conse­
quently, it is not really an anatomy of wit, but of a young wit, Euphues, his vices 
and virtues, so to say, “in action.” However, if we set all three anatomies side 
by side, we can find a certain unity of the generic purpose that lends coherence 
to Lyly’s project, so often interpreted as self-explosive.
2 The precursors of this form in England, such as Augustino Mainardo’s An Anatomi: that is to 
say A parting in peeces of the Mass. Which discovereth the horrible errors, and the infinite abuses 
unknowen to the people, aswel of the Mass as of the Mass book (1557), did not have the wide 
appeal that accompanied John Lyly’s Euphues books.
At this point it seems important to mention how difficult it actually proved 
in the past to define an anatomy as something more than an “assemblage of 
perspectives” (Scragg 2003:10). The most famous of English anatomies, Robert 
Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), has been classified by Northrop Frye 
as the Menippean satire, and the critic also argued that the term anatomy 
could replace the name of the genre (1973: 311). This was refuted by Martin 
Heusser in The Gilded Pill, who stated that pigeonholing was exactly what 
Burton attempted to avoid. Not keen on stopping at vague statements on the 
one hand and careful not to jump at far-fetched conclusions on the other, 
I would like to take a look at early English anatomies and try to specify 
some basic characteristics that texts as different as Lyly’s, Nashe’s and Stubbs’
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had in common. I will draw on Devon L. Hodges’s insight into Renaissance 
anatomies, at places trying to modify it to interpret Elizabethan literature in 
a way that would seem more appropriate to the epoch in question.
Most importantly, anatomies were meant for instruction. Their main func­
tion was corrective, and abuses, absurdities or arrogance of youth were anat­
omized so that they could be evaded. In displaying “abusive enormities,” 
however, the authors felt the need for disclaimers stating that they are well 
aware of good sides to the sources of controversy, and these statements were 
followed with prolonged discussions of the positive aspects. It is also quite 
telling that the authors diagnozed their times to be corrupt and made theolog­
ical references. Stubbes (1999), e.g. wrote: “I haue aduetured the making of 
this litle treatise, intituled, [The Anatomie of Abuses] hoping that the same (by 
diuyne assistance) shall somewhat conduce to the building of this spirituall 
howse of the Lord.” Augustine would add: the house built of antitheses.
Another essential characteristic of anatomies pointed out by Hodges was 
that, allegedly, anatomies by nature ended up being rhetorical or visual displays 
of their authors’ skills, with practically no elusive truths revealed or even 
approximated. The early anatomists’ joy to indulge in the extravagant, florid 
style and dwelling on contrasts is interpreted as an attempt to conceal this vital 
lack at the centre of their works. However, arguing in utramque partem, i.e. 
to confront a proposition by its alternative with a flourish of eloquence was 
a perfectly legitimate and highly valued rhetorical practice and should not be 
seen simply as deliberate deception. University exams consisted of arguing 
in favour of the righteous as well as the wicked, and there were textbooks 
teaching how to win a debate taking the part of a villain. All this was seen 
as instruction not in dishonesty, but in the intellectual attributes demanded of 
any well-educated gentleman.
Still, anatomies as “ambiguous,” self-contained projects were supposed 
to be put before a potentially unruly audience. In the ideal world, it would 
serve “the pleasure of the Godly, and amendement of the wicked” (Stubbes 
1999): there would be no place for indeterminacy. But the authors of spiritual 
anatomies knew what to expect. They reminded their readers to “construe al 
things to the best” (Stubbes 1999), referred to an Erasmian principle to “learn 
as well to discern thy loss as thy gain, thy hurt as good” (Nashe 2002: 21) 
and stated straightforwardly: “let him that fyndeth fault amende it, and him 
that liketh it, vse it” (Lyly 1967: 183/1). They also felt compelled to evoke the 
commonplace idea that human mind perceives the outside world according to 
its own inclinations. The wicked could find fuel for their vice even in the Holy 
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Scripture.3 Anatomies, ambiguous literary forms relying on the coexistence of 
contraries, were deeply concerned with indeterminacy and tried to exorcize the 
subversive reading by its inclusion in the text. Thanks to its plotline, Euphues is 
particularly successful in this respect. Not only does it depict such a reading on 
the part of its characters, but also tries to turn the threat of indeterminacy into 
a medicine. Instead of the standard anatomy concept of a mirror, The Anatomy 
of Wit recommends a dynamic reading procedure. Its readers are supposed to 
catch themselves trying to hide their defect while they are carried away by the 
text. In other words, they are supposed to exercise their conscience, while the 
text remains detached and safe from collapsing into the chaos of indeterminacy.
3 Nashe (2002: 4), for instance, wrote: “everyone maketh that sacred preservative a pernicious 
poison unto his sinful soul, nourishing his vanity with sacred verities, increasing his damnation by 
the ordained means to salvation.”
Thus, against most recent readings I would like to propose that Lyly’s 
Euphues is a perfect example of the text as the positive basis for interpretation, 
rendered self-contained and not self-explosive by the Elizabethan genre of 
anatomy. Ambiguity, the term used so often in reference to Euphues, does 
not necessitate treating the work like a disillusioned comment, but legitimizes 
a variety of interpretations “as the actualization, the rendering-meaningful, of 
the text” (Bahti 1986: 211).
For example, the question that has apparently determined critical response 
so far is whether the reformed Euphues is the ideal source of moral authority. 
This problem arises as a result of plot antithesis: the first part, which is a ro­
mance, is followed by the conversion of the wicked Euphues and the second, 
didactic part, with his letters of harsh admonishment addressed to his con­
temporaries. The fact that the “improved” Euphues finally decides to become 
a hermit seemed confusing for those who took things at face value, while the 
attempts to “wake him up” by Lyly’s imitators appeared pathetic to others. 
There is no way to decide conclusively now what Lyly’s original intention was, 
but there is also no need to do so. John Carroll’s comment on Elizabethan Eng­
land could be applied to Lyly’s prose fiction: it “was driven mainly by the two 
dominant cultural forms that carried the age, Puritanism and the civility code 
of the gentleman” (Carroll 1981: 467). The immense popularity of Euphues: 
The Anatomy of Wit can be attributed to the fact that it combined the code of 
courtly gentleman with the code of an austere Puritan in one handy volume. 
It did not give prominence to any of them: that was done by the readers, who 
would learn about their partiality on their way through the book.
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The reason why I call Euphues “an anatomy of ambiguity” is that it delib­
erately presents the juncture between the text and the interpretation, ambiguity 
of the former and the upcoming threat of indeterminacy in the latter: in short, 
“the interpenetration of text and interpretation” (Bahti 1986: 211). Being an 
anatomy, it does not reflect Lyly’s preoccupation with the mutability of con­
temporary world, but highlights the literary combination of opposites that was 
a perfectly stable basis for analysis. But at the same time, it evidences keen 
awareness of the indeterminacy of interpretation and tries to indicate wherever 
it can that “multiple meanings are less in the text than they are a difficulty for 
choice” (Jonathan Culler qtd. in Bahti 1986: 210). What modem readers should 
bear in mind is that it involves the reader in a play of ongoing commentary on 
a complete text rather than conclusions on an incomplete one.
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Symbolism of Light and Darkness in Selected 
Prose and Poetry of John Donne
Evelyn Simpson in her critical edition of The Sermons of John Donne notices 
that light, and especially the morning, was among Donne’s favourite images. 
Simpson likewise mentions that of all the Anglican divines of the period, it was 
only Donne that made frequent use of the translation of Christ Oriens as Christ 
theSww or East (Simpson 1964 X: 304).1 Even in his earlier poetry, John Donne 
had already demonstrated his fondness for using light and its cognate - the sun 
- in various conceits, often pointing out the implications of the contrast between 
light/day and darkness/night. Suffice it here to mention some of Donne’s earlier 
poems, such as “The Sun Rising,” in which the indignant lover scolds that 
“busy old fool, the unruly sun,” whose “reverend beams” can be “eclipsed and 
clouded with a wink,” thus demonstrating the power of love. Or the speaker of 
“A Nocturnal upon St. Lucy’s Day being the shortest day,” who - employing 
expressions indicating degrees of light and darkness, e.g. “Lucy” (light), day, 
and “midnight” or “the sun [that is] spent” - refers to himself, again in contrast 
to the riches of light, as “re-begot of absence, darkness, death.” Yet far from 
this pose of an arrogant or sometimes even desperate lover, it is in the religious 
works that Donne’s use of light and darkness reaches its spectacular heights 
of metaphysical conceit.
1 The critical edition of John Donne’s sermons mentioned here is of ten volumes. When 
Simpson’s commentary in this edition is cited, the number of the volume in Roman numerals, 
followed by the number of the sermon and finally of the page are provided. In quoting the sermons, 
the number of the volume is provided in Roman numerals, followed by the number of the sermon 
and finally of the page.
The scope of the present paper does not allow an extensive study of this 
important topic, therefore demonstration and examination of Donne’s ingenious 
use of the symbolism of light and darkness will take place here only on the 
example of a few selected religious poems and homilies. The intention of the 
paper is to prove that in using the images of light and darkness Donne goes far 
beyond the expectations connected with what has become known as the meta­
physical metaphor. The poet-preacher does not merely juxtapose contrasting
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images for the sake of displaying his intellectual sharpness and impressive wit. 
It has been claimed that Donne in his religious poetry often employs conflicting 
images because it is the natural state of a typically “democratic” character who 
refuses to attach himself to one particular mode of thinking (Coffin 1958: 49). 
It has also been argued that the metaphysical metaphor so well-known as the 
literary trademark of Donne has been the emotional by-product of an acute 
and intense intellectual process (Eliot 1993: 86). In my opinion, this choice of 
technique springs, especially in his religious poetry, from other reasons. It has 
its roots in a conscious decision on the part of the poet to go far beyond the 
limits of language play. The metaphysical conceit is used here to strengthen the 
power of a deeply religious conviction. The poems and homilies, selected for 
analysis in the present paper, point at Donne’s concentration on one of the most 
difficult problems - the Christian paradox of suffering. It is in dealing with 
this question that the poet-preacher most successfully employs the strategy of 
“conceited” imagery.
The richness and complexity of metaphysical conceit in Donne’s religious 
poetry is best displayed in his use of light. Light is something that not only 
follows darkness in a logical sequence or order of things. As has already been 
mentioned, in the Christian world-view light and its cognate the sun have been 
often used as the metaphor for Christ as the Oriens, the rising Sun that breaks 
through the darkness of sin and suffering. Thus Donne uses these images not 
only to show that light follows darkness in the same way that day follows 
night. Rather, the choice of these contrasting images demonstrates how light, 
particularly Christ the Sun, not only belongs with night-darkness but breaks 
through darkness in “reverend beams.” Following the logic implied in the 
images, the other direction also appears as illuminating: darkness begets light, 
in the same respect as night “gives birth” to a new day.
Understanding this imagery of night-darkness as the prelude to day-light is 
something crucial in understanding Donne the speaker’s seemingly masochistic 
choice to persist in night-darkness. This willingness to choose the conditions 
of night-darkness understood not only as a metaphor for the state of suffering 
and even sin is explained by the fact that with night-darkness comes day-light. 
Moreover, with night-darkness standing for suffering-sin comes a union with 
light-day in Christ the Sun.
In her Introduction to The Sermons of John Donne Simpson convincingly 
argues that the image of light was mostly used by the preacher to describe God’s j 
majesty and mercy (Simpson 1964 X: 303). This was later elaborated into the 
scripturally inspired symbol of light as the Messiah, to be finally explored as 
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the “Christ the Oriens” theme, that is Christ as the Rising Sun dispersing the 
shadows of darkness of sin and strife. If we turn to Donne’s poetry, composed 
in the years preceding Donne’s priestly career, we can likewise see the frequent 
use of the imagery of Christ as Light superior to the rays of the natural sun - 
the light that rises in the East and disperses not only natural darkness. So, for 
example, in the poem “Resurrection, Imperfect” the speaker conveys a complex 
message through the conceit in which “the old sun” (i.e. the natural sun) which 
went through an eclipse (i.e. darkness) on Friday - the day of Jesus’s Passion, 
is juxtaposed with “a better Sun” - Christ who “enlighten’d Hell/And made 
the dark fires languish in that vale” (the reference to the power of the risen 
Christ demonstrated in the Harrowing of Hell). Another example of the similar 
representation of Christ as East can be found in the poem “Goodfriday, 1613. 
Riding Westward.” Here the speaker juxtaposes the two seemingly contrary 
poles of his journey, in its geographical and spiritual sense: on a day such as 
Good Friday, he should have his “soul bent towards the East,” but, paradoxically, 
he is heading for the West:
Hence is’t, that I am carried towards the West
This day, when my Soules forme bends towards the East. (11. 9-10)2
2 All the excerpts of Donne’s poems are taken from Helen Gardner’s edition of Donne’s poetry 
entitled The Divine Poems. The numeration of the lines of the selected verses follows this edition 
as well.
Like in the other poems of that period before Donne’s ordination, we can see 
how the two extreme poles, apparently opposite directions, East and West, are 
united in Christ. The East, referring to divine majesty in the rising sun and to 
the Resurrection of Christ, is reconciled with the West, which seems to allude 
to Christ’s death on the cross in the setting of the sun. This is well illustrated in 
the poem “Upon the Annunciation and Passion falling upon one day. 1608.”
Th’Abridgement of Christs story, which makes one
(As plaine Maps, the furthest West is East)
Of the Angels Ave, ’ and Consummatum est. (11.19-21)
In the poem already cited above, “Goodfriday, 1613. Riding Westward,” Donne 
also mentions Christ the Son of God as that sun, which “by rising set / And 
by that setting endlesse day beget,” referring directly to the paradox of the 
Passion and Redemption:
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There I should see a Sunne, by rising set,
And by that setting endlesse day beget;
But that Christ on this Crosse, did rise and fall,
Sinne had eternally benighted all. (11. 11-14)
This is the speaker’s image of the East where he does not want to go or even 
look at. This is the place of Christ’s Passion, of His “rising on the cross” - the 
place where the mystery of His Death and Resurrection is demonstrated in the 
oxymoronic expression “a Sunne, by rising set.” Travelling West understood 
as travelling towards the end of the day, that is night and darkness, is seen here 
as a conscious choice on the part of the speaker (motivated by “pleasure, or 
business”). Contrary to Barbara Lewalski’s interpretation of the poem, where the 
rise of emergent business is seen as deliberately used by the poet to demonstrate 
a disrupted and failed attempt at meditation (Lewalski 1979:279), I would agree 
along the lines of Louis Martz, who has argued that in the Goodfriday poem the 
speaker is preparing himself for the meditation of the Cruxifixion of Christ as 
a prelude to a more interior contemplation of this scene (Martz 1962: 71-72). 
For, it is in the East that the most important things take place - and therefore 
spiritually (his “soul’s form”) - the rising Sun that is at the same time setting 
(dying) does not initiate eternal night nor darkness, but in thus “setting” in fact 
begins everlasting light (“endlesse day beget”).
Following the images of light and darkness associated with theme of Death 
and Resurrection, or Passion and Redemption, it is necessary to move to Donne’s 
two later poems, “A Hymne to Christ, at the Author’s last going into Germany,” 
most probably composed in 1619, and “A Hymn to God my God, in my 
sickness,’’composed after Donne’s illness of the winter of 1622-1623. In the first 
poem, the speaker after contemplating the “sea of [Christ’s] blood,” understands 
the need to unite his own sacrifice to the holocaust offered by Christ. Finally, 
in a tone of expiation but also of self-giving, the author, in self-abandonment 
to Christ, closes the poem with the following lines:
Churches are best for Prayer, that have the least light:
To see God only, I goe out of sight:
And to scape stormy dayes, I chuse
An everlasting night. (11. 29-32)
The paradox of darkness and blindness creating ideal conditions for confiding 
prayer and faith may here be taken to refer to at least two things. Firstly, the 
speaker obviously means the churches’ interiors. The lack of light in a church 
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facilitates prayer since attention is better focused on the centre of the church, 
the altar and tabernacle. But the author’s readiness to admit blindness (“goe 
out of sight”) in choosing an “everlasting night” also seems to suggest the 
willingness to experience suffering so as to be more detached from any form 
of consolation and thus grow in trust and faith in God alone. Here darkness is 
understood not only as the lack of physical brightness but also as persistence 
in the darkness and loneliness of suffering and strife. The speaker willingly 
chooses these conditions, for they allow him to be absolutely detached from 
any form of compensation, physical or spiritual.3
3 Clay Hunt (1954: 97) in his book on Donne poetry in fact argues that the central argument of 
this poem rests on the fruitful use of death and suffering for one’s redemption. “The essence of the 
argument which the rest of the poem develops is that death and physical sufferings of his illness 
must be accepted willingly: first because it is only through suffering and death that man can reach 
heaven; second, because this experience forms a requisite of God’s dealings with man that are to 
be just; and finally because Donne himself is confident of salvation through Christ’s redemption.”
The same ideas were expressed in the homilies, where Donne pointed to 
the firm trust in Divine Providence in the moments of darkness. The recurring 
refrain is that of God as the Almighty God of Light, who rules over darkness 
itself and is able to draw goodness and light even out of evil and darkness. One 
such fragment worth considering is taken from a sermon preached on Christmas 
Evening, at St. Paul’s Cathedral, 1624. For this sermon, Donne chose to reflect 
on a verse from the prophet of Isaiah 7:14, “Therefore the Lord shall give 
you a signe; Behold, a Virgin shall conceive, and beare a son, and shall call 
his name Immanuel.”
If some King of the earth have so large an extent of Dominion, in North, and South, 
as that he hath Winter and Summer together in his Dominions, so large an extent 
East and West, as that he hath day and night together in his Dominions, much more 
hath God mercy and judgment together; He brought light out of darkness, not out 
of a lesser light; he can bring thy Summer out of Winter, though thou have no 
Spring; though in the wayes of fortune, or understanding, or conscience, though 
have been benighted till now, wintred and frozen, clouded and eclipsed, damped 
and benumbed, smothered and stupefied till now, now God comes to thee, not as 
in the dawning of the day, not as the bud of the spring, but as the Sun at noon to 
illustrate all shadowes, as the sheaves in harvest, to fill all penuries, all occasions 
invite his mercies, and all times are his seasons. (VI: 8, 172)
Donne here mentions God as the Lord of the entire earth, of all seasons, and as 
the One who brings light not out of “lesser light,” but “out of darkness” itself. 
This “darkness” is meant here as a more spiritual kind of darkness brought about 
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by “fortune, understanding or conscience,” hence signifying poverty, ignorance 
or even sin. It is precisely in these moments of strife that “God comes to thee,” 
Donne continues, “not in the dawning of the day, not as the bud of spring, but 
as the Sun at noon to illustrate all shadowes [...] to fill all penuries.” Christ 
not only is the Oriens, which is symbolized by the majestic beginning of a new 
day, but He is the light that shines despite, through and from the darkness of 
suffering. This theme is further developed by Donne in the Trinity Sermon 
delivered at St. Dunstan’s, April 1627. Here the preacher meditates on the lines 
taken from Revelation 4:8, “And they do not rest day and night, saying, ‘Holy, 
holy, holy, the Lord God almighty, who was, and who is and who is coming.’ ”
But even in the depth of any spirituall night, in the shadow of death, in the midnight 
of afflictions and tribulations, God brings light out of darknesse, and gives his Saints 
occasion of glorifying him, not only in the dark, (though it be dark) but from the 
dark (because it is dark). This is a way of unconceivable by any, unexpressible to 
any, but that be the night what night it will, be the oppression of what Extention, 
or of what Duration it can, all this retards not their zeal to Gods service, Nay they 
see God better in the dark, then they did in the light; Their tribulation hath brought 
them to a nearer distance to God, and God to a clearer manifestation to them. And 
so, to their Ingenuity, that they professe God, and their Religion openly, is added 
an Assiduity, that they do it incessantly. (VIII: 1, 53)
It is then the idea described above that underlies the speaker’s choice of “an 
Everlasting Night” in the “Hymn to Christ, at the Authors last going to Ger­
many,” It is, as he explains, a consequence of his act of submission to God’s 
mercy. The speaker wants to be wholeheartedly fixed in the contemplation of 
God, detached from any material and even spiritual consolation. Thus “to see 
God only,” he opts to “go out of sight.”
The way that leads from darkness to light, from suffering to God is, what 
I believe, the south-west discovery mentioned in the poem, “A Hymn to God 
my God, in my Sickness.” To further appreciate this poem, it would be useful 
to refer to some excerpts taken from two other homilies, one of which was 
preached in the spring of 1623 on the Penitential Psalms and the other to the 
King at Court in April 1629.
For the sermon on the Penitential Psalms, Donne chooses to meditate on 
Psalm 6. 8-10. Here he reflects on the dejection of spirit experienced by King 
David on contemplating his sins. Donne argues that it is in these moments of 
being “troubled with a sense of the indignation of God,” that precisely is the 
“storm past,” for the soul is “on its way [...] to a calmness.” He differentiates 
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between a dejection of spirit which rests in a faith in God’s mercy and the sin 
of despair. Yet, Donne stresses that even sin itself can be an occasion to be 
reconciled with Christ. It is true that Christ is the Oriens and Lucifer, Filius 
Oriens. Yet even if one is “fallen by Lucifer and [so long not] as Lucifer,” 
then the way already leads to the East, which, should the sinner repent, will 
eventually open to heaven.
In a flat Map, there goes no more, to make West East, though be distant in an 
extremity, but to paste that flat Map upon a round body, and then West and East are 
all one. In a flat soule, in a dejected conscience, in a troubled spirit, there goes no 
more to the making of that trouble, peace, then to apply that trouble to the body of 
the Merits, to the body of the Gospel of Christ Jesus, and conforme thee to him, 
thy West is East, thy Trouble of spirit is Tranquility of spirit. The name of Christ is 
Oriens, The East', And yet Lucifer himselfe is called Filius Orientis, The Son of the 
East. If thou best fallen by Lucifer, fallen to Lucifer, and not fallen as Lucifer, to 
a senselessness of thy fall, and an impenitibleness therein, but to a troubled spirit, 
still thy Prospect is the East, is thy Climate is heaven, still thy Haven is Jerusalem; 
for, in our lowest dejection of all, even the dust of the grace we are so composed so 
layed down, as that we look to the East. [...] A troublesome spirit and a quiet spirit, 
are farre asunder; But a troubled spirit, and a quiet spirit, are neare neighbours. 
And therefore David meanes them no great harme, when hee sayes, Let them be 
troubled; For, Let the winde be as high as it will, so I sayle before the winde, Let 
the trouble of my soule be as great as it will, so it will direct me upon God, and 
I have calme enough. (VI: 1, 59)
In this passage, we see how Donne on the one hand argues that the East and West 
do lie at opposite poles, yet, when “upon a body” which, as he later explains, 
applies to “the body of the Merits, to the Gospel of Christ Jesus,” the East and 
West are all one. What Donne calls the “body of merits,” most probably refers 
to the Church of Christ, while the “Gospel,” to the Word of God. Either way, in 
the Christian perspective, the East meets the West, and the West, which is sin, 
suffering and strife, all lead to the East, which is Christ. Hence, as Donne says, 
he allows himself to be subject to even the greatest forms of suffering, “Let the 
wind be as high as it will,” for “it will direct [him] to God.”
Donne further elaborates on the metaphors of the poles of the earth in the 
sermon on Genesis 1:26, preached to the King at Court, April 1629. Referring 
to the lines, “God said, Let us make Man in our Image, after our likenesse,” he 
divides these concepts geographically and applies them to man. Since Christ 
is East, a Christian’s “East” lies in his “confession of [his] East, that is the 
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confession of the Trinity. His West lies in his ‘faciamus Hominem,’ that he is 
made ‘man.’” This Donne expounds further:
[...] and man there, is but Adam: and Adam is earth, but red earth, earth dyed red 
in bloud, in Soul-bloud, the bloud of our soules. To that west we must all come, to 
the earth. The Sunne knoweth his going down: Even the Sun for all his glory, and 
heighth, hath a going the discomfort of mortality. (IX: 1, 49)
If the West then consists in being made man, that is in “this West [lies the] matter, 
substance [which] is but earth,” then the North consists in the “dissipation of 
that darkness [...] that we are not all earth.” For in man there is a “power” that 
overcomes that “low and miserable state, In Imagine.” It is by virtue of this 
other “image” that man has that other “likeness, form” which “cannot die.” It is 
by virtue of the soul, that immortal form which never yields to physical decay, 
that man is not pure matter, nor simply earth. Finally, it is in the South that man 
finds his “highest point.” It is in this “Meridionall height” that man finds his 
“highest elevation.” For, it is in this “noon,” that man has knowledge that he 
is of the “image of God himself’ (IX: 1, 50).
And then, whose image and likenesse it is, is our Meridionall height, Our noon, 
our south point, our highest elevation; In Imagine nostra, Let us make man in our 
Image. Though our Sun set at noon, as the Prophet Amos speakes; though we die in 
our youth, or fall in our height: yet even in that Sunset, we shall have a Noon. For 
this Image of God shall never depart from our soule; no not when that soule departs 
from our body. And that’s our South, our Meridioniall height and glory. (IX: 1,50)
Thus even in those situations of “sunset - west,” or even “sunset - physical 
death,” there shall always be present our “noon, our south point, our eleva­
tion.” Death cannot destroy nor conquer man’s “meridional height and glory.” 
Traversing thus through the south, which is the “divine image” in man, and 
the west, which is that “purely material,” leads to the East, Christ. This is that 
“South-west discoverie,” referred to in the “Hymn to God my God, in my sick- 
nesse,” where the idea of geographical south-west passage to the East islands 
is itself emblematic of death by fever - the sickness that was to kill the poet. 
But moving from this “south-west discovery” made by the physicians, the poet 
speaks of yet another, more personal discovery.
Whilst thy physicians by their love are grown,
Cosmographers, and I their map, who lie
Flat on this bed, that by them may be shown
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That this is my south-west discovery
Per /return febris, by these straits to die
I joy, that in these straits I see my west;
For, though, their currents yield return to none,
What shall my west hurt me? As west and east
In all flat maps (and I am one) are one,
So death doth through the resurrection. (11. 11 -20)
Of what importance is it that he sees his west, which is death, when he knows 
that “West and East in all flat maps are one”? He is, he insists, the sinful Adam, 
crowned with thorns and thrown down. But he is also the new Adam, Christ, 
who is crowned with victory over death awaiting the promise of resurrection.
We think that Paradise and Calvarie,
Christs Crosse, and Adams tree, stood in one place;
Looke Lord, and finde both Adams met in me;
As the first Adams sweat surrounds my face,
May the last Adams blood my soule embrace. (11. 21-25)
Hence it is this radical unity of East and West, light and darkness, that 
pervades Donne’s prose and poetry and can be taken as a corrective of the 
rider of “Goodfriday,” who though riding westwards, “bends his soul towards 
the East.” In a reluctant and hesistant look at the One whose hands span the 
poles and who is lifted up on high, through that squinting gaze on that “sunset 
and noon,” that “south and west,” the rider in fact understands that it is in 
the West-death the he is reconciled with the East-life. It is in the same spirit 
that Donne encourages his listeners to “look towards the East,” because Christ 
“looked into our west, from the east:”
[...] then we looke towards our East, the fountain of light, and of life. There this 
world begänne; the Creation was in the east. And there our next world begänne too. 
There the gates of heaven opened to us; and opened to us in the gates of death; for, 
our heaven is the death of our Saviour, and there where he lived, and dyed there, 
and there he looked into our west from the east, from his Terasse, from his Pinacle, 
from his exaltation (as he himself calls it) the Crosse. (IX: 1, 50-51)
In conclusion it should be stressed that the present paper has been an attempt 
to demonstrate and examine how in his prose and poetry Donne understood 
and used the symbols of light and darkness. As has been illustrated above, 
the poet-preacher employs these symbols with their cognates day and night, 
108 CLARINDA E. CALMA
Christ and suffering and sin, building his complex conceits, rich in theological 
implications. Both in his prose and poetry, Donne shows that darkness is first 
of all an intrinsic part of light, in the same way that night is of day and sin, and 
suffering is with Christ. One cannot be fully understood without the other. It is 
not only for this reason that Donne often juxtaposes these seemingly contrasting 
symbols. He also makes a conscious effort to choose night, darkness, suffering, 
precisely because it is not only the prelude but an inseparable part of day, 
light and Christ.
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“A Spectacle of Blood”: The Art of Suffering 
in Andrew Marvell’s “The Unfortunate Lover”
‘“The Unfortunate Lover’ is probably the worst love-poem ever written by 
a man of genius,” wrote H. C. Beeching in the National Review in 1901. Despite 
his generally favourable opinion on Marvell’s lyrics, the critic distinguishes 
a group of poems which he finds “the least satisfactory” on account of the “little 
passion” they demonstrate. According to Beeching a good love-poem (and he 
gives “To His Coy Mistress” as an outstanding example) is “the spontaneous 
expression of feeling,” preferably the poet’s “individual feeling,” while “passion 
is allowed to take its natural path” (in Donno 1978: 292). These expectations 
about the aim and character of love lyrics seem to rehearse a similar conviction 
expressed earlier by John Dryden about John Donne, who according to the 
younger poet “affects the Metaphysicks, not only in his Satires, but in his 
Amorous Verses, where Nature only shou’d reign; and perplexes the Minds of 
the Fair Sex with nice Speculations of Philosophy, when he shou’d ingage their 
hearts, and entertain them with the softnesses of Love” (in Smith 1975: 151). 
While Beeching is looking for genuine passions recreated in a confessional 
love poem, Dryden would probably be more interested in the way this passion 
is recreated or created in poetry - genuine or not, love, and not metaphysics, 
should be the main theme of a love poem.
But is “The Unfortunate Lover” a love poem at all? Generic expectations 
raised by the title, and to some extent by the first stanza, are not fulfilled. 
“The absence of courtship” and “the distancing from passion,” as Nigel Smith 
(2003: 88) notices, make critics turn their interpretative effort towards alle­
gorical reading, be it philosophical, religious or political allegory. Thus, the 
figure of the suffering lover becomes an allegory of the soul which falls from 
the eternal bliss into a prison of the mortal body and the finite world ruled by 
time and “quarrelling elements.” The unfortunate lover is also interpreted as 
a symbol of Christ, whose dual divine-human nature and ultimate sacrifice the 
poem seems to represent allegorically. Last but not least, the lover’s story can 
be an unconventional and obscure (for obvious political reasons) elegy on the 
death of Charles I, the king-martyr. None of these readings fully solves all the
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puzzles presented by the poem, and, as Nigel Smith (2003: 88) rightly observes, 
this enigmatic lyric “has the ability to ruin the effectiveness of any interpreta­
tion, however subtle, which attempts to render it clear.” Without aspiring to this 
interpretative ideal, I would like to concentrate in my paper on the theme of 
suffering, which is crucial to all the above-mentioned readings, and, definitely, 
the most manifest emotion constructed in the poem. Even if at first we find it 
difficult to penetrate into the intricate network of the poem’s symbolism, the 
strongest sensation evoked in the reader is that of the lover’s agony. I will try to 
demonstrate that the way this prolonged torment is rendered in the succession 
of seemingly conventional images turns suffering into a form of art. This, in 
turn, invites meta-poetic speculations that can be made on the margins of the 
more comprehensive allegorical readings of “The Unfortunate Lover.”
In another poem by Marvell, “The Gallery” (one of those “least satisfactory” 
according to Beeching) lovers’ passions and hardships are turned into various 
types of portraits each representing a different pictorial style or genre. Similarly, 
“The Unfortunate Lover” transforms passions into form, or rather forms, of art, 
offering a greater variety of pictorial or literary conventions that fictionalise 
and mythologise the lover’s suffering. We can recognise references to two 
closely related visual symbolic arts - emblems and heraldic devices, both 
contributory to the Renaissance courtly re-enactments of chivalric tournaments 
- a type of spectacle which is also present in the poem; while all these forms 
provide iconographic and dramatic material for the most spectacular pageant 
of the Stuart times - a courtly masque, to which the poem’s great “spectacle 
of Blood” can be compared.
The premature (enforced by medicinal art of Caesarean section), violent 
shipwreck-birth of the lover becomes a royal-like occasion to be celebrated 
with a breathtaking spectacle, in which “Nature to his Birth presents / This 
masque of quarrelling elements” (11. 25-26).1 Like the disguised ladies in 
Samuel Daniel’s Vision of the Twelve Goddesses, who dance and leave an 
offering in the Temple of Peace, Marvell’s imaginary masquers offer their gifts 
to the new-born “unfortunate and abject Heir” (1. 30), though these donators 
are everything but peace-loving:
1 All quotations from Marvell’s poem come from George de F. Lord’s (1984) edition.
The Sea him lent these bitter Tears
Which at his Eyes he alwais bears:
And from the Winds the Sighs he bore,
Which through his surging Breast do roar. (11. 17-20) 
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Like Stuart courtiers, the lover, in whose honour this cruel spectacle is held, 
becomes himself its main actor. But instead of enjoying the harmony and splen­
dour of the main masque, he is thrown, as if by mistake (since this was the 
realm of professional actors rather then noble masquers [cf. Orgel 1969: 5]), 
into a topsy-turvy uncontrollable world of the anti-masque (or antic-masque). 
Surprisingly, in this spectacle the raging elements are not miraculously dis­
persed by a sudden turn of stage machinery, and the poor lover is entrapped in 
the succeeding scenes of fighting contraries and unresolved paradoxes.
The scene of raging elements is replaced now by an emblematic pair of 
voracious black cormorants, cruel guardians who keep the lover alive only 
to torture him:2
2 Marvell’s cormorants seem to be a peculiar transformation of the Pelican symbolism (espe­
cially as the two species of birds belong to the same family). Like the Pelican they feed, and like 
the Pelican they peck, but not at their own but at the human breast. While the Pelican symbolises 
Christ’s sacrifice that gives life to man, the Cormorants give and at the same time take, feed and 
famish; they are a paradox pointing to the “amphibious” state of a human being.
They fed him up with Hopes and Air,
Which soon digested to Despair.
And as one Corm’rant fed him, still 
Another on his Heart did bill.
Thus while they famish him, and feast
He both consumed, and increast
And languished with doubtful Breath,
Th’ Amphibium of Life and Death. (11. 33-40)
As in the Stuart masque, where the idealised world is fundamentally a Neo­
platonic vision, so in this extraordinary image a reader-spectator is referred 
through verbal allusions to Sir Thomas Browne’s Religio Medici, a Christian- 
Neoplatonic-hermetic-esoteric spiritual credo of an English Neoplatonist. In 
the first part of his book, having exulted at the perfection of Angels, Browne 
compares their existence with that of man, reflecting upon our “in-between” 
status in God’s creation.
These [Angels] are certainly the Magisterial and master pieces of the Creator, [...] 
the best part of nothing, actually existing, what we are but in hopes and probabilitie, 
we are only that amphibious piece betweene corporall and spirituall essence, that 
middle form that linkes those two together, and makes good the method of God 
and nature, that jumps not from extreames, but unites the incompatible distances 
by some middle and participating natures; that wee are the breath and similitude 
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of God, it is indisputable, and upon record of holy Scripture, [...] thus is man that 
great and true Amphibium, whose nature is disposed to live not onely like other 
creatures in divers elements, but in divided and distinguished worlds.
(Browne 1977: 103, italics mine)
While Thomas Browne never despairs about the amphibious condition of man, 
but rather admires his intermediary-comprehensive-unifying role and stands 
in awe of God’s “method,” Marvell, by contrast, concentrates on the strife 
and suffering brought about by this dualism. His “poor lover” is not a link 
in the Great Chain of Being, but is tossed between the extremes, Hope and 
Despair, Life and Death; and due to the rhyming scheme of this stanza the 
emphasis falls always on the second word of the pair.3 Thus, even though 
a Neoplatonic concept of man is implied through an intertextual allusion, the 
ideal world of the masque proper does not yet appear deus-ex-machina-\ike to 
interrupt miraculously the cruel “spectacle of Blood.” The opposites are not 
“married” to form a perfect union, as in Jonson’s masque Hymenaei, and the 
lover is now summoned to face Fortune in a chivalric tournament witnessed 
by “angry Heaven:”
3 Verbal correspondences between this passage from Browne’s book and stanza V of Marvell’s 
poem are particularly interesting, especially as they do not seem to me accidental. First, the words 
emphasised, hopes, breath and Amphibium appear in the same order in Browne and in Marvell. 
Moreover, while such common nouns as hope and breath might have been used by Marvell 
without any intention to link them with Browne, the poet’s borrowing of the Amphibium simile 
unmistakably points at Religio Medici. Thus, it seems possible to assume that stanza V becomes 
a pessimistic counterpart of the passage from Browne; hopes digest/transform into despair while 
God’s breath of life is “doubtful” or feeble in man, placing him closer to the influence of death 
than life. This does not have to be Marvell’s vision of human condition in general, but an image 
referring to the unfortunate lover’s state at this particular stage of the poem’s development.
And now, when angry Heaven wou’d
Behold a spectacle of Blood,
Fortune and He are call’d to play
At sharp before it all the day:
And Tyrant Love his breast does ply
With all his wing’d Artillery. (11. 41-46)
Like Elizabethan courtiers at Accession Day Tilts (cf. Bates 1992: 45-89) 
or Stuart aristocrats in Jonson’s allegorical pageants of Prince Henry s Barriers 
or A Challenge at Tilt, the unfortunate lover is made to enact his chivalric 
romance. However, his combat, though clearly allegorical, seems at the same 
time disturbingly real, as the opponents “play at sharp,” i.e. fight with sharpened 
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weapons, to the death. Nor does Hymen come, as in Jonsonian fictional barriers, 
to reconcile the contestants. Apparently, the lover becomes heroically engaged 
in a losing battle. Nevertheless, it is this heroic attempt to subdue the raging 
elements, and not the masque’s mechanical magic, that turn the “spectacle of 
Blood” into an ideal.
“Cuffing the thunder with one hand,” with the other grappling “with the 
stubborn Rock,” “Tom into Flames, and ragg’d with Wounds” in this unfair 
struggle, the lover finally consciously turns suffering into art. Like courtiers 
fashioning their own symbolic devices in Renaissance tournaments, the lover 
chooses his own blood to be both his stage-costume and his impresa', “a Lover 
drest / In his own Blood does relish best,” he says. Although, after his precipitous 
and untimely fall in time, he, like a fallen meteor, cannot climb back, yet his 
heroic stance raises him to the title of banneret whose heraldic device, “in 
a field Sable a Lover Gules," symbolises the bloody victory over black despair 
and death. Woefully unable to return to the ideal world he fell from, he yet 
transcends the hostile world of raging elements - dying he metamorphoses into 
a literary ideal of a chivalric romance (“And he in Story only rules”).
These references to masque, tournament, emblems and heraldry that can 
be traced in “The Unfortunate Lover” may work as an interpretative key to 
break the poem’s “secret” codes; a “key” that operates at different levels of 
the poem’s structure of meaning.4
4 This metaphorical reference to cryptography is not necessarily accidental or an expression 
of the author’s licentia poetica, especially if we consider the troubled times when the poem was 
written. To some extent this poem can be treated as a “coded” royalist message.
Firstly, on the generic level, the presence of those closely related visual- 
dramatic-literary forms clearly suggests possible hidden meanings that go be­
yond the conventions and themes of a love lyric, on account that all these 
arts were highly symbolic and associated with the Renaissance interest in hi­
eroglyphics. As Vaughan Hart (1994: 61) explains, “Jonson made frequent 
reference to editions of Ripa’s Iconologia and Valeriano’s Hieroglyphica when 
composing the poetics of masque, thus requiring the audience to decipher what 
he once referred to as ‘removed mysteries.’” Hence Marvell’s references to 
masque or heraldry may be treated as the poet’s suggestion that also in his poem 
we should look for “removed mysteries” - allegorical, hermetic or political.
These generic interpretative allusions are inseparable from the potential 
meaning behind the symbolic veil. If from the methods of interpretation typ­
ically applied to masques, emblems or heraldic devices we now turn to the 
cultural context within which these arts functioned, we may determine which 
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of the allegorical readings of the poem seem most plausible. The predominantly 
royal character of masques and chivalric tilts (with their use of heraldic devices 
and emblems) seems to corroborate Charles I’s, the king-martyr’s substitution 
for the enigmatic figure of the unfortunate lover. When on 30 January 1649 
the Banqueting House, which witnessed so many royal spectacles, becomes 
the setting for Charles’s execution, the king’s death becomes a masque-like, 
though bloody, spectacle; ironically, for ever turning the king into an icon of his 
royal masques. Similarly, the reality of the turbulent times of the Interregnum 
is transformed by Marvell into a boisterous world of anti-masque, while the 
opposite factions become the “quarrelling elements.” Thus, the suffering lover 
who “betwixt the Flames and Waves, / Like Ajax the mad Tempest braves” 
is the king who heroically fights with his enemies, and with equal heroism 
meets his death at the scaffold. The magical-miraculous ability to break the 
anti-masque’s evil spell and restore peace and order that the king or queen used 
to display in a courtly masque,5 does not seem to have power against the Civil 
War reality. However, the miracle that Charles’s suffering performs is to turn 
the king into a saint-like figure, making him “rule” if not in his country, at least 
in the realm of stories and legends. The royal masque’s myth-making function 
finds a surprising epilogue on the scaffold and in Marvell’s poem.
5 See Jonson’s Hymenaei, in which James I is called the “Priest of Peace” and Campion’s 
Somerset Masque, in which Queen Anne’s “Sacred Hand” was required to destroy the power of 
enchantment and release the captive knights.
While the royal context of the discussed spectacles supports the politi­
cal allegory behind the poem’s enigmatic imagery, the idealism and magical 
elements of the Stuart masque should refer the readers of “The Unfortunate 
Lover” to the Neoplatonic concept of the human soul. Though pitilessly re­
moved from its native spiritual element, the soul always tries to ascend to the 
higher world of Ideas, while the proportions of the human body reflect this 
higher harmony of the macrocosm. These correspondences and aspirations are 
present in the symbolic texture of Stuart masques; one may take as an example 
Jonson’s Hymenaei, where the union of two people in marriage corresponds to 
the union and peace between two competing factions within the body politic, 
and these two earthly types of union reflect the union of the elements and cos­
mic harmony. Similarly, the unfortunate lover’s heroic effort to impose order 
upon fighting elements may represent such a wish to restore harmony and an 
attempt to climb to “this region” to which he belongs. However, the masque 
created in the poem is mostly a chaotic anti-masque, and if any type of tran­
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scendence is achieved as a result of the lover’s suffering and heroic death, it 
would be transcendence into art.
This conclusion leads to another set of interpretative suggestions afforded 
to the reader by references to various forms of Renaissance art, and to the 
masque in particular. The high degree of conventionality characterising the 
images of suffering turns the reader’s attention (probably with some grimace of 
displeasure) to the convention itself, while frequent verbal allusions to visual, 
dramatic or literary genres make art and fiction come in focus not only as 
metaphors or sources of the poem’s imagery but also as one of the important 
themes. What seemed to be simply a vehicle in some metaphors, transforms 
into the tenor of the whole poem. Thus “The Unfortunate Lover” becomes, on 
the one hand, a poem about the role of Art in the world where Nature rules, and, 
on the other hand, a self-referential text commenting on its fictional character 
and on its ordering power over the uncontrollable matter.
The opposition of Art to Nature is an all-pervasive Renaissance topos and 
a recurring motif in Marvell’s poetry, where it is put to test in the context 
of various genres, arts or traditions - such as pastoral art and poetry, garden 
engineering, meditation, language philosophy or the question of social and 
political retirement. Also in this poem Art is juxtaposed with Nature, but a new 
viewpoint on this opposition is presented by the poem’s reference to the Stuart 
masque. Studying the relationship between hermetic tradition and art at the 
court of the Stuart kings, Vaughan Hart (1994: 12) observes that
The magician, and alchemist in particular, was held in occult philosophy to possess 
the power to connect earthly things with their archetypal forms, within the realm of 
Ideas6 [...]. As an aspect of this, for the Platonist the artist’s creation of architecture, 
painting, and music represented a parallel attempt to transform the lower, earthly 
world into this higher, angelic world of Platonic perfection. Magic itself laid claim 
to be the highest of all arts and as such a symbol of human creativity.
6 Reading the poem as a symbolic representation of a violent alchemical process seems to 
be yet another plausible interpretative option; in this context the image of suffering gains a new 
alchemical significance.
7 This king I magus / artist “trio” makes us immediately think about Shakespeare’s Prospero - 
a ruler, a magus, and an artist, staging his masque for Ferdinand and Miranda. This association is 
At the Stuart court, Ben Jonson, the poet whose allegorical vision opens into 
the world of Ideas, Inigo Jones, a stage-magician, and the monarch, presiding 
as a “Priest of Peace” over the spectacle, create an art-form which becomes 
a “religious ritual blessing the Court” (Hart 1994: 17).7 In the masque Art has 
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magical power over the forces of Nature, harnessing and transforming them 
into a higher reality.
The unfortunate lover’s struggle with Nature is also symbolically trans­
formed into Art. Like a hermetic magus or a Neoplatonic poet, the lover becomes 
the mediator between the lower and the higher world, with his one hand on the 
“stubborn rock” and the other turned to heaven. However, in this image, the 
mediation and the following transformation is fulfilled through strife and suf­
fering. As in the Promethean myth (and the figure of Prometheus is definitely 
implied in the poem in stanzas V and VII), the gift of Art that subdues rough 
and hostile Nature is dearly bought; it seems, however, that in Marvell’s poem 
the final act of heroism is brought about by earlier suffering, reversing the story 
of the wretched Titan (it is Prometheus’s heroic act that led to prolonged tor­
ment). Be that as it may, unlike the Stuart masque, Marvell presents miraculous 
transformation of chaos into Art as a painful process requiring sacrifices. The 
lover dies in the moment of his heroic act of self-creation, “yet dying leaves 
a Perfume here / And Music within every Ear.”
Last but not least, “The Unfortunate Lover” is not only a poem about Art 
as a philosophical or aesthetic concept; it is a poem that through all its liter­
ary, dramatic or pictorial allusions becomes a self-referential poem, turning the 
reader’s attention to its artificial and fictional character as a product of poetic 
creation. In the last stanza the lover is turned into an emblem of his own heroic 
suffering, becoming at the same time a hero in a story. The poem itself tells 
such a story. The lover’s fall in time corresponds with his fall into the time of 
a narrative, as the universal present of the first stanza changes into past tense 
of a story which starts with the violent birth and ends with the heroic death of 
the main protagonist. Thus, the poem both describes the lover’s metamorphosis 
into the hero of a story and becomes this story. Similarly, the Art of the poem’s 
form orders the Natural forces of its content. Surprisingly, the poem about vio­
lence, turmoil and hostility of the world of matter displays a very regular form. 
Maren-Sofie Rostvig, examining assumed structural and thematic correspon­
dence between Marvell’s “The Unfortunate Lover” and Giordano Bruno’s De 
gli heroici furori (Heroic Frenzies), noticed a similar circular structure in both 
works. According to her, the regularity of Marvell’s poem is revealed “in the 
form of key concepts strategically placed so as to create a perfectly balanced 
symmetrical sequence ABCDEFFEDCBA” (Rostvig 1977: 249). The concepts 
not surprising if we agree that both Shakespeare’s Tempest and Marvell’s “The Unfortunate Lover” 
are informed by the same Neoplatonic/hermetic concepts.
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behind these letters are key words, the placement of which really creates some­
thing resembling a textual mirror reflection, or a number of spheres revolving 
around the central stanzas IV and V. Thus A stands for Love in the first stanza, 
B and C for Wave and Rock in the second D and E for Breast and Day in 
the third, followed by the repetition of the word Cormorant(s) as the centre of 
this little universe of the poem, on the other side of which, as if reflected in 
a mirror, appear day, brest, Rock, Wave, Love (in stanzas VI, VII and VIII). 
One may doubt whether these are really the key words-concepts in the poem, or 
whether the particular structure was borrowed from Bruno, but this conceptual 
as well as rhythmical regularity of the poem is evident. The ordering power 
of Art manifests itself in the poem’s regular structure and in its highly hyper­
bolic and conventional images. It may seem at first that throughout the poem 
we are watching an uncontrollable anti-masque of elements which cannot be 
miraculously interrupted. However, this spectacle of raging Nature is from the 
very beginning controlled by the regular form of the poem, just as the Stuart 
anti-masque is always a spectacle of madness controlled.
Marvell’s poem figuratively refers to a spectacle which openly emphasises 
its artificial character, a dramatic genre in which it is Art that reigns and 
not Nature (against Dryden’s expectations). But in Marvell’s poetry Nature 
is always a domain of chance and passions that should be controlled and 
subdued by the ordering power of Art.8 In the masque harmony and balance are 
achieved both through the art of magic and through the magic of Art. Referring 
to this myth-making ritualistic spectacle, not only does Marvell offer a number 
of interpretative keys or praises of Art over Nature, but he also gives Art the 
power to transcend the world of Nature.
8 See, for example, Marvell’s presentation of the chancy Meadow as opposed to the orderly 
though “military” Garden, in his country house poem “Upon Appleton House.”
REFERENCES
Bates, C. 1992. The Rhetoric of Courtship in Elizabethan Language and Literature. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Browne, T. 1977. The Major Works. Ed. C. A. Patrides. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Donno, E. S., ed. 1978. Andrew Marvell: The Critical Heritage. London: Routledge 
& Regan Paul.
Hart, V. 1994. Art and Magic in the Court ofthe Stuarts. London & New York: Routledge. 
118 KLAUDIA ŁĄCZYŃSKA
Marvell, A. 1984. The Complete Poems. Ed. G. de F. Lord. London: Everyman Library.
Orgel, S., ed. 1969. Ben Jonson: The Complete Masques. New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press.
Rostvig, M.-S. 1977. “In ordine di ruota: Circular Structure in ‘The Unfortunate Lover’ 
and ‘Upon Appleton House.’” Tercentenary Essays in Honor of Andrew Marvell. 
Ed. K. Friedenreich. Hamden: Archon Book, 245-67.
Smith, A. J., ed. 1975. John Donne: The Critical Heritage. London: Routledge.
Smith, N., ed. 2003. The Poems of Andrew Marvell. London: Pearson Longman.
PART II
Eighteenth- and
Nineteenth-Century British
Literature

Joanna Maciulewicz
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań
Fanny Burney’s Cecilia, or An Heiress’ Search 
for Meaning in the World of Fashion
Frances Burney’s Cecilia; or, Memoirs of an Heiress (1782) is customarily 
classified as the novel of manners but the text exploits a number of genres and 
literary conventions. Cecilia is undeniably realistic, with its “social analysis 
[which] is almost Dickensian [in the] forceful sympathy for those whose place 
in the structure of things is taken for granted,” as the blurb of Oxford World’s 
Classics informs. The scope of the picture of the eighteenth-century world of 
fashion, the multitude and diversity of characters inhabiting it as well as the va­
riety of situations in which they are placed all prepare the ground for the realist 
novel. The eighteenth-century tale reads, however, as a “grim modem fable,” 
to use John Richetti’s phrase (1999: 229). Its theme is the eighteenth-century 
version of the fight between good and evil over a soul of an individual, that 
is, the perpetual and irresolvable conflict between the values of the fashionable 
world on the one hand and reason and virtue on the other - allegorised by 
characters encountered by the young heroine at the beginning of her adult life. 
The outcome of the conflation of realism and allegory, however, hardly leads to 
an unambiguous moral and clear life lesson. The world of Cecilia is the world 
upside down, where masquerades, bankmptcy auctions and suicides are chief 
entertainments and the order of the day, and the precious few who are ratio­
nal and virtuous are considered as mad. Burney’s romanticised conduct book 
scarcely instructs its heroine (and readers) how to resolve the inherent contra­
dictions of the eighteenth-century world of pleasure, which functions in clear 
defiance of reason and Christian charity preached from every pulpit. Rather, it 
highlights the tragic situation of a novice confronted with the ambiguities of the 
life of fashion and forced to find a way between the madness of its dissipation 
and the insanity of non-conformity.
Yet, the novel of manners was supposed to elucidate the world rather than 
perplex the readers and the heroine. The genre is customarily described as an 
emplotted form of conduct books, serving the function of the guide to “social 
etiquette, social discrimination, and ethical conduct” (Kelly 1989: 44). The 
theme employed to illustrate the desirable and undesirable manners is most aptly
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described by the subtitle of Frances Burney’s first novel: Evelina; or, the History 
of a Young Lady’s Entrance into the World An inexperienced heroine
is confronted with the complex world whose codes, customs, principles and 
language she is supposed to leam in order to negotiate her place in society. Julia 
Epstein (1996: 200, 199) describes this kind of a protagonist as a “threshold” 
or “liminal” character, a character in “a state of ambiguous identity” since 
she is caught in the “conditional terrain of betwixt and between,” between the 
“emergence from her father’s protection and the subsumption of her identity 
into that of her husband.” Cecilia, however, is hardly a guide to social etiquette 
bound by a romantic plot. As Jane Spencer (2007: 30) points out, Burney’s 
novel by the foregrounding of the theme of “choice of life” is transformed 
from a “mere romantic story” to the story “of serious morality” comparable 
to Samuel Johnson’s philosophical tale Rasselas. “Cecilia’s love story,” argues 
Kristina Straub (1994: 206-7), “repeatedly intrudes upon her Rasselas-like 
search for a meaningful ‘course of life’ outside the framework of love. Try as 
she does to get on with her life through books, good deeds, and friendship, the 
romantic extremes of marital bliss versus ‘ruin’ [...] continue to undermine 
her sanity to the point of actual madness.” The ambiguity of Cecilia’s identity 
initially resultant from her inexperience gives way to the ambiguity caused by 
her experience of the internally contradictory world, symbolically represented 
by her mad ramble through the streets of London, “gliding from place to 
place, from street to street; with no consciousness of any plan, and following 
no other direction than that of darting forward where-ever there was most 
room, and turning back when she met with any obstruction” until she fainted 
in a shop and was taken for someone who “broke lose [sic!] from Bedlam” 
(Burney 1999: 897).
The persistent ambiguity of the moral is surprising in a tale which otherwise 
seems like a modem allegory. The construction of the conflict in Cecilia is based 
on the clear-cut opposition of the impersonated vices of the fashionable world 
and the charity of a single quixotic figure of Mr. Albany, and the characters, 
despite the profusion of details employed in their characterisation, are perfect 
allegories for the values of the world. Cecilia’s process of socialisation is shaped 
by conflicting counsels of her three guardians and Mr. Albany’s warnings, which 
lead her to profound perplexity and the ultimate ruin. Mr. Harrel, the epitome of 
“dissipation” and “unfeeling extravagance” (Burney 1999: 99), unscrupulously 
preys on Cecilia’s goodwill and by emotional blackmail swindles her out of her 
parents’ fortune before his spectacular suicide. The other guardian, Mr. Delvile, 
represents “haughtiness with ostentation” (Burney 1999: 100), feels contempt 
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for the Harrels, “whose ancestors, but a short time since, were mere Suffolk 
farmers” (Burney 1999.- 260), and to Cecilia herself, who is his superior in 
fortune but inferior in birth. As Mr. Briggs, the girl’s third guardian, a scrooge 
attached to money more than nobility, puts it, “he’s [Mr Delvile] counting 
nothing but uncles and grandfathers, dealing out fine names instead of cash, 
casting up more cousins than guineas” (Burney 1999: 333). Cecilia, thus, finds 
herself under protection of three figures representative of three obsessions of 
the culture to which she is introduced: pleasure, rank and money.
That the allegorical simplicity of the moral significance of the story is 
merely an illusion is signalled early in the novel in the scene of masquerade. As 
Terry Castle (1986: 260) explains, this is “the conventional situation: a novice 
heroine is about to undergo her ‘entrance into the world,’ an initiation into social 
life itself. [...] Confrontation with fashionable metropolitan life is Burney’s 
primary metaphor for learning one’s place in the symbolic order.” Cecilia is the 
only person undisguised, using the privilege of being the host’s inmate, and she 
is surrounded by masks, who allegorically represent the roles that their owners 
have to play in her story. Thus, although the usual rule of masquerades is to 
wear a costume contradictory to one’s own identity, Burney uses the motif, as 
Castle (1986: 263) explains, “in the familiar eighteenth-century comic mode, 
as a paradoxical transparency of the self [...] Each betrays himself [...] by 
the oddly lucid form of self-estrangement each has chosen.” Castle (1986: 
264) describes the rational and comic treatment of the theme as “a suave, 
unambiguous, entirely rhetorical operation” but the topos has here also an 
important function to play: it reveals that the masquerade, where guests are 
expected to attend disguised, is paradoxically the only occasion where people 
can show their true colours and where the social order is no longer obscured 
by convenances founded on hypocrisy. Cecilia, as Craft-Fairchild (1993: 4) 
observes, is presented as a symbol of “a painful submission of the woman to 
male scopophilia,” persecuted by a gang of admirers allured by her beauty and 
fortune but the only occasion on which she can see it clearly is, paradoxically, 
the one that requires the disguise of one’s true identity.
The masquerade, “the attendant circumstance of wantonly accumulating 
unnecessary debts” (Bumey 1999: 103), serves also the realistic function of 
depicting the Harrels’ dissipated way of life, which is one of the dominant 
themes in the novel. The Harrels’ lifestyle is, however, hardly exceptional 
in their times. Historians describe the eighteenth century as characterised by 
unprecedented consumerism in middle-class circles. As Maxine Berg (2007:21) 
explains, the eighteenth century is a period when luxurious goods “[l]uxuries, 
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formerly negatively associated with foreign imports and with elite ostentatious 
display, gave way to consumer goods identified with middling-class domestic 
interiors and dress. Distinctive British consumer goods connected the middling 
classes to an economy extolling the virtues of quality, delight, fashion and taste, 
comfort and convenience, and variety and imitation” and defining the status in 
fashionable society (Berg 2007: 29-31). Small wonder then that the rise of 
materialist philosophy of life, so radically opposed to Christian glorification of 
non-material values, provoked comments from philosophers, who emphasised 
the discrepancy between, as E. J. Hundert (1997: xxiv) describes it, “divine 
injunctions and everyday behaviour,” the latter of which required following 
the standards of fashion. Bernard Mandeville, Hundert (1997: xxv) explains, 
demonstrated that
[p]ersons in the recently constituted commercial polities [...] were obliged [...] to 
respond to a revised structure of priorities if they were to satisfy their impulses. [...] 
Mandeville showed that the aggressive pursuit of wealth had now to be understood 
not as an activity properly confined to marginalized minorities, but as central to the 
self-definition of urban and commercial populations.
The evaluation of the social consequences of the growing importance of 
consumerism was not, however, unified. Mandeville’s treatise, for example, 
aimed to demonstrate its public utility, Frances Burney’s Cecilia, by contrast, 
joined moral condemnations of the emerging code of conduct and showed it 
as a violation of common rules of decency and reason, leading to madness 
and unhappiness.
The language, pursuits and values of London polite circles in Cecilia - all 
defy the rules of common sense. The world of fashion appears to be governed by 
a certain logic but this is a logic that resembles that of madness, as is described 
by Michel Foucault in his Madness and Civilisation. Foucault (1988: 108) 
associates madness not with “reason diseases, or as reason lost or alienated, 
but quite simply with reason dazzled'."
Dazzlement is night in broad daylight, the darkness that rules at the very heart of 
what is excessive in light’s radiance. Dazzled reason opens its eyes upon the sun 
and sees nothing, that is does not see [...]
To say that madness is dazzlement is to say that the madman sees the daylight, the 
same daylight as the man of reason (both live in the same brightness); but seeing 
this same daylight, and nothing but this daylight and nothing in it, he sees it as void, 
as night, as nothing; for him the shadows are the way to perceive daylight. Which 
means that, seeing the night and nothingness of the night, he does not see at all. 
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And believing he sees, he admits as realities the hallucinations of his imagination 
and all the multitudinous population of night.
Cecilia is surrounded by dazzled figures who act on their own irrational logic. 
Miss Larolles is the first of the uncritical eulogists of her world, oblivious of 
its fissures, even if they are pointed out to her.
[Miss Larolles] beg[ged] leave to recommend to her [Cecilia’s] notice her own 
milliner.
“I assure you,” she continued, “she has all Paris in her disposal; the sweetest caps! 
the most beautiful trimmings! And her ribbons are quite divine! It is the most 
dangerous thing you can conceive to go near her; I never trust myself in her room 
but I am sure I will be ruined. If you please, I’ll take you to her this morning.” 
“If her acquaintance is so ruinous, ” said Cecilia, “I think I had better avoid it.” 
“Oh impossible! There’s no such thing as living without her. To be sure she’s 
shockingly dear, that I must own; but then who can wonder? She makes such sweet 
things, ’tis impossible to pay her too much for them.” (Burney 1999: 28-29)
In the world of fashion, where rank and affluence, or at least their appear­
ances, determine the position in society, words of common sense are drowned 
in the music and murmur of receptions and masquerades, which provide the 
opportunities to exhibit the luxury goods.
Even the auction sales of bankrupts’ property fail to provoke alarm and 
bring to the senses those in the mad pursuit of costly pleasures. The truth about 
the madness of such lives seems to be abundantly clear to the outsiders but 
not to those who belong.
While they were yet at breakfast, they were again visited by Miss Larolles. “I am 
come,” cried she, eagerly, “to run away with you both to my Lord Belgrade’s sale. 
All the world will be there; and we shall go there with tickets, and you have no 
notion how it will be crowded.”
“What is to be sold there?” said Cecilia.
“O every thing you can conceive; house, stables, china, laces, horses, caps, every 
thing in the world.”
“And do you intend to buy any thing?”
“Lord, no; but one likes to see the people’s things.”
Cecilia then begged they would excuse her attendance.
“Oh by no means,” cried Miss Larolles, “you must go, I assure you; there’ll be 
such a monstrous crowd as you never saw in your life. I dare say we shall be half 
squeezed to death.”
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“That,” said Cecilia, “is an inducement which you must not expect will have much 
weight with a poor rustic just out of the country: it must require all the polish of 
a long residence in the metropolis to make it attractive.
(Burney 1999: 31; italics mine)
Cecilia views the “monstrous crowd” and “see[ing] other people’s things” - 
and Miss Larolles assures her that “it will be the best sale we shall have this 
season,” since “the creditors have seized everything” - for what they are. She 
looks upon “continual dissipation as an introduction to vice” and “unbounded 
extravagance as a harbinger of injustice,” and they are in conflict with “the 
sobriety of her education, as it had early instilled into her mind the pure dictates 
of religion, and strict principles of honour” (Burney 1999: 32). Miss Larolles, 
however, fails to perceive their sinister aspect and regards them as nothing 
short of fashionable entertainments.
The same dazzlement of reason is manifested by Mrs Harrel, Cecilia’s 
guardian’s wife, whom the ward strives to dissuade from her dissipated lifestyle: 
“to retrench her expences [sic!], and change her thoughtless way of life for one 
more considerate and domestic,” warning her that “in time her income by such 
depredation will be exhausted.” Earnest though they are, all the attempts to 
open the woman’s eyes to the danger of bankruptcy come to no avail. “Mrs 
Harrel, with much simplicity, assured her she did nothing but what everybody 
else did, and that it was quite impossible for her to appear in the world in any 
other manner” (Burney 1999: 193).
The madman [argues Foucault] is not so much the victim of an illusion, of a hallu­
cination of his senses, or of a movement of his mind. He is not abused; he deceives 
himself. “We call madmen,” Sauvages was to say, “those who are actually deprived 
of reason or who persist in some notable error; it is this constant error of the soul 
manifest in its imagination, in its judgements, and in its desires, which constitutes 
the characteristic of this category.” (Foucault 1988: 104)
Mrs Harrel becomes an unconscious prisoner of her image of reality, which she 
cannot go beyond. Like Foucault’s madman, she seems to be “inside the image, 
confiscated by it, and incapable of escaping from it.” She “never oversteps 
the image presented” but “surrenders to its immediacy,” unable to act like 
“a reasonable man who, rightly or wrongly, judges an image to be true or false 
[...] transcends and measures it by what is not itself (Foucault 1988: 94).
Mrs Harrel is immune to all calls of reason. “O, it’s a very good proposal, 
that I agree,” she responds to Cecilia’s plans of reform, “but only the thing is
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it’s quite impossible.” When importuned as to the reasons why, she repeatedly 
asserts: “Lord I can’t tell - but I know it is - because - I am very sure it is” 
(Burney 1999: 194). Cecilia, as Burney describes it, “grieved at her blindness” 
(Bumey 1999: 195) and vexed by the new expenses incurred to deceive the 
world where bankruptcy seems inevitable, exclaims: “Who then at last [...] are 
half so much the slaves of the world as the gay and the dissipated?” (Bumey 
1999: 360). Appearances, however, can rarely be kept for long if cash runs low. 
Mr Harrel’s suicide in the fashionable gardens of Vauxhall, among the crowds of 
the fashionable people like himself, is its best evidence. Yet, even the extremity 
of death fails to awaken the people of pleasure from their dangerous delusions.
It is noteworthy that in the madness of the fashionable world, the only 
person who is capable of challenging its values in the open is considered as 
a madman. Mr. Albany, as Mr. Gosford, who serves Cecilia as a guide through 
the world, explains:
seems to hold mankind in abhorrence, yet he is never a moment alone, and at 
the same time he intrudes himself into all parties, he associates with none: he is 
commonly a stem and silent observer of all that passes, or when he speaks, it is but 
to utter some sentence of rigid morality, or some bitterness of indignant reproof.
(Bumey 1999: 69)
He acts like a prophetic figure who in the sinful world of dissipation scares 
and annoys the people of fashion pointing to them their hideous vanities. Miss 
Larolles complains, “[o]ne day he came up to me all of a sudden, and asked 
me what good I thought I did by dressing so much” (Bumey 1999: 290). 
Captain Aresby has a similar story to tell: “once he took the liberty to ask me, 
what service I was of to the world! and another time, he desired me to inform 
him whether I had ever made any poor person pray for me” (Bumey 1999: 
290). Mr Albany clearly does not fit the world he haunts: by his appearance - 
“I happened to fall a laughing at his going about in that old coat” (Bumey 1999: 
290), - or by his language - “without any seeming effort or consciousness, 
he runs into blank verse perpetually.” What is, however, most singular is “the 
matter of his discourse” (Bumey 1999: 291).
Mr Albany’s philosophy of life is defined in the total opposition to the 
principles of the world in which he lives. One of the characters describes it 
as strange, although it is a reflection of nothing but Christian charity, which 
was preached from every pulpit: “he thinks the whole world made to live in 
common, and that every one who is poor should ask, and every one who is 
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rich should give” (Burney 1999: 209). Yet, the world fails to live up to the 
simple biblical standards so Mr. Albany’s diagnosis of the world is blunt: folly, 
idleness and luxury have replaced virtue in the life of fashion.
“Oh times of folly and dissipation!” [...] “Oh mignons of idleness and luxury! 
What next will ye invent for the perdition of your time! How yet further will ye 
proceed in the annihilation of virtue!” (Burney 1999: 66)
And then he adds, stressing the defiance of the biblical principles of charity:
“Oh objects of penury and want!” .. .“Oh vassals of famine and distress! Come and 
listen to the wantonness of wealth! Come, naked and breadless as ye are, and learn 
how that money is consumed which to you might bring raiment and food!”
(Burney 1999: 67)
The impassioned speeches of Mr. Albany delivered in public places fail to 
produce the desired effect. For the fashionable company he remains a “crazy­
man” and a “bore” (Burney 1999: 67), which is the best illustration of the low 
esteem his values have in society.
Madness in Cecilia’s world is defined as a refusal to conform to the general 
protocol of life, however illogical and uncharitable it would be. Mrs. Harrel 
repeatedly asserts she cannot mend her life since “it’s what nobody thinks of’ 
and “one must live like other people” (Burney 1999: 194) to the outrage of 
Cecilia herself, who regards the conformity as an act of gross irrationality:
But were it not better [...] to think less of other people, and more of yourself? To 
consult your own fortune, and your own situation in life, instead of being blindly 
guided by those other people? If indeed other people would be responsible for your 
losses, for diminution of your wealth, and for the disorder of your affairs, then 
might you rationally make their way of life the example of yours: but you cannot 
flatter yourself such will be the case; you know better; your losses, your diminished 
fortune, your embarrassed circumstances will be all your own! Pitied, perhaps by 
some, but blamed by more, and assisted by none! (Burney 1999: 194-95)
Much as Cecilia condemns her friend’s conformity with the insanities of the 
fashionable world, she herself is scarcely prepared to utterly reject it. Cecilia’s 
personality may well be characterised by a “strong sense of DUTY, a fervent 
desire to ACT RIGHT” as well as a firm conviction that “her affluence” was 
but a “debt contracted with the poor, and her independence, as a tie upon 
her liberality to pay it with interest” (Burney 1999: 55). She, however, wants 
the firmness of character indispensable to defy the world in the open. When 
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approached by Albany in public, she tries to avoid his company. “I will not 
only hear, but thank you for your precepts, if you will forbear to give them 
before so many witnesses,” she implores in “a low voice.” Mr. Albany clearly 
resents the “false delicacy” in her:
“Whence,” cried he sternly, these vain and superficial distinctions? Do you not 
dance in public? What renders you more conspicuous? Do you not dress to be 
admired, and walk to be observed? Why then this fantastical scruple, unjustified 
by reason, unsupported by analogy? Is folly to be published? Is vanity alone to 
be exhibited? Oh slaves of thoughtless contradiction'. Oh feeble followers of yet 
feebler prejudice! Daring to be wicked, yet fearing to be wise; dauntless in levity, 
yet shrinking from the name of virtue!” (Burney 1999: 293; my emphasis)
Mr. Albany equally forcefully protests against the insincere polite formulas of 
the language employed by people of fashion. Having been greeted by Cecilia 
with the usual expression
“How little, Sir, [...] did I expect this pleasure.”
“This pleasure,” repeated he, “do you call it - what strange abuse of words! What 
causeless trifling with honesty! is language of no purpose but to wound the ear with 
untruths? Is the gift of speech only granted us to pervert the use of understanding? 
I can give you no pleasure, I have no power to give any one, you can give none to 
me - the whole world could not invest you with the means!” (Burney 1999: 702)
The hypocrisy of the culture is ingrained in its idiom - Cecilia’s mastery over 
it is symbolical of her, if only partial, inclusion in it. Mr. Albany’s refusal to 
compromise with the insincerity, dissipation and uncharitability of the world 
puts him on a par with madmen, although what he calls for is truth and virtue. 
Cecilia is thus confronted with a choice between the mad reality of the world 
of fashion and the knight-errantry of Mr Albany, and she fails miserably. Too 
timid to choose Mr Albany’s lifestyle and devote her life and fortune to charity, 
which was her original plan for life, enamoured with young Deville, whose 
father obsessed with the family pride objects to his heir’s acceptance of the 
wife’s name, Cecilia forfeits her fortune and autonomy.
Burney’s novel thus, allegorical as it may seem, hardly brings a moral. 
The struggles to reconcile various claims laid on its heroine by society and 
her own conscience, though apparently resolved by a moderately happy end­
ing, fail to mark the way out of the perplexity that a process of initiation into 
society is bound to produce. Although the story concludes with Cecilia’s “im­
perfect” happiness and reconciliation with the truth “that of the few who had 
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any happiness, there were none with some misery” and bearing “partial evil 
with chearfullest resignation” (Burney 1999: 941), Burney’s novel does not 
show the way to follow. Her conduct book remains ambiguous as to what code 
of conduct would allow to remain in agreement with one’s integrity and the 
strictures of the world. And thus the true conclusion of the novel seems to be the 
scene where Cecilia, penniless and bereft, rambles the streets of London until 
she faints in a shop and is taken for a lunatic and nursed by its owners in the 
expectation of a reward for taking care of a gentlewoman. This is where Burney 
portrays most aptly the implausibility of constructing an unambiguous book of 
conduct in the self-contradictory world of fashion of the eighteenth century.
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The Ambiguity of Violence in the Poetry 
of Robert Browning
Yet each man kills the thing he loves,
By each let this be heard,
Some do it with a bitter look,
Some with a flattering word,
The coward does it with a kiss,
The brave man with a sword!
Some kill their love when they are young,
And some when they are old;
Some strangle with the hands of Lust
Some with the hands of Gold:
The kindest use a knife, because
The dead so soon grow cold.
Some love too little, some too long.
Some sell, and others buy;
Some do the deed with many tears,
And some without a sigh:
For each man kills the thing he loves,
Yet each man does not die. (Oscar Wilde, “The Ballad of Reading Gaol,” 1898)
“All the major [Victorian] poets turned their attention to issues of sexual 
attraction and repulsion, if not violence. More forcefully than other discourse 
of the time, poetry opened up a space where the awkward tensions between 
sexual longing and being could be closely investigated” (Bristow 1991: 128). 
From this assertion, it is clear that Joseph Bristow considers violence to be 
innately connected to “sexual attraction and repulsion,” and suggests that the 
relationship between sexual impulse and violence can be most searchingly and 
eloquently expressed in poetry, for example, that of Robert Browning. Whilst 
there is certainly an inextricable link between sexual impulse and violence 
in poems such as Browning’s “Porphyria’s Lover” and “My Last Duchess,” 
depictions of violence in Browning’s poetry are suggestive of rather more than
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mere sexual conflict, and may be considered representative and reflective of 
wider conflicts, for example, those within the individual psyche, and within 
the male creative personality; tensions between the desire of the individual 
and repressive Victorian censoriousness; and the disparity between idealised 
expectations of femininity and the voracious male fascination with the illicit.
Jan Marsh attributes the opposition between the idealisation of the feminine 
and desire of the illicit to “rapid and immense social and economic change” and 
its “corresponding cultural repercussions,” claiming that “changes in patterns 
of work and family life [...] established new structures of feeling and repre­
sentation whereby women were both elevated and constrained, worshipped and 
restricted to specific roles” (1987: 10). However, the incongruity between male 
expectation of the feminine ideal and desire of the sexually illicit was by no 
means unique to the Victorian male, as illustrated by Tertullian’s (c. 160-220 
AD) description of the female as the ambiguous “temple built over a sewer,” 
simultaneously divine in her purity and sordid in her sexuality. The Janus-faced 
image of women as divine and woman as sordid occupied a significant po­
sition in the Victorian consciousness, and is embodied by the virtuous Rose, 
the heroine of Tennyson’s “The Gardener’s Daughter,” and the subject of Julia 
Margaret Cameron’s photograph, and Keats’s femme fatale, “La Belle Dame 
Sans Merci,” painted by John William Waterhouse, respectively. These con­
flicting notions of “woman as desirable, woman as chaste, woman as dutiful, 
woman as witch” (Marsh 1987: 9) result in the male confusion and conflict of 
emotions that can be observed in Browning’s “Porphyria’s Lover,” published 
in Dramatic Lyrics in 1842. Porphyria is both the feminine domestic ideal - 
“straight / She shut the cold out and the storm, / And kneeled and made the 
cheerless grate / Blaze up, and all the cottage warm;” - and unashamedly sexual 
in her gentle caress of the speaker - “She put my arm about her waist, / And 
made her smooth white shoulder bare, / And all her yellow hair displaced, 
/ And, stooping, made my cheek lie there” (11. 6-9; 16-19).1 Her partially 
unclothed state provides a subtle illustration of the speaker’s conflicting emo­
tions. Bristow (1991: 132) explains that the female body is seen as “a sight 
of purity in its nakedness,” yet to the speaker, Porphyria’s purity, represented 
by her “smooth white shoulder,” is tainted by her association with wider so­
ciety, symbolised by the clothes that she has not removed - the symbols of 
the soiled world outside the cottage, a world in which she is prevented from 
1 All quotations from Browning’s poetry are from A Critical Edition of the Major Works. 
Ed. A. Roberts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
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loving him openly by societal strictures, and those restrictions placed upon the 
“worshipped,” ideal woman.
The paradoxical perception of the female as both “a sight of purity” and 
irrevocably tainted leads to equally paradoxical demands on femininity made 
by the male. Porphyria’s lover desires to preserve this moment in which she 
is solely his - “mine, mine, fair, I Perfectly pure and good” (11. 36-37) - yet 
in strangling her, he irrevocably destroys the warmth, passion, adoration and 
attention that he so deeply desires. Her very presence in his cottage would 
be considered morally transgressive by society, yet he, believing that she is 
“too weak, for all her heart’s endeavor / To set its struggling passion free I 
From pride, and vainer ties dissever” (11. 22-24), seeks to protect her from 
further moral transgression through infidelity by murdering her. The speaker 
is caught between Victorian society’s insistence upon moral rectitude and his 
own powerful yearning for sensation and intimacy. Similarly, in Browning’s 
“My Last Duchess,” first published in the 1842 collection, Dramatic Lyrics, the 
jealous Duke wished to be the sole object of his wife’s attention and adoration, 
yet in orchestrating her death, has deprived himself of that pleasure. He wished 
her to be simultaneously more attentive to him, and less appreciative of others. 
Thus, we see that these acts of violence committed by the speakers are bom 
of confused and conflicting emotional reactions to the feminine. Browning 
proves himself to be intelligently aware of Victorian society’s paradoxical 
embrace of both moral rectitude and the desire for the illicit, and the violent 
bewilderment that results.
In an attempt to stave off the confusion of the “soul made weak by its pa­
thetic want,” (The Ring and the Book, XXI. 1. 559), Browning’s speakers often 
seek to control the feminine; physically, mentally and verbally. In “Porphyria’s 
Lover” we see how the speaker attempts to control and manipulate Porphyria, 
first with his sullen, spiteful silence, reflected in the “sullen wind” that “tore 
the elm-tops down for spite” (11. 2-3), then with brute force. Roma A. King 
(1968: 71) describes how “he resents her strength, although perhaps subcon­
sciously.” In the first section of the poem, Porphyria occupies the active role - 
“she sat down by my side / And called me. When no voice replied, / She put 
my arm about her waist” (11. 14-16, italics mine) - and it becomes clear that he 
believes that, in strangling her, and thus relegating her to the passive role, he has 
“righted things and assumed the normal masculine role” (King 1968:72). There 
is a deliberate reversal of the action as the speaker describes how, “Only this 
time, my shoulder bore / Her head, which droops upon it still” (11. 51-52, italics 
mine). However, he fails to comprehend that it was his misguided strategy of 
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control - his dour passivity and silence - that forced her to occupy the active 
role. Indeed, it is arguable that the entire poem represents a “misguided strategy 
of control’’ on the part of the speaker. He attempts to rationalise his murderous 
act, blaming her “pride” and attachment to “vainer ties,” yet the highly patterned 
rhyme scheme - ABABB - is at odds with his reasoned self-presentation. The 
intricacy of the rhyme scheme makes his colloquial, even casual tone seem 
unnatural and incongruous, prompting the reader to doubt the speaker’s appar­
ent rationality. Even after her death, the speaker seeks to control Porphyria, 
projecting onto her his own desires and insecurities, as he says, “The smiling 
rosy little head, / So glad it has its utmost will, / That all it scorned at once is 
fled, / And I, its love, am gained instead!” (11. 53-56), and justifies his violence 
as the fulfilment of “her darling one wish” (1. 57). Thus we see that a triple act 
of violence and control has been committed against Porphyria. His passiveness 
forced her to take charge of the situation, and then he punished her for her 
cheerful occupation of that active role by strangling her, then sought to justify 
his violence by projecting his desires onto her. Browning’s sensitivity to the 
complexities of human relationships allows him to recognise that passiveness 
can paradoxically be used as a violent means of manipulation and coercion.
In direct contrast to Porphyria’s lover, in “My Last Duchess” the Duke 
adopts a strategy of verbal activity rather than passiveness in an attempt to 
control his late wife. The Duke glibly and seemingly confidently directs the 
conversation and attention of the internal addressee towards the portrait, and 
attempts to demonstrate his mastery over his late wife through speech. However, 
his speech reveals his deep insecurities and inability to control his reaction to 
his wife, even after her death. The use of enjambment means that there is no 
sense of psychological or linguistic closure at the end of lines, but rather a sense 
of urgent, even uncontrollable compulsiveness behind the Duke’s revelations. 
This impression of lack of control is compounded by the subtle change from 
masculine to feminine rhyme, as the Duke explains, “She had a heart - how 
shall I say? - too soon made glad, / Too easily impressed; she liked whate’er 
she looked on, and her looks went everywhere” (11. 21-23). Max Keith Sutton 
(1969: 285) describes how “the tempo accelerates with the addition of a slight 
syllable at the end of a line, making the utterance sound full of energy and 
vehemence.” This is suggestive of the playful, innocent feminine energy of the 
Duchess breaking though the rigid verbal control of the Duke, as he fails to 
repress his violent reaction to the memory of his wife’s vitality.
That the Duke is still threatened and intimidated by that vitality and innocent 
sexuality is suggested on two levels within the poem: firstly, by his conscious 
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insistence that the portrait is veiled - “(since none puts by / The curtain I have 
drawn for you, but I)” (11.9-10), and secondly by his hesitations and demurrals, 
which suggest discomfort and anxiety, for example, in lines 22, 32 and 36.2 
It is clear that Browning’s male characters are highly vulnerable to the latent 
charms of the female. Indeed, in “Women and Roses,” published in Browning’s 
1855 collection, Men and Women, the male speaker promises his beloved that 
he would gladly “break my heart at your feet to please you! / Oh, to possess 
and be possessed!” (11. 19-20). Thus, the violent reaction of both Porphyria’s 
lover and the Duke may have been a subconscious act of self-defence, bom 
of a fear of self-extinction at the feet of the beloved, intended to destroy the 
female that threatened to completely ensnare them.
2 “She had / A heart - how shall I say? - too soon made glad” (11. 21-22); “She thanked men 
- good! But thanked / Somehow -I know not how - as if she ranked / My gift of a nine-hundred- 
years-old name / With anybody’s gift” (11. 31-34); “Even had you skill / In speech - (which I have 
not) - to make your will / Quite clear [...]” (11. 35-37).
Marsh (1987: 12) describes how the female figure in Victorian poetry and 
Pre-Raphaelite art “represented the artist’s own soul, the creative impulse of 
his art” - a notion explored in Dante Gabriel Rossetti’s prose piece “Hand 
and Soul.” However, Marsh fails to recognise that whilst the female represents 
the artistic soul, the male speaker in Browning’s poems often represents the 
artist’s physical being, desiring to visually capture something of the female. 
For example, in “Women and Roses,” the speaker exclaims, “Stay then, stoop, 
since I cannot climb, / You, great shapes of the antique time! How shall I fix 
you, fire you, freeze you?” (11. 17-18). He wishes to capture and preserve the 
beauty of the female object in the same way that an artist wishes to immortalise 
the beauty of his subject or give visual form to his inspiration. Similarly, the 
Duke wishes to “fix” his wife by turning her in an objet d’art, which can 
be controlled with what Laura Mulvey (1975: 11) terms “the male gaze,” 
which tends towards “a certain violence; penetrating, piercing, fixing.” Carol 
Christ (1987: 386) attributes a similar “gaze” to Tennyson’s male protagonists, 
describing how “Tennyson frequently presents poetry as an erotic theft through 
which the male incorporates a power he locates in the female. This theft is 
most often defined in visual terms, as an unauthorised gaze through which 
the poet steals the power that generates his art.” However, the Duke does not 
appear to derive any creative power or confidence from the portrait, because, 
as Mulvey (1975: 13) explains, “woman as icon, displayed for the gaze and 
enjoyment of men, the active controllers of the look, always threatens to evoke 
the anxiety it originally signified.”
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That the female figure is intended as a representation of the artist’s own 
creative energy initially seems problematic, as an act of fatal violence against 
the poetic rendering of the anima-figure would seem to symbolise the self­
destruction of that very creative inspiration. However, William O. Raymond 
(1950: 209) suggests that the female figure is also representative of “abstract 
idealism,” which is pitted against “masculine realism.” Thus in “Porphyria’s 
Lover” Porphyria represents the “abstract idealism” that naively leads her to 
believe that she can maintain a healthy relationship with a man of a lower socio­
economic class in a class-conscious society, whereas the speaker represents the 
unfortunate reality of that injuriously class-conscious patriarchal society which 
leads him to harm her jealously. Porphyria, innocently unaware of the tensions 
that socio-economic difference causes between them, is also representative of 
Browning’s “artistic inheritance of the ideals of Romanticism, as represented by 
the poetry ofShelley” (Raymond 1950: 195). Thus, the speaker’s actofviolence 
against her is representative of the tension that existed between Browning’s 
residual Romantic idealism and the mood of moral righteousness that pervaded 
Victorian society, though for Browning, such tension was employed construc­
tively and creatively. Raymond (1950: 211) asserts that “Browning is prone to 
make his characters voice his own ideas, to grant them only semi-independence, 
or even reduce them to mouthpieces of his personality.” If this is true, then an 
act of violence against the female is an enactment of the intellectual violence 
of the conflicting beliefs, opinions and emotions of the poet.
Such conflicting emotions and desires can be observed in Browning’s “Two 
in the Campagna,” first published in Men and Women. The speaker wishes to 
“pluck the rose” (1. 48), yet is troubled by the intangible presence of a “fault” 
or “wound” in their relationship (11. 39-40). Bristow (1991: 137) describes how 
the speaker, though “guided towards this divine act of sexual union, [...] none 
the less fears violating the woman’s individuality.” The tension between these 
desires is augmented by lines in which the speaker sincerely voices a desire 
for union, then immediately negates or qualifies it for fear of her subjection, 
for example when he says, “I would that you were all to me, / You that are 
just so much, no more. / Nor yours nor mine, nor slave nor free!” (11. 36-38). 
The moral dilemma is also physically enacted in the line, “No. I yearn upward, 
touch you close, / Then stand away” (11. 46-47). The ultimate irreconcilability 
of these desires - to both sexually possess the woman and leave her free to 
retain her individuality - is subtly expressed in the image of the “thread the 
spiders throw / Mocking across our path” (11. 8-9), which long eludes his grasp. 
The speaker asks his beloved, “Help me to hold it!” and “Hold it fast!” (11. 
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11; 20). However, despite the speaker’s obvious concern for the interests of 
his beloved, she is largely absent from the poem; his personal predicament 
is privileged over hers. Although not through physical violence, she too, like 
Porphyria and the Duchess, is denied a voice.
A similar conflict of male desires pervades “Women and Roses.” The 
speaker wishes to “make an Eve, be the artist that began her, / Shaped her to 
his mind” (11. 46-47), yet recognises that “women faded for ages, / Sculptured 
in stone, on the poet’s pages” dull in comparison to the “women fresh and 
gay, / Living and loving and loved to-day” (11. 6-9). The impossibility of 
“shaping” a woman to his mind, yet leaving intact her personality and vitality 
is encapsulated in the phrase, “Drink but once and die!” (1. 23). The speaker 
may “shape” her to his taste, but her individuality will “die” in the process. 
Bristow (1991: 134) observes an ethical point in the poem: “that women should 
not be entrapped by a male’s all consuming desire. Women have the right to 
resist a male impulse that seeks to ‘fix’ its object.” This reflects Browning’s 
“firm commitment to the [notion of the] liberal subject; a free, independent and 
ostensibly ungendered being” (Bristow 1991: 129).
It is clear that Browning was deeply concerned with the freedom of the 
individual and the moral responsibility connected to that freedom. Marsh (1987: 
152) suggests that the depictions of female characters such as Porphyria, the 
Duchess and Tennyson’s Lady of Shalott are intended to communicate not only 
the implicitly criticised “confined and restricted world of the Victorian woman” 
but also “the dire consequences attendant on rebellion.” Marsh’s suggestion 
prompts us to consider whether Browning intended to convey a moral precept 
through his depiction of violence against the female. Whilst he no doubt wished 
to explore the complex rationalisation behind the punishment of the female, 
nothing in the poetry suggests that he is expressing a personal belief in her 
moral delinquency. Indeed, in “My Last Duchess,” the reader is encouraged to 
view the Duchess as merely innocently vivacious and charming. In “Porphyria’s 
Lover,” the speaker convinces himself that his act of violence was a pre­
emptive punishment for her inevitable infidelity. As in many Victorian texts, 
her “yellow hair” (1. 17) is symbolic of sexual potency and female desire, 
and it is deeply significant that he strangles her with the very symbol of the 
sexuality for which he is punishing her. However, the reader is left in no doubt 
that the speaker is mentally unstable, thus fatally undermining the legitimacy 
of his moral judgement. Far from criticising the female, Browning’s depiction 
of violence is in fact a subtle condemnation of Victorian society as a whole. 
The advent of sensationalist novels and tabloid newspapers, both due to the 
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creation of a mass reading public, led to the normalization of violence, and 
a desensitised readership. Fed with lurid stories every day, the public came to 
regard such violence as hackneyed. This is suggested in “Porphyria’s Lover” 
as her strangulation is described in a conversational, even blase tone - “I found 
/ A thing to do, and all her hair / In one long yellow string I wound / Three 
times her little throat around, I And strangled her” (11. 37-41). Browning’s 
depiction of this fatal act is intended to shatter that sense of complacency and 
provoke a sudden, sincere emotional reaction, and in the process illustrate the 
disturbed condition of the Victorian psyche. Raymond (1950:203) suggests that 
“in order to accentuate the poignancy and arduousness of this process, the poet 
dwells with unflinching realism on the grim potency of evil and suffering.” 
However, Browning recognised that evil could often appear attractive and 
charismatic. In “My Last Duchess,” the Duke says, “Notice Neptune, though, 
/ Taming a seahorse, thought a rarity” (11. 54-55), and we are led to identify 
the Duke with the impressive image of the god. King (1968: 69) describes 
how “the artistry of the object suggests a certain perverse beauty in the Duke 
and explains partly why we have been temporarily captivated by him. Upon 
reflection, he is likely to seem repugnant.”
One of the guises in which violence may “captivate” the imagination and 
appear attractive is that of Imperialistic ambition. Browning’s depictions of 
violent acts committed against women could be considered to be metaphors for 
acts of imperialist violence committed against subject nations. Edmund Dowden 
(1915:111), however, argues that Browning does not “anywhere study political 
phenomena or events except as they throw light on individual character,” and 
would thus be more interested in the individual instance of violence, than in its 
metonymic potential for the illumination of “political phenomena or events.” 
That said, Browning would have surely perceived and appreciated its effective 
metaphorical or metonymic potential. Like the female, the subject nations were 
considered to be what Edward Said described as “the Other” - ultimately 
unknowable in their dissimilarity. The misconstrued innocent vitality and sexual 
allure of Porphyria and the Duchess can be likened to the native traditions and 
cultures that were similarly suppressed by British Imperialism. Bristow (1991: 
141) claims that Browning seeks to “estrange eroticism from Imperialism” in 
“Love Among the Ruins,” first published in Men and Women, by emphasising 
the contrast between the lovers’ embrace and the “whole centuries of folly, noise 
and sin!” (11. 81-82) caused by violence and warfare, and each stanza formally 
emphasises the schism between past and present. The speaker longs to mentally 
and physically disconnect from the “million fighters” of the past, and voices 
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a desire to “Shut them in, / With their triumphs and their glories and the rest!” 
simply concluding, “Love is best” (1. 84). Despite this attempt at estrangement, 
or perhaps, suppression, Bristow (1991: 141) questions “what act of war might 
the male speaker be committing on the woman that awaits him?” Her “yellow 
hair” calls to mind the unfortunate Porphyria, and we cannot help but wonder 
how long it will be before the speaker grows suspicious of her “eager eyes.”
It seems that the Victorian male poet faced a double crisis of gender, 
so to speak. He experienced not only the inevitable uncertainty of a man in 
a society which simultaneously idealised and demonised, desired and despised 
women, but also an anxiety about how the writing of poetry was to be rec­
onciled with the new Victorian ideal of “entrepreneurial manliness” (Sussman 
1995: 82). Dorothy Mermin (1986: 67) notes that “for the Victorians, writing 
poetry seemed like woman’s work, even though only men were supposed to 
do it [...] Male Victorian poets worried that they might in effect be feminiz­
ing themselves by withdrawing into a private world.” What has come to be 
the stereotypical (though now somewhat discredited) image of the Romantic 
poet - a fey, solitary figure, isolated from the male sphere of commerce, gov­
erned by “feminine” imagination rather than “male” rationality - loomed large 
in the Victorian period, and male poets, such as Browning and, in his later 
work, Tennyson, sought to “recover a male identity though remasculinization” 
(Shires 1987: 269).
In “Fra Lippo Lippi” and “Andrea del Sarto,” both published in Men 
and Women, Browning presents a male artist figure attempting, with varying 
degrees of success, to reconcile his occupation with the Victorian ideal of 
“entrepreneurial manliness.” Both poems suggest that artistic potency is in­
extricably linked to male sexual energy and commercial success. However, 
with characteristic subtlety, Browning, despite portraying Lippo as commer­
cially successful, and creatively and sexually potent - the apparent epitome 
of “entrepreneurial manhood” - suggests that there are inherent and insoluble 
contradictions within that ideal. As such, Browning’s male artist figures are 
haunted by fears of emasculation, and the kind of violence that is elsewhere 
inflicted upon Browning’s female characters. For example, in “Fra Lippo Lippi” 
it appears to Lippo that a guardsman holds aloft “John Baptist’s head a-dangle 
by the hair / With one hand [...]/ And his weapon in the other, yet unwiped!” 
(11. 34-36). This ominous image is compounded by the Prior’s reference to 
“Herodias, [...] I Who went and danced and got men’s heads cut off!” (11. 
196-97). Lippo attempts to assert his masculine autonomy, declaring, “I’m 
my own master, paint now as I please,” but then continues, “Having a friend, 
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you see, in the Comer-house!”(ll. 226-27). Lippo, despite his protestations of 
independence, is as dependent upon his influential Medici patron as any wife 
upon her husband, or whore upon her client. Indeed, Rossetti (1965-67: 2. 
1175) wrote in a letter to Ford Madox Brown in 1873, “I have often said that 
to be an artist is just the same thing as to be whore, as far as dependence on 
the whims and fancies of individuals is concerned.” The “munificent House” 
that “harbours” Lippo also, in a sense, imprisons him (11. 29). He is forced to 
suppress his sensual nature, as the Prior orders him:
ignore it all,
Make them forget there’s such a thing as flesh.
Your business is to paint the souls of men -
[...]
Give us no more of body than shows soul! (11. 181-88)
For Lippo, as for Browning’s female characters, to display his sensual na­
ture would be to incur punishment and disgrace. In order to be economically 
successful and retain the favour of his influential patron, he must suppress 
his male sexual energy, yet in doing so, he cannot achieve the ideal of “en­
trepreneurial manliness,” which the poem ostensibly celebrates.
It is clear that Browning found violence to be an abundant source of literary 
inspiration, and that the depiction of the violent act allowed him to explore the 
underlying tensions and oppositions that pervaded the dramatically changing 
Victorian society, and characterised the contradictory attitudes towards the fe­
male and the feminine, and the subsequent insecurity of the male. Browning 
recognised that violence could take many forms, and could appear behind the 
guise of passivity, suppression, or feigned moral righteousness. As with all of 
Browning’s themes and subjects, violence is never straightforward or unam­
biguous, either in its motivation, its depiction or its perception. The complexity 
and acuity of Browning’s depiction of violence engages the reader on both an 
intellectual and emotional level, and so we, as readers, are intellectually and 
emotionally implicated in the poem’s search for meaning.
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“Knitting the Days Away”: Needlework 
in Margaret Oliphant’s Salem Chapel
When the ten-year-old Jane Eyre arrived at Lowood school, one of the first 
questions she was asked was whether she could “read, write, and sew a little” 
(Bronte 1994: 45). Sewing, then, was a necessary element of a girl’s education, 
on a par with reading and writing, and it formed a significant part of a woman’s 
life: “one of the great silences about women’s lives was undoubtedly filled 
with needlework [...] middle-class women were constantly sewing, and their 
daughters were taught to do so from the age when they could grasp a needle” 
(Davidoff and Hall 2002: 387). In The Sampler (1855), E. Finch, who describes 
needlework as “Art [which] is useful, and indeed indispensable to women of 
all ranks” (1855: xi), indicates the necessity of teaching poor girls the art of 
the needlework, as it might be the means of improving their condition and add 
to their happiness (1855: x). Writers of the period often stressed the practical 
advantages of the dexterity with the needle but needlework had also acquired 
associations with feminine virtues and, for both reasons, it was considered an 
accomplishment necessary to a woman of any class. As Maitzen indicates, “to 
lack this skill was to appear not just ill-trained but unfeminine” (1998: 63).
The meaning of needlework in Victorian culture, however, is ambiguous 
and far more complex than its interpretation as a signifier of domestic feminin­
ity and feminine virtues might suggest. Margaret Oliphant, who, in Langland’s 
words, challenges “so many Victorian sacred cows” (1995: 153), does not 
seem to embrace the sentimentalised views either on femininity or needling but 
rather subscribes to the more critical attitudes, evident also in other texts from 
the period (see Maitzen 1998: 67—70).1 Her Salem Chapel (1863), for instance, 
does not present needlework as an ennobling activity, but rather as a drudgery 
performed either for lack of other occupation or for money. The novel features
1 Maitzen mentions a writer in the Athenaeum, who believes needlework to be “as injurious 
to mind as it is to bodily health” (quoted in Maitzen 1998: 67). Several female writers, including 
Margaret Oliphant, George Eliot and Elizabeth Barrett Browning, whose very identity as authors 
depends on their putting aside the needle (which symbolises a feminine occupation), see in needle­
work a symbol of “the enforced and stifling leisure” (Maitzen 1998: 70).
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two prominent needling characters: Mrs Hilyard and Adelaide Tufton. When 
Mr Vincent, the new minister of Salem Chapel, visits Mrs Hilyard in her hum­
ble abode, he assumes that she is an impoverished gentlewoman reduced by 
some unfortunate circumstances to earn her living by slopwork. Undoubtedly 
affected by contemporary representations of seamstresses as martyrs sacrificed 
on the altar of capitalists society, he does not realise that far from being an 
innocent victim, Mrs Hilyard oversteps the norms of acceptable behaviour for 
a lady: not only does she leave her good-for-nothing husband and conceals their 
daughter’s whereabouts, but also she threatens to kill him and almost manages 
to carry out the threat. Adelaide Tufton, in turn, is the old minister’s crippled 
daughter, whose major entertainment is knitting and gossip, and who observes 
Mr Vincent’s career in Salem Chapel with great interest. Neither Mrs Hilyard’s 
application to the coarse sewing, however, nor Adeleide Tufton’s eternal knit­
ting, make them paragons of womanhood or contribute to the development of 
superior feelings of sympathy and love. By presenting the clash between Mr 
Arthur Vincent’s sentimental reading of Mrs Hilyard’s plight and reality, as 
well as by substituting the idealised angelic middle-class needling woman with 
the rather uncanny figure of Adelaide Tufton, Oliphant ironically subverts the 
cultural icon of needlewoman.
The figure of a needlewoman, often identified as specifically Victorian 
(Alexander 2003: 24), had acquired by the nineteenth century a great symbolic 
richness, “the ideological and cultural legacy of the previous three hundred 
years” (Maitzen 1998: 63). In the nineteenth century, amateur needlework, re­
tained its connotations from the Elizabethan period with “leisured, well-bred 
femininity” (Maitzen 1998: 63), and thus it was a signifier of rank as well as of 
taste and refinement. Simultaneously, however, as needlework was a skill taught 
to women at all levels of society2, it could be seen as “a bridge between the 
classes” (Alexander 2003: 20)3, obliterating class differences, as not only rank, 
2 Victorian writers stress that needlework is an occupation for all classes. “Needlework appears 
to have been not only a pastime for noble ladies but the principal occupation, as a source of 
pecuniary advantage, for women, from the most remote periods [...] from time immemorial, it 
has ever been the constant amusement, and solace, of the leisure hours of royalty itself’ (Lambert 
1842: 1); “From the stateliest denizen of the proudest palace, to the humblest dweller in the poorest 
cottage, all more or less ply the busy needle; from the crying infant of a span long and an hour’s 
life, to the silent tenant of‘the narrow house,’ all need its practical services” (Stone 1840: v).
3 Because of the positive associations of needlework and gentility, needlework became one of 
the very few possible professions for middle-class women in reduced circumstances. “Needlework’s 
association with middle-class gentility made working in a dress-shop like a step up the social ladder 
for the former [lower-class girls], and only a small step down for the latter [middle-class women]”
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but also the moral virtues associated with rank, were symbolised by needle­
work. Maitzen indicates that in the seventeenth century, when needlework was 
“one of the primary means by which every girl was trained in her society’s ide­
ology of womanhood,” samplers were indicative not only of “specific stitching 
skills” but, more significantly, of “self-discipline, patience, and industry” and 
“other desirable virtues such as piety, obedience, submission, and resignation” 
(1998:63). The “little dainty tool,” as Craik(1858: 81) called it, and needlework 
in general, became a visible manifestation of invisible virtues, which underlined 
a woman’s domesticity and her social role as it was conceived in the Victorian 
period. The association of needlework with gentility and genteel virtues, in 
turn, explains why a poor seamstress, rather than any other figure, came to 
represent victims of the industrial revolution and symbolise social inequalities. 
As a woman embracing middle-class moral values implicated by her occupa­
tion, she “was someone to whom readers could respond without prejudice” 
(Alexander 2003: 9), and with whom they could identify “either as women who 
sewed or as men whose mothers, wives and sisters sewed” (Alexander 2003:9). 
Although she embodied the suffering of the working classes, she “escaped the 
stigma of being a factory worker” (Alexander 2003: 9), “presented no threat to 
the status quo” and “[tjhere were no images of mob scenes or riots surrounding 
her” (Alexander 2003: 25); in contrast to “the feisty, independent, relatively 
well paid factory woman who had embodied the working woman in the 1830s” 
(Rogers 1997: 590), a seamstress “provided a feminine worker who could easily 
be tied to more traditional symbols of hearth and home, often heightened by ties 
to a past rural environment, and, indirectly, reinforced a sense of paternalism 
in the calls for reform” (Alexander 2003: 10).
The fate of poor seamstresses in the Victorian period became the subject of 
parliamentary reports, journal articles* 4  and fiction.5 A seamstress was a figure 
(Maitzen 1998: 94-95). Moreover, because of the association of sewing with domesticity and 
domestic middle-class virtues, a needlewoman forced to work for wages, became a very potent 
symbol of social injustice and of victims of industrialism.
4 Whereas fiction and art tends to romanticise the image of a seamstress, the reports or at least 
some journal articles present a more realistic, if also more gruesome picture of the seamstress’s 
life, which would, however, prove “unpalatable to many Victorian viewers” (Edelstein 1980: 196).
5 The figure of an exploited seamstress appears, to mention just a few examples, in Dickens’s 
Nicholas Nickleby (1838-39), Charlotte Tonna’s The Wrongs of Women (1844), Elizabeth Gaskell’s 
Mary Barton (1848) and Ruth (1853), or less known Lucy Dean: the Noble Needlewoman (1850) 
by “Silverpen” (Eliza Meteyard’s penname), not to mention “Song of the shirt” by Thomas Hood, 
which became an inspiration for artists and writers alike.
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frequently depicted by Victorian artists6, especially since Richard Redgrave’s 
presentation of his picture “The Sempstress” (1844).7 Consequently, when 
Oliphant’s protagonist, Mr Arthur Vincent, meets Mrs Hilyard, “working busily 
at men’s clothing of the coarsest kind, blue stuff which had transferred its colour 
to her thin fingers” (Oliphant 1986: 20), and continuing her work during their 
conversation “without ever raising her eyes, intent upon the rough work which 
he could not help observing sometimes made her scarred fingers bleed as it 
passed rapidly through them” (Oliphant 1986: 21), he cannot but perceive 
her through the prism of his own preconceptions fostered by similar scenes 
proliferating in art, novels and daily press, where a needlewoman was usually 
presented as a blameless victim of the capitalist society. Thomas Hood’s famous 
poem, “The song of the shirt” (1843), for instance, describing a seamstress 
“With fingers weary and worn,/With eyelids heavy and red” (Hood 1861: 193) 
and stitching “in poverty, hunger, and dirt” (Hood 1861: 193) is a potent source 
of imagery. Victorian seamstress paintings, which tend to romanticise the figure 
of a needlewoman, however, might have had an even more powerful hold 
on Victorian minds. Many of the paintings follow the fashion established by 
Redgrave’s picture, which “creat[ed] a visual iconography echoed in some 
way by all subsequent versions of the motif’ (Edelstein 1980: 185) and which 
“embodies the Victorian vision of the needlewoman” (Edelstein 1980: 188), 
present a single female figure in circumstances not much different from those 
in which Mr Vincent finds Mrs Hilyard. They show “an isolated figure of 
sorrow and suffering, with only background details - the late hour as indicated 
by a clock and guttering candles, the ill health indicated by the medicine bottles 
with hospital labels, or the lack of food indicated by empty cupboards and dirty 
cups but no plates” (Alexander 2003: 11). The meagre but neat attic room, 
often overlooking a church tower8, which usually forms the background for the 
presentation of the needlewoman, becomes in the novel “a shabby room, only 
half-carpeted, up two pairs of stairs, which looked out upon no more lively 
6 For example J. T. Peele’s “The Seamstress” (1852), Anna Blunden’s “For only one short hour” 
(1854), or George Elgar Hicks’ “Snowdrops”; see the list of seamstress artwork in Alexander 2003: 
229-232.
7 Richard Redgrave painted two versions of the picture, one was presented in 1844, and the 
other is dated 1846. The second version includes details that make the fate of the poor seamstress 
even more dreary than in the first version (see Wood 1976: 126)
8 Edelstein believes that the church tower visible through the window in the pictures presenting 
a needlewoman might suggest the passage of time, the clock in the tower chiming hour after hour 
(1980: 202)
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view than the back of Salem Chapel, with its few dismal scattered graves” 
(Oliphant 1986: 19-20).
In addition, Mrs Hilyard, although neither extremely beautiful nor young, 
as it was frequently the case in Victorian depictions of a needlewoman, is 
nevertheless perceived by Mr Vincent as evidently more genteel or cultivated 
than her surroundings seem to suggest, and thus she seems to correspond 
with the conventional image of a seamstress, who, as “a martyr to modem 
urban society” (Edelstein 1980: 190), is portrayed in a way that evokes saintly 
imagery (Edelstein 1980: 190). Mr Vincent claims that “the most ignorant could 
not doubt for a moment [Mrs Hilyard’s] perfect superiority to [her surroundings] 
- a superiority so perfect [...] that it is not necessary to assert it” (Oliphant 
1986: 64). Even her “extreme thinness of outline and sharpness of line” seems 
to Mr Vincent a sign of refinement, as it is clearly contrasted with “the faces 
which had lately surrounded the minister” (Oliphant 1986: 19), the faces of the 
Tozers, the Browns and the Pigeons who live “[a]mid their rude luxuries and 
commonplace plenty” (Oliphant 1986: 16), and especially with the “plump and 
pink” Phoebe (Oliphant 1986:13). Mrs Hilyard’s is an “educated countenance,” 
and although “[i]t was not a profound or elevated kind of education, perhaps, 
[...] it was very different from the thin superficial lacker with which Miss 
Phoebe was coated” (Oliphant 1986: 19). When their first interview comes to 
an end, Mr Vincent feels “as if he had been dismissed from the presence of 
a princess” (Oliphant 1986: 23) and he is left to wonder
Who she was or what she was - how she came there, working at those “slops” 
till the colour came off upon her hands, and her poor thin fingers bled - she so 
strangely superior to her surroundings, yet not despising or quarrelling with them, 
or even complaining of them, so far as she could make out - infinitely perplexed 
the inexperienced minister. (Oliphant 1986: 23)
Mr Vincent, however, has rather “mistaken notions of himself and those 
around him” (Terry 1983: 79), and his romanticised perception of Mrs Hilyard 
proves misguided. Rather than being an exploited but virtuously passive and 
helpless woman, Mrs Hilyard turns out to be more like a sensation heroine, 
whose violent passions and rejection of accepted norms of feminine behaviour 
render her a morally ambivalent and dangerous character. She is not a saint or 
an angel but, in the words of her husband, she might be a “she-wolf” (Oliphant 
1986: 106), a “she devil” and “a murderess” (Oliphant 1986: 107). Her life 
was one “where volcanoes had been, and earthquakes” (Oliphant 1986: 22): 
she deserted her husband and threatened to revenge herself on him and kill 
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him (and actually made an attempt to do so) should he try to snatch their 
daughter from her. Unlike Redgrave’s “single figure,” which “shows that this 
woman is alone and defenceless, without the protection of a husband, a family, 
or friends” by which he “exploits the Victorian conception of the necessity 
for a woman to exist under male protection” (Edelstein 1980: 188-189), Mrs 
Hilyard’s loneliness, resulting from her desire to protect her daughter, becomes 
a sign of her defiance and a refusal to accept a life with a brute of a husband, 
and her work signifies her hard-won independence.
Sensation seems to be completely absent in the life of another needling 
woman in Salem Chapel, Adelaide Tufton. As a disabled daughter of the old 
minister, she is sentenced to lifelong confinement at home, an existence that 
can only be diversified with her knitting and gossip. Interestingly, her disability 
might be read simultaneously as a metaphor for an angelic woman’s limited 
existence and for the distortion, not just of her body, but also of the Victorian 
feminine ideal. Adelaide is
[a] very pale, emaciated, eager looking woman, not much above thirty, but looking, 
after half a lifetime spent in that chair, any age that imagination might suggest; 
a creature separated from the world - separated from life, it would be more proper 
to say - for nobody more interested in the world and other people’s share of it than 
Adelaide Tufton existed in Carlingford. (Oliphant 1986: 25)
Her physical weakness and bad health suggested by her paleness and ema­
ciation can be read as a distorted reflection of an angelic woman’s physical 
frailty and delicacy. Her forced domesticity and her gloating on gossip echo 
a Victorian angel’s seclusion and life experienced vicariously, through men. 
The suggestion that she exists, as it were, outside time, unaffected by it, refers 
to an angel’s “suprahuman powers” (Auerbach 1982: 64).
Neither does Adelaide’s knitting quite fit the Victorian conception of 
needlework as the labour of love enhancing feminine virtues. The nineteenth­
century discourse presents the needle as one of the major attributes of a woman, 
and needlecraft signifies “the intangible and heavily class-inflected traits puta­
tively fostered by rigorous application to this difficult and tedious technical skill: 
elegance, taste, and refinement indicate affluence united with good breeding” 
(Maitzen 1998: 65) as well as a woman’s role in society:
Who amongst us has not a great reverence for that little dainty tool; such a wonderful 
brightener and consoler; our weapon of defence against slothfulness, weariness, and 
sad thoughts; our thrifty helper in poverty, our pleas friend at all times? From the 
first “cobbled-up” doll’s frock - the first neat stitching for mother, or hemming of
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father’s pocket-handkerchief - the first bit of sewing shyly done for some one who 
is to own the hand and all its duties - most of all, the first strange, delicious fairy 
work, sewed at diligently, in solemn faith and tender love, for the tiny creature as 
yet unknown and unseen - truly, no one but ourselves can tell what the needle is to 
us women. (Craik 1858: 81-82)
Not only does Craik, in the apologia for needlework, evoke the virtues tra­
ditionally associated with it - industry or thrift - but she also represents it 
as a labour of love (in contrast to labour for wages, which is the domain of 
men), and she delineates the stages of a woman’s life - as a daughter, wife 
and mother - by presenting different applications of the needle. Similarly, in 
The Illustrated girl’s own treasury the anonymous writer extols needlework as 
an expression of love and care:
[needlework] brings daily blessings to every home, though unnoticed, perhaps, 
because of its hourly silent application. In a household each stitch is one for comfort 
to some person or other; and without its very watchful care home would be a scene 
of discomfort indeed. In its ornamental adaptation, it delights the eye, amuses the 
mind, nay, sometimes cheats grief of its sorrow; but, more than all, gives bread to 
thousands. The women of every nation, from time immemorial to the present, have 
beguiled their hours with the needle [...]. Upon all classes and in all climes this 
simple instrument has bestowed a varied charm. (Craik 1858: 79)
Needlework is presented as the essence of a woman’s life, both work and 
amusement, an expression of taste and of a practical sense. Both Craik and 
the anonymous author, vindicate this rather simple and trifle activity which, 
however, contributes to happiness of the loved ones and their welfare.
Adelaide Tufton, however, knits for nobody and for no purpose: “during 
[her] long seclusion, [she] had knitted as all Salem Chapel believed, without 
intermission, nobody having ever yet succeeded in discovering where the mys­
terious results of her labour went to” (Oliphant 1986: 25). Her incessant work is 
exposed as drudgery whose only purpose is to kill time while leaving her mind 
free to indulge in local gossip. In fact, Adelaide seems to be totally deficient 
in the love and sympathy which were supposed to distinguish the Victorian 
angelic woman. She analyses human feelings in the cold and disengaged man­
ner of a scientist. When she torments Mr Vincent with questions about Lady 
Western’s marriage she “did not show any pleasurable consciousness of her 
triumph; she kept knitting on, looking at him with her pale blue eyes. There 
was something in that loveless eagerness of curiosity which appalled Vincent” 
(Oliphant 1986: 442). “[A] certain mischievous and pleased satisfaction” that 
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she experiences in the “probable discomfiture” of the object of her attention 
(Oliphant 1986: 31) seems to be the only emotion she experiences.
Adelaide’s incessant knitting, her isolated existence and the almost inhuman 
impermeability to emotion make her an uncanny figure. Her life seems to be 
unaffected by any change as if she existed outside time; she is like a goddess 
or an angelic woman, who “in some curious way inhabits both this world and 
the next” (Gilbert and Gubar 1984: 24). When Mr Vincent came to see Mr 
Tufton after all the painful events that had shaken his own life, he is surprised 
to find everything unaltered:
Had time really gone on through all these passions and pains, of which he was 
conscious in his heart? Or had it stood still, and were they only dreams? Adelaide 
Tufton, immovable in her padded chair, with pale blue eyes that searched through 
everything, had surely never once altered her position, but had knitted away the 
days with a mystic thread like one of the Fates. (Oliphant 1986: 440)
Adelaide’s days, where the passage of time is marked only by the clicking of her 
knitting needles, seem to embody the mundane existence of a Victorian angel, 
as contrasted with Mr Vincent’s more eventful life. To Mr Vincent, Adelaide 
“conveyed an idea of age” (Oliphant 1986: 27) and death:
He came away with a strange impression on his mind of that knitting woman, pale 
and curious in her padded chair. Adeleide Tufton was not old - not a great many 
years older than himself. To him, with the life beating so strong in his veins, the 
sight of that life in death was strange, almost awful. [...] if he came here ten years 
hence, he might still find as now the old man by the fire, the pale woman knitting 
in her chair, as they had been for these six months which had brought to the young 
minister a greater crowd of events than all his previous years. When he thought of 
that helpless woman, with her lively thoughts and curious eyes, always busy and 
speculating about the life from which she was utterly shut out, a strange sensation 
of thankfulness stole over the young man; though he was miserable he was alive.
(Oliphant 1986: 445)
For Adeleide, imprisoned in her disabled body and in her padded chair, her 
home becomes a tomb. But if her existence is much like death, so is the life of 
an angelic woman (Gilbert and Gubar 1984:24-26), excluded from the world of 
action and held down by trifles. Adeleide’s purposeless knitting, which seems 
to be the only activity, save gossip, left to her might be read as the symbol of 
an angelic women’s stultifying existence.
The meaning of needlework is, then, destabilised in the novel: no longer 
presented as an expression of female perfection, needling is exposed either as 
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drudgery and a symbol of stifled, death-like existence or as an expression of 
defiance. The conventional, that is, sentimentalised reading of needlework is 
misleading, and Mr Vincent can only find out the truth if he rejects simple 
interpretations. Not only do Mrs Hilyard and Adelaide resist conventional 
readings, but also they repeatedly point to Mr Vincent that his ideas about 
life are too romantic (that is, untrue): Mrs Hilyard accuses him of “talking 
romance and nonsense, quite incomprehensible in a man who had just come 
from the society of deacons” (Oliphant 1986: 89), and Adelaide Tufton refuses 
to invent any comforting fiction to console him: “If I were a clever romancer 
like some people, I could have made it all perfect for you, but I prefer the truth” 
(Oliphant 1986: 29). The incongruity between the conventional representations 
of needling women and the two characters in Oliphant’s novel force Mr Vincent 
(and the reader) to question his ability to read cultural signs, and compel him 
to reject their conventional meaning.
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Lewis Carroll’s Alice Books: A New Perspective
Defining the Concept
My paper deals with an analysis of Lewis Carroll’s Alice s Adventures in Won­
derland and Through the Looking-Glass from a schema theory perspective. 
This approach provides me with the perfect tool for analysing these ambiguous 
and controversial texts. The concept of schema theory can be best defined as 
“a body of ideas which has passed from psychology, through Artificial Intel­
ligence (Al) and into discourse analysis” (Cook 1994: 9). In the first part of 
my article I will define schema theory giving a brief description of its origins, 
general principles, terminology and main concepts.
Although the notion of schema theory as a mental representation can be 
traced back to Kant’s Criteria of Pure Reason (1787) (the German word is 
also schema) the origin of modem schema theory can be found in the Gestalt 
psychology of the 1920s and 1930s (Cook 1994: 9). Its basic argument is that 
a new experience is understood by comparison with a stereotypical version of 
a similar experience kept in memory (Cook 1994: 9). The new experience is 
then defined in terms of its deviation from stereotypical version or conformity 
to it. The theory can be applied not only to the processing of sensory data, but 
also to the processing of any written text (Cook 1994: 9).
Both Semino (1995) and Cook (1994) noticed an increased interest in 
the application of schema theory to the analysis of literary readings. This has 
resulted from the awareness of the connection between “background knowledge 
and interpretation variability” (Semino 1995: 84). According to Muske quoted 
in Semino, the attractiveness of schema theory to literary scholars resides mainly 
in the fact that it offers a flexible framework “within which to investigate 
the interplay between reader’s knowledge of the world and texts in literary 
comprehension” (1995: 84).
Cook (1994: 15) distinguishes three main types of schemata: world, text, 
and language schemata. By world schema one must understand schematic 
representation of the world e.g. conference schema; by text schema, schematic 
representation of certain text types. For example, diary writing obeys certain text
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patterns. Language schema represents schematic representation of the language 
we use for certain given situations (e.g. the language we use when we are at 
a cocktail party is different from the one employed at a conference). Deviation 
at the level of text and language disrupts the reader’s schema, causing according 
to Cook (1994) schema disruption or breaking which consequently results in 
schema change or schema refreshment. Cook (1994) also introduced the concept 
of schema adding when we deal with a reinforcement of the existing schema.
The second part of my paper proposes an analysis of Alice books only from 
the perspective of text schema. Textual schemata are perhaps more reader­
variable than world schemata or language schemata. They depend very much 
upon experience of other texts, and this is more likely to vary between individu­
als than experience of the language and of the world. A given text, for instance, 
may appear highly original to a particular individual, but very unoriginal to 
another, if the former has experience of other texts, with the same structure, 
while the latter has no such experience (Cook 1994).
Lewis Carroll’s Alices Adventures in Wonderland and Through the 
Looking-Glass are no exceptions to these rules. Furthermore, the reader­
variability or text schemata have given rise to many interpretations, some of 
them more “original” than the text itself, others purely speculative or, on the 
contrary, very relevant. In fact, Alice books are notorious as being the battle­
grounds of interpretative disagreement. They have been analysed many times 
over according to the tenets of different critical approaches. This large number 
of interpretations is also due to the fact that Alice books are meant both for 
children and for adults alike.
Fairy-tale Schema
Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass were initially written for 
children and the first text schema activated at a superficial reading of the two 
books, is that of a fairy tale. First of all, Wonderland and the Looking Glass 
country stand for “the other world” often met in fairy tales as an alternative 
reality to the actual one. The heroine, Alice has to pass through an intermediary 
space placed between reality and non-reality in order to enter the other world: 
the rabbit hole, the glass, doors, etc. Sometimes the entrance into the other 
reality is marked by interdiction: i.e. the doors to the Wonderland are all locked. 
Secondly, the creatures that inhabit this alternative magic world are animals or 
flowers that can talk, mythical animals, the Gryphon, the Unicorn. To all these 
we may add queens, knights in armour and kings.
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In almost all fairy tales metamorphosis is a common theme. Alice changes 
her size and shape very often and this change in form is rendered possible by 
eating or drinking magic potions. The initiatic journey full of obstacles that the 
hero and heroine has to go on in order to achieve a final goal is also present, 
especially in Through The Looking-Glass when Alice has to overcome some 
obstacles in order to become queen. Some critics have interpreted this initiatic 
journey as a necessary step towards reaching maturity. But even though, the 
fairy-tale schema has some elements to sustain it: the other reality, metamor­
phosis, initiatic trip, it is immediately challenged and refreshed. This is the 
reason why many children, especially those who have read a translated version 
of Alice books, are disappointed by the story. They expect the pattern of a fairy 
tale and while reading Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass, 
they confront the stories with the background knowledge of fairy tales. Their 
expectations are, of course, not fulfilled. The fairy tale schema is just the su­
perficial level of the two stories. The elements that disrupt the schema can be 
easily found. A main difference between the classic fairy tales and Alice books 
is the latter’s main concern with language. “All that happens, happens in lan­
guage and through language”1 (Deleuze 1969: 34, my translation). The other 
world is not the realm of princesses, witches, fairies but the abstract world of 
language; it is almost a non-referential world. The two books can be considered 
“the prison house of language,” a syntagm used for experimental literature.
1 Tout ce qui se passe, se passe dans le language et se passe par le language.
Furthermore, the characters inhabiting the magic realm of fairy tales are, 
of course, endowed with supernatural powers, but still their behaviour and 
language resemble very much that of normal people, whereas the other world 
proposed by Lewis Carroll governs itself after different rules. The creatures 
of Wonderland refuse any connection with reality. It is almost impossible to 
imagine the Mad Hatter or the March Hare inhabiting the magic realm of fairy 
tales, they would be too “mad” for them. Their unique preoccupation seems 
to be no sorcery or the preparation of magic potions but the abstract function 
of language. The initiatic trip, mentioned above becomes a mock one. Carroll 
clearly scorns any moralising pretence that his story might have, since Alice 
does not learn anything from the trip she takes or from the mad characters she 
encounters. In his preface to Sylvie and Bruno quoted in Jackson (2002: 35), 
Lewis Carroll identifies three different types of mental states, which are related 
to the three modes: mimetic, fantastic and marvellous. The first condition 
Carroll terms “ordinary,” the second is “eerie” and the third is “trance-like.” 
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In a normal state of mind, humans see a real world; in an eerie state they see 
a transitional world. These three categories correspond to mimetic, fantastic and 
marvellous literary forms. Fairy tales occupy the boundary between the real and 
the imaginary shifting the relations between them through their indeterminacy. 
Alice books go beyond the “eerie” state; almost reaching the so-called “trance­
like” state that rejects any connection with reality.
Metamorphosis, as I have already mentioned, plays an important part in 
fairy tales. People transformed into animals, princes into frogs, magical shifts 
of shape, size or colour, have constituted one of the main pleasures of the 
fairy tale mode. Nevertheless, even that important element - metamorphosis, 
which usually activates fairy tale schemata, is here distorted. In allegories or 
fairy-tales metamorphosis always plays a teleological function; there is always 
a reason behind any transformation (Jackson 2002: 81). In most cases it serves 
as a metaphor and it is almost always redemptive.
Lewis Carroll is considered one of the first writers of fantastic stories to 
change this perspective on metamorphosis. Beginning with Alice’s repeated 
shifts of size, metamorphosis has started to become meaningless and progres­
sively, independent of the will or desire of the subject (Jackson 2002: 81). 
Physical transformation like in Kafka’s Metamorphosis simply happens and it 
is no longer redemptive or metaphorical.
Another important aspect that comes to deconstruct a fairy tale schema is 
the problem of identity. The characters of fairy tales often change their physical 
appearance but, although transformed into animals, plants, they never lose their 
identity or even question it. The transformation Alice suffers does not alter her 
self - she remains the same sensible, good-mannered little girl to the end, but 
still the problem of identity troubles her.
But if I’m not the same, the next question is: who in the world am I? Ah, that’s the 
great puzzle. (Carroll 1993: 14)
What do you mean by that? Said the Caterpillar sternly explain yourself!
I can’t explain myself, I’m afraid, sir, said Alice, because I’m not myself, you see. 
(Carroll 1993:31).
This inclination towards the self becomes one of the reasons why Alice books 
have been considered to make a transition between the fantastic and marvellous 
mode typical for the modem fiction e.g. Borges, Kafka.
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Nonsense Literature Schema
Even though at the beginning of Alice books the elements I have described so 
far suggest a fairy tale schema, this perspective changes radically as we come 
to know better the world of Alice adventures, a world governed by ambiguity 
or even more, marked by nonsense. The fantastic pushes towards an area of 
non-signification, thus the nonsense schema is activated and sustained by the 
absurd of the situations described in Alice books and especially by the playful 
use of language.
“Mine is a long tale\" said the Mouse, turning to Alice and sighing.
“It’s a long tail, certainly,” said Alice, looking down with wonder at the Mouse’s 
tail; “but why do you call it sad?” (Carroll 1993: 21)
The characters themselves seem to be aware of the nonsensical world they are 
living in; they constantly repeat the word “nonsense” or “lack of meaning”: 
“What nonsense we are talking!” (Carroll 1993: 74), “What do you suppose 
is the use of a child without meaning!” (Carroll 1993: 161, my emphasis). 
Lewis Carroll’s primary concern seems to be language. He draws attention to 
problems of signification, presenting a confused, chaotic world which gives 
up the pretence to represent absolute meaning or reality. According to Jackson 
(2002: 141), when Alice walks through the mirror and falls down the rabbit 
hole, she enters the space of non-signification in which her acquired language 
system ceases to be of any help. Words have no control over things or objects: 
a baby becomes a pig, a grin becomes a cat and words begin to have a life of 
their own. No word has a meaning inseparably attached to it. For Carroll as 
for Wittgenstein, language is the means of constructing meaning - outside the 
language world, there lies only nonsense (Jackson 2002: 142).
The nonsense schema is activated by that strange semiotic excess where 
signs are deprived of significance. As I have already observed, in Lewis Car­
roll’s case words have started to lose their seemingly inseparable sense. Thus, 
Alice is faced with a non-referential world, a strange realm in which proper 
names have to mean something, while the common names seem to have no 
fixed meaning attached to them. In Wonderland “there are no ends, only signs 
which lead nowhere, landscapes which are labyrinths without a centre” (Jack- 
son 2002: 142).
She found herself in a long, low hall [...] There were doors, all around the hall, but 
they were all locked. (Carroll 1993: 10)
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She was wandering up and down, and trying turn after turn but always coming 
back. (Carroll 1993:98)
It is very important to make a distinction between nonsense and the absurd 
literature. Jackson (2002: 144) paraphrasing Sewell and Prickett claims that:
nonsense engages the force towards disorder in continual play. It tends to re-combine 
different semantic units which remain distinct from one another. It fractures rather 
than dissolves, returning to rigidity and the separation of individual units. Far 
from being “free” or formless, it [nonsense] is the most highly organised and the 
most rigidly controlled of all forms of fantasy. It is a fantasy of extreme logic, of 
rationality pushed to its limits.
The impression of a meaningless world deprived of any logic is, in fact, a result 
of the overuse of logic which is constantly abused and pushed to its extremes. 
But in the literature of the absurd the world as we know it is no longer controlled; 
logic or other form of rationality has no power over it.
The Theatre of the Absurd Schema
In the hierarchical order the absurd follows nonsense. In fact, it is considered 
that the genre of the absurd stems from nonsense literature. In other words, we 
cannot say that the activation of absurd literature schema implies the breaking of 
the nonsense schema; on the contrary, the construction of the former is a result 
of a continuous adding of the latter, thus we are dealing with schema adding. 
This is the reason why so many critics consider Lewis Carroll the forerunner 
of the theatre of the absurd. The schema specific to the theatre of the absurd 
is activated by the technique generally known as the dissolution of discourse 
usually caused by the breaking up of any predictable or reliable relation between 
the signifier and the signified or between the message intended and what the 
receiver of the message understands. The dissolution of discourse translates 
itself into lack of meaning and lack of communication.
In Beckett’s or Ionesco’s plays the characters are engaged in long conver­
sations, all signifying nothing, leading nowhere. In Alice books conversation 
is almost as barren as in the theatre of the absurd. Furthermore, each character 
is obsessed with only one topic of conversation. The Mad Hatter is obsessed 
with time and tea, the Queen of Hearts with cutting off heads, the Duchess 
with finding morals in everything. Their strange stubbornness in choosing the 
same topic of conversation makes Alice exclaim: “How can you talk to a per­
son if he always says the same thing?” (Carroll 1993: 49). In this way, they 
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become hermetically isolated in a self-centred discourse. But their obsession 
with certain subjects of conversation is not the only one responsible for their 
failure in communicating. To this we may add the misinterpretation of idioms, 
of homophones, of homographs, etc.
The lack of communication and the dissolution of discourse are also due 
to the characters’ original use of language to signify whatever they would like 
to. Humpty Dumpty claims the greatest freedom to give any meaning to any 
word (Sutherland 1970: 149). With Humpty Dumpty’s stipulative definitions 
of words chaos begins and communication cannot be established any longer. 
The discourse becomes one without an object - empty talking.
The Surrealist Literature Schema
The dream theme presented in Alice books influences and alters the discourse. 
As a consequence, we activate the surrealist schema sustained by numerous 
elements, also found in the surrealist writings. The specific atmosphere of 
dreams surpasses the chaotic world of the literature of the absurd; reality is 
turned upside down and another one is constructed. Surrealist schema springs 
out from the theatre of the absurd to which we add a few more elements. 
Therefore, we are dealing again with schema adding.
The first surrealist elements or themes which activate this schema are: the 
disintegration of objects, as in the Sheep’s shop, and the fluidity of forms as in 
“the glass was beginning to melt away, just like bright silvery mist” (Carroll 
1993: 87). Other similarities between Alice books and the surrealistic writings 
are best understood in terms of narrative structure and of the relation between 
text and reader. Both are much closer to a marvellous mode, as described 
by Lewis Carroll himself, in which the narrator or the characters are rarely 
in a position of uncertainty. Even Alice eventually gets used to that anarchic 
world: “this seemed quite natural to me” (Carroll 1993: 23).
As I have already mentioned, surrealism is closer to the marvellous - it 
is super-real and its etymology implies that it is presenting a world above this 
one rather than fracturing it from inside (Jackson 2002: 36). Lewis Carroll 
proposes another reality not related to the actual one. Alice books become 
non-referential texts not only through the language used, but also through the 
situation described.
The discourse of the marvellous, the characteristic discourse of oneiric 
literature, is best described by Novalis as “narrative without coherence but rather 
with associations like dreams [...] full of words, but without any meaning and 
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coherence [...] like fragments” (qtd. in Jackson 2002: 145). The theme of free 
associations based on Freud’s theories of the subconscious can also be traced 
in Alice books, especially in Through the Looking-Glass. Free associations are 
best described as chain reactions induced by oneiric, fabulous discourse, or as 
fluid passing from one scene to another.
Chapter 5, “Wool and Water” in Through the Looking-Glass is the best 
example of oneiric discourse based on free associations. The White Queen 
with whom Alice is having a conversation turns slowly into a sheep and the 
landscape changes gradually into a shop and then the shop into a river. In this 
passage we are not dealing with metamorphoses like in fairy tales but rather 
with that oneiric sensation that the objects around have lost all consistency 
and can take any form. Another illustrative example is offered by Chapter 3, 
“Looking-Glass Insects,” where Alice suddenly finds herself on a train talking 
to the Guard, and in the next moment under a tree.
In another moment she felt the carriage rise straight up into the air, and in her fright 
she caught at the thing nearest to her hand, which happened to be the Goat’s beard. 
But the beard seemed to melt away as she touched it, and she found herself sitting 
quietly under a tree. (Carroll 1993: 106)
Absurd conversation pertaining to the theatre of the absurd is also characteristic 
for surrealistic writing, but here its absurdity is pushed to its limits. The extreme 
rationality characteristic to nonsense is now completely lost.
“Tickets, please!” said the Guard, putting his head in at the window. In a moment 
everybody was holding out a ticket [...]
“Now then show your ticket, child!” the Guard went on, looking angrily at Alice. 
And a great many voices all sat together (“like the chorus of a song,” thought 
Alice). “Don’t keep him waiting, child! Why, his time is worth a thousand pounds 
a minute!”
“I’m afraid I haven’t got one”, Alice said in a frightened tone: “there wasn’t a ticket­
office where I came from.” And again the chorus of voices went on. “There wasn’t 
room for one where she came from. The land there is worth a thousand pounds an 
inch.” (Carroll 1993: 104)
Moving without advancing, the impression of immobility while trying to walk, 
running fast but arriving nowhere, the continuous fluid change of objects and 
of the landscape which devours itself creating new forms, all are elements 
prompting a surrealistic story schema. The last two pages of Chapter 9, “Queen 
Alice” offer a perfect example of a surrealistic piece of writing. The characters 
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change into monsters behaving in a grotesque manner, the objects dissolve and 
take other forms, strange associations produce fabulous forms and inanimate 
objects begin to have a life of their own.
As to the bottles, they each took a pair of plates, which they hastily fitted on as 
wings, and so, with forks for legs, went fluttering about in all directions. [...]
And all the guests began drinking it directly, and very queerly they managed it: 
some of them put their glasses upon their heads like extinguishers, and drank all 
that trickled down their faces [...] (Carroll 1993: 170)
The discourse is anarchic, deviant, and meaningless. It combines units in new 
relations and presents discrete elements which are juxtaposed and then re­
assembled in unexpected, apparently impossible combinations. Sometimes the 
discourse becomes tautological. The words themselves are not ambiguous; it is 
the intricate syntax which renders the statement impossible to understand.
“I quite agree with you,” said the Duchess; “and the moral of that is - Be what you 
would seem to be - Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise than what it might 
appear to others that want you were or might have been was not otherwise than 
what you had been would have appeared to them to be otherwise.”
“I think I should understand that better,” Alice said very politely, “if I had it written 
down: but I can’t quite follow it as you say it.” (Carroll 1993: 60)
If nonsense literature is characterised by an extreme logic which gives a false 
impression of disorder, the literature or the absurd begins to lose it, while 
the surrealism is completely deprived of any logic and rationality. I have em­
phasised once again the differences between the three levels of discourse to 
demonstrate that we arrive at a surrealistic story schema through a continuous 
adding in schemata.
The Metafiction Schema
The four schemata prompted by a slight change in discourse are all interrelated, 
they are all constructed starting from an alternative reality different from the 
actual one. The next schema is by far the most original, having also a defamil­
iarising effect on the reader. One would not expect to find in a book initially 
written for children so many metafictional elements. Alice books, especially 
Through the Looking-Glass, can also be considered books about language, 
about writing fiction. Michael Charles (qtd. in Cristofovici 1991: 67) defines 
metafiction as the deliberate interaction between discourse and metadiscourse.
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One of the main principles of metafiction, which also prompts the metafic­
tion schemata is the infinite regression. Wittgenstein (qtd. in Cristofovici 
1991: 68) defined language as “a type of infinite regression of words spoken 
by other words.” A passage taken from Through the Looking-Glass illustrates 
Carroll’s awareness of the way in which language can be used to talk about 
language. The White Knight wishes to sing for Alice a song whose tune is 
his own invention.
The name of the song is called “Haddocks ’ Eyes
Oh, that’s the name of the song, is it? Alice said, trying to feel interested.
No, you don’t understand, the Knight said, looking a little vexed. That’s what the 
name is called. The name really is “The Aged Aged Man
Then I ought to have said “that’s what the song is called.” Alice corrected herself. 
No, you oughtn’t: that’s quite another thing! The song is called “Ways and Means ” 
but that’s only what it’s called, you know!
Well, what is the song, then? [...]
I was coming to that, the Knight said. The song really is “A-sitting On A Gate."
(Carroll 1993: 155, original emphasis)
Carroll shows here that verbal symbols may be used to refer to other verbal 
symbols. This is the infinite regression I have referred to so far. Alice is confused 
because she does not realise what the Knight is doing when he states one 
linguistic expression to be the call-name of another (Sutherland 1970: 119). 
Carroll makes a distinction between the thing, the name of the thing and the 
name of the name of the thing. Nagel (qtd. in Sutherland 1970: 119) discusses 
this passage in his treatment of call names and he considers Alice’s difficulty to 
be “the type of misunderstanding that may arise from the failure to distinguish 
between fragments of discourse (such as names) and what linguistic expressions 
are about to designate.”
Furthermore, we can equate the written text of Through the Looking-Glass 
with the mirror through which Alice passes into the other world (Cristofovici 
1991: 65). Considering this equivalence between text and mirror we can claim 
that the commentary about the text is inserted in the text itself. What is most 
interesting is that the White King - the character who makes the comment about 
the metalinguistic characteristics of discourse - is the author himself as Tenniel 
portrayed him in the original edition of the Alice books. The author inserts 
himself in the text in an almost postmodernist manner, and becomes a character 
who helps Alice finish her journey. He obviously mocks the distant, neutral, all 
knowing, omniscient narrator who appears in fairy tales.
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The authorial voice which does not know more than his characters, sim­
ulating a position similar to that of the reader, makes itself heard again in the 
dialogue between Alice and Humpty Dumpty: “Alice didn’t venture to ask what 
he paid them with; and so you see I can’t tell you!” (Carroll 1993: 132).
The infinite regression is similarly present in Alice’s dream and the King’s 
dream functioning again as a signal within the text, thus commenting upon its 
fictional quality. Carroll multiplies the theme of the dream within the dream, 
which reminds us of Borges’s characters conscious of the fictional quality of the 
world they inhabit and of the fact that they are fictional products. The unreality of 
the characters, their fictional nature is made obvious in Chapter 4, “Tweedledum 
and Tweedledee” when the twins claim that Alice is just a fictional character.
“He’s dreaming now,” said Tweedledee: “and what do you think he’s dreaming 
about?”
Alice said: “Nobody can guess that.”
“Why, about you!” Tweedledee exclaimed, clapping his hands triumphantly. “And 
if he left off dreaming about you, where do you suppose you’d be?” 
“Where I am now, of course,” said Alice.
“Not you!” Tweedledee retorted contemptuously. “You’d be nowhere. Why, you're 
only a sort of thing in his dream!” (Carroll 1993: 117)
What is most innovative is that Lewis Carroll creates a character that has a dou­
ble status. First, Alice is a fictional character taking part in the adventures 
described. Secondly, she is a character who belongs to a discursive universe 
which she continuously tries to understand and decipher, a status resembling 
that of the reader. Thus, the text becomes a huge puzzle which needs to be rear­
ranged and whose meaning has to be interpreted. This explains the satisfaction 
the reader experiences when deciphering a pun or a misused homonym. Not 
surprisingly, the structure of Through the Looking-Glass follows that of a game 
of chess. Martin Gardner (qtd. in Cristofovici 1991: 65) demonstrates that the 
text is, in fact, an extended game of chess and each movement Alice makes on 
the chessboard is according to the rules of the game.
Furthermore, Lewis Carroll parodies the referential level of interpreting 
literally phrases and idioms, by inventing words, deprived of referentiality. 
The well-known poem “Jabberwocky” also feigns the construction of a text 
which gives only the illusion of meaning. The dialogue with Humpty-Dumpty 
parodies its interpretation.
The structure of the two books is concentric: the book within a book (the 
looking glass book Alice finds in the other room), the dream within a dream, 
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the story within a story. The story, as it is, is framed by two poems, so we have 
two types of discourse: the narrative discourse and the poetical one. In fact, all 
the poems inserted in the story are meant to explain and mirror the narrated 
happenings; they, in a way, announce what will happen next. This is the case of 
the famous limericks about Humpty Dumpty and Tweedledee and Tweedledum. 
Furthermore, the two books contain famous pieces of writing by Wordsworth 
and Hood, magnificently parodied by Carroll. “Resolution and Independence” 
was burlesqued in the “Aged Aged Man,” and the schoolmaster-murderer’s 
kind attitude towards his pupils in “Dream of Eugene Aram” was mocked in 
the “Walrus and Carpenter.”
In this paper, I have tried to approach Alice books from the perspective of 
text schemata. This analysis enabled me to understand how Carroll’s writings 
were able to give rise to so many interpretations. It was very interesting to see 
how many different types of discourse could be found in a book which, initially 
was meant for children and how much of the ambiguity present in the text is 
caused by the skilful interplay between the various schemata described above.
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“Going over to Rome”: The Changing Attitudes 
towards Roman Catholicism in Disraeli’s 
Sybil and Lothair
In 1850 Disraeli wrote in a letter to a lady friend, “[h]ere [London] we have 
only two subjects, and both gloomy ones - Religion and Rents” (qtd. in Davis 
1976: 103). In the Victorian age, the age of great religious revival, the influence 
of religion was extensive and included far more than just ecclesiastical matters. 
Religion was inextricably intertwined with politics and religious questions were 
the cause of the downfall of many a government; they also inspired writers 
ranging from mere hacks to the ones that are now widely considered to be 
canonical. One of the questions reappearing in the public discourse was the role 
of Roman Catholicism in England, still perceived by many as dangerous for 
English identity. The aim of this paper is to compare the attitudes of Disraeli 
towards Roman Catholicism, concentrating on his two novels: Sybil (1845) and 
Lothair (1870), and to explain the apparent radical change of Disraeli’s views: 
in his earlier novels he seemed to be mostly sympathetic towards Catholicism 
while in Lothair he presented it as a threat to English society.
Disraeli’s attitudes toward Roman Catholicism are coloured by his own re­
ligious identity. As is generally known, he was Jewish, baptized in the Church 
of England at the age of thirteen, apparently for purely pragmatic reasons; his 
father, who to all accounts seemed to be an agnostic in the mould of Enlight­
enment philosophers, made this decision in order to facilitate his children’s 
future careers. Benjamin Disraeli, however, “never forgot nor let willingly oth­
ers forget” his ethnic origins (Frietzsche 1961: 8). He made his Jewishness the 
cornerstone of his conservatism and had his omniscient and omnipotent Jewish 
character Sidonia in Coningsby (1844) argue that Jews are somehow bom To­
ries, always in defence of the established institutions (Disraeli 1904: 302-303). 
Political conservatism also informed other fascinations of Disraeli: his admi­
ration for the Middle Ages and his sympathetic attitude towards Catholicism. 
Indeed, in some novels, such as Sybil, Catholicism and medievalism seem 
to be inseparable. Catholics in Disraeli’s novels are often presented as living
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remnants of the past ages, long gone, but perceived as superior to the age of 
rapacious capitalism.
Pro-Catholic sympathies of the Tory Disraeli were by no means obvious 
nor common at the time of writing Sybil', anti-Catholicism in England had been 
a long-established tradition. In fact, it was one of the cornerstones of British 
identity, providing a link between different nations and different classes that 
inhabited Great Britain. The popular vision of English history was construed as 
a series of fortuitous events from the Reformation on, when the hand of God 
intervened over and over again to deliver England from Popery (the victory 
over the Spanish Armada, the Gun-Powder Plot, the Glorious Revolution and 
so on). However, in the late eighteenth century the danger of any real political 
intervention from the Pope or any of his subjects faded; Stuart pretenders 
had been vanquished, the Papal State established civil diplomatic relations 
with Britain and the British government tried to work out a mode of peaceful 
cohabitation with the growing numbers of its Catholic citizens, not only within 
Britain but also in the colonies, for instance in Quebec. A number of bills were 
passed, gradually relaxing the penal laws in Britain, and culminating with the 
Catholic Relief Act of 1829. However, the removal of anti-Catholic laws did 
not mean automatically the end of prejudice, but, conversely, the relaxation 
of the penal laws and the ensuing expansion of the Catholic Church served to 
fuel the suspicions of the Protestant majority all the more (Amstein 1982: 3). It 
is a telling fact that several influential societies for propagating Protestantism, 
such as the British Reformation Society and the Protestant Association, were 
founded in the years immediately before or after the Catholic Emancipation 
(Paz 1992: 33-34).
Within this political and social context, the distinctly pro-Catholic sym­
pathies of Disraeli in the novels written in the first half of his life are all the 
more striking. Catholics appear in The Young Duke (1831), Contarini Flem­
ing (1832) and Sybil (1845), always presented as sympathetic figures. This is 
even more remarkable, taking into account the fact that Disraeli’s own Tory 
party harboured some ultra-conservative members with decidedly anti-Catholic 
views. Sybil perhaps offers the clearest explanation of Disraeli’s sympathies to­
wards Catholicism in Book I, where Disraeli presents his Tory vision of history, 
which is the polar opposite of the Whig vision of history. Ostensibly delineating 
the family history of the main character Lord Egremont, he condemns all the 
events celebrated by Protestant Whigs as stages on the way of Britain towards 
parliamentarian democracy. The Reformation is presented as tantamount to 
the spoliation of monasteries, through which the family of Egremont gained 
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their riches, and the Glorious Revolution as an act of treason towards the law­
ful king, whom Disraeli exonerates from the charges of attempting to make 
England Catholic again: “That the last of Stuarts had any other object in his 
impolitic manoeuvres than an impracticable scheme to blend the two Churches, 
there is now authority to disbelieve” (Disraeli 1981:21). The de-glorification of 
the Glorious Revolution is combined with the adulation of Charles I: “Rightly 
was King Charles sumamed the Martyr, for he was the holocaust of direct 
taxation. Never yet did man lay down his heroic life for so great a cause: the 
cause of the Church and the cause of the Poor” (Disraeli 1981: 230). This 
hero-worship of the Stuarts seems to evoke the faint echoes of Defoe’s rant in 
his pamphlet “The shortest way with the Dissenters:” “You have Butcher’d one 
King, Depos’d another King, and made a mock King of a Third” (Defoe 1974: 
116-17), except, of course, for the fact that Defoe was ironic, while Disraeli 
at least purported to speak seriously.
As we can see from the above, the first reason for Disraeli’s criticism of 
the Whig vision of history runs more or less along the lines of Dr Johnson’s 
observation, “the prejudice of the Tory is for establishment; the prejudice of the 
Whig is for innovation” (Boswell 1961: 1155); the main sin of the Whigs is that 
they ruin the established institutions and, as he shows in another part of Sybil, 
provide nothing in their place. This argument is illustrated in Book 2, where 
Egremont has a dispute with two men (who later turn out to be Chartists) in the 
ruins of an abbey, now belonging to his family. In the dispute Walter Gerrard, 
a Catholic and father to the heroine of the title, paints an idyllic vision of the 
Middle Ages as the time of contented peasants ruled by benevolent lords abbots, 
the happy era brutally terminated by the Reformation. The description that 
Disraeli puts in Gerrard’s mouth goes against the well-rooted Protestant mistrust 
of monastic life, and Gerrard easily overthrows all traditional arguments against 
monks put forward by Egremont:
“[...] their history has been written by their enemies; they were condemned without 
a hearing; the people rose oftentimes in their behalf; and their property was divided 
with those on whose reports it was forfeited.”
“At any rate, it was a forfeiture which gave life to the community,” said Egremont; 
“the lands are held by active men and not by drones.”
“A drone is one who does not labour,” said the stranger; “whether he wear a cowl 
or a coronet, ’tis the same to me. All agree the Monastics were easy landlords; their 
rents were low; they granted leases in those days.”
“And do you really think they were easier landlords than our present ones?” said 
Egremont, inquiringly.
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“Human nature would tell us that, even if history did not confess it. [...] The monks 
were in short in every district a point of refuge for all who needed succour, counsel, 
and protection; a body of individuals having no cares of their own, with wisdom to 
guide the inexperienced, with wealth to relieve the suffering, and often with power 
to protect the oppressed.”
“You plead their cause with feeling,” said Egremont, not unmoved.
“It is my own; they were the sons of the People, like myself.”
“I had thought rather these monasteries were the resort of the younger branches of 
the aristocracy?” said Egremont.
“Instead of the pension list;” replied his companion, smiling, but not with bitterness. 
“Well, if we must have an aristocracy, I would sooner that its younger branches 
should be monks and nuns [...] but the list of the mitred abbots when they were 
suppressed, shows that the great majority of the heads of houses were of the people.” 
(Disraeli 1981: 61-62)
The defence of Catholicism is carried on further by Aubrey St Lys, a cler­
gyman who, though Anglican himself, defends the Catholic Church on the 
grounds that it “is to be respected as the only Hebraeo-Christian church extant; 
all other churches established by the Hebrew apostles have disappeared, but 
Rome remains” (Disraeli 1981: 111). Therefore, the respect that St Lys pays to 
Rome is purely on the grounds of its being immediate successor to Judaism, 
just like the New Testament is “only a supplement” (Disraeli 1981: 112) to the 
Old Testament. The respect for Judaism and Jews as the font of Christianity was 
one of favourite topics of Disraeli, to which he returned over and over again, 
both in literature and politics, for instance when he spoke for Jewish emanci­
pation. It might be argued, then, that for Disraeli Catholicism was Jewishness 
in disguise, and when he wrote in defence of one minority, he really thought 
about the other (O’Kell 1987: 221).1
1 Interestingly enough, Protestant polemicists viewed the relationship between Catholicism 
and Protestantism in analogous terms to those in which Catholics viewed the relationship between 
Judaism and Catholicism: Protestants had to leave the Church of Rome behind just like early 
Christians had to leave Judaism (Griffin 2004: 5).
This argument is even stronger when we look at his earlier novels such 
as Contarini Fleming. The title character is a black-haired, swarthy son of 
Italian mother and English father, who feels no affinity between himself and 
his pure-English blonde step-siblings: “[tjhere was no similitude between us. 
Their blue eyes, their flaxen hair and their white visages claimed no kindred 
with my Venetian countenance. Wherever I moved, I looked around and found 
a race different from myself’ (Disraeli 1832: 6). Contarini finally finds peace 
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of mind when as an adult he goes back to his Italian roots and converts to 
Catholicism. It has been argued that the feeling of being an oddball expressed 
by Fleming is a clearly autobiographical element for Disraeli, who with his 
“Venetian countenance” may very well have felt the same in the English school 
playground (Davis 1976: 5).
The praises of monasticism are consistent with the ideology of Young 
England movement, a small coterie of young liberal Tories centred around 
Disraeli. As Disraeli himself observed in the General Preface to the collected 
edition of his novels published twenty five years later, Young England sought 
to achieve in politics what the Oxford Movement tried to achieve in religion: 
to revive old practices and customs, make the church a vital presence in society 
again, reawaken social responsibility among the possessing classes. In Sybil 
social responsibility is embodied by Mr Trafford, a Catholic and a socially 
responsible factory owner, who provides his workers with safe and healthy work 
conditions, public baths and schools. “In the midst of the village, surrounded by 
beautiful gardens [...] was the house of Trafford himself, who comprehended 
his position too well to withdraw himself with vulgar exclusiveness from his real 
dependents, but recognised the baronial principle, reviving in a new form, and 
adapted to the softer manners and more ingenious circumstances of the times” 
(Disraeli 1981: 182). As we can see, Mr Trafford is basically the industrial 
version of the good feudal lord. His adherence to the “old” religion emphasizes 
the link between his exemplary mill and Old Merry England that Young England 
tried to bring back to life.
Sybil was the penultimate novel of Disraeli before the long break of twenty- 
three years which he devoted solely to his political career. He returned to the 
novelistic career with Lothair (1870) after his first brief stint as the Prime Minis­
ter. The book was very successful commercially, perhaps the most successful of 
all Disraeli’s novels, although it certainly owed at least some of its success to the 
curiosity of the public about a novel written by an ex-Prime Minister. In Lothair 
Catholicism plays a much larger role than in any of Disraeli’s earlier novels be­
cause the whole novel represents a psychomachia for the soul of the eponymous 
character, where the contestants are Anglicanism, Catholicism and Revolution, 
all of them represented in an allegorical manner by beautiful women.
The direct inspiration for the novel was the conversion of the young Mar­
quess of Bute to Catholicism, which caused much stir in English society 
(Amstein 1982: 131-32). Like Bute, Lothair is a young aristocrat who lost 
both his parents at an early age and was left under the care of two guardians, 
one of them a Scottish Presbyterian, the other an Anglican priest who later 
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converts to Catholicism and embarks on a rapid career advancing to the rank 
of Cardinal. At the start of the novel Lothair is about to come of age and has to 
decide what to do with his life and his immense wealth. He is a Candide-like 
character, believing almost everything he is told; he is also a bit like Cherubino 
in The Marriage of Figaro, since all the women he encounters are portrayed 
as immensely attractive. He wants to marry the first woman he comes across, 
that is Lady Corisande, the sister of his school friend, but her mother sensibly 
rejects the proposal. Then he becomes acquainted with the Catholic family of 
St Jeromes and in order to please the beautiful niece of Lady St Jerome, Clare 
Arundel, he starts to take part in Catholic masses with gentle encouragement of 
Cardinal Grandison, his former guardian. Finally he falls in love with Theodora, 
an Italian patriot fighting for the unity of her country and joins her in the cam­
paign against the Papal State. Theodora, wounded in a battle, asks Lothair on 
her death-bed to promise that he will never become a Catholic. Lothair him­
self is soon wounded and saved by Clare, who is at that time in Rome with 
St Jeromes. In Roman society Lothair’s deliverance is widely believed to be 
miraculous, and rumours are spread that he is going to convert to Catholicism. 
Disgusted with this intrigue and spurred on by the vision of Theodora’s ghost, 
Lothair manages to sneak away and travels to the Holy Land, from which he re­
turns spiritually regenerated and, since Clare decided to take the veil, proposes 
finally to Corisande and is accepted. As we can see, the romantic entanglements 
of Lothair follow a neat pattern: from Corisande, to Clare, to Theodora and via 
Clare to Corisande again (Flavin 2005: 159).
There are some elements that Lothair and Sybil have in common, among 
them the admiration for the idealized vision of the Middle Ages. What sets 
Lothair off on his spiritual-cum-romantic quest is his dissatisfaction with the 
present times. “Lothair’s plea ‘I wish I had been bom in the Middle Ages’ is, in 
essence, a familiar refrain from a Disraelian hero” (Flavin 2005: 155). In spite 
of his distrust of Catholicism, Disraeli also retains his fascination with Catholic 
art, ritual and ceremony; in fact, in Lothair it is even more visible than in Sybil.
The acolytes and the thurifers fell into their places; there seemed no end of banners 
and large golden crosses; great was the company of the prelates [...] a long purple 
line, some only in cassocks, some in robes, and mitred; then came a new banner 
of the Blessed Virgin, which excited intense interest, and every eye was strained to 
catch the pictured scene. After this banner, amid frequent incense, walked two of 
the most beautiful children in Rome, dressed as angels with golden wings; the boy 
bearing a rose of Jericho, the girl a lily. After these, as was understood, dressed in 
black and veiled, walked six ladies, who were said to be daughters of the noblest
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houses of England, and then a single form with a veil touching the ground.
(Disraeli 1870: 2. 133-34)
However, the whole ceremony, which Lothair attends out of politeness to 
his hosts, turns out to be a ruse set up by the Catholic Church to lure Lothair 
into its fold. The description of this attempt at spiritual seduction uses all 
the staple motifs of cautionary tales of Victorian popular literature: attractive 
Catholic members of the opposite sex serving as bait, priests who never walk 
but only “glide,” the deceptive beauty of art and ritual. The only difference 
is that the main character is a man since in anti-Catholic novels of the time 
it was mostly women who were in danger of being converted or, even worse, 
lured into a convent2.
2 For the use of this plot, see Frances Trollope, Father Eustace: A Tale of the Jesuits (1847) 
and Catherine Sinclair, Beatrice, or The Unknown Relatives (1852).
The first reason for Disraeli’s change of heart towards Catholicism might 
be the fact that in writing Lothair he wanted to settle an old score with Cardinal 
Manning, who in his opinion had stabbed him in the back by supporting the 
Liberals during the dispute on the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland 
and thereby contributed to the quick end of his first government. We must not 
forget that Disraeli was a politician who happened to write novels, and for 
the most part he used them as speaking platforms to air his views on various 
political and social issues. Apart from expressing noble sentiments about the 
condition of England, Disraeli also sometimes used fiction in a somewhat less 
noble manner to “vent his spleen on political enemies” (Frietzsche 1961: 41). 
Describing Cardinal Grandison, Lothair’s ex-guardian and the spiritus movens 
in the scheme of converting his former charge to Catholicism, Disraeli slips 
comfortably into all the old clichés of anti-Papist literature, which were ac­
tually becoming unfashionable in the 1870s but still could serve his purpose. 
He presents an Anglican convert very much like Manning: a smooth-tongued, 
devious character, endearing to everyone he meets and loyal only to the Pope. 
However, Disraeli apparently got over his disappointment with Manning’s “be­
trayal,” since a few years later he was able to present a fairer portrait of the 
cardinal in Endymion (1880) (Frietzsche 1961: 42). Another proof that Disraeli 
did not harbour old grudges, at least not enough to impede his social life, was 
that two years after publishing Lothair he was one of the official witnesses at the 
wedding of Marquess Bute, officiated by Cardinal Manning (Griffin 2004: 186).
Apart from personal disappointments, there were also larger issues at stake. 
In the period between Sybil and Lothair the number of converts to Catholicism 
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increased and “in the minds of many Englishmen became a flood” (Amstein 
1982: 40- 41). The interestingly oppressed and slightly exotic minority be­
came a strong and militant force, not only because of high-profile conversions 
but also because of the immigration of several hundred thousand Irishmen. 
However, Disraeli focuses on upper-class converts. As he perceives aristoc­
racy as “the natural leaders,” he sees their conversions as the acts of defection. 
“When I hear of young nobles, the natural leaders of the land, going over to the 
Roman Catholic Church, 1 confess I lose heart and patience. It seems so unpa­
triotic, so effeminate,” says Lady Corisande (Disraeli 1870: 1. 69). Indeed, the 
Catholics portrayed in the most satirical way are the “new” Catholics, converts 
such as Cardinal Grandison and Lady St Jerome. Lord St Jerome is an “old 
Catholic” and a real English gentleman, opposing the devious machinations 
of Cardinal Grandison.
Even though Disraeli praises Catholicism in Sybil and criticizes it in 
Lothair, he basically remains faithful to his “prejudice of establishment:” the 
“old” Catholics are praiseworthy for their adherence to their faith, the “new” 
show their lack of purpose by allowing themselves to be sucked in by the 
whirlpool of Rome if they do not show enough firmness of mind. He writes 
reproachfully about the new English converts in Rome: “all the beautiful young 
countesses who had ‘gone over’ to Rome, and all the spirited young earls 
who had come over to bring their wives back, but had unfortunately remained 
themselves” (Disraeli 1870: 2. 160). Moreover, in Sybil the Catholic Church 
practically does not appear in its institutional form, apart from the convent 
where Sybil lived and was educated by the kindly Mother Ursula. In Lothair, 
on the other hand, the Catholic Church on the threshold of the First Vatican 
Council, which was to pronounce the dogma on papal infallibility, is a vast 
organization, becoming ready to take over the globe:
And first of all Lothair was presented to the cardinal-prefect of the Propaganda, who 
presides over the ecclesiastical affairs of every country in which the Roman Church 
has a mission, and that includes every land between the Arctic and the Southern Pole. 
This glimpse of the organized correspondence with both the Americas, all Asia, 
all Africa, all Australia, and many European countries, carried on by a countless 
staff of clerks in one of the most capacious buildings in the world, was calculated 
to impress the visitor with a due idea of the extensive authority of the Roman 
Pontiff. (Disraeli 1870: 2. 123-24)
This vision of the Roman Catholic Church as an efficient and menacing bu­
reaucratic machine stands in stark contrast with the quoted earlier romanticised 
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image of the English medieval church in Sybil, romanticised because belonging 
safely to the past. After all, the dispute on monasticism between Egremont and 
Gerrard takes place in the ruins of Mowbray Abbey while Gerrard’s daugh­
ter, the eponymous heroine, has removed herself in order to sing an evening 
hymn to the Virgin. In Sybil we have a lone figure of a lovely young woman 
occupied with pleasantly mysterious and picturesque rituals in a long defunct 
church; in Lothair we face a powerful international organization. It could be 
inferred that Catholicism for Disraeli was more of a convenient symbolic short­
cut, a wormhole to his idealized vision of the Middle Ages. The moment when 
it started to function as a real organized religion in the contemporary world, it 
stopped being a sentimental reminder of the past and became a living, greedy 
and rapacious organization.
The difference between attitudes towards Catholicism in Sybil and Lothair 
seems, then, to have its roots in the difference between Catholicism as the 
symbolic entity and the Roman Catholic Church as an actual contemporary in­
stitution. In Sybil the vision of Catholicism is highly romanticised, and it seems 
mostly to be a picturesque relic, just like the ruins of the abbey are. In Lothair 
the Catholic Church is a very real and powerful institution, endangering what 
was closest to Disraeli’s conservative heart: the established English institutions, 
including the Church of England. This change in Disraeli’s mindset might be 
read as an ironic twist provided by history along the lines of “beware of dreams, 
they may come true.” Disraeli saw the “old religion,” which he praised from 
a safe historical distance, coming back to life in his own country, and he recoiled 
with horror. Lothair might be seen as Disraeli’s coming to the conclusion that 
it is best to leave monasteries in ruins.
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The Artist versus Commodity Culture: 
Wyndham Lewis and the Dilemmas 
of Bourgeois-Bohemianism
Modernist culture is often associated with an exalted view of the artist as 
the aloof aesthete “paring his fingernails” while the contemptible philistine 
engages in the pursuit of material goods. The focus of this paper is the career 
of a modernist whose aloofness was notorious but who, nevertheless, sought 
to undermine the notion of art as something antithetical to marketplace values. 
Apart from marketing his own artistic ventures, he captured in his work the 
ambivalent position of the artist faced with the realities of capitalist economy. He 
also ridiculed the intellectual pose of many of his contemporaries, supposedly 
opposed to commodity culture but failing to practice what they preached. Where 
other modernists saw opposition, Lewis spotted complementarity, or at least, 
ambiguity. The term “bourgeois-bohemianism,” which he coined to describe 
a mixture of subversive pretence and middle-class calculativeness, conflated 
two attitudes which had traditionally been perceived as mutually exclusive.
The meaning of the word “artist” seems to trouble Lewis. It is a persistent 
theme in his creations, however if any definitions are provided, they are given in 
the negative. As Alan Munton (1998: 17) observes, “Lewis’s fictions delineate 
the social circumstances that support the bad artist and the bad idea.” The 
subject of pseudo-art is treated extensively in Tarr and The Apes of God, and 
keeps recurring in other texts, both fictional and critical ones. Unlike many 
canonical modernist works which celebrate the artist hero, Lewis’s writings 
seem to place emphasis on the decline of forceful individuality and its failure 
to shape the life around it. There is not much hope for the artist’s resistance 
to the trends of modem society: mediocrity triumphs over a superior mind, if 
such a thing as a superior mind exists at all.
Lewis’s pessimistic reflection upon the artist’s status in the modem world 
originally stemmed from his experience of living in Montparnasse in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. There, in the bohemian quarter of Paris, he 
met an array of artists and intellectuals, some genuine but also many sham ones
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- people he would call “art parasites” and intellectual frauds. Often short of 
money, he also developed an acute awareness of the forces which weigh upon 
the artist in a free market economy. We find those aspects of Lewis’s Parisian 
adventure transposed in the novel Tarr, whose initial title was Bourgeois- 
Bohemians, later dismissed by the author as perhaps too straightforward.
In Tarr, Lewis subjects the myth of artistic Bohemia to critique by ruth­
lessly unmasking cultural affectation and intellectual fakery. What interests 
Lewis is the collapse of the binary opposition between the bohemian and the 
philistine: he shows how the boundaries between the two become blurred, 
and links this phenomenon to the advent of commodity culture. The portrayal 
of bourgeois-bohemianism in Tarr is set against the background of the ag­
gressively expanding metropolis, where people and places are swept by “the 
victorious flood of commerce” (Lewis 1996: 97) and where superior and elitist 
qualities give way to mass appetites and unrestrained acquisitiveness. There 
is a memorable passage in the novel describing the Restaurant Lejeune which 
used to be “a clean, tranquil little creamery” but became transformed by the 
forces of the market into a “a broiling, luridly lighted, roaring den, inhabited 
by a rushing and howling band of slatternly savages” (Lewis 1996: 97). The 
artistic circles of Paris undergo a similar transformation, as if the giant organism 
of the city conditioned the lives of its inhabitants. In such an oppressive and 
competitive environment, artists and intellectuals find themselves tom by con­
flicting desires: on the one hand, they would like to cling to their non-conformist 
ideal, and, on the other, they develop materialistic yearnings. Plagued by the 
same maladies as the entire consumer society, they find it difficult to resist the 
compelling power of the good (that is, material) life. What they aspire to is the 
status of the new idle class - imagining themselves as the aristocracy of spirit, 
they nevertheless willingly partake of the pleasures of consumerism.
Although Tarr’s bohemians look back with nostalgia on their mid­
nineteenth-century predecessors, described in Henry Murger’s Vie de Boheme
- a book that each of them considers a necessary read - they can place them­
selves within this tradition on a very superficial level, for example by wearing 
bohemian outfits. Their counter-culture posturing is reduced to collecting artis­
tic trinkets and attitudinising; it has nothing to do with the ideal of bohemia 
as depicted by Murger, that is, a community of free souls beyond the pale 
of respectable society. Tarr’s characters are too shrewd to truly rebel against 
bourgeois, philistine mentality, because this would be tantamount to voluntary 
poverty. They lack the courage which Clement Greenberg (1993:541) mentions 
in his famous essay on avant-garde and kitsch, where he writes that “emigration 
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from bourgeois society to bohemia meant also an emigration from the markets 
of capitalism, upon which artists and writers had been thrown by the falling 
away of aristocratic patronage.”
Anticipating Greenberg’s findings, Lewis captures the moment when the 
inhabitants of the artistic underworld gradually discover the “umbilical cord 
of gold” (Greenberg 1993: 542) with which they are connected to those they 
despise - the bourgeoisie. Sometimes this cord of gold is literal, as many of 
Tarr's bohemians hail from bourgeois background and their “artistic” lifestyle 
is made possible thanks to allowances they receive from family homes. Lewis 
(1996: 117), describes them as “disciplined in their idleness,” because the 
degree of their non-conformism is regulated by the ebbs and flows of funds sent 
in by their parents. The less fortunate aspirants to Parnassus who have no stable 
source of income must turn their art and ideology into a marketable commodity. 
What they sell to bourgeoisie is either their work, geared to the lowest common 
denominator of mass taste, or even just the “avant-garde” ideology. Thus, for 
example, a protagonist called Ernst Volker paints portraits of the middle class 
ladies, while the two scroungers Kreisler and Soltyk get money from people 
who are flattered to spend time in the presence of “artists.” A mere impression 
of activity is sufficient to gain respect and recognition, as is the case with the 
painter Lowdnes, who “has enough money to be a Cubist” (Lewis 1996: 45) 
but does not produce much, only constantly pretends to be interrupted at work 
by unexpected visitors.
Once bohemianism is turned into a commodity, the role of its material 
manifestations increases. Hence the importance of artistic objects, outfits, props 
and trinkets, so well recognized by the artistically dressed Hobson or by the 
two polite society ladies, Bertha and Fraulein Lipmann, whose apartments are 
decorated so as to display the desirable “art-touch”:
[Hobson] was very athletic, and his dark and cavernous features had been con­
structed by Nature as a lurking place for villainies and passions. But he slouched 
and ambled along, neglecting his muscles. [...] The Art-touch was very observ­
able. Hobson’s Harris tweeds were shabby. A hat suggesting that his ancestors had 
been Plainsmen or some rough sunny folk, shaded unnecessarily his countenance, 
already far from open. (Lewis 1996: 22)
[Fraulein Lipmann’s] room, dress and manner, were a sort of chart to the way to 
admire [her]; the different points in her soul one was to gush about, the different 
hints that one was to let fall about her “rather” tragic life-story, the particular way
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one was to regard her playing of the piano. You felt that there was not a candlestick, 
or antimacassar in the room but had its lesson for you. (Lewis 1996: 131)
All such gadgets and accoutrements add a material, tangible dimension to bo­
hemian ideology. Abstractions are reduced to objects which can be accumulated, 
bought and sold. In this way, form begins to outweigh content, and bohemianism 
degenerates into kitsch, becoming a matter of style without substance.
The most perceptive of the bunch of bourgeois-bohemians, Tarr, realizes 
this when he visits the flat of his art-student fiancee, Bertha. Upon entering the 
room, he is confronted by an abundance of phony, pseudo-artistic objects:
Tarr was in the studio or salon. It was a complete Bourgeois-Bohemian interior. 
Green silk cloth and cushions of various vegetable and mineral shades covered 
everything, in mildewy blight. The cold, repulsive shades of Islands of he Dead, 
gigantic cypresses, grottoes of teutonic nymphs, had invaded this dwelling. Purple 
metal and leather steadily dispensed with expensive objects. There was the plaster­
cast of Beethoven (some people who have frequented artistic circles get to dislike 
this face extremely), brass jars from Normandy, a photograph of Mona Lisa (Tarr 
hated the Mona Lisa). (Lewis 1996: 52)
The trinkets in Bertha’s room represent the artificially synthetised mass culture 
that has been produced by industrialization. They are “works of art in the age of 
mechanical reproduction,” cast in plaster, reduced to kitsch and made accessible 
to a mass audience. Tarr, the self-styled modernist Übermensch, reacts to them 
with horror, but at the same time acknowledges the pervasiveness and appeal 
of “the little,” always threatening to contaminate “the large”:
She had loved him with all this. She had loved him with the plaster cast of Beethoven, 
attacked him with the Klingers, ambushed him from the Breton jars, in a funny, 
superficial, absorbing way. [...] The appeal of the little again. If he could only 
escape from scale. The price of preoccupation with the large was this perpetual 
danger from the little. (Lewis 1996: 73)
Among the many bourgeois-bohemian protagonists, Tan seems to be the 
closest to the ideal of the artist (in one of the letters Lewis (1963: 79) admits 
to making him a mouthpiece for his ideology). Very tellingly, however, even 
Tarr allows “the little” to overwhelm him completely: at the end of the novel he 
turns out to be every bit as idle and pretentious as the others, having wasted his 
creative talents on seducing femmes fatales and polite society ladies. The fact 
that Lewis does not “save” him from the general malaise of inauthenticity means 
that he probably cannot see any possibilities of redemption, or of autonomous 
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life, for an artist in a bourgeois environment. The forces which are remaking 
society at large are beyond the individual’s control - one must ultimately yield 
to their powerful pull.
While Tarr offers an early perspective on the transformation of bohemi- 
anism into its opposite, The Apes of God, written in 1930, anatomizes the 
condition of the arts in postwar Europe. The setting has changed from Paris to 
London, where, in the recognizable milieu of Chelsea and Bloomsbury, Lewis 
detects the familiar symptoms of the modem cultural malaise. A trend that he 
finds particularly alarming is not so much the bohemian inclination towards 
bourgeois values, which has by then become the norm, but rather the infiltra­
tion of artistic circles by the bourgeoisie. As Lewis’s introduction to the novel 
makes clear, the eponymous Apes - the monied amateurs usurping the name of 
artists and mimicking bohemian lifestyles - maintain a stranglehold on artis­
tic creation, thus threatening the traditional distinction between the producers 
and consumers of art:
Bohemia, just after World War One, was so full of déclassés, driving a pen or 
dipping a brush - Apes of God - that confusion ensued. Confusion was the result 
when it came to the jeunesse doreé taking up oil painting, their gold in future 
ceasing to be spent upon pictures (not their own) and in all spheres the passive rôle 
of the patron coming to an end. People no longer bought books, they wrote them. 
One began to recognize the people from the stalls and boxes acting on the stage; if 
a man had an expensive house he became an interior decorator, and so on and so 
forth. (Lewis 1955: 3)
The Apes of God depicts a society in which, in the words of one of the 
novel’s protagonists, “Everyone able to afford to do so has become a ‘bo­
hemian’” (Lewis 1955: 119). Bohemianism as a lifestyle requires means, for 
it has been reduced to a new form of idleness. Its attractiveness lies not in the 
urge to create, but in the temptation to indulge in wastefulness while enjoying 
the status of intellectual elite. Thorstein Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class, 
a classic tum-of-the-twentieth-century analysis of consumer culture, provides 
an explanation for this state of affairs. To be an idler is a mark of superiority, for 
it sets the individual apart from persons forced to work for a living. The ruling 
canon of leisure-class life is “conspicuous consumption” and, resulting from it, 
“conspicuous waste.” Under the conspicuous waste coda, the more useless an 
activity, service, or article, the greater the consumer’s prestige. Counted among 
the occupations which do not carry the stigma of productive industry, bohemi­
anism becomes a pastime of the leisure class. It is ennobling, for it seems to 
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be connected with abstract values, and at the same time expedient, for one’s 
adherence to these values cannot be easily verified.
The lack of verification is what distresses Lewis most, as it makes possible 
the propagation of sham artistry. The “Encyclical” part of The Apes of God 
contains a warning against “all these masses of Gossip-mad, vulgar, pseudo­
artist, good-timers” who “are as vulgar as any of their nouveau riche first 
cousins” but “more damaging for the very reason that they are identified, in the 
mind of the public, with art and with intelligence” (Lewis 1955: 121). Because 
the well-off bourgeois-bohemians do not really need to sell their work to survive 
as “artists,” it is enough for them to occasionally come up with some trivial, 
amateurish imitation of serious art, which they can then popularize by making 
hype. In this way, the channel of communication between artist and public is 
blocked by false messages, and that which is of genuine value is obliterated 
in the deluge of mediocrity.
Consequently, in order to mark his presence, the real artist is forced to 
compete for attention. In keeping with the trends of the modem market, he 
has to deploy the tactics known from the advertising industry and seek out 
audiences for his work. So, while the bourgeois-bohemian can enjoy the life of 
an aloof idler, the truly creative person must invest his precious time in activities 
necessary to his economic survival. Lewis finds this situation humiliating; still, 
he sees no other possibility but to adapt to the rule of the day:
The trouble is this: It does not matter what objective Nature supplies. The inventive 
artist is his own purveyor. But the society of which he forms a part, can, by its 
backwardness, indolence, or obtuseness, cause him a series of inconveniences; 
and above all, can, at certain times and under certain conditions, affect his pocket 
adversely and cause him to waste an absurd amount of time. When no longer able 
to produce his best work, it would not be a waste of time for a painter or for a writer 
to lecture, for example, on the subject of his craft. The propaganda, explanatory 
pamphlets, and the rest in which we, in this country, have to indulge, is so much 
time out of active life which would normally be spent as every artist wishes to spend 
his time, in work, in a state of complete oblivion as regards any possible public 
that his work may ever have. Yet were one’s ideas on painting not formulated, and 
given out in the shape of a lecture, a pamphlet, or a critical essay, an impossible 
condition would result for an artist desirous of experimenting. (Lewis 1991: 160)
These words are full of intellectual pretension, but they reveal an awareness of 
the changing times. Much as the real artist may be distressed by commodity 
culture, he has to go along with it to a certain extent. Lewis understood this, 
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indulging willy-nilly in self-promotional campaigns: his numerous journals, 
autobiographies and treatises, the Enemy pose, the catchy titles for his texts all 
betray his knack for hype-making. Even if his marketing efforts were largely 
frustrated (he died far from prosperous), the ambivalence of his position must 
have given him mental dyspepsia. The concerns of his artist protagonists - 
Tarr, Kreisler, Zagreus, Dan Boleyn and others - seem to be also his concerns. 
Tortured by the questions he was trying to ask, as well as by the answers he came 
up with, he produced works which record the struggle for the impossible, the 
attempt to secure the sacred status for art in an increasingly commodified society.
One way to read Lewis is to treat his creations as an expression of the elitist 
longing for the time before democracy made things possible for everyone. 
Intrinsically political in his sensibilities, he feared
the William Morris, tolstoyan, or other utopist dream of a millennium in which no 
one would have to work too much; and in which, above all, everyone would “have 
the scope to develop his personality,” everybody be a “genius” of some sort; in 
which everyone would be an “artist” of some sort - singing, painting, composing 
or writing, as the case might be, and in which a light-hearted “communism” should 
reign in the midst of an idyllic plenty. (Lewis 1963: 124)
Such views may appear outrageous, but that should not prevent us from appre­
ciating the accuracy of much that Lewis foresaw, especially when we consider 
the levelling dynamics of mass culture. Bearing in mind the fact that Lewis 
wrote from the perspective of modernism, “that uncanny moment when for 
the last time High Art still mattered enough to hate” (Kamiya 2001: 1), one 
has to give recognition to the more influential aspects of his legacy: existential 
anguish about the void that opens up before modem man, and the genuine 
concern about the direction our culture is taking.
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Meaning Created by the Language 
of Geoffrey Hill’s Poetry
All discourse is realized as event but understood as meaning [...] The word is always 
the bearer of the “emergent meaning” which specific contexts confer upon it.
(Ricoeur 1994: 167)
All discourse is produced as an event, says Paul Ricoeur. Poetic discourse is 
realized as a particular kind of event because its understanding as meaning is 
extremely complex, going beyond “specific contexts.” The reading of the lines 
of poetry is tantamount to the opening of new vistas of experience, leading the 
reader to a better self-understanding or even self-building, even though every 
reader can perceive the same text differently and the author is also just one of 
the readers at best.1 The range of the meanings of a text is bound to grow in 
time due to the expansion and extension of the interconnected numbers of its 
interpretations in the process of reading.
1 “What the text signifies no longer coincides with what the author meant; verbal meaning and 
mental meaning have different destinies” (Ricoeur 1994: 91).
2 “The simulacrum is never that which conceals the truth - it is the truth which conceals that 
there is none. The simulacrum is true. Ecclesiastes” (Baudrillard 1983: 1).
The present paper pursues the theme of the multiple layers of meanings in 
Geoffrey Hill’s poetry and its aim is to offer an assessment of the presence and 
role of the postmodern manner of writing which penetrates the basically neo- 
modemist texture of his poems. The following lines that come from his latest 
volume - “don’t wreck a good phrase simply to boost sense” (Hill 2006: 27) or 
“the eternal falsity of poetry is that its events occur in a time that differs from 
reality” (Hill 2006: 44) - remind us of the familiar concept of “simulacrum,” 
developed and presented by Jean Baudrillard.1 2  Therefore, we should not be 
surprised that the modernist lines of Geoffrey Hill tend to carry a number of 
postmodern ideas and influences, especially when his later poetry is concerned. 
Indeterminacy of the meaning of some of his poetic lines seems to have been 
intentional: the reader has been left more work to do and more scope to cover 
to interpret those intricate and ambiguous lines.
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Language is the stuff that any poem is made of, but Geoffrey Hill’s language 
is unusually complex and ambiguous. The search for meanings in this kind of 
poetry forces the reader to plunge into myth, history, technical innovations 
practised by the poet, and into the etymological layers of the English language. 
The influences coming from the reading of other European poets, such as Paul 
Celan or Lope de Vega, for example, are helpful in the search for the meanings 
of Hill’s mysterious and elusive poetry. The meanings of the poem can be 
discovered by the perspicacious reader as well as created by the poem itself. 
The dialogue between the reader and the poetic text is unavoidable and new 
shades of meanings are destined to be bom in the process. Geoffrey Hill has 
always been conscious of the voluble character of the poetic text and he has 
also been constantly striving for the perfection and for the victory over the 
“inertia of language” (Hill 1984: 2)
In his essay, entitled “Poetry as ‘Menace’ and ‘Atonement,’” Hill presents 
a very ambiguous linkage between the perfection of the sense of language 
and the moral exigencies that some poets succumb to. Referring to Thomas 
Mann’s Doctor Faustus, he remarks, “There is a sense in which the modem 
artist is called upon to atone for his own illiberal pride and a sense in which 
he is engaged in a vicarious expiation for the pride of the culture which itself 
rejects him” (Hill 1984: 4). “Empirical guilt” that poets experience is referred 
to as a writer’s attempt to make “a vicarious atonement for other writers’ sins 
of commission and omission” (Hill 1984: 13). Hill seems to be tom between 
the moral and technical demands set by his sense of cultural and historical 
responsibility. On the one hand, while speaking about T. S. Eliot, for example, 
Hill (1984: 13) stresses the “indefinite extent” of language to which the poet 
was forced to surrender “and seek his focus there.” The symbolist stress laid on 
the perfection of form plays a very significant role in Hill’s view of literature. 
On the other hand, the older emphasis placed on moral responsibility of a poet 
is equally powerfully emphasized by him.3
3 “However much and however rightly we protest against the vanity of supposing it to be merely 
the ‘ spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings, ’ poetic utterance is nonetheless an utterance of the 
self, the self demanding to be loved, demanding love in the form of recognition and ‘absolution’ 
[...] This dismay is as nothing compared to the shocking encounter with ‘empirical guilt,’ not as 
a manageable hypothesis, bust as irredeemable error in the very substance and texture of his craft 
and pride” (Hill 1984: 17).
The conflict endured in the shameless world, that is, in a society of “aggre­
gates and items” (Hill 1984: 18) lays a double duty on a poet, in Hill’s opinion. 
The feelings of attrition, contrition, shame and fear are bound to go hand in 
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hand with the growing demand for perfecting the poet’s mastery over the lan­
guage.4 The ambiguity and verbal difficulty of Geoffrey Hill’s writing present 
a daunting task to any researcher. The consolation is that the task is endless and 
inexhaustible, which means that the search for the elucidation of the poems can 
always be expanded and enlarged upon by the future researchers.
4 “The major caveat which I would enter against a theological view of literature is that, too 
often, it is not theology at all, but merely a restatement of the neo-Symbolist mystique celebrating 
verbal mastery” (Hill 1984: 17).
In his first collection of poems, titled For the Unfallen (1959) Geoffrey 
Hill introduces his principal poetic themes, which are those of myth, religion, 
fascination with nature, with the monuments of the past and the creation of 
words. The multiple meanings of the poems seem to emerge from the words 
themselves. The first poem of the collection, significantly titled “Genesis,” 
enlarges upon an act of creation. It is not very clear whether the created object 
is the world or the poem. It is equally unclear whether the creator is God or 
the poet who just introduces himself as being the one “crying the miracles 
of God” (Hill 1994: 3). The paradise presented in the poem seems to be the 
paradise produced by the language.
Biblical themes of innocence and guilt are also treated in a very contra­
dictory manner in the famous poem “Holy Thursday,” fashioned after William 
Blake’s two poems, bearing the same title and presented respectively in his 
Songs of Innocence and Songs of Experience. As the influence of Blake’s po­
ems on Geoffrey Hill has been thoroughly analysed in numerous critical studies, 
including that of Andrew Michael Roberts, carried out from the angle of history 
and politics, I would merely like to stress the verbal contradictions present in 
Hill’s poem - the contradictions conspicuous also in all of his oeuvre. Terror 
and consolation seem to form an inseparable unity in Hill’s “Holy Thursday” 
where we read that “Child and nurse walk hand in glove.” Such a union of the 
opposites is also expressed in the following lines in the poem:
Lo, she lies gentle and innocent of desire
Who was my constant myth and terror. (Hill 1994: 7)
The poem “God’s Little Mountain” continues the paradoxical and contradictory 
themes of the creation of the world as we know it in parallel with the world 
of language. The poet complains that he continually “waited for the word that 
was not given” (Hill 1994: 6) until he reached the ambiguous state of which 
he speaks at the end of the poem:
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I [...] fell, until I found the world again
Now I lack grace to tell what I have seen;
For though the head frames words the tongue has none.
And who will prove the surgeon to this stone? (Hill 1994: 6)
In one of Geoffrey Hill’s finest collections of poems entitled Tenebrae 
(1978) the poet continues presenting the tension between the transcendental 
search for God and bodily love. Passion permeates all the poems, and we 
can admire the poet’s “neo-Symbolist mystique celebrating verbal mastery” 
(Hill 1984: 17). Closed neo-symbolist structures, where one image adumbrates 
another, and in this manner creates a circle of interlaced ranges of meaning, are 
varied and intertwined with open multifaceted post-modern structures whose 
meanings are unsheltered, and which seem to be waiting for the reader to 
recreate them anew. It is only very gradually that readers can succeed in entering 
into a dialogue with the text, and the intended meanings still remain very 
ambiguous. For example, the following lines from the poem “Tenebrae”:
Possessed by you I chose to have no choice,
Fulfilled in you I sought no further quest, (Hill 1994: 160)
leave the readers puzzled with the multiple meanings. Who is the addressee of 
those lines - God or a mortal beloved? Further lines, highlighted by the image 
of “your cross,” bring some clarity into the inherent multiplicity of meanings. 
However, the tension between the adjectives “passionate” and “passionless” 
suggests a different, though barely potential, range of meanings, namely, that 
of the unfulfilled bodily love:
As I am passionate so you with pain
Turn my desire; as you seem passionless
So I recoil from all that I would gain, 
Wounding myself upon forgetfulness, 
False ecstasies, which you in truth sustain
As you sustain each item of your cross. (Hill 1994: 160)
The epithets “passionate” and “passionless” are joined through their opposition 
in the above quoted lines. Once they have been mentioned, both of them 
perform their interdependent roles in the poem, that is, both of them work 
together, suggesting each other through their mutual negation.
In the fifth part of the collection Lachrimae, titled “Pavana Dolorosa,” the 
play of the words, which formally seem to deny each other’s presence, creates 
a new presence which is even more forceful, more mysterious and leading
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to a frightful conclusion in the end. The line “self-seeking hunter of forms” 
clearly defines the endless aims and pursuits of the poet, whereas the paradoxes 
inherent in the oxymoronic phrases such as “your silence is an ecstasy of sound” 
(Hill 1994: 137) culminating in the final three lines:
And your nocturnals blaze upon the day.
I founder in desire for things unfound.
I stay amid the things that will not stay. (Hill 1994: 137)
hint at the paradoxical nature of all creation, divine as well as human. The 
other phrases, such as “Ash-Wednesday feasts,” “ascetic opulence,” “music’s 
creation of the moveless dance,” etc., are no longer able to surprise us. They are 
the expressions of the new world, created by Geoffrey Hill, which nevertheless 
expands our perception of the paradoxical nature of the world that we inhabit.
Andrew Michael Roberts compares Hill’s “Pavana Dolorosa” with Robert 
Southwell’s “Saint Peter’s Complaint.” The historical note has been sounded, 
and the unfortunate martyr of the Elizabethan England has received his poetical 
return in Geoffrey Hill’s oeuvre, the more so that the epigraph marking the 
whole collection of Lachrimae or Seven Tears Figured in Seven Passionate 
Pavanes has also been taken from Robert Southwell’s poem “Marie Magdalen’s 
Funeral Teares,” published in 1591. In his poem, though, Geoffrey Hill seems 
to doubt the possible “joys” of the “self-wounding martyrdom” leading to 
“Active consonance,” whereas the “self-seeking hunter of forms,” that is the 
poet, knows that “there is no end to his pursuits” (Hill 1994: 137). Poetry is thus 
given the priority of significance in Geoffrey Hill’s poetry; religious imagery 
has just emerged as a constituent part of the poet’s paradoxical language, which 
seems to create its own religious dimensions. But when, for example, we read 
the following lines from “Genesis”:
At dawn the Mass
Burgeons from stone
A Jesse tree
of resurrection (Hill 1994: 127)
we are confronting the problem of whether the enigmatic language does not 
assert the omnipotence of religious presence. The language itself seems to 
create “ghosts for love” on “forlorn altars” (Hill 1994: 127).
In a truly postmodernist manner, Geoffrey Hill is capable of subjecting real 
feelings to the demands of language, where language clearly gains the priority 
over all else in the newly created universe of poetry. For example, in “Coplas,” 
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which forms a part of the poem “The Songbook of Sebastian Arruruz,” where 
the eponymous Arruruz is also the invented name of an invented poet, we read 
the following lines: The metaphor holds; is a snug house.
You are outside, lost somewhere. I find myself
Devouring verses of stranger passion
And exile. The exact words
Are fed into my blank hunger for you. (Hill 1994: 84)
“The metaphor, verses of stranger passion” as well as “the exact words” seem to 
hold dominion over the real feelings which, in a good postmodem fashion, are 
not supposed to make stuff and substance of poetry. The poet “like a disciplined 
scholar” is trying
To find value
In a bleak skill, as in the thing restored:
The long-lost words of choice and valediction. (Hill 1994: 80)
The only thing which seems to be truly real are metaphors and language itself.
The collection of poems, significantly titled The Mystery of the Charity 
of Charles Péguy (1983), is dedicated to the life and death of the French poet 
Charles Péguy, bom in 1873 and killed in battle in 1914. The themes of history, 
war, myth and religion get intertwined, and all of them are viewed from the 
vantage point of poetry. Memory dominates the verbal scenes of battle and 
death on the fields of France. “In memory of these things these words were 
bom” is the final utterance of the Charles Péguy cycle.
The first poem of the cycle comments on the murder of the French socialist 
deputy Jean Jaurès. Geoffrey Hill parallels the ghost of the French deputy with 
that of Caesar. Indirectly, Péguy is compared with Bratus. The fatal question, 
though, which Hill asks is the following:
Did Péguy kill Jaurès? Did he incite
The assassin? (Hill 1994: 165)
Hill raises the question of whether the people, especially poets, are answerable 
for their inciting words; in this case, the words would be those pertaining 
to Péguy’s criticism of Jaurès. The question is reminiscent of the self-rebuke 
which W. B. Yeats addressed towards himself in his poem “The Man and the 
Echo:” “Did that play of mine send out / Certain men the English shot?” (Yeats 
1991: 221). In both cases, the questions are rhetorical. In Hill’s poem, the poet 
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is urged to “defend your first position to the last word” (1994: 166), where the 
word takes priority over any military positions.
As Charles Péguy is known to have been a follower of Bergson in his 
acceptance of the principles of organicism and criticism of the possibilities of 
technical and mechanical advancement, which would turn an individual into 
a cog of the machine or a number among the masses, Geoffrey Hill celebrates 
Charles Péguy’s response to Bergson’s ideas and links the French philoso­
pher with
an army
Of poets, converts, vine-dressers, men skilled
In wood or metal, peasants from the Beauce,
Terse teachers of Latin and those unschooled
In all but such hard rudiments of grace. (Hill 1994: 168)
The privilege given to poets, aristocracy and individual craftsmen is very 
similar to W. B. Yeats’ urging the poets of the future to “[s]ing the peasantry 
and then / Hard riding country gentlemen (1991: 211). Hill knows very well 
that words may have many meanings, that “history is law, clad in our skins of 
silver, steel and hide” (Hill 1994: 173) and that
Counting our blessings, honestly admire
The wrath of the peacemakers, for example
Christ driving the money-changers from the temple,
Applaud the Roman steadiness under fire (Hill 1994: 173)
we perceive that “the metaphors of blood begin to flow” (Hill 1994: 174), while 
poetry becomes more important than real blood.
The play of words creates new ranges of meaning, all of them challenging 
our perspicacity as readers. The farce of history is played out against “the last 
rites of truth, or the Last Judgement [...] or Mercy” (Hill 1994: 179), all of 
which are presented as being much the same in Hill’s poetry.
The sentencing of Dreyfus is paralleled with “the world-famous stories of 
Jules Verne” or the scenes at Golgotha. In both instances:
Serenely the mob howls
Its silent mouthings hammered into scrolls
Tom from Apocalypse. (Hill 1994: 173)
The religious dimension given to the famous trial of the 19th century demon­
strates the archetypal character both of the events and of the mob, which are 
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always able to hit the expected note while searching for a scapegoat. It is 
through his mastery over the language that Geoffrey Hill distances himself 
from all those “we,” famous in history and represented by “Pilate, Caiaphas in 
his thin soutane and Judas” (Hill 1994: 173).
The historical figures of Péguy or Jaurès or even Dreyfus acquire a new 
reality in the poetry of Geoffrey Hill. Historical judgement should be left for 
the historians to attain. The poetical work accommodates history only to the 
extent which permits the poet to create an absolutely new world based on 
the historical circumstances. However, the play of language, the polysemy of 
words, the twisted and ambiguous usages of idioms bring all these events into 
our present world, and make us perceive them all anew and very differently. 
Hill’s mastery over the language implies his mastery over the historical events, 
which gain a new life in The Mystery of the Charity of Charles Péguy. Still, 
while contradicting R. C. Nettleship’s utilitarian and business-like approach 
towards language, Geoffrey Hill insists that “there is something ‘mysterious’, 
some ‘dark and disputed matter’ implicated in the nature of language itself’ 
(Hill 1984: 151).
In his latest volume of poems, Without Title, Geoffrey Hill continues to 
pursue the mysterious trends of language as such. Paradoxes amalgamate and 
clash, creating in this manner new and still unexplored ranges of meaning. 
Even memory becomes suspect. “Men of stale will” may continue “nursing 
their secret wounds,” but the author knows that the man ruled by the mob, 
that is “the mob-ruled” may have only “five seconds’ freedom.” “The work of 
mourning [...] bugles dead achievements” and therefore, when viewed against 
the exigencies and expectations posed by the mob-ruled:
Metaphysics remain
In common language something of a joke.
Mourning my meaning is what I meant to say. (Hill 2006: 14)
In our age, the existence of meaning itself is threatened and that is why meaning 
may become simply a cliché unless it is created by poetry. The mourning for the 
meaning, absent or present, creates meaning. “Symbol bums off reality” (Hill 
2006: 12), we read in another poem, and symbol always indicates the search 
for meanings as well as for ideas. It is not in vain that one of the poems is 
paradoxically titled “On the Reality of the Symbol.”
Aware of the threats to meaning, Geoffrey Hill still connects poetry with 
moral and ethical demands. Justice still is one of his favourite words. Although 
the poet knows that “[s]o few of us absolved when what we write / Sets us to 
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rights on some scale of justice” (Hill 2006: 26), he still insists that he may be 
just “a whiz at ordinary language” (Hill 2006: 25) and, consequently, people 
may often mishear him, but the demands of his art are the same. More than 
ever does he see “through a painter’s eyes” and more than ever does his desire 
to “stay immortal and ageless” (Hill 2006: 3) get delegated to the sphere of 
the dream. His only consolation remains that “dead friends are no remoter than 
in life” (Hill 2006: 3).
Since one of the concerns of the present paper, as has been mentioned at the 
beginning, is the neo-modemist connection in Hill’s poetry, it seems appropriate 
at this point to mention links and parallels, necessarily limited here to a couple 
of examples for reasons of space, with the work of modernist poets, Ezra Pound 
and T. S. Eliot. Those links and parallels find their direct and indirect reflection 
particularly in Hill’s latest volume of poetry.
In his essay, significantly titled “Our Word is Our Bond,” which is included 
in the collection of The Lords of Limit, Hill writes about Ezra Pound as well 
as a number of other poets, writers and philosophers. Hill does not justify Ezra 
Pound’s political delusions but still he goes back to Pound’s trial and finds it 
more paradoxical than any paradox itself.5
5 “At the same time, ‘the peculiar legal paradox’ that, as a result of the court’s verdict, ‘Pound 
found himself, in effect, under a sentence of life imprisonment despite the fact that he was innocent 
in the eyes of the law’ is in itself more oxymoronic than paradoxical” (Hill 1984: 154).
What is of more interest, however, for the present paper, relates to Hill’s 
comments on Pound setting high demands for the definitive character of lan­
guage as such and Hill’s criticism of Pound’s inaccuracy in the latter’s trans­
lations of Propertius. To recall what T. S. Eliot said as regards Pound’s poem 
“Homage to Sextus Propertius” seems important at this place: “It is not a trans­
lation, it is a paraphrase, or still more truly (for the instructed) a persona” (Eliot 
1991: xxiii). Geoffrey Hill, on the other hand, comments on Ezra Pound con­
flating two lines of Propertius’ Latin because “the major implications of the 
change certainly involve a claim to status, to be ‘among’ the true poets” (Hill 
1984: 156). In short, by creating his personas, including that of Sextus Proper­
tius, Ezra Pound seems to have been fighting his own battles directed against 
what he thought to be the narrow-mindedness of his entourage in England, in 
1917. His poem abounds in numerous classical names and references, helping 
the poet to emphasize the principal subject of the poem, which is poetry and the 
autonomy of the poet. The poem ends on a very fragmentary Modernist note, 
leaving a possibility for the reader to connect very disparate images.
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Geoffrey Hill’s poem “Ex Propertio,” on the other hand, is very different 
in character. To begin with, it is a short poem, in contrast to Ezra Pound’s text 
being of a substantial length and volume. In this poem, Hill seems to be trying 
to fathom out his life-long themes of love and law, and to link them as well as 
to separate them through rhetoric and poetry:
I bowelled my loyalties to law and love
Rhetorical in parts. (Hill 2006: 61)
Hill’s poem opens on an ironical note reminiscent of literary traditions pertain­
ing both to W. B. Yeats and T. S. Eliot:
Encouraged by a glib-tongued haruspex
To practice divination - what’s wrong there? (Hill 2006: 61)
The lines are reminiscent of the denunciatory opening of T. S. Eliot’s fifth 
part of East Coker:
To communicate with Mars, converse with spirits,
To report the behaviour of the sea monster,
Describe the horoscope, haruspicate and scry. (Eliot 1991: 198)
Eliot links the above mentioned occupations with the playing of cards and 
calls them “pastimes and drugs,” especially if they get contrasted with the far 
worthier and further searching poetical endeavours, such as
To apprehend
The point of intersection of the timeless
With time. (Eliot 1991: 198)
Geoffrey Hill, on the other hand, asserts the reviving power of love over 
that of the self-consuming law:
Love as a necromant
Re-infiltrates the dead whilst law usurps
Upon itself. (Hill 2006: 61)
Both poets clearly mistrust “divinations charms.”
Whereas Pound writes of Propertius’ love for Cynthia, Hill stresses that 
“the act of love surpasses eloquence” (Hill 2006: 61). All the three poets 
nevertheless unequivocally proclaim their absolute faith in the powers of the 
poetical language. Hill speaks of this in these very impressive lines which are 
his homage to the potential of the language:
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Words are never stone
Except in their appearance. See me out,
Long-domiciled epiphanies I trust. (Hill 2006: 64)
These lines coming from the poem “On the Sophoclean Moment in English Po­
etry” can be clearly perceived as Geoffrey Hill’s creative motto. The meanings 
of the long-domiciled epiphanies are created by and revealed through words.
Geoffrey Hill is extremely skilful, aptly playing with the similarities and 
differences offered by poetical language. The poet appears to be certain that 
there is but “one stop from Sophocles to Sepulchre” (Hill 2006: 64). However, 
although the Sophoclean Moment may last only for a moment (Hill 2006: 64), 
the attempt to become Sophoclean will always be there.
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Uncanny Authors, Ambiguous Tales: Metafictional 
Discourse in J. M. Coetzee’s Novels Foe 
and The Master of Petersburg
Since the publication, in the late 1960s, of two influential essays, Roland 
Barthes’s “The Death of the Author” (1967) and Michel Foucault’s “What 
is an Author?” (1969), the question of authorship has continued to be the site 
of intense debate in literary theory. As Andrew Bennett (2005: 127) points out,
critical interest in literature is driven by an uncertainty about the author, about what 
the author is, about what this author is (this author that we are reading, now, a book 
in our hands). And such an interest is impelled in fact by the author’s irresistible 
infraction of the limits of textuality, meaning, intention. The condition on which 
criticism and theory are undertaken, the condition even of reading, is this crisis, 
this crisis of literature, this uncanny, undecidable author (original emphasis).
Although postmodernism challenges the idea of the author as source and centre 
of the text, author figures, paradoxically, have become pervasive in postmodem 
fiction where they often function as a means to articulate a text’s metafic- 
tional reflection.
This essay aims to discuss how the contemporary debate about the author 
and authorship is addressed by J. M. Coetzee in his novels Foe (1986) and 
The Master of Petersburg (1994). J. M. Coetzee is seen by critics as “a self- 
conscious postmodernist,” “a writer’s writer” whose central preoccupation is 
the nature of authorship, the writer’s authority over his subject, as well as 
the broader issue of the cultural authority to which fiction written within the 
Western tradition can lay claim (Lowry 1999).
In the two novels under discussion here, Coetzee has revisited authors of the 
past: Foe features Daniel Defoe and rewrites Robinson Crusoe (1719) from the 
female castaway’s point of view, while The Master of Petersburg re-imagines 
Dostoevsky and conjures up the genesis of his novel The Possessed (1872). 
Both Foe and The Master of Petersburg foreground the authors of their pretexts 
and fictionalize the way the precursory novels were conceived; both can be read
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as extensive metafictional discourses offering a developing commentary on the 
nature and status of the activity of story-telling / story-writing and linking it 
with notions of power, authority and ownership. It should be added that Defoe 
and Dostoevsky are the two authors whose influence on Coetzee’s writing has 
been especially significant, they figure prominently not only in his fiction but 
also in his criticism.
In Foe Coetzee revisits and subverts the source text by inserting into the 
original plot the character of Susan Barton, a female castaway on Cruso’s [sic] 
island. Rescued by an English ship, Susan and Friday finally return to London, 
yet Cruso dies on the voyage back to England. Out of the four sections of 
the novel only the first (and the shortest) one - Susan’s account of the island 
episode - offers a narrative which can claim to be a version of the Robinson 
Crusoe story. The remainder of the novel dramatizes Susan’s efforts to tell 
the island story first through and then over and against the writer Daniel Foe 
(later Daniel Defoe).
Foe is both a metafictional and political allegory questioning the assump­
tions of race, class and gender underlying the works of the Western literary 
canon; it has been described by Dominic Head (1997: 14) as a “textual decol­
onization.” In particular, Coetzee’s novel narrativizes the exclusion practices 
which operate in the construction of a literary canon and reveals that “sto­
rytellers can certainly silence, exclude, and absent certain past events - and 
people” (Hutcheon 1991: 107). As the readers follow Susan’s desperate at­
tempt to have her story told and to retrieve Friday’s story, they come “gradually 
to realize the criminal distortion by which Susan will be written out of the story 
altogether, and the tragic truth of Friday’s experience will be misrepresented 
as benign, as comedy” (Burnett 1996: 245). Drawing our attention to the fact 
that Foe was Defoe’s real name, Coetzee exposes him as enemy of truth, the 
giver of false witness. Paula Burnett (1996: 245) reminds us that “in Protestant 
Christian parlance the Foe is the devil, the old enemy. In the moral landscape 
of the text, Mr Foe is unmasked as a figure of the devil, seducing with his 
apparently reasonable blandishments, then disappearing when he has done his 
evil work, leaving a trail of unpaid debts.” Thus, Coetzee’s novel constructs 
authorship as seduction and betrayal, as distortion of truth, while Foe - the 
author, representing the voice of the elite culture of patriarchal power, is seen 
as a bearer of guilt who, by silencing the voices of the Other of gender and the 
racial Other, fails in his authorial responsibility.
In Coetzee’s novel, there is a continuing debate as to who determines the 
boundaries of the story and, as a result, controls and owns the narrative. Since 
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Susan shared the island experience with Cruso and Friday, can she claim the 
island story as her own? Or is she only telling Cruso’s story in his absence? And 
what are Friday’s rights in this regard? While Susan wants to recount the island 
episode, she realizes that she is not equipped to do it and needs Foe’s experience 
and established reputation as professional writer. Yet, Susan’s views as to where 
her story begins and ends are very different from those of Foe. While Foe sees 
her story as describing a quest for her abducted daughter, with the adventure 
of the island being only a fragment of it, Susan insists that her time spent in 
Brazil, searching for her daughter, is not part of her story. As Patrick Corcoran 
(1996: 260) observes, this differing point of view about the limits of the story 
and especially about who has the right to set those limits, contains elements of 
a power-struggle. The metafictional discourse here closely parallels the novel’s 
exploration of power relationships.
Coetzee further problematizes the question of the ownership of stories 
by highlighting the polysemantic nature of the author’s name. Following the 
ideas of Michel Foucault (1979) who wrote that the author’s name has both 
a descriptive and a designatory function, Coetzee calls attention to the fact that 
the author’s name functions as a cultural signifier and that today Defoe has 
become a half-real, half-fictional character. According to Jean-Paul Engelibert 
(1996: 272), there exists a myth of Daniel Defoe - the author, which constructs 
Defoe as “the poor but prolific writer, eternally creating yet eternally the victim 
of his own undertakings, inventor of the ‘English novel.’” This mythic Defoe, 
writes Engelibert (1996: 268):
combines all the characteristics of the writer and the adventurer. He presents us 
with the spectacle of adversity and of perseverance, of courage and of genius, of 
a life of suffering and wandering and yet a life of inexhaustible energy; inventing 
a new literary form against all the odds he becomes a hero of the act of writing.
In other words, just as the author generates texts, texts generate the author. 
Revealed to be a discursive construct, the author is dispossessed of his work; 
the authoritative and controlling role of the author is called into question and 
the author’s exclusive right over his own texts is problematized. Coetzee’s 
novel also rejects what Roland Barthes (1995) called the myth of filiation - 
the traditional notion of authorship that views the author as a kind of parent 
giving life to a text - and emphasizes the intertextual nature of authorship as it 
portrays Foe feeding his writing on other people’s stories.
Coetzee’s text offers a view of the creative process as possessing an ex­
tremely ambiguous nature. On the one hand, writing is seen as an authenticating 
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and authorizing process - something necessary to record experience and give it 
“substance:” without any clear written account of her stay on the island, Susan 
feels she is a “being without substance, a ghost” (Coetzee 1987: 51). On the 
other hand, writing inevitably involves misrepresentation and plagiarism.
Foe steals from Susan not only the island narrative but also her life story to 
use it as source material for another novel, Roxana, or The Fortunate Mistress. 
What is more, his fictional narrative gives Susan a false understanding of her 
own history. The appearance of the second Susan Barton, who claims to be 
the long lost daughter of the first, further complicates the story. In the end 
Susan seems unable to distinguish fact from fiction any longer. The question 
she asks about the second Susan: “Is she substantial or is she a story too?” 
(Coetzee 1987: 152), remains unanswered. The introduction of the mysterious 
figure of Susan’s daughter destabilizes the narrative and seems to suggest that 
the dividing line between fiction and reality can prove to be blurred. Coetzee’s 
novel deconstructs what Gérard Genette (1995: 236) calls “a shifting but sacred 
frontier between two worlds, the world in which one tells, the world of which 
one tells” and becomes an expression of the characteristic postmodern view of 
reality as textuality suggesting that we all, “the narrator and his narratees - you 
and I - perhaps belong to some narrative.”
In the final section of the novel Susan’s first-person narration is replaced 
by that of an unidentified first-person narrator, destabilizing the narrative fur­
ther both in temporal and fictional terms. This new unnamed and unidentified 
narrator enters a London property and finds Susan and Foe, presumably dead, 
in a bed and Friday bricked up alive in an alcove. Pressing his ear close to 
the door, the narrator hears some strange noises flowing from behind it: “From 
his mouth, without a breath, issue the sounds of the island” (Coetzee 1987: 
154). Then the opening action of slipping overboard is repeated and the whole 
narrative is revised by revealing that Susan died in the shipwreck with which 
the narrative began. This cryptic and dreamlike section of the novel received 
various interpretations.
Paula Burnett identifies the new first-person narrator with the authorial 
voice - that of Coetzee himself. Friday’s story cannot be contained within the 
bounds of Coetzee’s narration, the author can only hand over the narration in 
dread and hope to Friday as the guilty white race looks to the victimized black 
for redemption. According to the critic,
Coetzee as a white South African here acknowledges that he is not empowered 
to speak for black Africa: the black story will be told elsewhere. [...] The final
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narrator falls silent in the posture of reverent listener, his phase of utterance ended
- a symbol of the end of white domination. (Burnett 1996: 248)
On the other hand, the whole metafictional reflection which this part of the 
novel articulates may be understood as being aimed at disrupting the traditional 
power relations implicit in the dichotomy author-reader and rejecting a linear 
epistemology according to which the left-hand term is seen as superior and 
dominant. Both Patrick Corcoran and Jean-Paul Engelibert (1996) argue that 
the author’s narrative is replaced in the final section by the reader’s narrative 
who makes sense of the text in a new way. According to Patrick Corcoran (1996: 
265), “the power relationships which are analysed through the metafictional 
discourse must naturally include the reader who also has the power to liberate 
or enslave.” In his turn, Jean-Paul Engelibert (1996: 275-6) points out that
the final chapter presents a Utopian situation in which the narrative finds itself 
severed from all authority. [...] The narrator-reader has taken over from the female 
narrator who wanted to be the author. And it is by and through him that the text 
flows forward, an impersonal energy which disperses itself in the immensity, which 
bathes him and flows over him. Here, the story of the island no longer has an author 
and no longer belongs to anyone.
Julie Sanders (2006:111,112) suggests that the final section aims at empha­
sizing the fictionality of the narrative the reader has just been following, while 
the sounds emanating from Friday render him “a semantic signifier of the island, 
and all that was suppressed, oppressed, or repressed in Defoe’s ‘master-text.’”
In comparison with Foe, the novel The Master of Petersburg is less experi­
mental in its narrative structure; however, it provides a complex and disturbing 
reflection on creativity at a deeper philosophical level. The novel features Fyo­
dor Dostoevsky as its protagonist and deals with the period of his life leading up 
to his writing of The Possessed. The action takes place in 1869 as Dostoevsky, 
despite the threat of creditors and the secret police, returns to Petersburg to 
discover the truth behind the sudden death of his stepson, Pavel, with whom he 
had a difficult but intense relationship. Agonized by grief and guilt, he moves 
into the room Pavel rented from a widow called Anna Sergeyevna and reads 
his diary. He becomes sexually involved with Anna Sergeyevna and attempts 
to learn from her young daughter, Matryosha, how his stepson lived and died. 
Dostoevsky is interrogated by councillor Maximov, who investigates Pavel’s 
death and his connections with the Nechaevists, a clandestine group of nihilist 
terrorists. Dostoevsky also meets the fierce anarchist Sergei Nechayev himself.
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Though some elements of the novel recall certain aspects of the life of the 
Russian writer, Coetzee does not offer a literary biography of Dostoevsky. Just 
like in Defoe’s case, Coetzee rather draws on the myth of Dostoevsky - the 
author whose name is redolent with complex meaning: one of the founding 
fathers of modem prose; the author of dark, intellectually complex novels 
dealing with the themes of suffering, evil and the quest for God and famous 
for their psychological insights; the writer who was an epileptic all his life and 
a compulsive gambler and whose brooding, tortured characters are believed to 
reflect his own manias and rages. The Dostoevsky figure functions in the novel 
as an emblem of a modem writer. Using Dostoevsky as the focaliser of the 
novel’s third-person narration, Coetzee aims to present the complicated state 
of mind of an author and to further reflect on the ambiguities of the creative 
process and ethical responsibilities of a writer.
Coetzee’s novel subverts the idea of creative writing as a noble and whole­
some activity. By portraying the irreconcilable and often distasteful contradic­
tions within the author’s mind and showing how the author draws inspiration 
from the unlikeliest sources, Coetzee offers a dark view of the creative process 
as a transgression, a perversion. Remembering the question he was asked by 
Maximov’s assistant: “What kind of book do you write?” - Coetzee’s Dosto­
evsky believes the correct answer should be: “I write perversions of the truth. 
I choose the crooked road and take children into dark places. I follow the dance 
of the pen” (Coetzee 1999: 235-6).
In his novel Coetzee appropriates the famous chapter “At Tikhon’s,” written 
by Dostoevsky for The Possessed but suppressed by his editor M. N. Katkov. 
This chapter, though never reinstated in the novel, is usually supplied as an 
appendix in modem editions. In the chapter, the character Nikolai Stavrogin 
confesses to a sordid liaison with a fourteen-year-old girl, Matryosha. The 
character of Matryosha, the setting of Stavrogin’s tale as well as allusions to 
pedophilia, appear in The Master of Petersburg emphasizing the idea that there 
are elements in writing which take the writer to the edge of what is ethical. 
As Coetzee’s Dostoevsky muses watching Matryosha: “He has no difficulty in 
imagining this child in her ecstasy. His imagination seems to have no bounds” 
(Coetzee 1999: 76). The writer is aware that in his writing as well as in his life, 
“shame seems to have lost its power” (Coetzee 1999: 24) and he contemplates 
writing a “book of the night, in which every excess would be represented and 
no bounds respected,” he calls it “a book of evil” (Coetzee 1999: 134).
In The Master of Petersburg Coetzee enhances his negative metaphor of 
writing as betrayal developed in Foe. The novel presents the writing activity 
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through a series of metaphors comparing the writer to a spy, a secret agent and 
a trespasser, amoral and passive, devoid of shame, who constantly violates the 
privacy of other people. Initially, mourning the death of his stepson, Dostoevsky 
believes that fiction is the art of raising the dead and sees the writer as an 
Orpheus waking up the dead. He hopes that writing as a means of identification 
with his dead stepson will eventually lead to his own salvation. However, as 
Dostoevsky reflects with striking openness about himself and what he perceives 
as evil, ridiculous and shameful in himself, he comes to see writing as treachery 
and immoral exploitation: he uses everyone and everything - his own very 
real feelings, his most intimate relationships with other people, his dead son’s 
writing - to fuel his writing:
Poet, lyre-player, enchanter, lord of resurrection, that is what I am called to be. And 
the truth? [...JI pay and I sell: that is my life. Sell my life, sell the lives of those 
around me. Sell everyone [...] a Judas, not a Jesus. Sell you, sell your daughter, sell 
all those I love. Sold Pavel alive and will now sell the Pavel inside me, if I can find 
a way. Hope to find a way of selling Sergei Nechaev too. A life without honour; 
treachery without limit; confession without end. (Coetzee 1999: 152-3, 222)
For the writer, nothing is going to remain private, everything is going to 
be published. Betrayal and venality seem to be indispensable components of 
writing. However, the writer has to pay a very high price for it. At the end of 
the novel Dostoevsky thinks: “They pay him lots of money for writing books, 
said the child repeating the dead child. What they failed to say was that he had 
to give up his soul in return” (Coetzee 1999: 250, original emphasis).
Portraying Dostoevsky mourning the death of his son and turning his grief 
into fiction, Coetzee seems to project onto the fictional writer-character his own 
private tragedy - his agony over the death of his twenty-three-year-old son 
in a mysterious falling accident which, as we may infer, has also been turned 
into prize-winning, best selling and financially rewarding fiction. The father­
writer is compared to a scavenger feeding on the decaying flesh: “A father 
like an old grey rat creeping in afterwards upon the love scene to see what 
is left for him. Sitting on the corpse in the dark, pricking his ears, gnawing, 
listening, gnawing” (Coetzee 1999:107). However, writing, being an expression 
of parental bereavement, also becomes a painful way for the father to adjust 
to the death of his son.
Central to Coetzee’s novel is the exploration of writing as confession and 
the reflection on what Sue Kossew calls “the self-mythologizing nature of the 
text” (1996: 63). Coetzee also dealt with the problem “whether it is possible 
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to tell the truth about oneself’ in his essay “Confession and Double Thoughts: 
Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky” first published in 1985. In this essay, analyzing 
“At Tikhon’s,” Coetzee (1992: 289) emphasizes Dostoevsky’s presentation of 
the limits of secular confession, which is characterized by deception and self­
deception and represents only partial truth. In the novel, Anna Sergeyevna asks 
Dostoevsky: “Do you act from the heart all the time? I don’t think so” and 
adds: “Why should I believe you? Why should you believe yourself?” (Coetzee 
1999: 167) questioning the very possibility of truth as a potential to know 
oneself. Coetzee’s Dostoevsky reveals “nothing so much as the helplessness 
of confession before the desire of the self to construct its own truth” (Coetzee 
1992: 279). However, despite the novel’s skepticism about the accessibility 
of truth and the possibility of objective self-knowledge, Dostoevsky’s self­
confrontation and interrogation of his own myth-making is shown as “the most 
radical intellectual and even spiritual courage” (Coetzee 1995: 15-6).
The novel’s final description of the act of writing, when Dostoevsky begins 
to write what will become The Possessed, may be interpreted as the most 
explicit embodiment of “the Dostoevskian confrontation between faith and 
skepticism” (Coetzee 1992: 248), or, as Cary Henson (1998) describes it, of the 
main philosophical debate staged by Coetzee in his novel - the debate between 
cynicism and grace. In his essay “Confession and Double Thoughts: Tolstoy, 
Rousseau, Dostoevsky,” Coetzee (1992: 392) defines the debate as follows: 
“Cynicism: the denial of any ultimate basis for values. Grace: a condition in 
which the truth can be told clearly, without blindness. The debate is staged by 
Dostoevsky: the interlocutors are called Stavrogin and Tikhon.” In the novel, as 
Cary Henson (1998) points out, this debate is conducted among Dostoevsky’s 
personal, political and authorial selves.
Writing his controversial chapter “At Tikhon’s,” the writer gambles with 
and provokes God:
It is an assault on the innocence of a child. It is an act for which he can expect no 
forgiveness. With it he has crossed the threshold. Now God must speak, now God 
dare no longer remain silent. To corrupt a child is to force God. The device he has 
made arches and springs like a trap, a trap to catch God. (Coetzee 1987: 249)
Not only is this fragment an expression of the writer’s skepticism, but, as 
Rachel Lawlan (1998: 153) rightly observes, it also reveals Dostoevsky’s (and 
Coetzee’s own) “longing for grace, for transcendence over contingency and 
eternal confusion,” “finally a longing for authority.” In The Master of Petersburg 
a kind of grace and absolution is achieved when the writer transforms his 
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demons into fiction, which provides an answer to the question Dostoevsky asks 
himself about the purpose of creativity as he contemplates writing “a book of 
evil”: “And to what end? To liberate himself from evil or to cut himself off 
from good?” (Coetzee 1999: 134).
Like Coetzee himself, Coetzee’s Dostoevsky is a writer of fiction in a highly 
politicized environment. There are obvious parallels between Dostoevsky’s 
Russia - a country on the verge of a historical upheaval, tortured by injustice 
and cruelty - and the apartheid South Africa in which Coetzee lived and wrote 
for most of his life. As Cary Henson (1998) notices, Coetzee
has been accused of being either reactionary or displaying complicity in the oppres­
sion of certain groups in society, and has rejected the violent and anti-intellectual 
revolutionary movements, choosing instead to try find an authentic voice and nar­
rative that can fully and self-critically explore fiction’s role in times of intense 
ideological pressure.
Like Coetzee, Dostoevsky is beset by the forces of both repression and rebellion. 
On the one hand, Maximov attempts to induce Dostoevsky to help track down 
Pavel’s revolutionary friends. On the other, their leader Nechaev tries to recruit 
the author for service in insurgency. As Peter Hom (2002) comments, Coetzee 
uses Dostoevsky to express his dislike of conformity, either to the state’s dictates 
or to the orthodoxy of opposition. Coetzee does not deny that the writer may 
have a “duty,” but he defines it as a transcendental imperative rather than as an 
obligation imposed on the writer by society.
Exploring the writer’s responsibility in a politically charged context, Co­
etzee (1992: 98-9) in his novel dramatizes the ideas formulated in his articles 
on South-African literature in which he speaks against “a literature in bondage, 
[...] unable to move from elementary relations of contestation, domination, 
and subjugation to the vast and complex human world that lies beyond them.” 
According to Coetzee (1988: 3), the novel should not be seen as a supplement 
to history, novelistic discourse is not subordinate to and should not be “col­
onized by the discourse of history”; on the contrary, it should help to “show 
up the mythic status of history” and in this way contribute to the practice of 
“demythologizing history.”
There is another important theme which recurs both in Foe and The Master 
of Petersburg: the presence of the strong woman, the female partner of the 
lonely male author, who takes the sexual initiative and who is both “mother and 
wife, nurse (in the nourishing sense as well as carer for the sick), and Venus” 
(Burnett 1996: 246). What is more, this strong female character - Susan in Foe 
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and Anna Sergeyevna in The Master of Petersburg - has the function of a Muse, 
who is both the goddess-wooer of the writer and the “true begetter” (Coetzee 
1999: 134) of his fiction. Each of these characters projects the female role onto 
the male writer “using him as vessel, or conduit, for her creativity, reversing the 
traditional model of sexuality which projects the female as vessel for the male 
seed” (Burnett 1996:247). In this way Coetzee’s fiction replaces the myth of the 
father as origin by the older myth of the mother as origin and deconstructs the 
traditional notion of creativity as a predominantly masculine activity. Moreover, 
as Paula Burnett (1996: 246) points out, Coetzee’s representations of the male 
as passive partner
create a model in which patriarchal guilt - the historic association of exploitative 
dominance with the masculine culture [...] can be alleviated. The phallus is no 
longer threatening; the female initiative can return the male to an innocent sexuality. 
The imagination haunted by images of the phallus as weapon finds in the idea of 
inert coitus with the muse-wooer a long-sought redemption.
In conclusion it has to be said that both in Foe and in The Master of 
Petersburg, Coetzee, via an intertextual strategy, focuses on the exploration 
of some of the darkest and most ambiguous aspects of the creative process 
and offers a number of disturbing metaphors to conceptualise the author and 
authorship. However, what finally emerges from our reading of these novels is 
also the idea of writing as a redemptive act, both in the private and political 
sense. Moreover, Coetzee subverts conventional views on the creative process 
and attempts to find a language and a type of narrative that can transcend 
traditional hierarchies.
In his works Coetzee conducts a dialogue not only with his predecessors, 
but also with himself as a writer. Each subsequent novel becomes a kind of 
metatextual commentary on his previous texts. After Foe and The Master of 
Petersburg, Coetzee has continued to develop his ideas on the nature of au­
thorship in other works: he has created a fictional author character, Elizabeth 
Costello, in the 2003 eponymous novel; this character reappears in his novel 
Slow Man (2005) providing a discourse on the interrelationship between the 
literary author and his characters, between fiction and reality. The latest novel, 
Diary of a Bad Year (2007), whose title and composition can be seen as a struc­
tural allusion to Defoe’s A Journal of the Plague Year (1722), also has a writer 
as the protagonist. Significantly, Coetzee’s Nobel lecture (2003), delivered in 
the form of an enigmatic short story entitled “He and his man,” is a metafic- 
tional parable which, like Foe, is constructed as an appropriation of Robinson
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Crusoe and which again includes Defoe as a character. Thus, Coetzee’s texts 
create a textual-metatextual space within which meanings are integrated and 
the author’s views on the metaphysics of writing receive a profound and mul­
tifaceted explication.
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“The Doer is Merely a Fiction Added to the Deed: 
The Deed is Everything” (F. Nietzsche). Tales 
of “Doing Gender” in Tipping the Velvet
“[...] the oyster, you see, is what you might call a real queer fish. Now, a he, 
now a she, as quite takes its fancy. A regular morphodite!”, writes Sarah Waters 
(2006: 51) in Tipping the Velvet. Such sexual flexibility of the molluscs is not 
just Waters’s literary creation. In fact, while oysters have separate sexes, they 
may change their sex once or more times during their life span. Waters makes 
this “queer fish” a symbol of gender fluidity in Tipping the Velvet. Nan Astley, 
the main character of the novel, works in an oyster-parlour, and she is like 
an oyster herself. She becomes a cross-dresser. She is “now, a he, now a she, 
as quite takes its fancy.”
Nan’s cross-dressing is in the foreground of the novel to such an extent 
that it is unclear whether Nan Astley or cross-dressing is the main character 
of Tipping the Velvet. Although Nan often wears masculine clothes her cross­
dressing does not signify her being transgender. At this point a distinction 
between cross-dressers and transgender people should be made. While these 
two categories overlap they cannot be used interchangeably. It is a well-known 
fact that a person who is transgender usually cross-dresses. In this case, wearing 
clothes of the opposite sex is an element of the transgender person’s identity. 
This person usually feels that his/her biological sex does not correspond with 
his/her psyche. Thus, a female who claims that inside, in her psyche, she is 
really a man will try to “fight” with her femininity by wearing men’s clothes. 
However, people cross-dress for many other reasons and then they are called 
“cross-dressers,” not “transgender people.” They may treat cross-dressing as 
disguise, like Achilles, who dresses up as a woman not to be forced to take 
part in war. Cross-dressing may also be an element of the carnival, which is 
a time of transgression and suspending of the laws of normativity. This is the 
time of breaking the boundaries, as for example wearing clothes characteristic 
for the opposite sex. In this case cross-dressing is a ritual and a symbolic 
change in behaviour, which gives people freedom to act the way they would
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never do in their everyday existence. Brazil is frequently called by cross­
dressers “the Promised Land” because of its carnival which is the time when 
“men appear in high heels, fishnet stockings, ruffle-and-lace dancehall girl 
outfits, with lips smeared with bright lipstick and wearing thick layered wigs” 
(Yarborough). Cross-dressing may also be an element of a performance. Drag 
queens and drag kings wear clothes of the opposite sex to entertain the audience 
by toying with gender stereotypes. This type of entertainment, because of its 
visual attractiveness, is frequently shown in films, such as: The Adventures of 
Priscilla, Queen of the Desert (1994), To Wong Foo Thanks for Everything 
(1995), Hedwig and the Angry Inch (2000), Split: Portrait of a Drag Queen 
(1992) and many others.
Nan Astley’s numerous acts of cross-dressing reveal all different shades 
of this phenomenon. It is her who assigns meaning to the masculine clothes 
she wears and when cross-dressing she plays multiple roles. Also the act of 
cross-dressing as the main character of the novel plays various roles: it acts as 
a disguise, a drag king’s costume and an element of a masquerade. Constant 
interaction of these two main characters - Nan and cross-dressing - is a crucial 
element of Nan’s journey of self-discovery, which begins in the Mecca of 
disguise, in the theatre.
At the beginning of the novel Nan’s identity seems to be well-defined and 
she appears to be pleased with her “oyster girl existence.” However, Nan’s 
seemingly fixed identity gets into motion when she sees a male impersonator, 
Kitty Butler, performing on stage in a music hall. Afterwards, Nan begins to im­
itate Kitty and becomes a cross-dresser. But Nan’s cross-dressing is not a mere 
enactment of stereotypical masculinity; Nan’s cross-dressing (both on-stage 
and off-stage) means playing multiple roles: a male impersonator (a mirror 
reflection of her lover), a renter,1 a kept-woman and “the angel of the house.” 
Through cross-dressing and playing these “roles” Nan goes beyond socially 
accepted norms and refuses to be “culturally intelligible” (Lloyd 2007: 35). 
The notion of “cultural intelligibility,” coined by Judith Butler, was later sum­
marized by Lloyd (2007: 36) as a reference to “the production of a normative 
framework that conditions who can be recognized as a legitimate subject.” This 
framework presupposes direct correspondence between sex, gender and sexu­
ality, which means that a girl’s gender is feminine and that she desires a man. 
This kind of relations exists within the “heterosexual matrix” in which gender 
is culturally intelligible. Any disruption in this chain of relations makes the 
1 Renter - a synonym of rentboy, a male prostitute.
“THE DOER IS MERELY A FICTION ADDED TO THE DEED .. 213
subject culturally unintelligible and unable to live a “liveable life.” However, 
seeing gender as performative challenges this heteronormative concept of gen­
der and broadens our understanding of identity as such. Gender perfomativity 
allows for playing with gender by breaking the chain of relations between sex, 
gender and sexuality.
This is what Nan Astley does in Tipping the Velvet. Her life is a constant 
performance of a cross-dresser outside the heterosexual matrix. She opposes 
“girling,” citing gender norms (Wolfreys 1999: 573) and she does not follow the 
heteronormative set of relations between sex, gender and desire. In each case 
of role-playing Nan breaks this chain of relations differently. Nan is constantly 
performing her gender, wearing masks and assuming identities which prove to 
be illusory temporary constructions. Nan’s identity is multiple and fragmented. 
Is there anything of essence in her identity behind all the masks? This paper 
will discuss Nan’s cross-dressing as a subversive act which proves gender to be 
performative; thus, gender is not “being” but “becoming.” It will analyze the 
process of Nan’s construction of her gender identity through constant breaking 
of the chain of relations between sex, gender and sexuality.
Nan’s process of creating her identity begins with imitation of the male 
impersonator, Kitty. The mechanisms of this stage of her development resemble 
“the mirror stage” described by Jacques Lacan. Kitty embodies an ideal that 
Nan aspires to, the “self’ she wants to become. By imitating Kitty, Nan hopes to 
reach this ideal so she becomes Kitty’s “mirror reflection.” When Nan dresses 
up as a boy, Kitty says:
She looks like a boy. Which I know she’s supposed to. But, if you follow me, she 
looks like a real boy. Her face and her figure and her bearing on her feet. That ain’t 
quite the idea now, is it? (Waters 2006: 119)
This description indicates that Nan resembles a boy too much, which was 
not the desired effect. Nan has to perform masculinity in a feminine way. That 
is why she covers her face with make up and wears feminine shoes. Thus, it is 
hard to say whether Nan enacts masculinity or femininity. It appears that she 
acts a girl who acts a boy. Wearing masculine clothes she flutters her eyelashes 
and she pouts her lips. After Nan’s first performance in a music hall she feels 
reborn and it is her point of transition into a new way of living. She says:
I had glimpsed the truth about myself and it had left me awed and quite transformed. 
The truth was this: That whatever success I might achieve as a girl, they would be
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nothing compared to the triumphs I should enjoy clad, however girlishly, as a boy. 
I had, in short, found my vocation. (Waters 2006: 123)
Soon, she changes her surname to “King,” which emphasizes the fact that 
being a drag king becomes an integral part of her identity. She makes a de­
parture from “quoting” the Victorian norms to “quoting” the non-normative 
male impersonation. At this stage of her life cross-dressing means imitating 
Kitty’s behavior and lifestyle. They enact masculinity together on stage, which 
reflects the lack of heteronormative coherence between their sex, gender and 
desire. They are both dressed up in masculine clothes and thus there is no co­
herence between their sex and gender. Moreover, they kiss each other, which 
shows a lack of correspondence between their sex and desire. Also the relation 
between gender and desire is non-normative because they are both of mascu­
line gender in the act, so kissing they go beyond the heterosexual matrix. An 
additional element of gender confusion and blurring the boundaries between 
femininity and masculinity is the “girlishness” of the “boyishness” that both 
Nan and Kitty enact. This complicates the reception of their joint act. Much 
as they may be perceived as two men kissing on stage, their “girlishness” is 
visible enough to notice that they are actually two girls kissing. What is more, 
Nan’s masculinity off-stage influences her desire for Kitty. At one point she 
says, “I seemed to want her more and more, further into boyishness I ventured” 
(Waters 2006: 124). It appears that off stage the chain of relations between 
sex, gender and sexuality is broken in a different way than on the stage. There 
is a correspondence between Nan’s gender and sexuality (a masculine person 
desires a feminine woman) and only the relation between sex and gender is 
non-normative (a masculine girl).
Is Nan’s life less liveable than before when she lived within the heterosexual 
matrix? Quite the contrary. Going beyond the norms, Nan and Kitty are in the 
centre of social life, admired and cheered by crowds. In this worldNan finds self­
confidence, charisma and freedom of expression. Becoming a mirror reflection 
of the woman she loves, Nan learns to love herself. She confesses, “I had fallen 
in love with Kitty; now, becoming Kitty, I fell in love a little with myself’ 
(Waters 2006: 126). However, the foundation on which Nan constructs her new 
self is Kitty, she is still a mere copy of her lover. “I was her foil, her echo. 
I was the shadow which, in all her brilliance, she cast across the stage” (Waters 
2006: 127), Nan says. When Kitty betrays her, the foundation of her new, male 
impersonator’s identity is smashed into pieces and, thus, the whole construction 
is shattered. All that remains are Nan’s male impersonator’s clothes.
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After leaving Kitty and her male impersonator’s profession and lifestyle, 
Nan perceives the life she has abandoned as “pieces of some other person’s 
history” (Waters 2006: 184). Nan detaches herself from her former identity 
of a male impersonator and wants to begin a new life. After some period of 
recovery she goes for a walk but she discovers that she “was a solitary girl, 
in a city that favored sweethearts and gentlemen; a girl in a city where girls 
walked only to be gazed at” (Waters 2006: 191). She feels disgusted by this 
new life of hers. She discovers that being a lonely girl in London is a dreadful 
experience. “If only I were a boy” (Waters 2006: 191), she says to herself sadly.
But soon she reminds herself of her masculine costumes and dresses up 
as a man. She realizes that finally she feels secure walking down the street. 
Masculine clothes seem to serve as a shield protecting her from being merely 
an object of male gaze. Nan also indulges in being attractive for other women. 
When a woman says to her, “Well now, pretty boy, you look like a lively one. 
Fancy payin’ a visit to a nice little place I know?” (Waters 2006: 194) Nan calls 
it “the success of that first performance” (Waters 2006: 195) and admits that 
it made her regain her self confidence. Again, Nan’s cross-dressing proves to 
be a rite of passage in her life and signifies her new role. This time she is also 
a male impersonator only now her stage is no longer a music hall but the streets 
of London. Similarly to her previous role, she starts playing with her gender 
identity and at some point she is uncertain whether she enacts masculinity or 
femininity. Talking about the lady who keeps a room for her where she can 
change into her masculine clothes she says, “she was never quite sure if I were 
a girl come to her house to pull on a pair of trousers, or a boy arrived to change out 
of his frock. Sometimes I was not sure myself’ (Waters 2006: 195). She admits 
that the boundaries between being a girl and “acting” a boy are blurred for her.
However, this attitude to her masculine role changes when she is mistaken 
for a boy by a man who offers to pay her money for having sex with him. 
She gives the man a positive answer and she excuses herself by claiming that 
her masculine disguise is part of an act, not her real self. At this point Nan 
seems to make a clear distinction between her being a girl and playing a boy. 
She confesses, “I spoke but it was as if someone else were doing the speaking, 
not me” (Waters 2006: 198). That is how she begins her “career” as a renter. 
At this stage of her life, cross-dressing appears to be a point of departure from 
emotional estrangement and financial crisis leading her to regained strength and 
independence. Cross-dressing enables Nan to create a world of illusion in which 
she is free to act the way she would never do in her real life; she treats her new 
profession as a performance, playing various male characters who are not Nan 
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Astley. Thus, she makes a clear distinction between being and doing. Her role 
of a renter is just an illusion, something that she does, not someone she really «. 
Her actions prove gender, as well as desire, to be performative. Nan enacts her 
masculinity so well that she is constantly treated as a boy. When she touches 
men she enacts the man’s desire for another man. A chain of relations between 
sex, gender and sexuality is broken in a different way than in her previous role 
of the male impersonator; in the role of the renter the relation between sex and 
sexuality corresponds to the one prevalent in heterosexual matrix (a girl has sex 
with a man) but the relations between sex and gender (a girl is masculine) and 
gender and sexuality (a masculine person having sex with a man) are outside the 
heterosexual matrix. The two roles (of the male impersonator and the renter), 
are constructs of identity that make Nan feel reborn and transformed. But soon, 
Nan’s new construction is again swept away.
The moment she meets Diane Letherby and becomes her kept-woman, 
Nan enters the world of luxury. Diane dresses Nan in expensive male clothes 
to make her act as Diane’s “boy.” When they go out together, Nan plays 
Diane’s boyfriend. On the surface, it signifies going beyond the heterosexual 
matrix, because her masculine gender does not correspond to her feminine 
sex. However, the relation between her gender and sexuality falls into the 
category of heteronomativity; Diane is feminine and Nan is masculine, which 
makes them look like a heterosexual couple. If they went out together, both 
wearing dresses, they would be ostracized and called “toms,” a Victorian word 
for lesbians. Nan’s cross-dressing makes their lesbianism less noticeable. Thus, 
paradoxically, the non-heteronormative practice of cross-dressing is conditional 
to being perceived as acceptable by the heteronomative society. But is it being 
acceptable enough?
The role of Diane’s boy is very different from the role of a renter, even 
though in both cases Nan cross-dresses for money. When being a renter Nan 
feels free and independent. Being Diane’s “boy” Nan is treated like her posses­
sion. It may seem that Nan’s role of a “boy” is a step backwards: from freedom 
to dependency. However, this new role has made an equally significant contri­
bution to her self-development as her previous roles. After all, her enslavement 
is, in many respects, a juxtaposition to her past freedom, and gives Nan a new 
insight into her personality. Being a kept-woman she enters the unfamiliar world 
of complete submission. Nan discovers her ability to be compliant and yielding, 
which are the features perceived by Victorians as characteristics of a perfect 
wife. She plays a seemingly masculine role of a “boy” but she does not really 
enact stereotypical masculinity (existing in heteromatrix) by the way she lets 
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herself be treated by Diane. Soon, when she betrays Diane with their maid and is 
immediately ejected from Diane’s house, Nan feels no regrets. This episode of 
her life is just another temporary construction and Nan’s experimental creation 
which, like the previous structures, is also subject to disintegration.
After Diane ejects her, Nan becomes homeless. She resolves to find Flo­
rence, a girl she used to be attracted to before meeting Diane. Soon, she reaches 
Florence’s house and she moves in. She starts playing another role - that of 
“the angel of the house.” She does cleaning, cooking and babysitting. She wants 
to fit in her new role, so she buys herself a flowery frock which seems to be 
expressive of her return to “quoting” Victorian norms of femininity. However, 
it seems that her constant enactment of masculinity over the past few years 
makes this re-transformation impossible. Nan says,
I looked extraordinarily awful. The clothes I had bought, they were the kind I’d 
used to wear in Whinstable. I had been known then as a handsome enough girl. But 
it was as if wearing gentleman’s suits had magically unfitted me for girlishness, for 
ever - as if my jaw had grown firmer, my brows heavier, my hips slimmer and my 
hands extra large, to match the clothes Diana had put me in. (Waters 2006: 381)
It seems that Nan’s performed masculinity has been inscribed in her body. 
Nan has been doing her gender and the result of her deeds is palpable. It may 
symbolize the superiority of doing compared to being and it may even indicate 
the lack of being as such. Nan is still playing a role (“the angel of the house”) 
but this is the only role which is not inextricably linked with cross-dressing. 
In this role, Nan has freedom to make a choice whether she wants to wear 
feminine or masculine clothes. Nan eventually decides to cross-dress but her 
masculinity is no longer an imitation or illusion. This is the role she identifies 
with; she “collects” multiple fragments of her identity coming from her previous 
roles and incorporates them into her new role. Her past constructs of identity 
may signify “the journeying consciousness on its way to absolute knowledge 
described by Hegel” (Lloyd 2007: 15). The “absolute knowledge” is obviously 
never achieved. What is achieved? Is it “liveability”? It is more than that; 
not “liveability” but multiplicity, not constancy but fluidity, not regularity but 
many different irregularities.
Sarah Waters tells a story of a constant performance of a cross-dresser and 
a constant performance of cross-dresser’s clothes. Both these characters lack the 
essential identity as they both constantly change their roles. While masculine 
clothes are supposed to play the role of stereotypical masculinity they fail to do 
so. Gentleman’s suits enable Nan to act as a kept-woman and “the angel of the 
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house,” which are typically feminine roles. It is Nan who assigns the meaning 
to her garments, not the other way round. Thus, we may ask the question: how 
can masculine clothes indicate the essential gender identity (masculinity) if 
they lack this essence themselves? When they hang on a hanger they may have 
this “essence,” but when being worn by a person they not only transform this 
person, but they are also transformed by him/her. Thus, Nan and her garments 
create a unity the nature of which changes in various stages of her life.
Before Nan fell in love with Florence her roles were illusory temporary 
constructions. She was a performer, a “doer” devoid of fixed gender identity, 
which is illustrated by Nietzsche’s sentence later quoted by Judith Butler, “The 
doer is merely a fiction added to the deed, the deed is everything” (Nietzsche qtd 
in Butler 2006: 53). Each of Nan’s roles seems to be just “a fiction added to the 
deed.” She assumes the masculine gender role and enacts it. What is more, her 
enactment of masculinity is often done in a feminine way so her boyishness and 
girlishness merge. Nan is “once a she and once a he, as quite takes it fancy.” Her 
gender identity is subject to constant transformation, not being but becoming. 
The roles appear in her life in the sequence of contradictions; Nan’s life of 
a male impersonator is connected with emotional dependence on Kitty, which 
is later contrasted with her independence as a renter; the freedom of a renter is 
juxtaposed with her enslavement as a kept-woman, which is finally set against 
her regained freedom as “an angel of the house.” All Nan’s roles prove to be 
subversive acts questioning gender norms generated by the heterosexual matrix. 
She makes an attempt to go beyond a strict feminine vs. masculine division and 
to find her own way of living in which the boundary between femininity and 
masculinity is blurred. Cross-dressed, she explores various worlds, both outside 
and within herself. She is the “doer,” the agent; she actively shapes her identity. 
Through the oscillation between the two polarities, between construction and 
demolishing, she realizes what kind of self she wants to create. It is both 
“a he” and “a she.”
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“Need Keeps the Book of Dying Open”: Negative 
Capability in Gil Ott’s The Whole Note
I have adopted Keats’ famous term in the title of this paper, because it feels like 
an answer to the conference theme of “Ambiguity and the Search for Meaning.” 
Keats’ definition of negative capability as: “when a man is capable of being 
in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact 
and reason” (Keats 1965: 53), seems to simultaneously refuse the search for 
meaning whilst potentially embracing ambiguity. However, what does negative 
capability actually look like? I want to examine Gil Ott’s book The Whole Note 
as a way of exploring this question, as negative capability seems part of its 
very fabric. Ott suffered from kidney disease for most of his life, undergoing 
numerous failed transplant operations, and died at the age of fifty four. I wish 
to read The Whole Note as a meditation on death and dying, noting in particular 
how the book, through its arresting formal procedures, seems to argue for 
a resistance to the final closure of meaning that death metaphorically and 
perhaps literally presents.
Gil Ott (1950-2004) was an American poet, writer and publisher associated 
with the Language Poetry movement. His journal Paper Air (1976-1990) first 
published Charles Bernstein’s famous verse-essay “Artifice of Absorption” and 
his small press Singing Horse (still extant) has published important figures 
such as Rae Armantrout, David Antin and Rosmarie Waldrop. He worked at 
The Painted Bride Arts Centre in Philadelphia for almost twenty years - a grass­
roots arts and community organisation. He published thirteen books including 
The Yellow Floor (Sun & Moon, 1985), Within Range (Burning Deck, 1987), 
Public Domain (Potes & Poets, 1989), The Whole Note (Zasterle, 1996), and 
Traffic (Chax Press, 2001).
The Whole Note is a sequence of thirty-two prose poems arranged into four 
sections of eight poems each. The book uses experimental techniques associated 
with the Language Poets, such as ambiguity, discontinuity and non-standard 
syntax. The density of the book resists attempts to paraphrase its argument as it 
moves from poem to poem. By making extensive use of non-sequiturs, the inner 
structure of each poem also refuses easy summary or closure. However, despite
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this difficulty, the book does offer recurring ideas or motifs: observations of 
the natural world (largely drawn from California where three quarters of the 
poem was written); reflections on poetics; images of relationships; the details 
of decay, pain and illness; accounts of the rituals of other cultures; thoughts 
about identity; the activities of walking and breathing.
What I hope to illustrate here is the highly suggestive movement of meaning 
and syntax in Ott’s writing. Each sentence reads like an independent entity, and 
although this is by no means a unique effect in the history of the prose poem, 
Ott’s subtle handling of syntax gives an effect of an over-determined semantic 
territory which requires extensive re-reading in order to establish continuities 
and discontinuities of argument and idea. The use of ambiguity and puns, 
leading to an impression of a subtle, critical irony at work, and the fact that the 
book’s themes are not overtly declared, analysed, explained or framed from the 
ordering perspective of a self-conscious narrator’s voice, offers the reader the 
possibility of a heightened engagement with the poem as language and form. 
As Ott (2001: 8) wrote in the preface to his 2001 volume Traffic.
I have always felt that the challenge in reading poetry is equal to or greater than 
that of writing it. The “poet” is not so much the one who composes or delivers the 
work, nor the one who reads and interprets, but the mutual establishment of all of 
these.
In my engagement with Ott’s work I am made aware of the book’s artifice as 
integral to what it offers as argument: it proceeds as much by its attitude to form 
as by theme, and this makes the process of interpretation highly visible.
Ott’s statement of poetics in the preface to Traffic is apt for discussing his 
approach in The Whole Note. He describes Traffic as adhering to “no unifying 
theme of narrative development” (Ott 2001: 7) and links this to a view of the 
world in which
It would seem to be a universal human desire to believe in the face of all contravening 
evidence and the complexity of the present moment, in a stable world, near at hand.
(Ott 2001: 8-9)
Ott’s postmodern critique here reveals his own commitment to negative capabil­
ity, one that leads to a kind of radically open-ended writing that acknowledges 
this contingency and complexity in its structure. Several parts of The Whole 
Note are readable as self-reflexive statements of this poetics.
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The statement “First to write them, then get to know the less and less 
form assuming” (Ott 1996: 131) suggests an open-ended, exploratory process 
of composition wherein writing is the primary act followed by getting to know 
what has been done, not unlike Jean-François Lyotard’s famous formulation 
“The artist and the writer, then, are working without rules in order to formulate 
the rules of what will have been done" (1984: 81). Paradoxically, what is 
written then seems to assume form less and less, rather than more. Elsewhere 
the limits of writing are acknowledged in statements such as “I take time 
writer to sit, remove you to whom magnified parceling you out teases alterity” 
(Ott 1996: 23). Here Ott uses a cross-word pun where “time writer” suggests 
typewriter. If writing here is an act of “magnified parceling you out” - a kind 
of representation that magnifies and isolates aspects of a person - then the 
fact that it “teases alterity” suggests ambiguously both the power of writing to 
overcome otherness, but that it may also be simply in thrall to otherness. Ott 
(1996: 28) also characterises writing as an endlessly self-reflexive process “the 
inventing looking for itself [...] acting out me, the author” which debates the 
role of form as enabling or otherwise: “feeling the constraints form imposed” 
(1996: 33) versus “free of constraint” (1996: 39).
1 The text of The Whole Note is unpaginated. References are therefore counted from the title
The Whole Note figures the activities of writing, breathing and walking as 
equivalent ways in which we persist, keep going and make our identities in the 
face of decay and death. That all these activities can in some way be thought 
of as different kinds of meditation, that is, attention to the present moment, fits 
with Ott’s insistence on the importance of the present in the preface to Traffic: 
“Past and future are essentially fictions, [...] Language, the act, is present” 
(2001: 9). Whilst this accounts for the lack of narrative continuity in The Whole 
Note, Ott (2001: 7) also acknowledges that his collection nevertheless does 
have a kind of unity:
By the natural force of the mind making whole, however, the collection [...] has 
found its unity, not so much in its form as in the chunk of time that it has come to 
occupy.
Ott’s sense of time as something experienced “in a multitude of ways, from the 
ephemeral to the immovable” with his focus on the more “solid experience of 
time” that “spreads and covers all of existence” (Ott 2001: 8) finds its analogue
page.
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in Deleuze’s (2000 [1964]: 129-130) account of time in Proust in his 1964 
book Proust and Signs:
Time, ultimate interpreter, ultimate act of interpretation, has the strange power to 
affirm simultaneously fragments that do not constitute a whole in space, any more 
than they form a whole by succession within time.
Deleuze (2000: 163) recuperates the idea of multiplicity as a kind of unity, 
looking for a “unity of this very multiplicity [...] a whole of just these frag­
ments.” This leads him to rewrite, or co-write with Proust, an evocation of 
Balzac’s style, or rather “nonstyle:”
The fragments of silence and of speech, what he says and what he does not say, are 
distributed in a fragmentation that the whole ultimately confirms because it results 
from it, rather than corrects or transcends. (Deleuze 2000: 165)
This tension between a sense of wholeness and fragmentation is illuminating 
of Ott’s poetics in The Whole Note, even exposing the pun on w/hole in the title 
- which is argued with in the poem by the statement “resistance turns a minor 
note” (Ott 1996: 26). Crucially for what I read as Ott’s concern with mortality 
in The Whole Note, Deleuze (2000: 157) makes an explicit link between time’s 
capability to affirm wholes out of fragments with that of the idea of death itself:
The idea of death as uniformly imbuing all fragments, carrying them toward a uni­
versal end.
For Deleuze (2000: 158), the idea of death “consists of a certain effect of Time” 
and its effect is less a kind of closure than of a mixing up, as dying is a process 
that is also carried on by the living. Deleuze (2000: 159) argues that the idea 
of death “ceases to be an ‘objection’ provided we can attach it to an order of 
production, thus giving it its place in the work of art.” As is Proust’s theme 
in the masked ball scene of Finding Time Again, it is through the decay of 
the human body that time, normally invisible, becomes visible. Such a poetics 
seems to underwrite Ott’s concern with the decay of the body and the fact of 
dying as a means of engaging truth. As Deleuze (2000: 160) puts it “it is the 
nature of truth [...] to be produced as an effect of time” and that “loss having 
then passed into the work” becomes “the condition of its form.”
Proust’s use of the walks of the Meseglise Way and of the Guermantes 
Way as figures for this kind of unity of fragments disclosed by truth, time, 
and death, find their analogue in Ott’s almost central concern with walking - 
especially walking characterised as a painful act. Walking is life-affirming as it 
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also reminds one of mortality, it is an act of poetics, of self-making in the face 
of uncertainty and the ever-present threat of loss.
The Whole Note actually begins and ends with the act of walking; the first 
poem ends “I walk away” and the final poem ends “I will walk away.” Walking is 
figured as wandering in many poems, a choice word with its pun on wondering, 
and constructed as an active “purposeful” (Ott 1996: 16) image for resistance 
to ageing: “find one wandering plans to interrupt decay” (Ott 1996: 10), despite 
it also being a source of pain: “piled on every bone felt” (Ott 1996: 40), “dark 
walk on leaked blood” (Ott 1996: 42). Towards the end of the first section of 
the book the following passage unfolds a more extended meditation:
Try my arms, the height of my hips’ measure to sap
sentences lacking subject, predicate, equilibrium, a pace implies home, identity, 
mine determined to undermine a diagram. Heel to ball. Forward heedless of the 
intrusion on purview, compromised. (Ott 1996: 11)
Here the narrator appears to be making a dis/connection between his physical 
integrity “try my arms [...] my hips” and that of his poem “sentences lacking 
subject, predicate, equilibrium.” The verb “sap” occupies an ambiguous ground 
in its position at the end of a paragraph break; it might mean the test of the 
“hips’ measure” is in the “sap” as a kind of life-force, or it could mean that the 
body’s state “saps” or drains the sentences of the poem. That a connection can 
be made between the body and the open textual strategies of the poem seems 
crucial and leads to the consideration that “a pace implies home, identity” as if 
the very act of walking guarantees a kind of personal, social integrity. That Ott’s 
poetics so far would lead us to treat such an end with some suspicion however is 
borne out subtly in the highly patterned phrase: “mine determined to undermine 
a diagram.” If the narrator refers to his own identity here, it may be something 
to value that the unconventional “measure” of his body and his writing seeks 
to question the normative certainties of existence in a postmodern fashion. The 
act of walking is again noted in a concrete image of “heel to ball,” isolated in 
a single short sentence. However, the immediately following sentence: “for­
ward heedless of the intrusion on purview, compromised” seems to reiterate 
a postmodern critique of a forward marching that is unaware of being under 
surveillance and compromised. Thus Ott’s utilization of the figure of walking 
is multivalent in meaning and is not straightforwardly redemptive, at least not 
in the terms of the radical politics that Ott’s radical poetics seems to hint at.
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As the book enters the end game of the final section, the tessellation of the 
themes of embodiment, selfhood, writing and mortality gathers in density. Ott 
makes the declaration that gives this paper its title: “Need keeps the book of 
dying open, the language common after all.” If the idea of death, as constructed 
by Deleuze, uniformly imbues the fragmented texture of Ott’s book, Ott seems 
to articulate a need for this contingency to remain open, a sort of w-hol(e)(y) 
unity that resembles negative capability. That this need is articulated in terms 
of the book and of language seems to make the act of attaching death to an 
order of production - that is, as Deleuze sees in Proust, to art - a recuperative, 
even redemptive one. Ott, with his background in leftist politics, seems to see 
the implications of thinking of death as a common language as an emblem of 
the human commons; our universal destiny, which, in order to remain ethically 
open to our freedom, also remains a necessarily unknown end.
In the penultimate poem Ott seems to acknowledge this active uncertainty 
of living and links it again to the act of walking, whereby the wordfeet decisively 
becomes a pun on the word as it is used in prosody:
Dispassionate grace the water’s edge
reach to what hypothesis uncertainty led the spirit. Still, moving, speaking, incom­
prehensible. Feet set in mud, decayed, and other feet
tirelessly composed. (Ott 1996: 42)
The role of uncertainty here as something that leads the spirit to hypothesize 
about its fate seems crucial, even if it leads to a kind of bathos in which the 
use of punctuation allows “still” to pun on its two senses in relation to both 
moving and speaking: now side by side, but incomprehensible. This seems quite 
like a Beckettian end game in which, although feet are set in mud, other feet, 
whether they be metrical or not, are tirelessly composed into being, or simply 
rest with energised composure. That Ott keeps the options open here, even in 
the face of extremity, seems to reveal a commitment to negative capability that 
underwrites his whole project.
In a book driven by the conjunction of death, truth and time, the last poem 
announces itself as “a formal end only” that “blurred with or without morphine 
decides to live” (Ott 1996:43). The suggestion that if the book ends the narrator 
will continue, rather chillingly implies that a choice was made to go on. The 
narrator acknowledges:
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I have made a mistake a meandering
stasis, down a notch and starting over. Someone else’s surgery pulled a knot out, 
left a man handled roughly bumped and thrown what dirt brackets. (Ott 1996: 43)
Here, the act of meandering is identified as stasis, although the phrases 
“down a notch and starting over” imply a slowing down and a new beginning. 
The next sentence contains what can be read as a rather brutal description of the 
surgical procedures Ott was subject to as part of his battle with kidney disease 
and suggests a certain bitterness about the way in which he was treated. The 
concluding lines of the book however suggest a resolution:
I will build a body of utterance, that fooled me. The odor will stay, and I
will walk away. (Ott 1996: 43)
That the narrator undertakes to build a “body of utterance” is a perfect figure 
for the link between writing and mortality articulated throughout the book, and 
hints at the notion of the complete works of a poet as inevitably a posthumous 
achievement. That the narrator adds ironically “that fooled me” suggests an 
ongoing resistance to closure, that even the body of utterance is not to be 
trusted as a completed artifact, surrendering its subject whole and intact. That 
Ott seeks an ongoing tension with closure is memorably encapsulated in the 
final statement. If odor is the odor of a dead body, then, once death comes, the 
narrator is already somewhere else.2 In this isolated, tightly alliterative closing 
phrase, the word “will” sounds almost emphatic. If this signals the actual end 
of the book, its final image - echoing its opening - is resistant and in defiance 
of that closure. This resistance is its rationale in its “search for meaning” in the 
face of death and constitutes a profound example of negative capability.
2 As Irvin Yalom quotes Epicurus: “Where death is, I am not” (Yalom 2008: 177).
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The Poetry of Seamus Heaney and the Ambiguous 
Politics of the Ceasefire
Just a few days after the IRA ceasefire was announced on 31 August 1994, 
Seamus Heaney (Sunday Tribune, 4 September 2004) wrote a short article for the 
Dublin Sunday Tribune. It begins in a very positive mood: “The announcement 
by the Provisional IRA last Wednesday changed everything for the better.” The 
effect of that announcement, he says, was like having a blind lifted in his head:
I went outside to try to re-collect myself and suddenly a blind seemed to rise 
somewhere at the back of my mind and the light came flooding in. I felt twenty-five 
years younger. I remembered what things had felt like in those early days of political 
ferment in the late sixties.
But that feeling of being “freed up,” as Heaney puts it, turns to anger as he 
ponders twenty-five years of suffering that have brought the situation to a point 
that is actually less politically promising than things were in 1968. Even so, 
the tentative optimism encouraged by the ceasefire is evident a little later in 
Heaney’s Nobel Prize speech in 1995, in which he speaks of “acts of faith” 
around the world that “inspire a hope that a new possibility can still open up 
in Ireland as well” (1998: 460-1).
With the exception of Edna Longley’s sobering essay, “Northern Irish Po­
etry and the End of History” (2000: 280), very little attention has been paid to 
the ways in which writers in Northern Ireland have responded to the peace pro­
cess. Longley is well used to journalists from abroad asking writers in Belfast, 
“What are you going to write about now?” “One reply,” she suggests, is that 
poetry “had never depended either on one theme or on one orchestration of that 
theme.” Even so, some crucially important questions need to be addressed about 
the perceived change of political climate registered in the recent poetry of writ­
ers like Seamus Heaney, Michael Longley, Ciaran Carson and Paul Muldoon. 
Edna Longley’s own incisive readings of works produced by these poets since 
1994 suggest that “the collective script might be changing,” even though she 
remains wary of simple formulations such as “post-ceasefire literature” (2000: 
315). The various interruptions and deadlocks and the general intransigence of
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the peace process have tended to undermine the initial promise and hopefulness 
of 1994, but the possibility of substantial political progress in a more peaceful 
domain has prompted reflections and imaginings that seem to indicate a new 
poetic consciousness. One manifestation of this is an impulse among poets (es­
pecially Seamus Heaney) to revisit and revise their own creative achievements. 
Edna Longley (2000: 316) notes “the accentuated tendency for poets to quote 
and revise not only earlier poets and each other but also their former textual 
selves.” In terms of a distinctive preoccupation with memory, forgiveness and 
reconciliation, and in terms of a sustained intertextual experimentation, it might 
be argued that there is a significant body of writing that is “post-ceasefire” in 
more than just the obvious chronological sense.
The image of light flooding into Seamus Heaney’s poems is anticipated, of 
course, in a good deal of his writing prior to 1994. This is especially true of the 
poems in Seeing Things, published in 1991, in which Heaney turns away from 
a “poetry sluggish in the doldrums of what happens,” towards the visionary 
mode suggested by the title of the volume. In the poem “Fosterling,” he writes 
of “waiting until I was nearly fifty / To credit marvels. Like the tree-clock of 
tin cans / The tinkers made. So long for air to brighten, / Time to be dazzled 
and the heart to lighten” (1991: 50). There is no doubt that Heaney’s work 
has recently come out into the light and that it has started to shed the heavy 
layers of discomfort that have been there since the early 1970s. For Heaney’s 
detractors, of course, this apparent lightening does not really matter. His poetry, 
they would have us believe, has always been supremely evasive of the actual 
stuff of politics, encrypting it in Celtic and Norse mythology and presenting it 
with such serene even-handedness and subtle obliquity as to say very little at all. 
The title of Heaney’s poem, “Whatever You Say, Say Nothing,” has frequently 
been turned back on him with an accusing stare. To appreciate fully the recent 
lightening in Heaney’s work, and the extent to which it has been a matter of 
intense creative struggle, we need to recall those moments of darkness and 
near-despair that made the title of his 1969 book Door into the Dark seem 
ironically prophetic. We need to remember, too, those occasions on which 
Heaney has been moved to speak out forcefully against the British media, the 
British government and the British army.
In March 1988, Heaney was invited to London to receive the Sunday Times 
award for excellence in writing. He used what might otherwise have been 
a pleasantly emollient occasion to express his deep dismay at the British media 
coverage of events in Northern Ireland, which threatened to undermine recent 
attempts to establish an Anglo-Irish political agreement:
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I noticed in yesterday’s newspapers an inclination to view the British army pres­
ence in Ulster once again as part of the solution rather than part of the problem, 
an inclination to view them as hygienic, rubber-gloved, impersonally motivated 
technicians operating in polluted ghettoes where indigenous hatreds are cultured 
in self-induced and self-wounding conditions. I noticed an inclination to think of 
military funerals as a tribal and undesirable form of solidarity when enacted on the 
Falls Road, but as somehow immunised against tribal significance when the victims 
were British soldiers, the mourners were British parents, and the martial music was 
relayed with deeply emotive effect by the news channels of British television.
(Heaney 1989: 14)
Heaney’s bold and uncompromising stance on this occasion was informed by 
Robert Lowell’s assertion that “every serious artist knows that he cannot enjoy 
public celebration without making subtle public commitments,” (qtd. in Time 
11 June, 1965) but the example of Yeats was also in his mind: “Yeats’s challenge 
to the writer was to hold in a single thought reality and justice, and the same 
challenge is in effect in Westminster and Fleet Street” (1989: 14). We cannot 
embark upon a worthwhile appraisal of Heaney’s post-ceasfire writings without 
giving adequate measure to the gravity and seriousness that weigh upon his ear­
lier writings, and without taking into account what he memorably characterises 
elsewhere as his own “responsible traZza” (1998: 43). That tristia is gently self- 
ironising, but it adequately points to a pervasive mood and a sense of moral 
obligation that persist in Heaney’s work over a period of some twenty years.
Heaney’s 1993 lecture, “Frontiers of Writing” (the closing piece in The 
Redress of Poetry), recalls an Oxford college dinner that took place a week after 
the death of Bobby Sands, on the same day that another hunger striker, the son 
of a neighbouring family of the Heaneys in Co. Derry, was being buried. As the 
poet circulates among the sherry-sipping crowd, he thinks of a very different 
crowd in a small house, close to home, where a funeral is taking place. He 
recognises acutely a “moment of conflicting recognitions, self-division, inner 
quarrel, a moment of dumbness and inadequacy when it felt like a betrayal 
to be enjoying the hospitality of an Establishment college and occupying, if 
only accidentally, the room of a British minister.” What he experiences at 
that moment is “the classic bind of all of Northern Ireland’s constitutional 
nationalists,” caught between “commitments to cultural and political ideals 
which are fundamentally Ireland-centred” and “their disavowal of support for 
the violent means of the Irish Republican Army, an army which operates with 
pre-emptive and atrocious force in order to further similar cultural and political 
ideals.” Heaney’s acknowledgement of the “frontier” and its political, as well 
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as imaginative, consequences is candid but also unflinchingly forthright: “But 
whether the north and the south are to be regarded as monolithic or pluralist 
entities, the fact of the border, of partition, of two Irelands on one island, 
remains the salient fact” (1995: 188-9). There are other occasions on which 
Heaney has made his political sympathies and attachments explicit, and his 
prose writings have been scrupulously frank about their own aesthetic and 
ideological procedures. To understand the complex shifts that have taken place 
in Heaney’s writings since the ceasefire, however, we need to go back even 
further to 1972.
In an essay titled “1972” and published in the Guardian that year, Heaney 
asks how poetry can come to terms with the violence and brutality of the times. 
He ponders these lines from Shakespeare’s Sonnet 65: “How with this rage shall 
beauty hold a plea / Whose action is no stronger than a flower?” (1980: 33). In 
a later essay in 1974, Heaney (1980: 57) answers that question with the help 
of Yeats. What he must do, as Yeats does in his “Meditations in Time of Civil 
War,” is to find “befitting emblems of adversity”: images and symbols that 
are somehow adequate to the predicament. Those emblems of adversity have 
steadily given way to emblems of reconciliation and renewal in recent times, but 
their force and significance are still apparent in Heaney’s most recent poems.
The most striking emblems of adversity in the 1970s can be found in the 
Bog Poems of Wintering Out and North, in which Heaney establishes a parallel 
between the sectarian killings going on in his own north and the ritual sacrifices 
to Mother Earth in the early Iron Age culture across northern Europe. The 
source for this pervasive anthropological interest was P. V. Glob’s illustrated 
book, The Bog People, published in English in 1969. Heaney (1980: 57-8) 
writes that “the unforgettable photographs of these victims blended in my mind 
with photographs of atrocities, past and present, in the long rites of Irish political 
and religious struggles.” Among the first of the bog poems to be written was 
“The Tollund Man,” which begins with the announcement of a pilgrimage, 
a desire to visit the peat bogs of Jutland: “Some day I will go to Aarhus.” 
The most striking aspect of this and other bog poems is the strange fusing 
of Christian and pagan ritual. In the third stanza, the meditative line, “I will 
stand a long time,” suggests a veneration and a reverence usually reserved 
for the Stations of the Cross, and the second section of the poem explicitly 
acknowledges that to pray to a pagan saint is to “risk blasphemy.” The closing 
stanza of the poem recognises the paradox of internal exile, of being an inner 
émigré: “Out there in Jutland / In the old man-killing parishes /1 will feel lost, 
/ Unhappy and at home” (1998: 65).
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One of the first poems to be written by Heaney after the announcement of 
the ceasefire at the end of August 1994 was “Tollund,” the penultimate poem 
in Heaney’s 1996 book, The Spirit Level. The poem is dated September 1994, 
as if announcing its presence in a new political dispensation. At the same time, 
it looks back at “The Tollund Man,” gently suggesting a changed world view 
in its delicate verbal echoes of the earlier poem. As the new title suggests, 
the focus now is less on the fossilised sacrificial object than on the broader 
prospect of the place itself, with its promising “path through Jutland fields.” 
The penitential journey envisaged in the earlier poem has now been undertaken; 
but most importantly, the speaker’s solitary and uncertain veneration in “The 
Tollund Man” (“I will stand a long time”) now gives way to a sense of shared 
destiny and communion: “That Sunday morning we had travelled far. / We stood 
a long time out in Tollund Moss” (1998: 443). The familiar yet “hallucinatory” 
quality of the place prepares us for the prospect of “seeing things,” for the 
possibility of the miraculous.
One way in which Heaney is prompted to see a bright utopian vision 
is through a subtle recall of “Townland of Peace,” part of a sequence titled 
“Freehold,” written in the 1940s by the Ulster regionalist poet, John Hewitt: 
“It could have been a still out of the bright / ‘Townland of Peace’, that poem 
of dream farms / Outside all contention” (1998: 443). In “The Tollund Man,” 
Heaney had established a parallel between ancient Jutland and the “old man­
killing parishes” of his own homeland. Now, he establishes a different parallel 
between the quiet pastoral of the Jutland fields and Hewitt’s wartime regional 
idyll, in which the poet imagines stepping “clean out of Europe into peace.” 
As Edna Longley (2000: 307) suggests, ‘“Townland of Peace’ may have come 
into Heaney’s mind because its images distinguish peace from war so simply 
and clearly, and because it explains how wartime circumstances stimulated 
the visionary new history for ‘Ulster ... my region’ that emerges later in 
‘Freehold.’” At the same time, Heaney’s new vision of “Tollund” is one that 
is open to change and modernisation. His pastoral setting admits “Light traffic 
sound,” and the generously embracing image of a scarecrow with its arms open 
is strategically aligned with a satellite dish in a nearby paddock. A standing stone 
has been “resituated and landscaped,” and the speaker who once felt lost among 
foreign names now discovers “tourist signs in futhark runic script / In Danish 
and in English.” All the signs suggest that “Things had moved on” (1998: 443).
The earlier negative identification that Heaney articulates in “The Tollund 
Man,” feeling “lost, / Unhappy and at home,” now gives way to a more easeful 
and open sense of being “at home beyond the tribe.” The dejected solitariness 
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of the earlier poem is replaced with a more positive sense of companionship 
and shared endeavour:
More scouts than strangers, ghosts who’d walked abroad
Unfazed by light, to make a new beginning.
And make a go of it, alive and sinning,
Ourselves again, free-willed again, not bad. (1998: 443)
The image of ghosts is momentarily unsettling, since the haunted present usu­
ally signifies the troubled legacy of the past, but the facing of the light is 
a positive indication of a new start and a new determination to go forward, 
unconstrained by the narrow moral and religious dictates that have previously 
hindered progress. The willingness to take risks in the interests of change has 
a formal corollary in Heaney’s readiness to employ the rhythms of living speech: 
“make a go of it [...] not bad” (1998:443). Edna Longley (2000:309) notes that 
the phrase “Ourselves again” appears to conflate the familiar translation of Sinn 
Fein (“ourselves alone”) with the famous Irish ballad, “A Nation Once Again,” 
and she concludes: “Perhaps it is fitting that subtextual irresolution should char­
acterise an ‘end’ that cannot yet generate the language, the tropes and modes, 
for ‘a new beginning.’” Andrew Murphy (1996: 103), however, offers a more 
optimistic reading of these closing lines, noting that “By cancelling the ‘alone’ 
and replacing it with ‘again,’ Heaney suggests a kind of rebirth of Irishness 
and a breaking of traditional isolationist introversion.” The closing colloquial 
summation, “not bad,” is just deflationary enough to caution against wild ex­
pectations; it suggests a reasonable start, but it also invites a more generous 
estimation of human kindness and potential than had previously prevailed.
The most remarkable manifestation of the Tollund Man in recent times, 
however, has been in “The Tollund Man in Springtime,” a sonnet sequence 
included in District and Circle (2006). As the title of the sequence suggests, 
the longed-for germination that Heaney sought in Wintering Out has now come 
about and the Tollund Man walks abroad in the rapidly changing contemporary 
world. The new global order that he inhabits is one in which terrorism is 
a persistent and widespread concern, and in which new technology drives the 
increasing need for surveillance. If this seems like a disappointing, dystopian 
end to all that was hoped for in the earlier poem - as if the violence and terror 
at the local level have now assumed a worldwide presence - there is also an 
abiding hope and determination. The persistence of the Tollund Man testifies to 
the survival and persistence of poetry itself, and now the Tollund Man speaks 
in his own voice, with a new-found sense of liberation:
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Into your virtual city I’ll have passed
Unregistered by scans, screens, hidden eyes,
Lapping myself in time, an absorbed face
Coming and going, neither god nor ghost... (2006: 53)
The strong sense of endurance and fortitude that informs the poem derives in 
part from the anti-totalitarian vision of Heaney’s friend and fellow poet, Czeslaw 
Milosz, who died in August 2004: “The soul exceeds its circumstances.” The 
presence of the Polish poet reinforces the impression that “The Tollund Man 
in Springtime” is a celebration of poetry’s “staying powers.” By the end of the 
sequence, it seems as if poet and Tollund Man have merged and become one. 
If the title District and Circle brings to mind the London Underground and the 
hellish circumstances of the terrorist bombings in July 2005, it also suggests 
Heaney’s continuing preoccupation with his own district and his relentless 
circling back on his own poetic achievements. There is resilience and endurance 
in the figure of the turf cutter with which the sequence ends: “I straightened, 
spat on my hands, felt benefit / And spirited myself into the street” (2006: 58).
Stylistically, too, “The Tollund Man in Springtime” registers a changed 
world view. For all the deep-seated anxieties that attend the prospect of glob­
alised terror, there is a lightness and deftness in Heaney’s handling of the sonnet 
form. The syntactical fluency and rhythmic buoyancy of the sonnets suggest 
a recovery of confidence in the lyric mode. In the opening sonnet, for instance, 
the Petrarchan rhyme scheme is established with an easeful and artful simplic­
ity, allowing words like “passed” and “ghost,” “lost” and “rust,” to function as 
near-echoes of each other, rather than as full-throated rhymes. This sustained 
experimentation with lyric form takes on a new confidence and adventurousness 
in the changed political climate of the post-ceasefire period. Between 1972 and 
1994, between “The Tollund Man” and “Tollund,” Heaney had continued to 
think about the function of poetry, and about whether lyric poetry, in particular, 
was adequate to the circumstances in which it now had to operate. One of the 
most revealing instances of Heaney’s theoretical manouevering can be found 
in the Richard Ellmann Lectures which he delivered at Emory University in 
Atlanta in 1988, and which were subsequently printed in a small book titled 
The Place of Writing (1989). In these lectures, Heaney (1989: 38) confesses 
just how difficult it is to carry on writing in a cultural climate where a suspicion 
of Yeatsian heroics combines with a more general European scepticism about 
the possibilities of poetry after Auschwitz:
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it all added up to a situation in which the literary intelligentsia of Britain and Ireland 
were anxious to confine the operations of imaginative writing to a sanitized realm 
that might include the ludic, the ironic, the parodic, the satiric, the pathetic, the 
domestic, the elegiac and the self-inculpatory, but which would conscientiously 
exclude the visionary prophetic, the patriotic witness, the national epical.
In Heaney’s own work, of course, there are many instances of the domestic, 
the elegiac and the self-inculpatory, but rather less attention has been given to the 
visionary prophetic, the patriotic witness and the national epical, all of which 
are also abundantly present in Heaney’s work, and which arguably begin to 
surface more confidently and explicitly in the poetry written after the ceasefire 
of 1994. The references to “the ludic, the ironic, the parodic” derive in part from 
the preface to The Penguin Book of Contemporary British Poetry, edited by 
Andrew Motion and Blake Morrison, in which Heaney (somewhat reluctantly) 
had been included in 1982. It suggests the kind of poetry then being written 
by Paul Muldoon, a poetry that was advertising itself as postmodern in its 
self-reflexive, allusive, deconstructive energies. Just a little later in the essay, 
Heaney (1989: 41) takes Muldoon to task for seeming to “deride the notion that 
poetry might have a desirable, never mind a demonstrable, relation to the life 
of a nation. To get involved with such ideas, he [Muldoon] implies, is at best to 
commit a literary offence, at worst to promote dubious mystiques involving race 
memory and the chosen people complex.” How, then, to steer a line between 
patriotic witness and the kind of postmodem playfulness that would seem to 
abandon any serious commitment to the life of the nation? Heaney has always 
tried to balance the place of writing in terms of a particular national location 
with the place of writing in terms of where it exists, theoretically, in relation 
to other cultural activities and events.
Three poems written by Heaney over a period of thirty years, all of them 
preoccupied with a particular place - Toome, in Co. Antrim - suggest how 
pervasive and persistent Heaney’s ideas about the “place of writing” have been 
throughout his career. All three poems give voice to the urge and necessity 
of poetry itself, but also reveal distinctive stages of development in Heaney’s 
thinking about the adequacy of his own artistic impulses. The first of these 
poems, simply titled “Toome,” appeared in Wintering Out in 1972. It is one of 
a number of sensuous verbal realisations of local places, including “Anahor- 
ish” and “Broagh,” in which Heaney taps a long Irish tradition of placename 
poems (dinnseanchas) and attempts to recover “forgotten Gaelic music in the 
throat”: “My mouth holds round / the soft blastings, / Toome, Toome.” At 
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a phonetic level, the poem is an exploration of the distinctive music of Gaelic 
vowel sounds; it exerts a sense of kinship and perhaps a sense of possession 
in the mouth’s prolonged “holding” to the soundings of the place. As Heaney 
suggests in his early essays, however, linguistic contours are also geo-political 
contours. Toome is part of the Bann valley, a site of important archaeological 
discoveries (and therefore an appropriate place for poetic excavations involv­
ing language and memory), but it is also associated with the 1798 Rebellion, 
and especially with the folk memory, preserved in Ethna Carbery’s song, of 
the rebel Roddy McCorley: “For young Roddy McCorley goes to die on the 
Bridge of Toome today” (Regan 2004: 367). The “soft blastings” of Toome 
open up the poem’s excavation of the landscape, while subtly hinting at its 
troubled political history. Heaney’s poetic “prospecting” uncovers, instead of 
gold, an assortment of objects, including “musket-balls.” The final prospect is 
a place of danger, where the speaker acknowledges the risks that accompany 
his archaeological excavations: “I am sleeved in / alluvial mud that shelves / 
suddenly under / bogwater and tributaries, / and elvers tail my hair” (1998: 53). 
That final image is a Celtic version of the Medusa myth that suggests that 
Heaney has pushed back well beyond the 1790s into pagan Ireland. If it pro­
vides evidence that Heaney has “located his primeval, preliterate self,” it also 
reminds us of the fossilising, petrifying consequences of looking too intently 
into the past (Morrison 1982: 44).
“The Toome Road” provides a striking indication of the colloquial vigour 
and directness that started to enter Heaney’s work between Wintering Out in 
1972 and Field Work in 1979. That stylistic shift is immediately apparent in the 
poem’s opening recollection of a meeting with the British Army:
One morning early I met armoured cars
In convoy, warbling along on powerful tyres, 
All camouflaged with broken alder branches,
And headphoned soldiers standing up in turrets. (1998: 150)
The echoes of English folk song (“Early one morning, just as the sun was 
rising”) are quickly dispelled, and the image of a singing maiden is displaced 
by military hardware. In its surveillance of rural Ulster, the army also appears 
to have displaced the birds and even the trees in which they sing. The broken 
alder, the darling tree of the exiled Sweeney, is an ominous sign. In Heaney’s 
version of Buile Suibhne (Sweeney Astray, 1983), the alder has “some milk of 
human kindness / coursing in its sap” (1983: 37), but here that innocence has 
been destroyed. The voice of the poem modulates in response to the perceived 
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invasion, asserting territorial rights: “How long were they approaching down 
my roads / As if they owned them?” (1998: 150). If the voice is that of a local 
farmer, it is also the oracular voice of the poet, speaking with the full authority 
of the author, through and on behalf of the community, and emulating the defiant 
idiom of Yeats’s “Meditations in Time of Civil War.”
Even as the conceit of the military convoy as a grotesque debasement of 
nature is extended, the poem refuses to conceal its violent actuality. If the 
occupants of the armoured cars are “Sowers of seed,” they are also “erectors of 
headstones.” The lyrical address, “O charioteers,” is strangely anachronistic, but 
its function is to expose rather than obscure political power. As Neil Corcoran 
(1986: 134) points out, “the British soldiers become, briefly, continuous with 
the forces of the Roman imperium.” That backward historical look might seem 
to deflect from the urgent needs of the moment, but it nevertheless presents 
the British army as an aggressive, occupying presence. The poem gathers to 
a climax as it sets against the passing image of violence an enduring image of 
artistic inspiration: “The invisible, untoppled omphalos.” The Greek omphalos 
is a crucially important word in Heaney’s lexicon, as it is in that of James Joyce. 
It appears as the first word in the opening essay of Heaney’s first collection 
of essays, Preoccupations, associating the navel and the centre of the world 
with the sound of water being pumped in the yard of the farm where he grew 
up in Co. Derry. The claim that it “stands here still, stands vibrant as you 
pass” is a defiant recognition of art’s resistance to brutal pressures, and a bold 
acknowledgement of all that poetry stands for.
From the outset, the poet’s imagination has set the assuaging rhythms of 
water being pumped in the yard - “omphalos, omphalos, omphalos" - against 
a troubling military incursion. The child growing up in the 1940s hears “Amer­
ican bombers groan towards the aerodrome at Toomebridge,” while “American 
troops manoeuvre in the fields along the road” (1980: 17). In Electric Light 
(2001), Heaney returns to the early places of the imagination, but with a new 
sense of energy and insight. The opening poem, “At Toomebridge,” gathers 
up Heaney’s earlier interests in local topography and replays them with a new 
suddenness and a new sense of the marvellous:
Where the flat water
Came pouring over the weir out of Lough Neagh
As if it had reached an edge of the flat earth
And fallen shining to the continuous
Present of the Bann.
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The title and the repeated anaphoric emphasis on “where” (four times in a poem 
often lines) are strong indicators of a persistent interest in places and placenames 
in Heaney’s work. The technique of finding verbal equivalents for features of 
the landscape is reminiscent of the earlier “Toome,” while the speaker’s ex­
cited apprehension of the world recalls some of the early poems in Death of 
a Naturalist and Door into the Dark. Even so, there is a distinct and decisive 
change of perspective. The typographical indentation and the syntactical dis­
connectedness create the impression that the poem has been extracted from 
some larger sequence. The movement of water sets up a complex interplay of 
spatial and temporal effects, as if enacting the processes of memory and imag­
ination as they explore the contours of the earth. The poem acknowledges both 
the Heraclitean flux that Gerard Manley Hopkins revelled in and the persistent, 
ineffaceable stuff of history, including the remembrance of “Where the rebel 
boy was hanged in ’98.” The world is charged with electricity, and poetry is 
bom out of the tension between sameness and difference, between that which 
lasts and that which changes.
Heaney’s renewed engagement with the energies of place in Electric Light 
is undoubtedly prompted by the changing political climate in the late 1990s. 
A consciousness of the ceasefire and its local consequences becomes apparent 
in the poem’s recollection of “Where the checkpoint used to be,” but this 
is a post-ceasefire poem in other ways as well. The stylistic corollary of the 
changed political order is a new willingness to entertain the ludic, self-reflexive, 
playfully riddling idiom that had previously appeared suspect. Heaney’s self­
referencing now takes on a slippery, eel-like allusiveness. The closing lines both 
take us back to the earlier poetry and reassert a sense of changed priorities: “As 
once before / The slime and silver of the fattened eel” (2001: 3). The expected 
“sliver” is cleverly transformed into silver, and a subtle subliminal connection 
is established between electric light and electric eels. We are reminded both 
of the “prospecting” speaker amidst the elvers in the earlier “Toome,” but 
also of the phosphorescent eels near Toomebridge in Heaney’s early “Lough 
Neagh Sequence.” The light that came flooding in with the announcement of 
the ceasefire in August 1994 now seems to fill the poems with a new political 
promise and a new stylistic charge and energy.
Since 1994, Heaney’s poetry has taken on a more reflective, retrospective 
disposition; it has steadily, if cautiously, opened itself to the possibilities of 
reconciliation and peaceful settlement. Both before and after the ceasefire, 
Heaney has credited poetry with the responsibility of being a witness to its 
times, as well as an impulse for change. He has never abandoned the idea that 
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poetry might have “a desirable and demonstrable relation to the life of a nation,” 
even if his conception of poetry has broadened recently to admit more of “the 
ludic, the ironic, the parodic” than once seemed possible. It is still too early to 
tell how Heaney’s poetry might develop in the aftermath of new power-sharing 
initiatives at Stormont, but there is no doubt, as he himself has recognised, 
that things have “moved on.”
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Unfinished Narratives of Sparkian 
Finishing School
Closure as an Important Component in Making Sense
When the concept of the narrative is applied to works of art, especially literary 
art, rather than history, it is usually conceived as a teleological phenomenon. Its 
artistic design, which is always a question of form, implies a definite purpose 
that is aiming at, and therefore presupposing, some kind of closure. Even such 
classic examples of the postmodem open-ended novel as John Fowles’s The 
French Lieutenant’s Woman, with its proposition of alternative endings, does 
not really reject the sense of closure, but only makes it less definite. At the same 
time it becomes more demanding for the reader to get actively involved in the 
process of sense-making. A sense of leading to a closure, no matter whether 
it is with a linear or a spiral movement, or else along a zigzag path, is so 
deeply ingrained in the nature of narrative discourse in the novel that closures, 
and even post-modem vestiges of the traditional closure, are difficult to erase 
completely in the artefacts of fiction. It is so because closure, no matter what 
particular form and degree of completion it assumes as a key component of 
the narrative structure, is an important element in the process of constructing 
meaning in narrative texts. Consequently, it is fully justified to look upon the 
removal, or dissolution, of closure as a subversive strategy that will inevitably 
lead to deconstructing sense.
Subversion through Irony of the Teleological Character of Narrative 
Discourse
The aim of the following discussion is to look closer at how the erasure of 
closure, producing what has been referred to in the title as “unfinished nar­
ratives,” is effected in the fiction of one of the most significant post-modem 
novelists, Muriel Spark. As my point of departure I have adopted the view 
that narrative, as a teleological activity spanned between two complementary
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poles of the teller of the story and its recipient, must necessarily involve an at­
tempt, decisive or hesitant, sometimes successful and at other times frustrated, 
to construct meaning. As emphasized by Wayne Booth and Linda Hutcheon, 
in their respective most comprehensive studies, among the strategies which 
foil endeavours to construct meaning the principal position should be assigned 
to irony which represents the greatest challenge to the well-established, and 
sanctioned by tradition, teleological paradigm of narrative discourse. It is the 
ironic mode, it seems, which in Muriel Spark’s novels is most effective in 
removing or invalidating closures thus producing unfinished narratives which 
characterise most of her fiction, and at the same time it becomes a cornerstone 
of post-modern literature. The most explicit denial of the validity of closure 
can be found in The Only Problem (1984) that may be read as a novel about the 
impossibility of closing a discourse which assumes the form of a philosophical 
or theological inquiry, and where the reader is eventually informed, in a tone 
of accepted resignation, that “If the answers are valid then it is the questions 
which are all cock-eyed” (Spark 1985: 180).
Paradigms of Socratic Dialogue in Sparkian Fiction
Therefore it is not surprising that in Muriel Spark’s novels the narrator often 
adopts a pose of the interrogating Socrates who, not without a good reason, is 
generally regarded as a master ironist. More importantly, it is the pose which 
belongs to Socrates, the doubter, who seems to mock, or maybe pity, his inter­
locutor’s vain attempts to confer the finality of answers upon questions asked. 
Engaged in the truth-seeking dialogue with his disciple, the ironic mentor all the 
time undermines seemingly established meanings and defers ad infinitum the 
conclusiveness of a closure. Thus he shows reluctance to terminate their com­
mon pursuit and instead proposes ever growing uncertainty which inevitably 
leads to the blurring of clear-cut conclusions and to ultimate rejection of defi­
nite closures. Such Socratic dialogue, which has as its underlying principle the 
shunning of even provisional finality, is inscribed into the majority of Sparkian 
unfinished narratives, and it constitutes a characteristic feature of Muriel Spark’s 
writing. But her affiliation with Socrates’ ironic mode is most overtly acknowl­
edged in her Symposium (1990) which not only through the title and the mottoes 
referring to Plato’s and Lucian’s Symposiums, but also by means of the setting 
of a convivial meeting, and the underpinning quasi-philosophical discussion, 
reflects, even if it is a distorted reflection, the paradigm of the Socratic debate.
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The Finishing School as an Epitome of Muriel Spark’s artistic creed
Without any doubt unfinished narratives constitute a distinctive feature of 
Muriel Spark’s writing. However, if the lack of closure is taken as a probing 
critical instrument for the examination of Spark’s novels, then it becomes evi­
dent that manifestly unfinished narratives prevail in her later fiction. Attempts 
and intimations of a closure, which still can be found in The Comforters (1957) 
or Robinson (1958) that belong to her earliest novels, are already missing in 
her late works of which Aiding and Abetting (2000) and The Finishing School 
(2004) are the best examples. In the title of my paper I refer specifically to The 
Finishing School, which is the last novel Muriel Spark got published before her 
death in April 2006, and I am doing it for two reasons. First of all I believe that 
The Finishing School can be seen as a testament left to the world of letters by 
the novelist who was giving her compelling testimony to the trends operative 
on the post-modern literary scene. Secondly, the very idea of the “finishing 
school,” evoked in the title and elaborated throughout the novel, has a symbolic 
significance, and reflects a rupture at the heart of Sparkian narratives which on 
the one hand seem to tend towards a perfect completion, while on the other they 
demonstrate the mature novelist’s awareness of the resistance of the material 
of art to various strategies of closure. The former, i.e. the drive of fictional 
discourse towards closure, is a prerogative of art imposing an aesthetic order 
upon existential chaos. The latter, i.e. the novel’s refusal to go along with the 
closing tactics, results from the novelist’s profound recognition of a complex 
relationship between artefacts of fiction and facts of life. The paradoxical nature 
of that rupture is best rendered by Muriel Spark’s own words when she defines 
her aim as a novelist in terms of a commitment to the search of absolute truth 
through the form of the novel (see Kermode 1963) which has its limitations 
and is subject to various processes of relativization.
Tension between Opening and Closing as a Motive Power in Sparkian 
Post-modern Narrative
The Finishing School takes up the most representative themes of Spark’s fiction, 
and like many of its predecessors, e.g. The Comforters (1957), Loitering with 
Intent (1981), A Far Cry from Kensington (1989), Reality and Dreams (1997), 
by introducing the motif of writing a book, it revolves around the tricky business 
of producing fiction, and makes disturbing allusions to confrontations and 
overlapping of imagined realities with the factual. It is a meditation in the 
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fictional mode on the subversive power of words and the prevarications of 
language employed to deal with the enigma of life, deviousness of human 
dealings and deficiency of social institutions. It is also an admission of the 
insufficiency of language, in general, and narrative discourse in particular, to 
grasp and render the inscrutability of divine universe and the complexity of 
human predicament.
The eponymous finishing school is “a place where parents dump their 
teen-age children after their schooldays and before their universities or their 
marriages or careers” (Spark 2005: 46). The “finishing school” is a significant 
element both in the structure of the novel and its thematic pattern. If two basic 
dimensions of time and space are applied here, it can be said that in terms of 
space “finishing school” represents a waiting hall, whereas in terms of time 
it corresponds to a preparatory phase which necessarily implies a sense of 
commencement. When at the level of certain abstraction both get combined 
into a spatio-temporal matrix where the Bakhtinian term chronotope may be 
implemented, then the finishing school can be perceived as a chronotope un­
derpinning the post-modern discourse of the novel.
Paradoxically, throughout the entire narrative the idea of “finishing” school 
alludes to “getting started.” Alan Kennedy speaks of such union of opposites as 
something particularly relevant for Muriel Spark’s fiction, and he applies to it the 
term antisyzygy: “An antisyzygy is a union of opposites. It is not to be perceived 
as a fusion of contraries in which the two lose their identities and become one, 
but as an existing together of mutual exclusives. [...] Muriel Spark’s work 
can be seen to be constantly striving to realise an antisyzygy” (Kennedy 1974: 
152). Thus The Finishing School is the novel about getting ready to begin 
something or to launch a new phase in life: it may be writing a novel, publishing 
one, starting another relationship, or another career. However, looking here for 
a demarcation between what is vital and what is trivial turns out to be completely 
irrelevant as in the fictional world of Muriel Spark’s novel all the evaluative 
distinctions and grades of significance, which derive either from ethics or 
from epistemology, are obliterated. The only differentiation which seems to 
matter belongs to the realm of ontology and it concerns the apparent separation 
between the beginning and the end. But even that proves to be illusory as no 
such separation is achieved in Sparkian post-modern novel.
If we take into consideration the criterion of teleology which, as previously 
postulated, is an important instrument in making sense, then the fundamental 
purpose of the “finishing school” and its most important raison d’etre becomes 
“getting started.” Such binary opposition and obvious discrepancy between 
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“finishing” and “getting started” generates irony which pervades the narrative 
discourse of Muriel Spark’s work. In a similar way the name of the finishing 
school, “College Sunrise,” combines the sense of an ending (“finishing”) with 
the sense of a beginning (“sunrise”). Hence the finishing school, as a domain for 
perfecting and consequently closing, in its purely onomastic aspect, conveying 
the suggestion of the opening of a day, corresponds to the idea of getting started, 
with a clear foregrounding of getting started in the novelist’s profession. In such 
a way the title that represents the leitmotif of the novel, becomes an illustration 
of the basic irony stemming from the divergence between language and reality 
which sustains the life of works of fiction, and which is the marshy territory 
where the novelist is continually compelled to walk.
Instability Inscribed into the Narrative and the Illusory Nature of 
Denouement
College Sunrise is an itinerant enterprise run by Rowland and Nina, a married 
couple at the beginning of the novel, who, however, get divorced as the narrative 
progresses. Thus the main protagonists, and the owners and managers of the 
finishing school testify to the lack of stability in personal liaisons and to endemic 
undermining of established social structures which is a pervasive motif in 
Sparkian Active worlds, where human relationships are continually shifted 
and reshuffled. Rowland’s and Nina’s finishing school is an ultra democratic 
institution, “by its foundation, free and mobile” (Spark 2005:117), resisting any 
form of authoritarian order, showing disregard for conventions and intolerant of 
any limitations. It cannot be confined to one place to the effect that the finishing 
school itself as an institution is getting started over and over again:
After another year at Ouchy [Lousanne] he [Rowland] moved to Ravenna where the 
school specialised in the study of mosaics. From there he moved to Istanbul where 
he met with many problems too complicated to narrate here. (Spark 2005: 154)
Apart from Rowland, who teaches courses in creative writing, and is himself 
a frustrated writer, continually suffering from “writer’s block” and “professional 
distractions” (Spark 2005: 42), another pivotal character in the novel is Chris, 
a seventeen-year-old College student and an aspiring novelist with assets of 
youth and talent to help him climb to success. Rowland simultaneously ad­
mires, envies and hates Chris; while the latter treats his mentor with youthful 
disrespect, often seasoned with arrogant superiority and condescension. Chris 
finds Rowland’s presence and his instruction indispensable, for Rowland is 
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“part of his identity as a writer” (Spark 2005: 98). However, when it comes to 
the actual practice of novel-writing, the pupil completely ignores his teacher’s 
professional advice. Rowland sticks to the Aristotelian principles of compo­
sition and believes that the novel should have a beginning, a middle and an 
end. Chris, who “seemed to have a built-in sense of narrative architecture and 
balance” (Spark 2005: 55), little cares about the classical order. Everything 
Rowland professes stands in striking contrast with Chris’s creed of the creative 
writer whose guiding principles are manipulation of history and exercising 
absolute control over characters.
Rowland and Chris are tied to each other with the bond of mutual inter­
dependence. Their relationship, which seems to be the motive power of the 
plot of the novel, is the record of rivalry and obsessive attraction devastating 
and sustaining them at the same time. “I can’t work without you, Rowland. 
I need whatever it is you radiate. I have to finish my novel in peace” (Spark 
2005: 93), says Chris. “I know I’m obsessed with Chris, but I want my obses­
sion. So does he” (Spark 2005: 115), says Rowland. Contrary to what might 
be expected the story of their relationship does not represent either a growing 
awareness of the writer-protagonists or any interesting development of the craft 
of practising or aspiring novelists. Although Chris fictionalises history in his 
novel about Mary Queen of Scots and the murder of her husband, whereas 
Rowland sets out to record the actuality of experience in his book The School 
Observed, in fact they are both doing essentially the same thing; and eventually 
they both get their novels published. Without being definitely resolved, Row­
land’s and Chris’s impassioned rivalry finds an impassive denouement in their 
getting engaged in a “same-sex Affirmation Ceremony” (Spark 2005:155). The 
conclusion of their turbulent liaison, if that may be called a conclusion at all, 
is presented in the narrative as if it were a side track observation completely 
irrelevant from the perspective of the main story line. But then in view of 
such sham closure, the baffled reader is confronted with the question: what, 
if anything, is the main story?
Inconclusive Conclusion and Questions About Narrative Fiction in the 
21st Century
The narrative discourse in The Finishing School deliberately arouses the 
reader’s expectations in order to refuse to meet them. It starts a number of 
narrative tracs, but shows no intention to follow them till even a semblance 
of an end. In this respect the novel illustrates Rowland’s precept for creative 
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writing according to which things that are left out matter more than those 
which are put in (see Spark 2005: 59). Similarly Sparkian fictional discourse 
counterpoints sounds and silences, and while hinting at a conclusion or clo­
sure, it nevertheless works with the potential of beginnings, and consequently 
capitalises on the unfinished quality of the narrative.
Contrary to the expectations which the title arouses Muriel Spark’s Fin­
ishing School gives neither a sense of completion nor finality. Instead, with 
a thrust of irony, it launches the lives of the novel’s characters onto a new 
course, after they have left College Sunrise, and after the same, and yet dif­
ferent, finishing school has restarted again at another place. Accordingly the 
novel closes with hints at new beginnings which open up for the whole gallery 
of College students and College friends and associates. Many of them belong 
to the margins of the narrative and have been barely touched upon in the dis­
course of Sparkian fiction. Thus the ending of the novel reads like an outline of 
a number of introductions to new story lines which are dormant and suspended 
in the narrative that is being wound up.
Pallas Kapelas - her father had skipped bail, was wanted and always would be.
Pallas married a merchant shipowner and was, so far, contented.
Nina had not heard from Lionel Haas, not a word.
Pansy Leghorn had a temporary job as an editor at the BBC.
Princess Tilly had a baby girl who, as Isreael Bron had predicted, was nursed and 
coddled into Tilly’s family, Tilly went her own way and became a society journalist. 
Albert visited his daughter from time to time, taking her a teddy bear and a bedside 
clock.
Opal Gross was in the process of studying for the Anglican ministry.
Mary Foot opened a shop in Cornwall where she sold ceramics and transparent 
scarves. She corresponded regularly with Rowland and Chris, passing on their 
news to Nina.
Lisa Orlando got a place at Southampton University reading psychology.
Joan Archer got a place in a good drama school, as she had for so long desired. 
Eventually she was to write television scripts.
Albert was kept on at the house as a gardener, and Claire as a domestic helper.
Elaine got a job in Geneva at the travel agency. She frequently met Albert at 
weekends and public holidays.
Her sister, Celestine, had a job at the restaurant of a skating rink in Lausanne, where 
she also progressed wonderfully at skating. [...] (Spark 2005: 155-6)
There are many “good-byes” and “good-nights” (see Spark 2005: 110,125) 
in the novel, and at the same time there are many hints at new courses of life 
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being open. In the closing scene of The Finishing School, Nina walking to the 
hotel listens to young voices reminiscent of College Sunrise which overlap with 
the voice of a speaker on Sky News. And appropriately the final words of the 
narrative are a fragment of the weather forecast: “As we go through this evening 
and into tonight ..(Spark 2005: 156). The narrative closes with three dots 
which function as true suspension points seemingly terminating the narrative 
discourse. And they acquire a special significance for they both prepare the 
ground for an illusion of an ending and simultaneously allude to everything 
that has not been said and which is the potential of a beginning.
With a curious twist of irony which, after D. C. Muecke may be termed 
as the philosophical irony of life, The Finishing School is Muriel Spark’s last 
novel. It appropriately closes the writing career of one of the most accomplished 
British novelists who was leading the way from the 20th century modernism, 
through postmodernism, into yet unrealised potential of the 21st century. In­
terestingly, it closes the creative life of the novelist by putting in strong relief 
her unfinished narratives and thus positing an undefined status of narrative art 
in the times to come.
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The Cons and Pros of Being Dead: The Meaning 
of Life and Language in Hotel World by Ali Smith
Once in a while in literature there appear texts which dare to confront the 
subject of life after death. Interestingly, some of them attempt to fathom the 
very moment of crossing the thin border between the known and the unknown. 
Perhaps the most famous modem story about the borderline between life and 
death is Ambrose Bierce’s An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge (1890). The 
story’s perplexing time sequence and its surprise ending inspired at least a dozen 
stories and films in the second half of the 20th century, including such artists 
as Flann O’Brien, Jorge Luis Borges, David Lynch and Martin Scorsese. It 
might seem that the human condition immediately after passing away raises 
more interest and controversies than eternity itself. Undoubtedly, tackling such 
subjects like life and death puts a writer at an immediate risk of speaking in 
clichés. Therefore the authors reach for various devices and means of expression 
to depict the state of consciousness at the moment of the detachment between 
the material and the immaterial. Texts like this can be viewed in relation to the 
ancient tradition of tales in which a mortal hero descends into the underworld, to 
the abode of the dead, and in some cases, like Heracles or Orpheus, he manages 
to return. In Pincher Martin, William Golding reveals at the very end of his 
novel that the protagonist’s struggle for survival was in fact a post mortem 
narrative (Golding 1956). The ghost of the brutally murdered teenage Susie 
in The Lovely Bones (Seabold 2002) desperately tries to hold on to something 
material before it is taken to heaven.1 She brushes against her schoolmate who, 
endowed with such uncanny experience, develops later the gift of second sight. 
Susie narrates her tragic story already from heaven, watching her bereaved 
family struggling to come to terms with the horror.
1 See the review of The Lovely Bones by Ali Smith in: The Guardian, August 17, 2002 at 
guardian.co.uk.
Ali Smith makes an attempt to convey the most extreme sensations both 
physical and emotional that are evoked not only in the instant of death but 
also after death. The unique quality of Hotel World is the language Smith uses
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to render the experience of a tragic death. It is a striking mixture of lyricism 
and brutality, morbidity and subtlety, black humour and sensuality. Her elegy is 
based on a variety of linguistic devices which make the protagonists’ sensations 
feel almost tangible for the reader. The language serves also as a means of 
characterizing the protagonists’ identity and their condition at a certain stage 
of life, or, more precisely, posthumous existence.
Linguistic inventiveness is considered the hallmark of Smith’s writing. Her 
daring verbal experiments, present also in her other novels Like (1997) and The 
Accidental (2005) have won her critical acclaim.2 Referred to as “an acrobat of 
a writer” (Nunez 2006) and “a wonderful ventriloquist” (Kakutani 2006), Smith 
is particularly admired for her use of free indirect style in which she renders 
the surprising variety of her protagonists’ voices (Poole 2005, Clark 2005).
2 She is also the author of three collections of brilliant short stories Free Love (1995), Other 
Stories and Other Stories (1999) and The Whole Story and Other Stories (2003) and a reworking 
of the myth of Ipfis Girl Meets Boy (2007).
In Hotel World a young chambermaid Sara dies a tragic death when she, 
as a joke, squeezes herself into a hotel dumb waiter and inadvertently falls 
down three floors. While her buried body rests in peace, her restless “rest,” an 
insubstantial trace of her spiritual and mental existence, remains on earth for 
a few more months, experiencing a variety of self-revelatory emotions. The 
emotions concern primarily the physicality of life that can be solely rendered 
through the senses. Unfortunately, immaterial Sara is already partly devoid of 
them. Although she is still able to see and hear, she desperately longs for the 
feeling of touch, taste and smell.
what I want more than anything in the world is to feel a stone rattling about in 
my shoe as I walk, a small sharp stone, so that it jags into different parts of the 
sole and hurts just enough to be pleasure, like scratching in itch. Imagine an itch. 
Imagine a foot, and a pavement beneath it, and a stone, and pressing the stone with 
my whole weight hard into the skin of the sole [...]. (Smith 2002: 3-4)
Such posthumous deliberations reveal the value of the most trivial, unap­
preciated or even bothersome sensations as the customarily overlooked qualities 
of human corporality. Indeed, in the relationship between Sara’s body and the 
invisible fading consciousness, there is a certain inferiority of the latter, at least 
in terms of the knowledge of the external world. While the body is quietly 
rotting in its grave, Sara’s spectre is vainly trying to recall the details about her 
fall. She must finally resort to her decaying body which appears to be much 
more knowledgeable, especially when it concerns Sara’s falling to death and 
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her falling in love. The body, however, is not willing to share its exclusive 
knowledge and dreads to be disturbed in its peaceful idleness. It is only due to 
the spirit’s persistence and determination, which includes pulling at the corpse’s 
stitches, that the body finally surrenders and recalls its earthly memories. The 
argument reads like a variation on Marvell’s A Dialogue Between the Soul and 
Body (1972:103-104). However, while in Marvell’s poem the bothersome dual­
ity was experienced in the human lifetime, the conflict between Sara’s material 
and immaterial component is transferred to the beyond. The corpse insists:
Fuck off. Leave me alone. I’m dead, for God’s sake. [...] I’m tired. Go away. Don’t 
come back we’ve no business with each other any more. (Smith 2002: 15, 26)
The former unity between the two of them is broken, the physicality and 
spirituality fall apart and become alienated. The separated body falls into a state 
of stupor while the immaterial element painfully longs for no longer attainable 
physical sensations. Interestingly, such posthumously broken harmony resulting 
in a certain disability of both elements, emphasizes the perfect state of human 
completeness during lifetime. The spirit’s nostalgic reflection “We were a girl 
[...] we had a name and nineteen summers [...] it was no one else’s name in the 
world” (Smith 2002: 26) is a real affirmation of the human dualistic condition, 
traditionally perceived as troublesome and frustrating.
Before disappearing into the next world, Sara’s fading existence seems 
to go through an earthly purgatory, where she realizes the unique quality of 
life’s ordinariness.
I will miss blue and green. I will miss the shapes of women and men. I will miss 
the smell of my own feet in summer. 1 will miss smell. My feet. Summer. Buildings 
and the way they have windows. (Smith 2002: 7-8)
In her posthumous monologue, she struggles against the gradual loss of words 
which coincides with her approaching disappearance. It seems the final and the 
most painful stage of her alienation from the world.
Seeing birds. Their wings. Their beady . The things they see with. The things we 
see with, two of them, stuck in a face above the nose ... In birds they’re black and 
like beads. In people they are small holes surrounded in colour... (Smith 2002: 8)
The gaps in the text replace the lost words and reflect the lapses of deteriorating 
memory. The disappearing words remain in their basic definitions or are evoked 
through the fixed sets of connotations:
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Lost, I’ve, the word. The word for. You know. I don’t mean a house. I don’t mean 
a room. I mean the way of the . Dead to the . Out of this . (Smith 2002: 30)
While such treatment of words creates an effect of estrangement and, con­
sequently, revitalizes the language, Ali Smith aims at something even more 
daring, namely, rendering the extreme experience of a tragic fall, the experi­
ence of a sudden death.
Woooooooo-
hooooooo what a fall what a soar what a plummet what a dash into dark into light 
what a plunge what a glide thud crash what a drop what a rush what a swoop what 
a fright what a mad hushed skirl what a smash mush mash-up broke and gashed 
what a heart in my mouth what an end. (Smith 2002: 3)
The almost ecstatic roller-coaster sensation of moving downwards at dizzying 
speed, a breathtaking flight whose whooshing sound of cutting through the air 
is heard in the onomatopoeic “sh” verbs such as “dash,” “rush,” “hush” is then 
developed into a factual, almost clinical description3.
3 Smith’s experiments with sound and punctuation may be linked to her fascination with James 
Joyce whose ouvre was the subject of her doctoral thesis. See also: M. Denes, “A Babel of Voices” 
in: The Guardian, April 19,2003 at <http://books.guardian.co.uk/departments/generalfiction/story/ 
0,60000,938610, OO.htmb.
The ceiling came down, the floor came up to meet me. My back broke; my neck 
broke, my face broke, my head broke. The cage round my heart broke open and my 
heart came out. I think it was my heart. It broke out of my chest and it jammed into 
my mouth. [...] For the first time (too late) I knew how my heart tasted.
(Smith 2002: 6)
The twofold character of the fatal experience, which hovers between striking in­
tensity and chilly sarcasm, returns in the interior monologues of Sara’s younger 
sister, Clare. Unlike their mother, who plunges into numb despair, or their father, 
who disposes of every object reminding him of the deceased daughter, Clare 
experiences extraordinary closeness with her sister. Her monologue is a record 
of rage, loneliness and helplessness in the face of death. The intensity and ur­
gency of her stream of thoughts reflect her teenage rebellion, and her frequent 
use of obscene words and sarcasm serves to tame the atrocity she is facing.
I still just don’t get it a dead person & her a dead person & her how the two things are 
the same thing where does it go where did she how one minute can you be walking 
about & the next you can’t as if like you just got lifted up & disappeared into the
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sky [...] God fuck sake one minute there is & the next you are you were 
just flakes of whatever stuff that you can’t even see properly God now 
all the chest of drawers is mine. (Smith 2002: 211, 192)
The sisterhood, taken earlier for granted, is revived posthumously and reveals 
its strength. Clare becomes, in a way, an extension of Sara, and, as if in a certain 
spiritual unity, feels her dead sister’s deepest desires:
I am watching TV for you in case you are missing it I am keeping up with Brookside 
for you it is seriously crap & not just George Clooney is out of ER but there is 
a rumour that Carol is going to leave too [...]& when I eat a piece of toast it is 
slowly so I will remember for you what it tastes like & 1 look at things hard so you 
will know if you want to what they look like. (Smith 2002: 209)
While the monologue reads like an updating letter from the world, its structure 
resembles the rhythm of swimming under water. The echoes of Sara’s passion 
for swimming returns in her sister’s flow of thoughts. The oppressive density of 
the monologue, its breathlessness, almost physical tension and determination 
brings to mind a swimmer who is running short of breath. The gaps in the 
unpunctuated text feel like the moments of breathing in gulps of air when the 
thoughts become unbearably suffocating. The chapters narrated by Sara and 
her sister are complementary also in their titles. Named, respectively, “Past” 
and “Future in the Past,” they allow for a double interpretation. The latter 
grammatical tense places future at a particular point of the past. Such future 
is, like in Sara’s case, completed, or annihilated since it has already happened. 
However, future in the past can also be understood positively as the future 
rooted in the past and drawing from the past. Such future might still lie ahead 
of Clare, reunited with her deceased sister.
The idea of titling the chapters with the reference to the grammatical tenses 
is another concept of linking the protagonists’ identity with the language they 
use. The tense defines, often subversively, the protagonists’ condition. Elspeth 
or Else, a beggar asking for money in front of the hotel, whose existence is 
reduced to the basic needs, communicates in chunks of consonants: “Spr sm 
chn?” (Smith 2002: 45). She has disposed of vowels like of many other things 
in her life and uses a mutilated form of language, corresponding with her social 
status. Else lives, as the title of the chapter announces, in “present historic.” 
Externally mute, she revives the memories from the past, and her internal life 
appears surprisingly rich. Else’s random knowledge, acquired at school and in 
public libraries, where she occasionally seeks shelter, is quite impressive. For 
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passers-by she remains, however, invariably, an object of abuse, annoyance or, 
less frequently, pity. Nobody is inclined to recognize in her somebody (E)lse, 
somebody, who would escape the stereotypes imposed upon her. Like a language 
devoid of vowels, Else’s identity remains an illegible shorthand for the world. 
Juxtaposed with Else, a journalist and a hotel guest, Penny suffers from a kind of 
logorrhea and develops a pathetic habit of making up cheap, sensational stories 
about herself. Since her job boils down to “fill(ing) up grey space as fast as (she) 
can” (Smith 2002: 169), her reviews for the style column are padded out with 
repetitions and cliches. Penny, who hunts for superlative adjectives to advertise 
dubious standards of the hotel network seems to abuse the language more 
acutely than uncommunicative Else. Her calculated but superficial treatment of 
words turns them into a commodity and devalues them4.
4 Claudia FitzHerbert notes certain Beckettian tones in the dialogues between Else and Penny 
(see “The Haunters and the Haunted” in The Spectator, October 13, 2001). Also Alexandra 
Yurkovsky points out to a strong influence of Beckett in Sara’s monologue (see “Maid’s Nos­
talgic Ghost Makes a Haunting Narrator” in The San Francisco Chronicle, February 3, 2002).
The parallel between the treatment of language and the attitude to life is 
also drawn in the case of Lise - the bedridden ex-receptionist. Her thinking 
adjusts to the slow motion of her weakened body which translates into her 
almost surgical examination of words.
Lise wasn’t well.
Well: a word that was bottomless, that went down into depths which well people 
estimated, for fun, by throwing small coins then leaning with their heads over the 
mouth of the hole [...] so they could make a wish. What could well people find to 
wish for, having everything already? (Smith 2002: 83-84)
The concoction of various meanings of the word well, referring to good 
health, satisfactory condition and a “wishing well” recreates Lise’s slow train 
of thought. Lise ponders upon ambiguity of words and creates new sets of 
semantic connotations but at the same time she also experiences a monotony 
of thoughts and the persistent recurrence of jingles or slogans. She becomes 
language-ridden and slowly loses touch with outside reality. Her world shrinks 
to the size of her room, her bed, her mind. Her knowledge about the external 
world becomes irrelevant. Lise struggles against her impossibility of fitting her 
mental and physical condition into the space of Incapacity for Work Question­
naire. The multiple choice questionnaire proves ridiculously inadequate when 
it comes to conveying the complexity of her sensations. Yet, the stiffness of 
bureaucratic language appears to be contagious, and reading and rereading the 
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form shapes Lise’s memories into a questionnaire-like text, divided into sections 
and marked with headings. Gradually Lise submerges in the present moment 
which overshadows her past and which, though burdensome, is also revelatory.
Would’ve. Did. Was. Everything - cars, buses, work, shops, people, everything - 
other than this bed she was lying in was into a different tense now. Now: I am a sick 
person. I don’t do anything. My skin hurts. My face hurts. My head hurts. My arms 
hurt. (Smith 2002: 88)
Lise’s future, however, is still ahead, even if, as the title of the chapter states, 
it is “future conditional.”
The attempt to fit personal experience into a frame of a grammatical tense 
is not only a way of defining human existence as immersed in language or 
depicting the protagonists’ mental condition. It also points to a unique per­
ception of time by an individual at a particular moment of life. The notion 
of time, as one of the main preoccupations of Hotel World, manifests itself 
in a multiplicity of ways. A race with time was an integral element of Sara’s 
life as a swimmer, where a split of a second decided about success or failure. 
Sara’s obsessive posthumous preoccupation with how long her accident took, 
makes the fatal fall read as her final battle against time. Her sister goes to 
pains to time Sara’s speed of falling by throwing different objects into the hole 
left in the building after the dumb waiter had been removed. This is a curious 
therapy for Clare, who struggles to transform her sister’s senseless death into 
a meaningful activity. It appears that, in a paradoxical way, Sara was victorious 
because she fell towards death at a record speed. Consequently, death gains 
here an affirmative quality as an indispensable element of life. Transitoriness, 
on the other hand, emerges as creative evolution and, however painful, a source 
of self-knowledge. Such a positive orientation towards time as a productive 
rather than a destructive element in experience is relatively rare in literature 
(Meyerhoff 1960: 67-68). Clare’s deliberations about the moment of death day, 
equally present in human life as the date of birth but simply still unmarked, 
become an additional contribution to the process of taming death.
Another interesting approach to the issue of time in Hotel World is the 
transformation of an objective time order, associated with clocks and calendars, 
into subjective relativity. It is Sara’s broken watch that takes her to the watch 
shop where she falls in love with the shop assistant. Since the watch is the only 
link between the girls, it might be perceived as an instrument for measuring 
not time but infatuation. A sinister mechanism is thus turned into an intimate 
memento. Sara’s watch, bearing her initials and tickling on a living wrist of 
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the shop assistant long after Sara’s death, becomes the encapsulated extension 
of her existence, especially that the girl still cherishes the hope of seeing 
Sara again. Another instance where a clock appears as a device measuring the 
protagonist’s individual experience is the moment of dropping a hotel clock 
into the empty lift shaft. Clare, who is timing different objects falling down 
the shaft, throws there also a clock. The clock follows the same route Sara 
once took and breaks into pieces at the bottom of the shaft. The end of life, 
the end of time. Interestingly, it seems that also in this case Sara managed to 
outwit time as it was her, being faster, who led the way, time following in her 
footsteps. The moment is also a climax for Clare, who feels that through the act 
of timing Sara’s fall she not only executes her sister’s last will but also begins 
to reconcile herself to her passing away.
listen Sara [...] even though you couldn’t move couldn’t do anything about it listen 
to me you were fast very fast you were really really fast I know because I went 
there to see tonight I was there & you were so fast I still can’t believe how fast 
you were less than four seconds just under four & a bit that’s all you took I know 
I counted for you. (Smith 2002: 220-221)
The world as a hotel - the central metaphor of the book - focuses on the very 
subject of passing through, of transience. It also naturally points to a multiplicity 
of voices and a variety of perspectives. Hotels “imply more than one story [...] 
several stories happen in them at once [...] there is a collision of narratives only 
walls apart from each other” (Smith Encompassculture). And so it happens that 
the fabric of the narrative is composed of five distinctly different voices which 
are, nevertheless, interconnected. They allude to one another, overlap and enter 
into a dialogue5. The text reads like a kind of palimpsest. Palimpsestic is also 
the very nature of the hotel. It stores the flakes of skin and dust of visitors 
passing through, and collects the left behind random possessions. The hotel 
used to be a brothel - simply a different form of receiving quests. In future it 
might become something else, just like the lift shaft which served as a route 
for the dumb waiter, the grave for Sara and which temporarily is a black gash 
in the wall, open to new opportunities.
5 For a discussion of the treatment of the hotel theme by Ali Smith see G. Foden, “Check in, 
Drop out” in The Guardian, April 14, 2001 at guardian.co.uk and M. Upchurch, “The Ghost in the 
Minibar” in: The New York Times, February 3,2002.
Ali Smith believes that stories ought to be written with the purpose of 
“mov(ing) us at foundation and remind(ing) us how to live and understand 
what we experience” (Smith Random House Catalogue online). Consequently, 
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her treatment of the sensitive subjects of love, life, death and grief is startlingly 
thrilling. Smith’s experimental prose which focuses on the language as part 
and parcel of the human condition, endeavours to represent the physical and 
mental state of the protagonists in extreme circumstances of life. In order to 
imbue the very text with certain physicality, she employs a variety of linguistic 
devices such as onomatopoeic words, textual gaps reflecting memory slips, 
or text continuity that conveys a hectic pace of thinking. Her language is 
highly sensual. She explores the ambiguity of words and creates new semantic 
connotations which endow her prose with unusual freshness.
The old truth that the real appreciation of life comes with its end, is revi­
talized by Ali Smith with exhilarating power. Her affirmation of life and her 
fascination with language may be epitomized in an epitaph:
Remember you must leave. Remember you must live.
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“The Waxworks of Memory” or the Search 
for the Meaning of Life in John Banville’s The Sea
“Since we are haunted now by the idea of being haunted by the past, it is 
tempting for contemporary novelists to try and come up with new metaphors 
and analogies for memory,” writes Adam Philips (2005: 35) in his comprehen­
sive review of John Banville’s The Sea (2005). The phenomenon that Philips 
is referring to is succinctly described in an introduction to a recently published 
volume on theories of memory as a “memory boom” (Rossington and White- 
head 2007: 5), that is, a recent explosion of memory writing in the humanities 
and most significantly, in fiction. John Banville is one of many contemporary 
writers who present their readers with narrators struggling to come to terms with 
their past experience of trauma. The more or less conscious act of remembering 
and forgetting plays a crucial role in a large number of contemporary novels.1
1 Other significant contributions to memory writing have been recently made by Graham Swift, 
Sebastian Faulks, Ian McEwan, Kazuo Ishiguro and W. G. Sebald.
The Sea, Banville’s fourteenth novel, won the author the prestigious Man 
Booker Prize in 2005, in an atmosphere verging on scandal; in the final round, 
despite the protests of a group of judges, John Sutherland, the chairman, cast 
the decisive vote against the other runner up, Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me 
Go (Ezard 2005), which is, significantly, another novel about remembering 
and forgetting. In The Sea, Banville continues a number of themes which have 
come to constitute trademarks of his fiction: a solitary narrator dabbling in 
art history caught in between hope and despair, self-consciously commenting 
on the shortcomings of the language with which he is trying to express his 
anxiety (Hand 2002: 4).
As Eve Patten (2002) writes: “[rjegarded as the most stylistically elabo­
rate Irish writer of his generation, John Banville is a philosophical novelist 
concerned with the nature of perception, the conflict between imagination and 
reality, and the existentialist isolation of the individual.” That last phrase, “ex­
istentialist isolation of the individual” could be used to describe the writing 
of another Irish author Samuel Beckett, whose legacy is also discernible in 
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Banville’s preoccupation with human failure as well as his narrators’ obsessive 
attention to language (Hand 2006: x). As Philips notes,
in his recent novels - The Untouchable, Eclipse, Shroud and The Sea, books that 
seem retrospectively to form a quartet - the narrators have been, in their different 
ways, successful men who have a sneaking and a not-so-sneaking suspicion that 
there really is nothing to them. (2005: 35)
All the four novels are dominated by internal monologues which attract at­
tention to the narrators as “voices.” As the author states in an interview, he 
considers himself to belong to the oral tradition of Irish writers (Hand and 
Banville 2006: 1).
In the same interview he comments on the structure of The Sea:
there are really two books there - one set in the past, that is quite direct and has 
a pulse that’s like the sea: wave sentences, pulsating, while in the present-day 
narrative, when Max Morden is talking about himself in the present, the style goes 
back to that of Shroud. I think it makes for an interesting tension between the two 
voices. (Hand and Banville 2006: 5)
The pulse of the sea is achieved by means of alternating long and short sentences, 
the poetic effect is enhanced by alliteration:
They departed, the gods, on the day of the strange tide. All morning under the milky 
sky the waters in the bay had swelled and swelled, rising to unheard-of heights, the 
small waves creeping over parched sand that for years had known no wetting save 
for rain and lapping the very bases of the dunes. The rusted hulk of the freighter that 
had run aground at the far end of the bay longer ago than any of us could remember 
must have thought it was being granted a relaunch. I would not swim again, after 
that day. (Banville 2005: 3)
The opening paragraph quoted above contains both syntactic and thematic 
foreshadowing of the text that follows, the story that dwells on loss, grief 
and “the gratuitous dramas of memory” (Philips 2005: 35). The pedantically 
crafted structure of the novel will become apparent to the reader only at the very 
end, when, in the final paragraph, the gods’ “departure” will reveal its tragic 
meaning. The role of the reader is to persist in an attempt at making sense of the 
narrator’s monologue, which is only possible if the reader stores every detail 
mentioned in his memory and is prepared to fit the relevant elements into the 
jigsaw puzzle. That is all the more difficult as not all the details are relevant 
and the narrator’s recollections seem as chaotic, random and unpredictable as 
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we may expect in a man recently afflicted by severe psychological trauma. 
Gradually the reader learns to navigate between the two narratives that Max 
Morden inhabits; he moves between the present account - his stay in a boarding 
house, where he is trying to recover from the loss of his wife, and the past - his 
childhood memories of a summer he had spent in the same place.
The memories of the summer fifty years before open the text and “swell” 
like the sea in the first paragraph, so that they quickly dominate the narrative. 
They are composed of a series of “tableaux,” as the narrator calls them, each 
recalled with amazing immediacy and obsessive attention to detail, which may 
be only explained by the fact that, as Max says, the day he met the Grace 
family his life “was changed forever” (Banville 2005: 33). By making friends 
with the Grace twins, Chloe and Myles, the narrator is allowed entry into 
a new world where he can observe and occasionally even experience directly 
the middle-class life style; it is an existence so superior to that of his family 
that the Graces assume divine status in his eyes. He uses the term “gods” with 
reference to the entire family, he sees the father as Poseidon (123) or Old Father 
Time (90); Connie, the mother is transformed into a daemon by his sexual 
desire, and even Myles’s webbed feet are “marks of a godling, sure as heaven” 
(Banville 2005: 61). The Graces seem divine to young Max because of the way 
they live; their superior lifestyle is marked by what they can afford: trips to 
France, renting a house for the whole summer, drinking gin and entertaining 
guests over the weekend. These become attributes of a world that the narrator 
aspires to enter; his dream will come true years later when he marries Anna, 
the daughter of a wealthy crook.
The narrative of childhood memories is occasionally invaded by the nar­
rative of the present; however, the connection between these stories remains 
rather obscure until the end of the novel. The only point of correspondence 
is the place, and like in many previous novels by Banville, the house. The 
Cedars, which the Graces used to rent and endowed with magic qualities, is 
now a boarding house, run by an eccentric Miss Vavasour, who seems strangely 
attentive to the needs of her mourning guest. In an attempt at self-fashioning 
so characteristic of Banville’s unpleasant narrators, Max Morden introduces 
himself as an art critic writing a book on Bonnard, but that book seems never 
to get written (yet another failure); instead the narrator is “working the trauma 
through” for the purposes of self-understanding (Kaplan 2005: 20). In a man­
ner characteristic for trauma victims, Max Morden represses the actual external 
event that caused the shock, and focuses on the summer he spent in love 
with the Graces.
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The two narratives are written in different styles; the childhood memories 
are extremely vivid, the narrator’s professional interest in art is visible in the 
images which he reconstructs with loving nostalgia. His recollections are visual 
and sensual: “I see the game as a series of vivid tableaux, glimpsed instants 
of movement all rush and colour” (Banville 2005: 125). On another occasion, 
the narrator comments on the peculiar way in which he remembers: “Memory 
dislikes motion, preferring to hold things still, and as with so many of these 
remembered scenes I see this one as a tableau” (Banville 2005: 221), and 
a little bit further on he uses another metaphor of painting, where his memory 
is a “wall” on which he paints an image:
[...] I mean Chloe and her mother, are all my own work while Rose is by another, 
unknown, hand. I keep going up close to them, the two Graces, now mother, now 
daughter, applying a dab of colour here, scumbling a detail there, and the result of 
all this close work is that my focus on them is blurred rather than sharpened, even 
when I stand back to survey my handiwork. (224)
The Sea is a novel preoccupied with the working of memory and it abounds 
in metaphors of memory as well as reflections on its randomness and unre­
liability. Given the dramatic moment in life in which Max is writing, it is 
understandable that he dwells on the parallels between the past and the present, 
life and death, memory and imagination. A recollection of a voyeuristic mo­
ment at a picnic provokes reflections on the nature of reality and mortality 
which carry allusions to Joyce’s “The Dead”:
Which is the more real, the woman reclining on the grassy bank of my recollections, 
or the strew of dust and dried marrow that is all the earth any longer retains of her? 
No doubt for others elsewhere she persists, a moving figure in the waxworks of 
memory, but their version will be different from mine, and from each other’s. Thus 
in the minds of the many does the one ramify and disperse. It does not last, it cannot, 
it is not immortality. We carry the dead with us only until we die too, and then it is 
we who are borne along for a little while, and then our bearers in their turn drop, 
and so on in the unimaginable generations. (Banville 2005: 118-19)
The “waxworks of memory” are an image borrowed from the earliest the­
ories of memory; Plato in Theaetetus compared memory to a block of wax 
on which the experience is imprinted (Rossington and Whitehead 2007: 25). 
More recently, Freud conceptualized memory as the Mystic Writing Pad (Ross­
ington and Whitehead 2007: 114) following a very similar concept. In both 
metaphors the reliability of memory remains unquestioned; we may have prob­
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lems accessing our memories, but once we reach them, the imprint in the wax 
is a consistent mark of the past experience. However, Max’s own experience 
seems to contradict his own confidence; although his childhood memories are 
strikingly vivid and alive with detail, on a number of occasions they prove 
inaccurate, or entirely made up. When Adam Philips claims that:
Banville wants us to see that memory can be as random, as futile and baffling in 
its prompting, as anything else that happens to occur to us; and that what we see 
without looking - including our memories and our dreams - can be fascinating 
without being in any way intelligible or revealing, (2005: 35)
he seems to go too far. Max’s memories may not always seem relevant and 
revealing, but in the end the story becomes intelligible and coherent, and the 
past narrative throws some important light on the present.
The fascinating randomness of rambling memories and the dreamy world of 
childhood immediately bring to mind the work of yet another great writer Marcel 
Proust, an affinity recognized by a number of critics and reviewers (Tague 2005, 
Conradi 2005). The Sea is particularly reminiscent of La recherche du temps 
perdw, the holiday in a seaside resort, the narrator awestruck in the presence of 
the divine creatures from a superior social class, reflections on mortality and 
finally the blurred distinction between the narrator and the implied author, all 
bring to mind the work of Proust. But apart from borrowing the motifs and 
themes from Proust, Banville seems to enter a debate with the French author. 
For example, the visit at the dairy farm may be read as a commentary on Proust, 
or even a parody. Max Morden takes his daughter to visit Ballyless just after 
his wife’s funeral; the little streets and shops bring back the memories of the 
summers he spent there as a boy, but the sight of the dairy farm seems to transport 
him in time. Banville’s description is modelled on Proust’s description of the 
summer in Combray. In his analysis of the narrative structure of La recherche 
du temps perdu, Gérard Genette describes one of the complex anachronies as 
the iterative, that is, a single event which Proust describes as repeated in the 
past (1980: 116). Banville’s memory of the farm is an iterative event in this 
sense; we know that the details presented must belong to a single memory; the 
cool air in the yard, the dog lying under the cart, the horse putting its head over 
the half-door must have been noticed and remembered by the narrator on one 
occasion, but the grammatical tenses and the adverbs used transform this visit 
into a repeated event: “here as a boy I would walk down every morning [...]. 
there was always a dog lying tethered [...]” (Banville 2005: 51). Like Proust’s 
summer in Combray, the walk to the farm seems expanded into eternity; the 
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narrator is transported into the past, he remembers the shade of the horse’s 
forelock and “the cool thick secret smell of milk” (Banville 2005: 53). The 
elation is dispelled by a witch-like woman of an uncertain age who, when 
asked about the farmer’s family, surprises Max with a list of names that, to him, 
are completely alien. Suddenly he realises that he knows nothing about the farm:
I found it suddenly dispiriting to hear of them [...] all crowding in on my private 
ceremony of remembering like uninvited poor relations at a fancy funeral. [...] All 
the levitant euphoria of a moment past was gone now and I felt over-fleshed and 
incommensurate with the moment, standing there smiling and weakly nodding, the 
last of the air leaking out of me. (Banville 2005: 56-7)
In La recherche, Proust’s narrator was transported into the past moment 
by a trick of involuntary memory; in this way he gained access to the past 
experience as it really was. Banville, or rather his narrator, experiences the same 
euphoria only to discover a few moments later that it was only an illusion. Walter 
Benjamin’s comment about Proust’s narrator could be applied to Banville’s 
narrator as well, namely, what matters to him is not what he experienced 
but “the weaving of his memory, the Penelope work of recollection [...] or 
of forgetting” (1929: 238). Just like forgetting is an inextricable element of 
remembering, death is an inextricable element of life, Max talks about life 
being “no more than a long preparation for the leaving of it” (Banville 2005: 98) 
and on another occasion, he describes life as a rehearsal for the “real drama” 
(Banville 2005: 184) and goes on to say:
what I am looking forward to is a moment of earthly expression [...] I shall be 
expressed, totally. I shall be delivered, like a noble closing speech. I shall be, in 
a word, said.
The postmodern condition in Banville’s work manifests itself in an attempt at 
“saying the world while simultaneously admitting the futility of any such act 
of saying actually connecting with the world” (Hand 2002: 4).
Gradually, as the narratives of the past and the present move on, the elements 
of the jigsaw puzzle come into place, more and more parallels between the 
narrator’s childhood memories and his life with Anna become apparent. The 
marriage with Anna has enabled Morden to fulfil his childhood dream inspired 
by the Graces and move up socially. His laid-back wife fostered his sense 
of identity, which, as he says, he owes entirely to Chloe. But the crucial link 
between these two stories is departure and loss. The summer idyll ends suddenly 
when having quarrelled with their governess, the Grace twins wade into the sea 
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and commit suicide. Thus the phrase: “the gods departed on the day of the 
strange tide” of page 3 takes on its full meaning on page 246, just like the final 
sentence of the novel in which Max remembers the nurse telling him that his 
wife had just died: “I turned and followed her inside, and it was as if I were 
walking into the sea” (Banville 2005: 264). Twice in the novel, Max makes 
a self-conscious comment on his own narrative saying that he is compiling 
a Book of the Dead. Indeed of all the people that appear in his childhood 
memory, only the governess survives as the housekeeper of the Cedars, as Mr 
and Mrs Grace die a few years after the suicide of the twins. Max’s narrative 
and especially the story of the Grace family remembered with great love of 
detail suddenly assumes a therapeutic function in the eyes of the reader; the 
death of his first love is remembered in lieu of the more recent one. While the 
recollections of the summer he spent with the Grace family fill the pages of the 
text he is writing, they keep the memory of the agony of his wife’s death at 
bay. In the Tibetan tradition the Book of the Dead is written to bring spiritual 
comfort to someone looking after someone dying, and Max’s memories, which 
seemed random and irrelevant, serve this very purpose. The narrator focuses 
on his first encounter with death, his first experience of loss and mourning, in 
fact, the whole novel, like the Eclipse before may be summed up as a “crisis of 
mourning” (Wilkinson 2003: 27). Max is unable to mourn his wife; he seems 
unable to come to terms with this loss, and at some point the repressed emotions 
explode in a barrage of verbal violence: “You cunt, you fucking cunt, how could 
you go and leave me like this [...]” (Banville 2005: 195). The repression is 
also visible in the sharp contrast between the discourse time of the two stories. 
Max takes up 29 pages to describe his visit at a farm where his mother used to 
send him to fetch milk and only 6 pages to describe his relationship with Anna 
from their first encounter to their wedding day. The relevance of the twins’ 
suicide is deferred until much later in the narrator’s life, it is his wife’s death 
that makes it painfully relevant. Banville tries to illustrate the tragedy of the 
human condition which resides in the duality of life and death: one becomes 
relevant only when the other loses relevance.
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PART IV
American Literature
______________________________________
Sarka Bubikova
University of Pardubice, Czech Republic
Ambiguous Heritage and the Search for Identity 
in Native American Fiction
Identity has been a hotly debated issue in American cultural history as well as 
in literature, it “has become one of those words full of sound and fury” (Pinsker 
2001: 51). As Daniel Boorstin states, “Americans are the people in quest of 
[themjselves” (1963: 5) and thus the relationship between one’s inherited and 
received culture or between various inherited cultures is very frequently de­
picted in American literature. In the notoriously known passage from Letters 
from an American Farmer (1782) by Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, the ques­
tion of what constitutes American identity is answered by means of comparison 
with Europe, but already de Crevecoeur mentions cultural plurality and mixed 
heritage as important aspects of American identity. Of course, he does not use 
these terms but talks about “that strange mixture of blood” and gives an exam­
ple of a family “whose grandfather was an Englishman, whose wife was Dutch, 
whose son married a French woman, and whose present four sons have four 
wives of different nations” ([1782] 1990: 897).
While it was still possible in de Crevecoeur’s times to define American 
national identity in the Anglo-Saxon context, as European-Americans formed 
an “unquestionable” majority and thus could perceive themselves as “unhy­
phenated Americans,” as “the incarnation of America as such” (Barsa 1999: 
185) with the shifting demographics they, too, need to become aware of them­
selves as European-Americans, that means in a way ethnic Americans. As in 
the post-WW II years the idea of a nation state gave way to the concept of 
identity, the interest in defining American national character has been replaced 
by the interest in ethnicity.
An interesting part of this complex issue is the relationship between various 
ethnic heritages and personal identity. The issue can be even more complicated 
when cultural heritages are connected with ethnic / racial heritages and thus 
when one’s body becomes an ethnic or “racial signifier” (Lin 2003: 53) and 
a person then has to define his/her identity not only by inner means of who the 
person feels to be but also against external judgments and stereotypes of what 
others assume about the person’s identity based on the person’s body.
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As suggested above, the discussion on identity is quite a contentious and 
complex one and this paper offers only one perspective, one possible approach 
by focusing on how the issue of mixed cultural heritages, racially signifying 
bodies and personal identity has been dealt with in selected works of Native 
American literature, namely those texts that consciously address these issues 
on the example of people of mixed Native American and Euro-American (or 
African-American) origin, the so-called “mixedbloods.” The first work that fic­
tionalized the uneasy situation of mixedbloods is Mourning Dove’s Cogewea 
and the way the novel approached the topic is contrasted with several contem­
porary works by Louise Erdrich and her husband and collaborator, Michael 
Dorris, which also make the quest for identity and the complex situation of the 
people of multifaceted heritage one of their central concerns.
The difficulties involved in biculturalism or mixed heritage are well under­
stood by a majority of Native American writers because they themselves are 
mostly experiencing similar dilemmas - they write about the Native American 
world yet they live on its margins if not out of it, in the intellectual part of the 
white world, on university campuses. They often have mixed origins and might 
not necessarily know native languages, and thus their Native American identity 
is rather pan-Indian than tribal. Yet, in the mainstream world where these au­
thors have usually received their education and which, for the most part, forms 
their readership, they are typically recognized as minorities, or marginal voices, 
and are judged against prevailing stereotypical images of what constitutes an 
Indian. Furthermore, Native American novelists express themselves through 
a typically Euro-American medium - the novel, which is very different from 
the Native American oral tradition. Louis Owens aptly concludes:
For the contemporary Indian novelist - in every case a mixedblood who must come 
to terms in one form or another with peripherality as well as both European and 
Indian ethnicity - identity is the central issue and theme, and, as [James] Clifford 
has suggested, ethnic identity is always mixed, relational, and inventive. (1994: 5)
Most of the mixed-blood characters engage in complicated identity quests 
which usually have the form of a dilemma, of a choice between one of the 
inherited traditions. Thus when Mourning Dove in 1927 published Cogewea, 
the Half-Blood: A Description of the Great Montana Cattle Range, it was not 
only a first novel by a Native American woman, but also a work that clearly 
named “what was to become the dominant theme in novels by Indian authors: 
the dilemma of the mixedblood, the liminal ‘breed’ seemingly trapped between 
Indian and white worlds” (Owens 1994: 40).
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The book’s protagonist Cogewea is the daughter of an Okanogan mother 
and a white father but after the father deserts the family and the mother dies, Co­
gewea and her sisters are brought up by their maternal grandmother Stemteema, 
who represents the traditional elder. The dilemma for Cogewea is presented in 
the form of a choice between a white and a mixed-blood suitor. While the novel 
is “recognizable as a typical romantic story of betrayed love, stoic loyalty, and 
sentiment,” at the same time it attempts to “define the complex dilemma of the 
mixedblood” (Owens 1994: 45).
Cogewea says about herself: “I am not a full-blood - only a breed - a sitkum 
Injun” (Mourning Dove 1981:26) and laments: “Regarded with suspicion by the 
Indian, shunned by the Caucasian, where was there any place for the despised 
breed!” The book’s villain Densmore confirms this opinion when, on seeing 
a ranch full of people of unrecognizable origins, he wonders: “Where were these 
picturesque Indians ...? Instead, he had been lured into a nest of halfblood, 
whom he had always understood to be the inferior degenerates of two races” 
(Mourning Dove 1981: 48).
When Cogewea is about to marry a white easterner, her sister Julia agrees 
“not because she was ashamed of the Red race, but since civilization was the 
only hope for the Indian” (Mourning Dove 1981: 274). However, the traditional 
grandmother Stemteema warns Cogewea about the dangers awaiting her as 
a wife of a white man. Explaining her decision, Cogewea says: “My white blood 
calls to see the world - to do - to live” even if her Indian part (Spirit, as she 
says) “tells me that I am stepping wrong” (Mourning Dove 1981: 253). While 
at first Cogewea tries to embrace the white part of her heritage by marrying 
a white suitor, she later sees through his wickedness and marries a mixedblood.
According to Louis Owens, in having Cogewea marry a “breed” like herself 
and allowing them to accidentally come into fortune, Mourning Dove fails to 
produce a satisfactory ending of the tale. Not only does it remind him of a pulp 
fiction plot, but it postpones the issue till the next generation:
With the conclusion, the dilemma of the mixedblood poised between red and white 
worlds remains unsolved. Very literally allowed a place in neither the Indian nor 
white races, Cogewea will [...] produce children who will, like the parents, be 
halfbloods. The novel ends on a note of stasis, with nothing resolved, none of the 
many questions answered (Owens 1994: 48).
On the contrary, Arnold Krupat considers the choice of a happy ending as al­
ready a positive sign of the possibility of future for the people of mixed descent. 
His criticism of Cogewea tries to see the novel in its historical context: “In this 
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regard, it may fairly be said that Cogewea's irresolution provides an extraor­
dinarily accurate account of the betwixt-and-betweenness of mixedbloods of 
different blood types and quanta in the period” (Krupat 2002: 95). Contrary 
to Owens, Krupat appreciates the fact that Mourning Dove refused to fiction­
alize the idea of the mixedblood as a vanishing race. In “holding firm against 
the advice of her collaborator/mentor, L. V. McWhorter, who recommended 
a tragic ending” we may see “Mourning Dove’s belief in Indian survivance” 
(Krupat 2002: 88).
Moving more than half a century forward, we find a very interesting writer 
of mixed descent - Native American and German-American - Louise Erdrich. 
In her critically highly acclaimed novel, Love Medicine (1984), one of the 
mixed-blood characters is Albertine, the daughter of a Native American mother 
and a white father. In Albertine’s case, it is again the body that reveals her to 
the outer world as a mixed-blood. She says about herself: “I was light, clearly 
a breed” (Erdrich 1984: 22). She feels different from the rest of the family 
because of her looks and seems uncertain of how she should relate to the fact. 
On the contrary, her mother Zelda has no doubts as to where her daughter 
belongs. She says about Albertine: “My girl’s an Indian. [...] I raised her an 
Indian, and that’s what she is” (Erdrich 1984: 23).
In proclaiming her daughter Indian, Albertine’s mother not only expresses 
her disregard for the whites but also affirms Albertine’s membership in the com­
munity. Erdrich plays out the two possible approaches to defining an Indian - 
the “blood quantum” and the “culture” and shows the evasive, if not completely 
mistaken, nature of racial identification. Zelda insists that her daughter is only 
Indian because of the way she was brought up yet even in that comment she for­
gets to acknowledge the impact of the off-reservation schooling that Albertine 
has received. Regardless this omission, Zelda identifies Albertine in a manner 
that is very typical for Native Americans - the self-identification combined 
with the community’s acceptance. As Gerald Vizenor says:
The application of mixedblood geometric scores was not a form of tribal cultural 
validation. Skin color and blood quantums were not the means the tribe used to 
determine identities. The Anishinaabeg [Chippewa] classified a person Indian if he 
lived with them and adopted their habits and mode of life.
(qtd. in Rayson 1991: 31)
While Albertine can be seen as the most hopeful character in Love Medicine, 
the one who eventually leams how to live effectively in both worlds and 
how to see her dual heritage as two parts of her identity complementing one 
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another, Pauline Puyat (introduced in Erdrich’s 1988 novel Tracks') is, according 
to Annette Van Dyke, “the character most troubled by being a mixedblood” 
(1992: 21). Pauline is a metis, a person of mixed Indian and French-Canadian 
ancestry, a descendant of hunters in the clan no longer known by its name.
Pauline engages in a complicated spiritual quest and her main dilemma is 
of spiritual matter: she is attracted both to the traditional Chippewa beliefs and 
to Christianity. The Chippewa people, although now living in reservations in 
North Dakota, came originally from the Great Lakes area and their mythology 
is connected with water. For Pauline, the tribal tradition is represented mainly 
by the power of the water monster Misshepeshu, which is usually considered 
evil, although in some stories he has a dubious character because good spirits, 
such as Thunderbird, an opponent of Misshepeshu, are associated with the 
sky. As Ruth Landes claims, we can, to a degree, draw a parallel between 
Misshepeshu’s and Thunderbird’s fight and the eternal conflict of the Christian 
God and Satan (1968: 31).
Finally Pauline decides that the Chippewa world is vanishing, not worthy 
of preserving because the people “receded and coughed to death and drank” 
(Erdrich 1988: 139) while the white world is spreading and becoming more and 
more powerful. Pauline concludes: “It was clear that Indians were not protected 
by the thing in the lake or by the other Manitous” (Erdrich 1988: 139). Thus 
she turns away from her Native American heritage and embraces Christianity 
in the hope of saving the Chippewa people by bringing them to Christ. She 
decides to enter a convent but in order to become a nun, and particularly a saint, 
which is her greatest ambition, Pauline has to lie about her Indian ancestry 
to be accepted. Nevertheless, the dilemma remains. In fact, most of Pauline’s 
“behavior shows her conflict between her Chippewa and her Euro-American 
heritage she attempts to claim” (Dyke 1992: 21).
While in the convent, Pauline still believes in the power of the water 
monster. She hopes to gain a victory over him with the help of Christ, whom 
she sees in her visions, ironically, as seated on the convent’s stove. When her 
visions disappear, she believes that Christ, a newcomer in the area, no longer 
appears to her because the water spirit man has chased him away. “Christ 
was weak, I saw now, a tame newcomer in this country” (Erdrich 1988: 192). 
Pauline hopes to become the Christ’s “savior” (Erdrich 1988: 195), which for 
her means to save Christ from the water monster by killing the monster. Thus 
she sets out in a boat on the Matchimanito Lake, Misshepeshu’s home, armed 
with a spear in a scene reminiscent of a flirt, an initiation ritual, a hunt, and 
parodying St. George’s fight with the dragon. At the same time, Pauline is, 
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symbolically, trying to do away with her Native American heritage, to kill this 
part of her identity and her past.
Thus “Pauline plays out her bizarre amalgamation of Chippewa belief 
and Catholicism” (Dyke 1992: 22) in a way conflating, as Dyke suggests, 
Christ with the Chippewa sky spirit and the Chippewa water monster with 
Satan (1992: 21) yet herself using the power of the water monster to become 
a sorceress. While seemingly trying to help, Pauline becomes dangerous to the 
Chippewa community. When she appears in Love Medicine as Sister Leopolda, 
she is already in the state of gradual personal disintegration as if the two spiritual 
traditions (or at least the ways in which Pauline interprets them) cannot hold 
together, cannot be made into a meaningful and life-sustaining whole. It is 
thus Pauline’s spiritual life that becomes a battlefield for the two traditions 
she inherited. She claims the Euro-American part of her heritage by passing 
as white and converting to Catholicism and she turns away from the Native 
American part of her self.
The most difficult position among the mixed-bloods seems to be that of 
a person of Native American and African-American origin as the person is 
often subject to racial discrimination and ostracizing for both parts of his/ her 
heritage. This is the case of Rayona, one of the protagonists of Michael Dorris’s 
A Yellow Raft in Blue Water (1987). Rayona is trying to comprehend her life 
and to come to terms with her identity. Her mother is Native American and 
her father black yet in her identity quest Rayona is not helped much by either 
of them - her father is mostly absent and her mother, with whom Rayona has 
a very tense relationship - is fatally ill. Rayona’s parents are no longer together 
and Rayona remembers what her mother used to say to her father: “We’re the 
wrong color for each other” (Dorris 1987: 9). Aware of the skin color issue, 
Rayona comments: “Once, in a hardware store, I found each of our exact shades 
on a paint mix-tone chart. Mom was Almond Joy, Dad was Burnt Clay, and 
I was Maple Walnut” (Dorris 1987: 9).
Rayona is brought back from the city of Seattle to a Montana reservation 
to live with her grandmother. Although her grandmother, Ida still speaks the 
tribal language and knows traditional dancing, she is not really the traditional 
elder like Cogewea’s grandmother, because she lives her life by TV shows. 
Instead of providing Rayona with a community of accepting relatives, she can 
only offer television characters. As Owens says: “Ida will seldom be far from 
a television set [...] living in virtual isolation from the rest of her family and 
tribe” (Owens 1994: 220).
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When a priest introduces Rayona to a local youth group, she is painfully 
reminded of what her body signifies: “The two [Indian teenagers] look me 
up and down. I know what they see. Wrong color, outsider, skinny, friend of 
the priest” (Dorris 1987: 40). Instead of receiving support from her extended 
family, Rayona is, in fact, abused by a relative, a full-blood cousin Foxy: “You’re 
the one whose father is a nigger” (Dorris 1987: 41). Unlike Albertine, whose 
community accepts her and claims her despite her dual heritage, Rayona’s 
community rejects her as an outsider, as different, a lesser member of the 
community, even an enemy:
Foxy calls me “Buffalo Soldier” after the black men who were cavalry scouts and 
fought Indians a long time ago. He leaves a note stuck in the Africa section of my 
geography book. “When are you going home?” [...] “You sure you ain’t looking 
for the Blackfeet reservation?” (Dorris 1987: 44)
The priest tries to be helpful by acknowledging Rayona’s situation:
“It’s not easy being a young person alone at your age,” Father Tom says, “when 
you’re different.”
“I’m not different.”
“I mean, your dual heritage,” he says. “Not that you shouldn’t be proud of it.” This 
is the first time he’s admitted to my skin color, to the shape of my nose, to the stiff 
fullness of my hair. (Dorris 1987: 51)
However, Father Tom is not making the situation any easier because he finds 
himself physically attracted to Rayona. Finally, he tries to persuade her to go 
back to the city (so that she could not report his sexual advances). To help 
her solve her identity problem, he offers a cheap would-be Native American 
piece of jewelry: “Wear this. Then people will know you’re an Indian,” (Dorris 
1987: 58). As Owens comments on the scene, “identity is all surface” (Owens 
1994: 221) almost a mask to be put on or taken off. “With the medallion, 
Rayona may become Native American rather than African-American” (Owens 
1994: 221). But in this way, through misunderstanding and trivialization of 
the identity issue, Rayona becomes one of the loneliest characters, deprived of 
support from family, tribal community as well as the institution of the church. 
Running away into a neutral territory, Rayona is trying to find out who she 
actually is or could be.
Despite Rayona’s claim that: “It’s as though I’m dreaming a lot of lives 
and I can mix and match the parts into something new each time,” (Dorris 
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1987: 80) she is not really mixing but trying on different identities in order to 
fit in. For example, she assumes an identity of a white middle-class, spoiled 
daughter. Finally though, she realizes that in order to come to terms with 
herself and the things that happened to her, she must return. Paradoxically, 
she achieves a position within the reservation when she, dressed up as Foxy, 
her main abuser, triumphs at a rodeo. Masking her gender and ethnicity and 
thus, for the sake of the rodeo ride, passing as her full blood male cousin, 
Rayona challenges the community’s assumptions and their stereotypes about 
racial identity. By becoming a “rodeo queen,” actually receiving a prize “for 
the roughest, toughest, clumsiest cowboy” (Dorris 1987: 112), Rayona wins 
her position in the reservation community.
Still, Rayona seems to be connecting with only one part of her identity, the 
Indian part, and not with her African-American heritage and thus rather than 
mixing different parts of her dual heritage, she, like the other characters, makes 
her either/ or choice and claims only one part of her origin.
The last character to be mentioned is an example of a new, postmodern 
and thus no longer either/or approach to self-identification and ethnic identity. 
It is Vivian Twostar from Dorris’s and Erdrich’s postmodern novel The Crown 
of Columbus. Vivian’s quest for identity in no longer the making of a choice 
between her inherited cultures, as it was the case with the previous characters; 
she is truly mixing and recombining her heritages. Vivian Twostar characterizes 
her heritage as “a mixed bag of New and Old Worlds” (Dorris and Erdrich 
1991: 11). Vivian is the genuine personification of a melting pot. She explains:
I belong to the lost tribe of mixed bloods, that hodgepodge amalgam of hue and 
cry that defies easy placement. When the DNA of my various ancestors - Irish 
and Coeur d’Alene and French and Navajo and God knows what else - combined 
to form me, the result was not some genteel, undecipherable puree that comes 
from a Cuisinart. You know what they say on the side of the Bisquick box, under 
instruction for pancakes? Mix with fork. Leave lumps. That was me.
(Dorris and Erdrich 1991: 124)
As Farrell points out, “ethnic identity for Dorris and Erdrich is always compli­
cated and shifting because many of their characters play many different roles 
in the fragmented, postmodem environment they move in” (1999: 124). To 
borrow David McCrone’s phrase, they “wear their identities lightly” (1992: 
195) in which way they may be seen as variations on the Native American 
trickster topos. It is not, however, an end in itself but rather a means to one’s 
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survival. Contrary to Cogewea, who experienced her position of a mixed-blood 
as limiting, and to Pauline and Rayona, for whom the dual heritage was painful, 
for Vivian the complex heritage opens many new possibilities and allows for 
a broader perspective. In an interview, Erdrich states that unstable identities en­
able one “to pick and choose and keep and discard” cultural values at will and 
thus one can survive in a world that is so rapidly changing (Bruchac 1987: 79).
Dorris and Erdrich are playful about this part of identity quests in a multi­
cultural, post-modern society - the kind of consumer attitude of choosing and 
purchasing whichever item suits you. On several occasions the Native Ameri­
can or mixed-blood characters eat or prepare ethnic food, as when for example 
Vivian’s son Nash is eating “a bean burrito for dinner” (1991: 110). It reflects 
the fact that multiculturalism works best at the level of popular culture and 
life style. We wear ethnically marked clothes or accessories, eat ethnic food, 
and watch films about diverse cultures. While at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, as John Cawelti claims, popular culture still continued to foster white 
Anglo-American hegemony, in the last decades we can witness a strong “ten­
dency toward mixing and overlapping of hitherto separate ethnic traditions” 
(Cawelti 1996: 14). Popular culture is “increasingly attuned to recombinations 
of traditional heritages” and the new media including the Internet, make “pos­
sible types of diversity and recombination that would have been unimaginable 
during the 1950s and 1960s” (Cawelti 1996: 15).
There are many instances of this mixing and recombination in the novel. 
For example, Vivian and her son Nash attend together a karate course and adopt 
some of the “Asian wisdom” involved in it. However, before each karate class 
session they add their own ritual - they recite a “portion of the Navajo Blessing 
Way” (Dorris and Erdrich 1991:113) thus mixing together similarly functioning 
elements of their own Native American culture and Asian tradition. In the same 
way, when birthing, Vivian goes to a regular maternity hospital but takes with 
her a cloth bag that Grandma made for the occasion, filled with herbs Navajos 
traditionally associated with giving birth (1991: 92). In the culminating scenes 
of the novel when the lost treasure of Christopher Columbus is rediscovered, 
aspects of diverse cultures are consciously brought together and commented 
on by the novel’s narrator:
The world has become a small place, all parts connected, where an [American] 
Indian [hand wrapped in a clean white diaper] using an ancient Asian art can break 
into an old European box, witnessed by someone who grew up in Australia.
(Dorris and Erdrich 1991: 369)
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In the character of Vivian, the novel illustrates well the paradigmatic shift 
in the acceptance of ethnicity within American culture - the contemporary 
celebration and the fashionable going ethnic.
Perhaps the process of defining American identity has come full circle 
- because Vivian’s heritage is so complex, she can no longer be labeled by 
a hyphenated descriptor. She can only be called American. It may confirm what 
de Crevecoeur suggested and some earlier proponents of cultural pluralism 
believed - that being American is, in fact, being of mixed origin and thus there 
is no need for any hyphens to describe Americans’ identity.
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Instilling the Sentiment: The Poetic Philosophy 
of Ralph Waldo Emerson
Ralph Waldo Emerson did not leave behind himself a consistent philosophical 
system. His contribution to American, and not only American, philosophy and 
literature is of different nature. Irwin Edman (1951: v) in his introduction to 
Emerson’s Essays writes that he does not read Emerson professionally. “For 
disclosures of the nature and signature of things,” he says, “I prefer, on the 
whole, more explicit, more literal, and more analytic thinkers.” Emerson indeed 
is neither explicit nor analytic, which is one of the reasons why he enjoys the 
reputation of a difficult philosopher. Still Edman (1951: v) admits that he does 
read Emerson, and he reads him because Emerson is “the thoughtful writer of 
prose which has, without any of the more patent devices of verse, the magical 
effects of poetry.”
In certain respects, Emerson is a complete failure as a philosopher. This 
is the result of his open hostility towards systematic thinking. Emerson’s aunt 
is recorded to have said that no Emerson “is capable of deep investigation or 
of long continued thought,” which some consider “the profoundest comment 
on her nephew” (Buell 1975: 45).
A good illustration of Emerson’s failure as a systematic thinker is his 
introduction to Nature. In his introduction Emerson (2006: I 5-6) sets out to 
clarify the basic terms employed in the treatise, most importantly the very 
term nature, which, as we all know, is capable of having manifold meanings. 
The most interesting passage is the last paragraph of the introduction, and it 
runs as follows:
Philosophically considered, the universe is composed of Nature and the Soul. 
Strictly speaking, therefore, all that is separate from us, all which Philosophy 
distinguishes as the NOT ME, that is, both nature and art, all other men and my 
own body, must be ranked under this name, NATURE. In enumerating the values 
of nature and casting up their sum, I shall use the word in both senses; - in its 
common and its philosophical import. In inquiries so general as our present one, 
the inaccuracy is not material; no confusion of thought will occur. Nature, in the 
common sense, refers to essences unchanged by man; space, the river, the leaf. Art
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is applied to the mixture of his will with the same things, as in a house, a canal, 
a statue, a picture. But his operations taken together are so insignificant, a little 
chipping, baking, patching, and washing, that in an impression so grand as that of 
the world of the human mind, they do not vary the result.
Emerson’s definition of nature is strangely circular. Nature is nature plus art 
(“both nature and art [...] must be ranked under this name, NATURE”). This 
is quite confusing, even though Emerson explains that this is not the same 
nature. He speaks of nature in the philosophical (“the NOT ME”) and the 
common import (“essences unchanged by man”). And yet, for no apparent 
reason, graphically Emerson distinguishes at least three, and in some editions 
even four, different kinds of nature: there is Nature (with an initial capital), 
NATURE (in capitals), and (ordinary) nature. This is definitely more than is 
needed, especially that shortly afterwards he announces that anyway, he will 
use the word both in its philosophical and common sense. He claims that the 
difference between the two exists but it is so little that, in fact, it does not exist 
(“his [man’s] operations taken together are so insignificant, a little chipping, 
baking, patching, and washing, that in an impression so grand as that of the 
world of the human mind, they do not vary the result”). Thus the seemingly 
solved problem of the circularity of Emerson’s definition returns. His argument 
may be summarized as follows: Nature in the philosophical import equals 
nature in the common import plus art, but the art element is so insignificant that 
it can be, or even should be, disregarded, so Nature in the philosophical import 
equals nature in the common import. Or to put it even more concisely, Nature 
is nature. Such a definition is at best a tautology. Considering the fruits that it 
bore, Emerson’s great analytical effort seems to have been wasted.
In the passage quoted above Emerson attempts some other definitions of 
nature, which are even more baffling. The tricky thing about Emerson is that 
he introduces entirely new ideas in the disguise of a paraphrase. Thus what in 
the text is presented as merely an elaboration of the original definition is, in 
fact, an entirely new logical proposition, standing in a very dubious relation 
to the previous one.
First nature is defined in contradistinction to the Soul (“Philosophically 
considered, the universe is composed of Nature and the Soul”), from which it 
follows that Nature is the universe bereft of the spiritual element. Nature equals 
the Universe minus the Soul. Then, at the beginning of the very next sentence, 
Emerson defines nature in contradistinction to human beings (Nature is “all that 
is separate form us”), only to reject this definition in the second part of the same 
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sentence (“all other men [...] must be ranked under this name, NATURE”) 
and to define nature in contradistinction to the Self (“all which Philosophy 
distinguishes as the NOT ME”1). Emerson seems to be in two minds as far 
as other people are concerned. He cannot articulate his views clearly because 
his views are far from being clear.
1 This could be an echo of Fichte’s perplexing notion of the “Transcendental Ego.” Still Emerson 
seems to ignore the difference between the transcendental and the ordinary ego.
Emerson’s philosophy is haunted by the suspicion that man lives in the 
world of phantoms created by his own mind. In Nature he indicts solipsism in 
Chapter VII: “It leaves God out of me. It leaves me in the splendid labyrinth 
of my perceptions, to wander without end. Then the heart resists it, because it 
baulks the affections in denying substantive being to men and women” (2006: 
I 64). He struggles to transcend the duality between the soul and the world, the 
duality which he makes elsewhere the cornerstone of his philosophy. For he 
has proudly declared himself an idealist and
[ijdealism saith: matter is a phenomenon, not a substance. Idealism acquaints us 
with the total disparity between the evidence of our own being and the evidence 
of the world’s being. The one is perfect, the other, incapable of any assurance; the 
mind is a part of the nature of things; the world is a divine dream, from which we 
may presently wake to the glories and certainties of day. (2006:1 64)
His doubts seem to be gaining the upper hand in the essay entitled “Friendship,” 
where he declares:
I cannot deny it, O friend, that the vast shadow of the phenomenal includes thee 
also in its pied and painted immensity, - thee also, compared with whom all else is 
shadow. Thou art not Being, as Truth is, as Justice is, - thou art not my soul, but 
a picture and effigy of that. (2006: II 98)
And later he will add: “A friend therefore is a sort of paradox in nature. I who 
alone am, I who see nothing in nature whose existence I can affirm with equal 
evidence to my own, behold now the semblance of my being” (2006: II 205). 
Emerson (2006: III 61) is also the author of the saying: “Let us treat the men 
and women well: treat them as if they were real, perhaps they are,” which is 
probably the most succinct presentation of his views on this matter. Emerson is 
a philosopher who keeps his philosophy in the state of constant doubt.
That is why Emerson’s explanations usually do not explain anything, just 
the opposite, they only make the things more complicated. The introduction to 
Nature is a case in point. Emerson, as if realizing this, finally offers words of 
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comfort to his disturbed readers: “In inquires so general as our present one, the 
inaccuracy is not material; no confusion of thought will occur.” The weakness 
of this position is obvious; details do matter and should not be shoved aside 
that easily, just because they are inconvenient. But in his inability to explain, 
Emerson is similar to the Zen master from the following koan:
THE STUDENT Doko came to a Zen master, and said: “I am seeking the truth. In 
what state of mind should I train myself, so as to find it?”
Said the master, “There is no mind, so you cannot put it in any state. There is no 
truth, so you cannot train yourself for it.”
“If there is no mind to train, and no truth to find, why do you have these monks 
gather before you every day to study Zen and train themselves for this study?” 
“But I haven’t an inch of room here,” said the master, “so how could the monks 
gather? I have no tongue, so how could I call them together or teach them?”
“Oh, how can you lie like this?” asked Doko. “But if I have no tongue to talk to 
others, how can I lie to you?” asked the master. Then Doko said sadly, “I cannot 
follow you. I cannot understand you.”
“I cannot understand myself,” said the master. (“A Collection of Zen Koans”)
This affinity might run deeper. Both Zen and Emerson’s philosophy are ani­
mated by the spirit of rebellion; they are both iconoclastic. Even though Zen 
is commonly referred to as religion, it is a very unusual religious denomi­
nation as it rejects official creeds and religious dogmas. Considering this, it 
may actually be called an “anti-religion.” Similarly, Emerson’s philosophy 
may be described as an anti-philosophy. Emerson rejects the very principles 
of logical thinking.
The whole of Nature is actually a refutation of the definitions from the 
introduction. Emerson does present nature as something possessing spiritual 
characteristics. Nature is discussed as a source of Beauty, Language, and Disci­
pline. He further undermines the validity of the initial statement on the structure 
of the universe (“the universe is composed of Nature and the Soul”) by ques­
tioning the material existence of nature. As has been observed, his idealism 
verges upon solipsism. Emerson (2006: I 48) speculates that nature could be 
“the apocalypse of the mind,” or an image painted “in the firmament of the 
soul.” This would mean that man is not separate from nature but part of it (or 
that nature is part of him). In Chapter VII Emerson (2006: I 65) makes the 
following statement: “[Tjhat spirit, that is, Supreme Being, does not build up 
nature around us, but puts it forth through us, as the life of the tree puts forth 
new branches and leaves through the pores of the old.”
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Emerson rejects his analytical definitions for he finds them too restrain­
ing. He is much more himself when he announces in “History” that “nature 
is a mutable cloud which is always and never the same” (2006: II 14). He 
welcomes paradox and contradiction. In Nature Emerson makes a number of 
contradictory statements. He argues that nature is both the spirit and the matter, 
me and not me, me and other people, God and man, the object and the subject of 
perception, essences unchanged by man and essences changed by man. Nature 
is all this and much more; it is a great riddle. Solving this riddle would mean 
finding the answers to all important questions. Nature is the mysterious Over­
soul, in which all opposites are reconciled. It is unity underlying the seeming 
diversity of the created world. For differences exist only on the surface. This 
is what the juxtaposition of the contradictory definitions of nature might imply. 
Definitions feed on differences; if differences are only seeming differences, and 
the true reality is an all pervading oneness, then to differentiate and to define 
is a sheer waste of time. Everything is everything. If one analyzes, one refuses 
to acknowledge this spiritual truth.
Emerson never analyzes, he synthesizes. He does not want to divide but to 
unite. Ultimately, he wants to transcend all petty differences and distinctions, 
and reach the oneness of the ideal world, the real world.
One of the greatest paradoxes of Emerson’s philosophy is that this Platonic 
thinker inspired the philosophical tradition which is avowedly anti-Platonist 
and anti-metaphysical. And yet this is not an accident that such a philosopher 
as Frederick Nietzsche studied Emerson carefully and was deeply moved by 
his writing.2 It may be true that all texts deconstruct themselves but still there 
are texts that deconstruct themselves more than others do. Emerson’s essays 
belong to this category. Emerson’s aim is incommensurate with his method. 
His language runs counter to his argument.
2 For the account of Nietzsche’s studies of Emerson see Thomas H. Brojber Nietzsche’s Philo­
sophical Context. An Intellectual Biography (University of Illinois Press 2008), where Emerson 
opens the list of the major philosophical influences on Nietzsche’s thinking (22-25). For a more 
detailed comparison of the two philosophies see David Mikics’s The Romance of Individualism in 
Emerson and Nietzsche (Ohio University Press 2003)
The problem has been already identified by Charles Feidelson, Jr (1962: 
147),
What is extraordinary about Emerson’s writings is the way in which the problems he 
tried to ignore rose up again to dog him, lending a richer texture and content to his 
work. His flagrant inconsistency and the paradoxicality that he could never exclude 
from his theory were the product of his encounter with the making of literature and 
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with the claims of diversity upon every concrete fact. What is even more important 
is the seminal effect of his point of view, or the kind of thinking illustrated by it: 
the way his facile generalizations, which were intended as philosophical answers, 
communicated a new set of questions to the literary mind. While he spoke of the 
world as two only in order to suggest how it might be one, he thereby acknowledged 
a duality which is no less real because it is conquered in each instant of poetic speech.
The Emersonian cosmic vision of unity-in-diversity is also, at the same time, 
the vision of diversity-in-unity. Consider the following passage from Emer­
son’s journal,
The metamorphosis of Nature shows itself in nothing more than this that there is 
no word in our language that cannot become typical to us of Nature by giving it 
emphasis. The world is a Dancer; it is a Rosary; it is a Torrent; it is a Boat; a mist; 
a Spider’s Snare; it is what you will; and the metaphor will hold, & will give the 
imagination keen pleasure. Swifter than light the world converts into that thing you 
name. (I960: VIII 23; qtd. in Buell 1975: 170)
Feidelson (qtd. in Buell 1975:170) sees this passage as “a spontaneous dance of 
self-determining and autonomous symbols” that leads to “a literary anarchy.” 
Emerson abandons logical connectives, producing thus a volley of images. As 
Feidelson (1962: 151) notices, “The house of Rhetoric is built without logical 
mortar.” There is definitely more diversity than unity to this catalogue. The 
world is at the same time a dancer, rosary, torrent, boat, mist, and spider’s 
snare. As these images flash before our eyes, we cannot help but conclude that 
the world is constantly in the state of becoming. Nothing is stable, nothing 
is predetermined, everything changes. The world is a myriad of perceptions, 
and the truth, if there is such a thing as the truth, is bound to be subjective - it 
depends on the perceiver. The truth is what you will. The poet - the sayer creates 
the truth by creating metaphors. The truth is made rather than discovered; the 
world obediently converts into the thing the poet names, as if acknowledging 
the superiority of the poet’s will. I wouldn’t say that this is what the text 
implies; I’d say that this is what it explicitly states, even though it does not 
sound like Emerson the Metaphysician, or even Emerson the Idealist. It sounds 
very much like Nietzsche, the Prophet of Will and Becoming. Passages like this 
one, Nietzsche might have copied verbatim from Emerson.
Emerson is frequently caught arguing against his professed idealism. This 
is on the one hand due to a certain contradiction in his views, and on the other 
due to the language that he uses, and also his attitude towards language in 
general. Relativism is a corollary of subjectivity, which is in turn a corollary of 
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individualism. Thus it is small wonder than since Emerson argues for extreme 
individualism, sometimes he finds himself arguing for relativism, including 
moral relativism. In “Self-reliance” he declares, “’[I]f I am the devil’s child, 
I will live then from the devil.’ No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature. 
Good and bad are but names readily transferable to that or this; the only right is 
what is after my constitution; the only wrong what is against it” (2006: II 51). 
Emerson empowers the individual by giving him the right to decide what is right 
and wrong, and what is true and false. For Emerson the truth is not something 
that emerges in the process of logical argumentation. It is rather like a flash of the 
lightning. You see it, and you know. Hence in Nature he states, “Whenever a true 
theory appears, it will be its own evidence” (2006: I 5). A statement like this 
makes the whole philosophy and philosophizing redundant. We are reminded of 
Swift’s intelligent horses, who laughed when Gulliver tried to explain to them 
human systems of natural philosophy (1967: 315). When the truth is obvious, 
it is obvious, and there is no need to write about it. Emerson’s proposition will 
be echoed in Whitman’s poetry. The speaker of “Song of Myself’ will boldly 
state, “And what I assume you shall assume” (1955: 49).
Emerson always perceived himself more as a poet than a philosopher. In the 
letter to his future second wife Lydia Jackson, he writes, “I am bom a poet, of 
a low class without doubt, yet a poet. That is my nature & vocation” (2003: 24). 
As a poet, he believes that language is something more that a merely passive 
tool that one uses to describe what is and what is not. He empowers language 
along with the individual. The poet -.the sayer is capable of deciding what is 
true and what is false. He can do so as long as his metaphors influence people’s 
hearts. Thus truth appears to be a function of language. Obviously, this is not 
what Emerson explicitly says, but what he does say comes very close to it. 
The beginning of “Self-Reliance” is a very lucid presentation of the program 
of Emerson’s poetic philosophy:
I read the other day some verses written by an eminent painter which were original 
and not conventional. Always the soul hears an admonition in such lines, let the 
subject be what it may. The sentiment they instill is of more value than any thought 
they may contain. To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for 
you in your private heart is true for all men, - that is genius. Speak your latent 
conviction and it shall be universal sense. (2006: II 46)
And this is why Emerson neither explains nor analyzes, but stuns and inspires. 
Emerson, a former preacher, appeals to his readers’ emotions rather than the 
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rational faculty. The strength of his argument lies in the strength of his images 
and metaphors.
It has been argued that Emerson’s style is a natural extension of his meta­
physical project. Emerson believes “that there is no fact in nature that does 
not carry the whole sense of nature,” that “the entire system of things gets 
represented in every particle” (Feidelson 1962: 151), and that all nature is a vis­
ible garment for the spiritual truth. Thus he validates his use of symbol and 
synecdoche. He also says that nature is “one thing and the other thing, in the 
same time,” justifying his reliance on metaphor (Feidelson 1962: 151). And 
since metaphor points to a secret similarity between two seemingly dissimilar 
objects, all these tropes may be viewed as means of reinforcing the message 
of the all pervading oneness. And yet at the same time they resist and subvert 
this message. Both metaphor and symbol tend to multiply the meanings, ap­
proaching dangerously the trope of irony. They always contain a certain surplus 
of meaning and suggest the inexpressible other, for which there is no room in 
the perfectly monistic system.
In this way Emerson comes very close to Nietzsche’s ideal discourse, the 
discourse which “seduces, tempts, forces, overturns.” This is, as Nietzsche 
(1998: 149) says, the discourse of “bom enemies of logic and straight lines, 
desirous of the foreign, the exotic, the monstrous, the crooked, and the self­
contradictory.”
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The Jewish Other Half: Girlhood on the Lower 
East Side as Presented in Immigrant Narratives
“I was learning good English, I was reading and with the trait of my race 
for adaptability I was quickly learning the ways of this country” (Cohen 1995: 
256). The words of Rahel/Ruth/Rose Gollup explain the cultural transition from 
a childhood in Tsarist Russia to an adulthood in America, abruptly thrust on 
the shoulders of a maturing girl. This paper traces the construction of a fe­
male Jewish American identity. With the use of Critical Discourse Analysis, 
it compares two works of first-generation immigrant women coming of age in 
New York’s Lower East Side: Bread Givers (1925) by Anzia Yezierska and 
Out of the Shadow (1918) by Rose Cohen, an autobiographical novel and an 
autobiography, respectively.
To begin, it is worth considering the women writers’ cultural subjectivities. 
The beginnings of their life stories seem representative of countless nameless 
Jewish immigrant women populating the Lower East Side. Both were bom in 
the western reaches of Russia in the early 1880s, immigrated to the USA in their 
young teenage years together with their large families, toiled in New York’s 
sweatshops and tried domestic service. They were highly sensitive about gender 
- and zealous about education. They mastered English, and their quaint, local 
color - Yiddish vernacular was appreciated by the mainstream audience. Cohen 
and Yezierska reached the height of their careers in the turbulent 1920s. Cohen, 
however, never achieved the educational accomplishment or nationwide promi­
nence that Yezierska enjoyed. In mature adulthood the course of Yezierska’s 
life sharply diverted from the ordinary experience of Jewish womanhood at 
that time, through her flirtation with Hollywood and the American artistic elite. 
Cohen’s life, in contrast, was cut short at the age of 45, possibly by suicide. 
In the late 20th century both Cohen’s and Yezierska’s works were republished, 
yet only the latter became a bright star in the firmament of American ethnic 
writers. As put by Thomas Dublin (1995: xviii), Cohen “has come ‘Out of the 
Shadow,’ but it is clear that she has not fully entered into the light.”
Incidentally, the lives of the two Lower East side residents intersected 
on both factual and fictitious planes. As discovered by Dublin, Yezierska in-
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corporated into her 1927 short story, “Wild Winter Love,” a 1922 New York 
Times report of a suicide attempt by “a Rose Cohen, 40,” who plunged into the 
East River. The protagonist of the story, Ruth, wrestles with the responsibili­
ties of immigrant family life and a desire to write her autobiography. Having 
authored Out of the Ghetto, she achieves success, which estranges her from 
her tailor husband. Then she falls into the arms of a Gentile lover, and even­
tually commits suicide. By now it is impossible to completely separate fact 
from fiction in this story to know to what degree it reflects Cohen’s biography 
(Dublin 1995: xv-xvi).
Bread Givers and Out of the Shadow portray Sara Smolinsky and Ra- 
hel/Ruth Gollup, eldest daughters, in their rebellion against the Old-Country 
values and lifestyle. Sara struggles against the virtual tyranny and abuse of 
the children on the part of the Orthodox father. Ruth’s attitude, however, has 
more complex twists. Upon arrival in the New World, she is determined not to 
lose any of her religious zeal and outward expressions of faith, and the swift 
Americanization of her once pious father shocks her. But as Ruth grows up, 
the American environment bears its stamp on her and she becomes the family’s 
agent of modernity, persuading her mother to cast aside her wig, encourag­
ing her to read fiction, and eventually disobeying her father on the matter of 
marriage. Both girls are mesmerized by what America offers. Yet, they have 
different ambitions. Sara is determined to live independently and become “a fin­
ished teacherin." Ruth’s prospects are not as definite; it is only implied that 
she desired some kind of social advancement earned with her own effort, not 
just a comfortable position through marriage. More importantly, the heroines 
pursue a common dream: to find romantic love outside the confines of tradition. 
They are out for a spiritual union of soul mates, not a financial deal or a social 
contract. Ruth is not afraid of marrying a Christian convert, and Sara makes an 
even further departure from her culture by becoming Gentile’s wife. Finally, 
having realized their romantic and professional pursuits, both young women 
reconcile with their heritage and with a new conscience embrace things Jewish. 
To cut the story short, they leave their homes, families, and people in order to 
love them in the end. Ruth describes her identity quest in the following words:
now that I had a glimpse of the New World, a revolution took place in my whole 
being. I was filled with a desire to get away from the whole old order of things. And 
I went groping about blindly, [...]. And then [...] a little light came to me and I was 
able to see that the Old World was not all dull and the new was not all glittering. And 
then I was able to stand between the two, with a hand in each. (Cohen 1995: 246)
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As far as their chosen place in American society is concerned, Sara Smolin- 
sky has a far more definite outlook and priorities than Ruth Gollup. Perhaps it 
is connected with the genres containing different kinds of the autobiographical 
gaze. Cohen, writing directly about herself, seems to find it difficult to char­
acterize herself as decisively. We learn that she looks beyond the sweatshop, 
saying, “Surely this would not end there. Would this be all I would see of 
that other world outside of Cherry Street? And she waited from day to day” 
(Cohen 1995: 247). Ruth’s ambiguous identity is also manifested in her names, 
which is not the case of Sara. Bom Rahel, she still went by that name at home, 
in America. In her “greenhorn” days, she was involuntarily named Ruth by 
her boss’s Americanized wife, who advised that she should take a less cliched 
Jewish name, and it became the name of her autobiographical persona in public 
dealings, also in the Anglo context. This dichotomous identity underscores the 
distinction between the private and the public, and the Old, and New World as 
well. Rose, a name yet further removed from the Jewish tradition, is the one 
that is used by the author herself. Thus Cohen’s identity is clearly split.
For Sara and Ruth, “America” stands for a promise of a more affluent and 
happier existence, in contrast to the dreary experience of Hester Street. Both 
novels employ the notion of “America” as a banner-word, which is flashed 
to the readers on numerous occasions and has the function of a cognitive 
trigger with highly compressed meaning. Another such rhetorical device is 
the word Americanerin sneeringly used by Reb Smolinsky when speaking of 
his disobedient daughter. When used by Sara, the statement “I am American” 
(Yezierska 1975: 138) compresses a totally different set of ideas and explains 
her whole rebellion in the briefest way. Cohen ends her autobiography by 
quoting her now accomplished father: “After all this is America” (1995: 313), 
where she consciously uses the figurative construct promoting the American 
Dream. Banner-words are also used in Sara’s text: “He was the Old World. 
I was the New” (Yezierska 1975: 207). This conflict is further suggested by the 
use of a simile, which also carries a compressed meaning: the father is called 
“a tyrant more terrible than the Tsar from Russia” (Yezierska 1975: 65), while 
Sara, setting off to college, compares herself to Columbus “starting out for the 
end of the earth” (Yezierska 1975: 209). Here the spatial and temporal divide 
emphasizes emotional distance.
The two writers also use the rhetorical reversal of the American Dream 
in order to underscore the split in their families. The Americanized daughters 
eventually experience comfort and social recognition, while their parents live 
the lives of want and destitution. Yezierska eventually sends the rabbi father 
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onto the street peddling for pennies. Ruth’s family goes through years of hard­
ship, always on the verge of unemployment, homelessness and starvation. In 
the end, they achieve a relative success, with father opening a small but prosper­
ous family-run grocery and the eldest son, a would-be-rabbi, graduating from 
Columbia University as a teacher. Mrs. Gollup and Mrs. Smolinsky definitely 
do not share the American Dream as both are worn out by physical exhaustion 
and worry. Sara’s mother experienced only loss upon her arrival. Ironically, she 
claims to have been much better off back in Russia, “Who’d believe me, here 
in America, where I have to bargain by the pushcarts over a penny that I once 
had it so plenty in my father’s house?” (Yezierska 1975: 30). She concludes 
on the sentimental note, “There ain’t in America such beautiful things like we 
had at home” (Yezierska 1975: 33). Upon arrival in America, the Gollups be­
came deprived of whatever modest traces of affluence they had possessed back 
in Russia; now, instead of a fine brass Sabbath candlestick, they have to use 
a brick to hold candles, not to mention the broken and incomplete furniture, or 
the succession of shabbier and shabbier lodgings.
In this way, Yezierska and Cohen rhetorically undermine the long-standing 
myth of America as a Promised Land, a paradise offering all virtues and wealth 
to all its inhabitants, in opposition to Europe and its allegedly corrupt envi­
ronment. Both authors nostalgically remember the open, sunny fields and fresh 
air of their European childhoods, the abundance of simple, nutritious food, and 
good health. In America, teenage Ruth develops anemia, which drains all her 
strength and repeatedly confines her to bed for months. Sara, who works and 
studies tirelessly, living virtually on nothing, displays no major health condition 
probably only thanks to her innate stamina. Yet, there is a different America, 
and both Cohen and Yezierska reveal its rewards to the readers. Sara recounts 
her college entry as the passing of the gates of Eden, “But know I came to a town 
of quiet streets, shaded with green trees. No crowds, no tenements. No hurrying 
noise to beat the race of the hours. Only a leisured quietness whispered in the air: 
Peace. Be still. Eternal time is all before you” (Yezierska 1975: 210). Ruth finds 
a similar paradisiacal refuge in a Connecticut retreat established for immigrant 
children, where she worked and recuperated during successive summers. Cohen 
writes, “I walked among the tress. [...]. The leaves touched my face and I stood 
still. The quiet seemed to surround me and every now and then there was a twit, 
a rustle, and overhead the sky shone blue. [...]. In the house too it seemed as if 
I were living in a fairy tale” (Cohen 1995: 262). A clear-cut distinction between 
the immigrant and Anglo settings is evident here, and only those privileged to 
enter the inner circle can drink from America’s fountain of youth.
THE JEWISH OTHER HALF: GIRLHOOD ON THE LOWER EAST SIDE ... 297
New York City at the turn of 19th and 20th century was the largest metropo­
lis in the US, and its Jewish population made a huge cultural impact. A guide­
book from the period, The Sidewalks of New York, described the Lower East 
Side in the following way, “the enormous area east of the Bowery and south 
of 1 Oth Street, which [...] is almost exclusively Jewish.” One could encounter 
there “Yiddish signs, Yiddish newspapers Yiddish beards and wigs” (Rose Co­
hen 2003). The Jewish enclave was also probably the world’s most densely 
populated urban neighborhood at that time. In the words of Abraham Cahan, 
the district “covers a comparatively small area, something less than half a square 
mile, wherein is crowded a little city of its own, the ghetto, with a population 
of 500,000 souls. Half a million men, women, and children, almost exclusively 
Polish and Russian Hebrews” (qtd. in Rose Cohen 2003). Jacob Riis writes in 
his How the Other Half Lives,
The homes of the Hebrew quarter are its workshops also. [...] You are made fully 
aware of it before you have travelled the length of a single block in any of these East 
End streets, by the whirr of a thousand sewing-machines, worked at high pressure 
from earliest dawn until mind and muscle give out together. Every member of the 
family, from the youngest to the oldest, bears a hand, shut in the qualmy rooms, 
where meals are cooked and clothing washed and dried besides, the livelong day. 
It is not unusual to find a dozen persons - men, women and children - at work in 
a single room. (1971:88)
In numerous first-hand accounts of the immigrant “other half,” New York is 
hardly the Promised Land. It is neither Yezierska’s nor Cohen’s autobiographies 
that became the paradigm of the genre. Unlike Mary Antin, they experience 
initial repulsion to New York City and its citizens (Muir 2000: 7). Accord­
ing to Lisa Muir, Yezierska and Cohen strive to “‘expose’ their ethnicity to 
a dominant group that was blind to its own clannishness. They hold up their 
own ethnic group status as one for contemplation rather than revulsion” (Muir 
2000: 8). The strategy of differentiation is used by Yezierska to emphasize the 
distance between America’s newcomers and her native citizens. On election 
day, Sara’s sister says, “They say work can’t start till they got a new president” 
(Yezierska 1975: 2), and repeatedly uses the pronoun to refer to “the other 
half.” Interestingly, Cohen also remembers an election night, but her account 
is ridden with terror. It is used to underscore her and her people’s status as 
outcasts of the second degree, their existence as outlaws, and their exclusion 
and marginalization even within the ethnic ghetto. When “Americans” are cel­
ebrating their democratic ways, the immigrant girl is numb with fear caused 
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by the assaults of the Irish claiming a privileged status. The worst nightmares 
of persecution come alive again, now in the shade of the Statue of Liberty. 
Ruth explains, “I had grown used to seeing strange Jews mistreated whenever 
they happened to come to our village in Russia. But after election night I felt 
differently” (Cohen 1995: 104).
Ruth and Sara face not only a social gap between their fellow country­
men and Anglo-Saxons, with their quiet ways and elegant appearance, but also 
experience a chasm between the generations of the Jewish Americans. This 
can be observed through the use of the strategy of differentiation into “us” 
and “them.” This potent rhetorical tool, just as banner-words, is symbolically 
irrefutable because it rests on the relationship of familiarity, it is indetermi­
nate, and it limits the audience’s perception of choices (Paine 1981: 17). Sara 
differentiates herself not only from her parents but also from her less willful 
sisters. She cries, “Thank God I’m living in America! You made the lives of 
the other children! I’m going to make my own life!” (Yezierska 1975: 138). 
Also by the juxtaposition of social actors, Yezierska achieves the effect of 
differentiation. She writes, “I began to feel I was different from my sisters” 
(1975: 65), and throughout the story she builds a virtual wall separating the 
experiences and personalities of the girls. In the end, Sara reflects, “Sitting side 
by side with them [...] I felt stranger to them than if I had passed them in 
Hester Street” (Yezierska 1975: 214, emphasis mine). Ruth, the daughter of 
a tailor, in turn, writes unabashedly about her “blinding dislike for the whole 
class of tailors” (Cohen 1995: 247). She distances herself further from her 
people by stating, “I could never quite be a part of the filth I had absorbed” 
(Cohen 1995: 275). It is through her exposure to mainstream America at the 
Settlement, a hospital - which led her to reading the New Testament, strug­
gling through Shakespeare, and attending night classes - that she develops 
rebellious attitudes: “walking through the street it seemed to me that now 
I did not belong here. I did not feel a part of it all as I did formerly” (Co­
hen 1995: 250).
Both Ruth and Sara feel a sense of empowerment and pride at now being 
able to read in English and participate in the larger cultural exchange by entering 
“the rival cultural discourse,” to use William Boelhower’s term (1987: 50). 
Reading becomes a tool of enculturation as well as a manifestation of rebellious 
attitudes for both Jewish women. Their ancient tradition has made them well- 
acquainted with the narrative form through Biblical stories. Now they move 
beyond the confines of tradition, which becomes a liberating experience. As 
noted by Muir,
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Taking up the pen not only separated women from the Jewish community, but 
as immigrants, Jews, and women with working-class backgrounds, they could be 
“quadruply marginal” to American society as well. Frequently forced to live outside 
of society at large, and without a command of the English language, the women 
wrestled with their own silence. (2000: 8)
For Ruth and Sara, reading takes center stage in their lives, and they experience 
the dire reality around them through the textual lens. Ruth is also overpow­
ered by narration; she confesses to “making up stories for herself,” seemingly 
devoid of any meaning, but in fact, helpful in explaining the world around 
her (Cohen 1995: 197). She is also captivated by the autobiographical “I” as 
she mentions, “the simplicity of the intimate tone of the first person” (Cohen 
1995: 190). Ruth builds her new identity around the written word and cannot 
accept the situation when her suitor does not share her enthusiasm for edu­
cation. Writing letters later becomes a form of passionate romance with an 
educated Americanized Jew as well as a manifestation of her rebellion against 
the father, who “commanded [her] to drop writing the letters” (Cohen 1995: 
320). Similarly, Sara’s romance and marriage to her principal from work also 
starts around the word: the accomplished teacher instructing his young adept 
how to pronounce English words.
The women characters in Yezierska’s and Cohen’s writings are typically 
passivized and impersonalized by their fathers, to use CDA terminology again. 
Suffice it to say that Reb Smolinsky boasts of marrying off two of his daughters 
in one day, of course in the traditional way, without taking their opinion into 
account. And this is what Sara rebels against. She resolves, “to marry myself to 
a man that’s a person, I must first make myself for a person” (Yezierska 1975: 
172). To personalize the heroine, and thus differentiate her from her sisters, 
Yezierska consistently uses the active voice as well as the words make and per­
son when referring to Sara. Ruth’s father is nearly successful in his attempts to 
strike a match between Ruth and a financially secure grocer, thereby conform­
ing to Jewish customs. Interestingly, the traditional and formalized courtship 
ceremonies, which can be seen as a rite of passage, become an occasion for Ruth 
to assert her separate identity for the first time. After her family have chosen 
her future husband, Ruth remembers that during the preparations, “The choice 
was left entirely to me for the first time. [...] I chose a pretty pair of shoes 
and saw they were the right size” (Cohen 1995: 212). In Ruth’s case, her shoes 
are a simile of her social role. Prior to that, her father always made her grow 
into her shoes. She writes about her first pair of American shoes that took her 
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through her first immigrant years of struggle, “My shoes [...]- already worn 
out and still too large for me” (Cohen 1995: 125). Now, socially recognized 
as an adult, she has enough willpower to say no to her father. In contrast, her 
brother, who hates his old-country shoes and demands “American shoes,” is 
less hesitant about his own position and chooses to “fling them from a strange 
roof’ (Cohen 1995: 191) so he would never be able to find them again, even 
if his father makes him. Importantly, in the final chapters of her Out of the 
Shadow, Cohen throws herself back into twilight, casting the spotlight on her 
accomplished brother and father, thus giving way to men.
In the end, strikingly, the heroines arrive at the same understanding of their 
position in the family. After lonely pursuits of their dreams, they finally become 
reconciled with their fathers. They seem to be able to finally enjoy the best of 
both worlds, living as hyphenated Americans. Both Out of the Shadow and 
Bread Givers have somewhat cliched endings (see Zaborowska 1995: 129-31): 
marriage. Although these unions are of their own choice and against the Jewish 
tradition, ironically, they are not entirely in discord with it. As we are reminded 
by Yezierska in the words of Sara’s father, “It says in the Torah: A woman 
without a man is less than nothing" (1975:270). Eventually, both Ruth and Sara 
conform halfway to this rule. Cohen, however, proposes a more complicated 
relationship to men and America than Yezierska. In this way, the daughter-of- 
the-tenements turned autobiographer stays closer to the social reality of the 
era by unabashedly exposing her own weaknesses and psychological tantrums. 
Yezierska, in turn, “the Cinderella of the Ghetto,” as a novelist offers a nearly 
utopian role-model to follow for her “hungry-hearted” female readers looking 
for bearings in the cultural maize of their new world reality.
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Raymond Chandler and His Ambiguous 
Relationships to Women: A Search for Hidden 
Meanings within His Crime Novels
Raymond Chandler (1888-1959) is recognized today as one of the greats of 
American crime fiction. In the “hard-boiled” pattern of Dashiell Hammett, he 
is often described as a realistic writer of the American scene in the 1940s. 
And a dark vision it is, filled with betrayal and dishonesty, wherein even the 
protagonist is not a hero. A Chandler detective may have more integrity than 
the other characters in the story, but not that much more. His clients have 
hidden agendas and devious motives, especially the women. None are pure, 
some even are diabolical and evil.
Chandler began writing crime fiction in his mid-forties, but had been writ­
ing poetry and essays since his college days in England (MacShane 1976: 23). 
He modeled his first crime stories on those of Dashiell Hammett, whose writing 
he admired, and sought to have them published in Black Mask, a very suc­
cessful “pulp” magazine where Hammett also published some of his fiction 
(MacShane 1976: 48-49).
His first published short story was “Blackmailers Don’t Shoot,” which he 
later described as “pure pastiche” (MacShane 1976: 51). In 1939, after five 
years of writing short stories for various pulps, he produced his first novel, The 
Big Sleep (MacShane 1976: 61; Freeman 2007:174-175,177). Six more novels 
followed {Farewell, My Lovely, 1940; The High Window, 1942; The Lady in the 
Lake, 1943; The Little Sister, 1949; The Long Goodbye, 1954; Playback, 1958), 
and in his lifetime three collections of his short stories also were compiled (The 
Simple Art of Murder, 1950; Trouble Is My Business, 1950; Pick-up on Noon 
Street, 1953). Another short story collection, Killer in the Rain (1964), was 
released posthumously. His last novel, unfinished when he died in 1959, was 
Poodle Springs, later completed by Robert Parker with the permission of the 
Chandler estate (1989). Parker later wrote a sequel, Perchance to Dream (1991).
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Although widely hailed for his almost brutal realism, as the co-authors 
have previously demonstrated (Kania 2000a; 2000b; Kania and Pervushina 
2003), his works lack realism in one dimension in particular, that relating to 
gender. In the depiction of women both as crime victims and crime perpetrators, 
especially the latter, his fictional cases show an unmistakable gender bias. 
Actual American crime statistics show a slightly higher rate of victimization 
of women than is shown in Chandler’s novels (Bureau of Justice Statistics 
1996). More importantly, other American crime statistics (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics 1999) show a much lower incidence of women as criminal offenders 
than Chandler’s novels suggest.
In the examination of assailants and victims in Chandler’s novels previously 
reported by the co-authors (Kania and Pervushina 2003), we calculated that 
80% of his fictional violent criminal offenders are male, and 20% female, 
omitting one unknown assailant. Thus violent women are the assailants at 
a level disproportionately higher in Chandler’s works, 20% (20 of 102). This 
is almost twice the frequency found in the official U.S. crime statistics (11%) 
and more than twice the frequency in the novels of his literary model, Dashiell 
Hammett (8%). Chandler’s 20% female assailants clearly exceed the expected 
level of violence to be attributed to women, whether that expectation be based 
on reality or on modeling from Hammett.
Not only does he write of women as killers at a higher frequency that official 
statistics show, he makes multiple murderers of Velma Valento in Farewell, My 
Lovely, Carmen Stemwood in The Big Sleep and Mildred Haviland in Lady in 
the Lake, writing at a time when female serial killers were exceptionally rare.
For the scholar inclined toward a psychological vein of literary analysis, 
this invites a sincere inquiry into his state of mind regarding women. Did 
Chandler actually think that women were more dangerous than they are in real 
life? Did he anticipate or experience violent behavior in the women he knew? 
Did Chandler fear women in general?
Because Chandler (2000:20,52) claims to have written with a spontaneous, 
improvisational style, it is unlikely that he deliberately chose to over-emphasize 
women offenders in his novels and short stories, or to cast Marlowe’s relation­
ship with women in any particular way. Yet he did, and so we may suspect 
that he did so unconsciously. Thus it is his unconscious motivations which we 
hope to explore in the current analysis.
Women in his stories are often portrayed as both attractive and attracted, 
perhaps even over-attracted, to Chandler’s characters, Philip Marlow in par­
ticular. They frequently emerge as sensual, over-sexed, sexually aggressive, 
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forward, and even promiscuous. But Marlow is not particularly responsive to 
their attentions. As Sergei Belov explains:
Marlow is an object of women’s attention again and again. It proves that, on the one 
hand, this character is a real man, on the other hand, it reminds the audience that 
a woman can be dangerous if somebody is involved in a passionate affair with her. 
She can harm or even destroy a man. This idea presented an old cliché, a stereotype 
of the American mass consciousness connected with anti-feminism. [...] The genre 
of hard-boiled detective fiction absorbed the philosophy and the code of American 
individualism. In the framework of this genre a woman is viewed as a potential, 
eternal source of evil. That is why in many hard-boiled detective novels a woman 
is responsible for all the problems and damages.
(Belov 2003: 12-13, trans. L. Pervushina)1
1 <I>njinn Mapjio CHOBa h CHOBa BbicrynaeT oSbcktom ateHCKoro BUMManus - aoKaaaiejibCTBo 
Toro, HTO OH - «HaCTOBUIHH MJOKHHHa», H B TO Xie BpeMS - HailOMHHaHHe O TOM, HTO ¡KeHIHHHa 
nopoii hccct nonroe.Tb TOMy, kto xoTb KpaeM OKa3aacs 3aaeT Gypefl CTpacTefl. IIocneaHee - 
iiiTaMn aMepHKaHCKoro co3HaHHJi, OKpameHHoro aHTH<|>eMHHH3MOM. [...] «Kpyroñ aerexTHB», 
nepeHSBinHH cncTeMy Koaexca aweptiKaHCKoro nHanBnayaaH3Ma, ocTaBHa aceHiiiHHy b bcthom 
no.ioipeHHH KaK hctohhhk 3aa, n He caynaiiHO bo mhothx «xpyTbix aeTeKTHBax» eft cyjxaeHO 
HeCTH OCHOBHyiO OTBeTCTBeHHOCTE 3a npHHHHeHHBIH ymep6.
In 1949 Gershon Legman claimed to find evidence of latent homosexuality 
implicit in the Marlowe character, and by implication in Chandler (Abbott 
2002: 75), a claim Chandler disputed directly (Freeman 2007: 163-164). Be 
the charge valid or not, we do believe that Chandler had unresolved issues with 
powerful women, which manifest themselves in his novels.
Chandler wrote in what he described as a “whorehouse style” (2000: 59). 
Yet that expression of his clearly suggests a negative view of some women, 
the working occupants of whorehouses. This negativity toward the sexuality 
of at least some women does not explain why Chandler had, at the very least, 
a subtle, unconscious motivation to portray women as threatening.
Trying to understand why this is so, and why Chandler differs from other 
hard-boiled crime fiction writers on this stylistic point, is open to speculation. 
It could be that Chandler consciously perceived women as more threatening 
than his contemporaries and wrote to accentuate this viewpoint. He may have 
been a latent homosexual as Legman and Abbott suggest. Similarly, owing to 
cynicism, he may have been far less likely to employ the motif of the “damsels 
in distress” under the protection of the modem knight errant, the private eye. 
Alternatively, he simply may have sought to “flip” the pattern of other crime 
novelists of his times to give his mysteries more originality. Perhaps something 
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in his own life experiences revealed itself in his fiction. Determining which 
of these alternative explanations better explains his motivation is a question 
which Chandler scholars need to undertake.
Considering Chandler’s unusual domestic relationships, this bias may sug­
gest a hidden hostility toward or fear of women lurking in this presumed 
“macho” male writer’s personality. Frank MacShane’s biography of Chandler 
(1976) and a more recent biographical study of Chandler by Judith Freeman 
(2007) offer considerable insights into the ambiguous relationships of this major 
American literary figure with the women in his life and in his fiction.
In some ways Chandler appears as a “mamma’s boy.” He lived with his 
mother until her death in 1924. He was thirty-five years of age at her death 
and had never married. Just two weeks later he married Cissy Pascal (Freeman 
2007: 46-47), with whom he had been having an affair for some years, dating 
back to when she was married to another man (MacShane 1976: 32). Cissy was 
eighteen years older than Chandler and had a colorful past history. Supposedly 
a nude model in her youth, her marriage to Chandler was her third. Chandler 
referred to her as “highly sexed” and her letters to him being “pretty hot” 
(Freeman 2007: 64). In 1924, the year of her marriage to Chandler, at fifty- 
three she was still a stunningly attractive woman, but soon her age began to 
show and a series of lingering ailments began to drain her past vitality and 
beauty. In these later years Chandler became more of a caretaker for his invalid 
wife than an equal marriage partner. The relationship began to mirror his past 
relationship with his ailing mother.
Marlowe’s labors in the cause of justice cannot rescue him from his solitude 
and the emptiness of his personal life. The narration is progressively more 
melodramatic and Marlowe is shown as getting more lonely from one tale to 
the next. There is a yearning for some form of fulfillment that life has yet to 
give him. Perhaps that emptiness was manifesting itself in Chandler’s life also 
as the ailing Cissy became less of a lover, partner and companion.
While Marlowe “can keep a safe distance” from some of the women he 
encounters, Belov notes that he is not “made of stone” (2003: 13). He rebuffs 
the sexual overtures of the millionaire’s daughter in The Long Goodbye, and 
does not surrender to the charms of sexually manipulative Velma, whom he 
meets as the dangerously tempting Mrs. Grail in Farewell, My Lovely. But in 
that same novel he finds Ann Riordan more interesting and a spark of romance 
emerges between them in. Their romance fails to develop, but later he falls in 
love with Linda Loring and is contemplating their marriage in his last novel 
Playback. Although he did not finish his last novel, Poodle Springs, its initial 
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chapters and outline portray Marlowe as married, and contentedly so. Thus his 
response to women varies as his perceptions of them varies.
Philip Marlowe varies in another way, as he succumbs to the forces of time, 
aging with the novels. In The Big Sleep (1939) he is in his early thirties, and 
by The Long Goodbye (1954) he is in his late forties. The passage of time, 
contemporary events, and his difficult experiences with crime, criminals and 
clients shape his character and personality. He becomes cynical and sadder 
for it. This aspect of the Marlowe character was superbly presented in the 
film adaptation of Farewell, My Lovely with Robert Mitchum and Charlotte 
Rampling (Dir. Dick Richards. AVCO Embassy Pictures, 1975). Mitchum as 
Marlowe exudes exhaustion, melancholy and despair. In such a mood, it could 
be expected that a man, even if a normally healthy heterosexual, might have 
a depressed libido. But an alternative explanation continues to be raised - that 
women really do not interest Marlowe nor his creator, Chandler.
Megan Abbott (2002), using a deconstructionist approach and expanding 
upon a 1949 critique by Gershon Legman, suggests that questionable behaviors 
in the superficial masculinity of the key Philip Marlowe character hint at his 
latent homosexuality, and by implication latent homosexuality in Chandler. 
Marlowe is suspect because he never succumbs to the sexual temptations of 
the devious women he encounters. But Marlowe is not a clear surrogate for 
Chandler. Also this analysis of Marlowe is flawed. In several of his novels 
he does respond to a woman romantically. Ann Riordan stirs his libido in 
Farewell, My Lovely (1940) but Marlowe fails to take the opportunity of having 
a sexual relationship with her, an event cited to raise doubts about his sexual 
orientation (Freeman 2007: 162). He does court Linda Loring, first met in 
The Long Goodbye (1954) and appearing again in Playback (1958), and it is 
she whom Marlowe was to marry in Poodle Springs (Chandler and Parker 
1989). Marlowe resists the charms of wicked women, misses an opportunity 
to seduce the honorable Ann Riordan, but surrenders to true love and romance 
with Linda Loring. Thus our analysis does not concur with the implication of 
an exclusive, latent homosexual orientation for Marlowe. He is quite able to 
respond romantically and passionately in heterosexual relationships, even if not 
in every potential relationship with a woman. As Chandler himself expressed 
it, “the fictional detective is a catalyst, not a Casanova” (1950: x).
Nor does the characterization of latent homosexuality fit Chandler. He very 
easily succumbed to heterosexual temptations. His history was that of a wom­
anizer, guilty of multiple adulteries (Freeman 2007: 93, 100-102, 105-106, 
214-217), who sought out and enjoyed the company of women, romantically 
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and sexually. And of these, several could have served as models for the evil 
and manipulative characters in his novels (Freeman 2007: 304, 308, 310-315).
He occasionally wrote or spoke disparagingly of homosexual men and of 
those who associated him with them (Freeman 2007: 158, 164, 290), but also 
included a gay pairing in the short story “Pearls Are a Nuisance.” While some 
critics have labeled him a homophobe, others still suggest he was a closeted gay 
(Freeman 2007: 158, 196). Of course, both could be true, and this could have 
been the compensatory behavior of a man with self-doubts, chasing women to 
chase offhomosexual urges. Such reasoning may be possible, but the arguments 
are not compelling in the face of the contrary evidence of his heterosexual 
orientation and behaviors.
His heterosexual yearnings for Cissy Pascal, who became his wife in 1924, 
suggests that he was interested in women, and fancied romantic love (MacShane 
1976: 32). He began to court Cissy while she was still married to Julian Pascal, 
her second husband. She was already in her forties, but looked far younger. 
Also she dressed and behaved as a much younger woman (Freeman 2007: 64). 
Julian Pascal was older than Cissy, “a frail and delicate man who looked older 
than he was” (MacShane 1976: 32). Cissy was uncomfortable leaving Julian for 
Raymond, saying that she did love Julian, but loved Raymond more (MacShane 
1976: 32). So, could the cheating ways of Mrs. Grayle be based loosely upon 
the infidelity of Cissy and her betrayal of Julian for Raymond? If so, then 
perhaps Chandler is providing the rationalization for her abandoning Julian, his 
age and infirmity holding back the energy of the younger woman and failing 
to measure up to her libido.
When the tables turned in the later years of their marriage, in the 1940s, 
when her age and ailments made Cissy sexually unavailable, he remained de­
voted to looking after her, watching after her health and welfare. However, he 
aggressively began pursuing and propositioning secretaries at Paramount Stu­
dios where he was under contract as a screen writer (Freeman 2007: 214-217).
So there is another option also based on the history of Chandler and Cissy. 
Chandler’s women characters were unfaithful or promiscuous and the married 
ones were adulterous. So too was Chandler. He was a serial adulterer. Yet he truly 
was devoted to his wife. Could his story be inverted into his women characters? 
Consider that his character Velma/Mrs. Grayle in Farewell, My Lovely (1940) 
is married to a much older man. Velma was a Hollywood “wanna-be” (an 
aspiring actress), a “B-girl” (a prostitute who meets potential clients in bars) 
and a “moll” (a mistress) to a minor gangster Moose Malone, who considered 
her “as cute as lace pants” (Eder 1975) before she met and married the much 
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older Judge Grayle. Perhaps Judge Grayle is to Cissy Chandler as Mrs. Grayle 
is to Raymond Chandler. The much younger partner, still devoted to the older 
spouse, each was seeking the romance and passion of others closer to their 
respective ages and with matching libidos.
A similar situation is implied in the case of General Stemwood and his 
two daughters. They are the products of his unsuccessful marriage to another 
much younger woman. Mrs. Stemwood is an absent character in the novel The 
Big Sleep (1939). It is implied that their two daughters carry her bad seed, and 
that the elderly and infirmed General Stemwood passively accepts their moral 
deviance. Cissy too was much infirmed in her later years, and whether or not she 
knew of Chandler’s later dalliances, she certainly knew of some of his earlier 
ones. Was she willing to accommodate his infidelities?
Perhaps ironically Frank MacShane attributes the criminality and vicious­
ness of many of Chandler’s female characters toa form of feminism (1976: 54). 
By portraying women as having the capacity to be criminal, violent and de­
viously determined to have their way, Chandler is showing women as having 
strength and fortitude. They are not passive pawns of the men in their lives, 
but they successfully manipulate the men they encounter. They are strong, even 
courageous in pursuing their criminal objectives. Only the morally strong Philip 
Marlowe shows the ability to withstand the temptations and manipulations of 
these determined women.
So we have multiple explanations of why Raymond Chandler dispropor­
tionately frequently portrays women as criminals in his novels. Was Raymond 
Chandler simply fearful of women? Was he a “mamma’s boy,” who easily suc­
cumbed to the power of women over him? Was he a latent homosexual who 
scorned women? Did he create women characters modeled on his wife Cissy? 
Or did he invert his relationship with Cissy to provide a model for his cheating 
on women, a cheating Raymond Chandler? Was he writing as a precursor to 
feminism by creating strong women antagonists? The answer will forever re­
main ambiguous. Chandler cannot tell us now, and if he had while still living, 
could we be sure that his self-assessment would have been accurate? Whichever 
explanation for his negative depiction of women in his fiction one decides to 
accept, considering them all may give us clearer understanding of his liter­
ary contributions to American literature and the understanding of male-female 
relationships in mid-twentieth-century America.
The Chandler crime novels are characterized by that special appeal which 
is reflected in the desire of their readers to re-read his books again and again. 
He enriched the genre of the detective novel by revealing the dynamics of the 
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psychological states of his characters, both male and female. Chandler once 
stated that “the detective story for a variety reasons can seldom be promoted. 
It is usually about murder and hence lacks the elements of uplift” (Chandler 
1994: 387). We cannot totally agree. The novels of Chandler certainly warrant 
promotion, in spite of their “noire” moods and lack of moral uplift. They 
offer opportunities to explore the soul - of the characters, of Chandler himself, 
and of ourselves.
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Ambiguity and the Grotesque: History, Humor, 
and McCarthyism in Joseph Heller’s Catch-22
Joseph Heller’s political and social observations are an integral part of his 
fiction. One of America’s most revered authors, Heller has been credited with 
a unique skill of getting “history and humor to work hand in hand” (Miller 
1982:237). The novelist’s scorching political passion manifests itself especially 
vividly in Catch-22, an indisputable classic, which unveils the writer’s spirited 
mockery of the Cold War red-baiting.
At the novel’s publication in 1961 a spate of critical attention followed 
introducing a variety of reviews and scholarly interpretations. However, those 
critics who give credit to the claim that Heller’s Catch-22 reflects the climate 
of postwar America offer no more than a passing acknowledgement of the 
influence of the McCarthy-driven events on the novel. Walter James Miller 
(1982: 238) treats Catch-22 as “seemingly an attack on the military-industrial 
complex of World War II, [which] actually aims, through highly original use 
of anachronisms, to expose the entire power system of the postwar world.” 
Further in his article, Miller (1982: 240) mentions “controversies rampant in 
the Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961)” and points to Heller’s technique 
of “creating fictional events in one period of time (World War II) that parodied 
actual events that would not occur until a later period (the 1950s).” Robert 
Brustein (qtd. in Aldridge 1987: 380), writing in the New Republic, perceives 
the book’s Air Force setting in World War II as a metaphor of “a satirical 
microcosm for many of the macrocosmic idiocies” afflicting the postwar era. 
In fact, Joan Robertson’s essay “They’re After Everyone: Heller’s Catch-22 
and the Cold War” (1989: 41-50) is one of the few instances in which the 
critic holds the view that Heller’s treatment of McCarthyism was by no means 
coincidental and that a fully comprehensive study of the novel’s grounding in 
the McCarthy years is still lacking.
In this paper I will argue that in Catch-22 the writer uses his razor-sharp wit 
to lure his readers into unexpected confrontations with McCarthyism, satirizing 
anticommunist rhetoric of the later years of the Truman administration. Replete 
with literary allusions, quotations, and misquotations, the book is to be seen
314 KATARZYNA HAUZER
here as a vicious comment on the then-current excesses of McCarthy’s ideology. 
Its characters get entangled both by means of propaganda of the deed and 
word-level propaganda in persecutions characteristic of the 1950s America. 
Most effective are Heller’s references to the Major Peress case, the McCarran- 
Walter Act, loyalty oaths, and an overall feeling of fear. Propagandistic tools 
of the time, such as guilt by association as well as other attention-getters 
of the era, come up for ridicule in Heller’s depiction of false testimonies, 
investigations, and trials.
Historically, McCarthyism dominated the U.S. political scene as well as 
other sectors of American life in the years 1947-1957. The Republican sena­
tor Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin and his reckless charges of subversion 
in government and elsewhere succeeded in creating a culture of fear, dis­
trust, and disunity in postwar America. By charging that various federal and 
nongovernmental agencies harbor Communist employees, McCarthy has be­
come the central figure of unprecedented political turmoil, and his practice of 
publicizing accusations of disloyalty or subversion gave the decade its name. 
McCarthyism as a political “ism” has entered the historical lexicon to refer to 
a political style or methods that cross the bounds of decency. Most historians 
judge McCarthy to have been a demagogue who made false and misleading 
charges and identify the anticommunist investigations and hearings of the late 
1940s and early 1950s as a shameful episode in American life during which an 
allegedly nonexistent Communist threat was used to pillory innocent people for 
their political beliefs. Referring to what many researchers have denigrated as 
an overreaction to Soviet subversion espionage, Irving Horowitz (1996: 101) 
points out that “despite the existence of a few genuinely brilliant works on the 
subject of McCarthyism, the nature of the man and of the period he presum­
ably represented remains elusive.” Whether there were grounds for Heller’s 
treatment of McCarthyism as a solely laughable and condemnable concept is 
another vital matter that is to be seen.
One of the writer’s most obvious and most frequently cited satirizations of 
the McCarthy years is the description of Major Major. Because his first name 
is Major, an IBM machine reads that as his rank. Major Major’s promotion is 
a clear reference to Major Irving Peress, a dentist, who in 1953 had been forced 
to accept a discharge from the Army for refusing to discuss his possible leftist 
political associations. When asked about the character, Joseph Heller admitted 
that Major Major was certainly drawn from the events of the era. He made it 
clear when he said: “I took a paragraph straight out of the news reports and 
slipped it into the chapter about Major Major” (Merrill 1992: 150).
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Indeed, in September and October of 1953, McCarthy began making the 
headlines when he focused his attention on accusations of espionage activities 
associated with the Army Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. The 
Army Signal Corps installation at Fort Monmouth was one of the nation’s most 
vital security posts for the three research centers housed there were engaged 
in developing defensive devices designed to protect the United States from 
an atomic attack. Julius Rosenberg, a central figure in the U.S. espionage 
history, worked as an inspector at the military laboratories from 1940 to 1945 
and maintained his Signal Corps contacts for at least two years following his 
departure. In the period 1949-1953, the FBI had been warning the Army about 
security risks at Monmouth, but the Army paid little or no attention to the reports 
of subversion until the McCarthy investigation began in 1953. The so-called 
Army-McCarthy hearings, held in Washington, were based on documents and 
information sent to the senator by military and government officials as well as 
on the testimony of people who had left signal-corps related work soon after 
the war. In December of 1953, the senator was tipped off regarding the case of 
Irving Peress. He found out that, due to the military bureaucracy foul-up, one 
office was seeking Peress’s removal for his taking the Fifth Amendment1 and 
failing to answer questions on the Army’s Loyalty Certificate, while another 
office had automatically promoted him. McCarthy labeled the promotion of the 
Army dentist the “key to the deliberate Communist infiltration of our armed 
forces” (qtd. in Robertson 1989:46) and demanded a court martial. The rallying 
cry in this case was Who promoted Major Peress? In Catch-22 the Army gives 
private Major an immediate promotion and makes him Major Major so that 
“Congressmen with nothing else on their minds could go trotting back and 
forth through the streets of Washington, D.C., chanting, ‘Who promoted Major 
Major? Who promoted Major Major?’” (Heller 1994: 113).1 2
1 The clause from the Fifth Amendment that says that a person shall “not be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself’ became prominent in many investigations in the 
1950s, especially of people accused of Communist activity. Although witnesses’ refusal to answer 
questions often frustrated government investigators, this amendment clearly made it legal.
2 Heller’s choice of the phrase “Congressmen with nothing else on their minds” might be his 
indirect reference to the Republican-controlled 80th Congress under President Harry S. Truman 
whose achievements or lack thereof brought it a name of do-nothing Congress (also known as 
Turnip Congress).
Heller placed the Major on the faculty of an insignificant university. Major 
Major’s suspicious background caught the attention of the FBI and his selection 
of English history over American history is considered a truly subversive action. 
Instantaneously, Major’s patriotism is under scrutiny and his record smeared 
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with the accusations of Communist affiliation and homosexuality, all making 
him an inevitable peril to national security. This passage is significant enough 
to be quoted here:
Since he had nothing better to do well in, he did well in school. At the state university 
he took his studies so seriously that he was suspected by the homosexuals of being 
a Communist and suspected by the Communists of being homosexual. He majored 
in English history, which was a mistake.
“English history!” roared the silver-maned senior Senator from his state indignantly. 
“What’s the matter with American history? American history is as good as any 
history in the world!”
Major Major switched immediately to American literature, but not before the F.B.I. 
had opened a file on him. (Heller 1994: 113)3
3 The sexual allusion seems intentional here. In the early Cold War years McCarthyites targeted 
sexual minorities as national security risks and the conviction that homosexuals were highly 
blackmailable went unquestioned until the 1980s (Leebaert 2002: 116). Many initiatives were 
undertaken in the name of resisting subversion by the governments of Canada, U.S. and the 
UK. The notorious 1950s homosexual dismissal cases were those of the American Communist 
conspirator James A. Mintkenbaugh, Dwight D. Eisenhower’s spokesman Arthur Vandenberg, 
Jr., anticommunist columnist Joseph Alsop as well as British atomic bomb spies Guy Burgess, 
Anthony Blunt and bisexual Donald Maclean of The Cambridge Five. Homosexuals were also 
being expelled from the Communist ranks for fear that their vulnerability to blackmail might 
endanger their comrades.
Major Major’s ill-defined un-American behavior calls to mind the House 
Un-American Activities Committee which, independent of McCarthy in action, 
but not in attitude, worked at combating Communism by picking it out in many 
spheres of the American life. In one of the episodes of Catch-22, Captain Black 
jumps to conclusions when he identifies the corporal conducting the educational 
sessions in Captain Black’s intelligence tent as subversive “because he wore 
eyeglasses and used words like panacea and utopia, and because he disapproved 
of Adolf Hitler, who had done such a great job of combating un-American 
activities in Germany” (Heller 1994: 48). Later in the novel, Colonel Cathcart, 
working on his prayers-before-each-mission project, asks the chaplain to his 
office to help him perfect the idea. When the chaplain brings up the issue of 
atheism, Colonel Cathcart gets furious:
“What atheists? [...] There are no atheists in my outfit! Atheism is against the law, 
isn’t it?”
“No, sir.”
“It isn’t?” The colonel was surprised. “Then it’s un-American, isn’t it?”
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“I’m not sure, sir,” answered the chaplain.
“Well, I am!” the colonel declared. “I’m not going to disrupt our religious services 
just to accommodate a bunch of lousy atheists.” (Heller 1994: 247)
Heller treats extensively minority groups and immigration issues in Mc­
Carthy’s America by making indirect references to the McCarran-Walter Act. 
The McCarran Act of September 23, 1950 required the registration of Com­
munist organizations with the Attorney General, forbade entry into the United 
States of anyone who belonged or had belonged to any totalitarian organizations, 
and provided for the detention centers for such people in the event of national 
emergencies. In June 1952 Congress passed McCarran-Walter Immigration and 
Nationality Act which listed being a Communist or Communist sympathizer as 
one of the 700 reasons to deny immigration. Suitably, in the novel, when Chief 
White Halfoat shares his story with Yossarian, he describes a group of his native 
American relatives who wandered into Canada and who, upon trying to re-enter 
the U.S., were stopped at the border by American immigration authorities who 
would not let them back in. Heller’s wordplay is brilliant here: “They could not 
come back in because they were red” (Heller 1994: 61). In the first draft of the 
novel, as Robertson (1989: 43) reveals, the writer had stated it more plainly: 
“They could not come back in because of the McCarran-Walter Act.”
The 1950s legislation in question was codified on the basis of a quota 
system. In his veto message to Congress, president Truman (qtd. in Hochman 
1997:313) pointed out the inequities of the legislative draft which in his opinion 
boiled down to the statement that “Americans with English or Irish names were 
better people and better citizens than Americans with Italian or Greek or Polish 
names.” This comes up for ridicule in the passage in which Colonel Cathcart 
is tangled up in a menacing problem of his own:
The colonel sat back when he had finished and was extremely pleased with himself 
for the prompt action he had just taken to meet this sinister crisis. Yossarian - the 
very sight of the name made him shudder. There were so many esses in it. It just 
had to be subversive. It was like the word subversive itself. It was like seditious 
and insidious too, and like socialist, suspicious, fascist and Communist. It was an 
odious, alien, distasteful name, that just did not inspire confidence. It was not at all 
like such clean, crisp, honest, American names as Cathcart, Peckem and Dreedle.
(Heller 1994: 268)
Personal attacks, the violation of privacy that resulted from red-baiting, 
and an overall feeling of harassment are used by Heller as a subtext throughout 
his novel. In Catch-22 the characters are set in a climate of secret informants 
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in which reason gives way to hysteria, trust to suspicion and friendship to 
self-preservation. In a meaningful scene, ex-P.F.C. Wintergreen confides to 
Yossarian:
“We’d probably shoot you,” ex-P.F.C. Wintergreen replied.
“We?” Yossarian cried in surprise. “What do you mean, we? Since when are you on 
their side?”
“If you’re going to be shot, whose side do you expect me to be on?”
(Heller 1994: 79)
In McCarthy’s America charges were frequently made based on widely 
publicized, dubious or selectively documented evidence. At one point in Mc­
Carthy’s political career, the senator suggested that a person must be guilty if 
there was no information to state otherwise (Anderson and May 1953: 186). 
This guilt by association technique is clearly evident in Heller’s handling of 
the Action Board and its investigatory methods. Clevinger’s case, of whom 
Lieutenant Scheisskopf knew he “might cause trouble if he wasn’t watched” 
(Heller 1994: 106) was open and shut. As the narrator explains, Clevinger “was 
guilty, of course, or he would not have been accused, and [...] the only way to 
prove it was to find him guilty” (Heller 1994: 106). In his hearings, the senator 
of Wisconsin would often transform some minor point into an overwhelming 
proof of a person’s guilt. Suitably, Clevinger’s accidental stumbling on the 
parade field becomes “breaking ranks while in formation, felonious assault, 
indiscriminate behavior, mopery, high treason, provoking, being a smart guy, 
listening to classical music and so on” (Heller 1994: 100).
In Heller’s novel numerous characters are exposed to McCarthyite smear 
tactics. Corporal Popinjay, Yossarian, Major Major and others are all damned 
by innuendo. Significantly, the very first chapter of the novel opens with Dunbar 
and Yossarian’s allegations regarding the soldier in white. The comical effect 
is doubled when the reader learns that the Texan, who is under their attack, 
was so good-natured, generous and likeable that “in three days no one could 
stand him” (Heller 1994: 16):
“Murderer,” Dunbar said quietly.
The Texan looked up at him with an uncertain grin.
“Killer,” Yossarian said.
“What are you fellas talkin’ about?” the Texan asked nervously.
“You murdered him,” said Dunbar.
“You killed him,” said Yossarian.
The Texan shrank back. “You fellas are crazy. I didn’t even touch him.”
“You murdered him,” said Dunbar.
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“I heard you kill him,” said Yossarian.
“You killed him because he was a nigger,” Dunbar said.
“You fellas are crazy,” the Texan cried. “They don’t allow niggers in here. They 
got a special place for niggers.”
“The sergeant smuggled him in,” Dunbar said.
“The Communist sergeant,” said Yossarian.
“And you knew it.” (Heller 1994: 17-18)
In his probably most infamous speech, which he delivered in Wheeling, 
West Virginia on February 9, 1950, McCarthy (qtd. in Morgan 2003: 384-5) 
said: “I have in my hand a list of 205 - a list of names that were made known 
to the Secretary of State [Dean Acheson] as being members of the Communist 
Party and who, nevertheless, are still working and shaping the policy in the State 
Department.” Three days later the 205 Communists became 57 card-carrying 
Communists.4 The number was subsequently altered to 81.
4 In McCarthy’s words: “I have in my hand 57 cases of individuals who would appear to be 
either card-carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party, but who nevertheless are 
still helping to shape our foreign policy” (qtd. in Hochman 1997: 314).
This landmark event of McCarthyism is incorporated in Catch-22 when 
the meek Chaplain R. O. Shipman becomes a target of harassment. Heller’s 
reference to the incidents that have taken place since the advent of McCarthyism, 
the term being often synonymous with the Age of Accusation, is highly readable 
in the trial which abounds in the overwhelming pieces of evidence that the 
interrogator begins pulling one after another from a manila folder. In the lexicon 
so reminiscent of the 1950s verbiage, the colonel declares: “I have here in my 
hands another statement from Colonel Cathcart in which he swears that you 
refused to co-operate with him in conducting prayer meetings in the briefing 
room before each mission” (Heller 1994:486). Or, “I have here another affidavit 
from Colonel Cathcart that states you told him atheism was not against the 
law” (Heller 1994: 486). Or, “I have a signed statement here from Colonel 
Cathcart asserting you stole that plum tomato from him” (Heller 1994: 485). 
Or, “I have a notarized affidavit from Sergeant Whitcomb [...]” (Heller 1994: 
485), etc. Not surprisingly, all the official statements are either fabricated proofs 
or documents obtained from false witnesses whom their commanding officers 
can easily make swear anything.
As the novel unfolds, the colonels charge the chaplain with “a very serious 
crime” of which they “don’t know yet but [...] are going to find out” (Heller 
1994: 480). Soon before the trial Chaplain Shipman is tipped off by Corporal 
Whitcomb and leams about his alleged crimes:
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“They’re going to crack down on you for signing Washington Irving’s name to all 
those letters you’ve been signing Washington Irving’s name to. How do you like 
that?”
“I haven’t been signing Washington Irving’s name to any letters,” said the chaplain. 
“You don’t have to lie to me,” Corporal Whitcomb answered. “I’m not the one you 
have to convince.”
“But I’m not lying.”
“I don’t care whether you’re lying or not. They’re going to get you for intercepting 
Major Major’s correspondence, too. A lot of this stuff is classified information.” 
“What correspondence?’ asked the chaplain plaintively in rising exasperation. “I’ve 
never even seen any of Major Major’s correspondence.”
“You don’t have to lie to me,” Corporal Whitcomb replied. “I’m not the one you 
have to convince.”
“But I’m not lying!” protested the chaplain. [...]
Corporal Whitcomb was incensed. “I’m the best friend you’ve got and you don’t 
even know it,” he asserted belligerently, and walked out of the chaplain’s tent. 
He walked back in. “I’m on your side and you don’t even realize it. Don’t you 
know what serious trouble you’re in? That C.I.D. man has gone rushing back to the 
hospital to write a brand-new report on you about that tomato.”
“What tomato?” the chaplain asked, blinking.
“The plum tomato you were hiding in your hand when you first showed up here. 
There it is. The tomato you’re still holding in your hand right this very minute!” 
The chaplain unclenched his fingers with surprise and saw he was still holding the 
plum tomato he had obtained in Colonel Cathcart’s office. He set it down quickly 
on the bridge table. “I got this tomato from Colonel Cathcart,” he said, and was 
struck by how ludicrous his explanation sounded. “He insisted I take it.”
“You don’t have to lie to me,” Corporal Whitcomb answered. “I don’t care whether 
you stole it from him or not.”
“Stole it?” the chaplain exclaimed with amazement. “Why should I want to steal 
a plum tomato?”
“That’s exactly what had us both stumped,” said Corporal Whitcomb. “And then 
the C.I.D. man figured out you might have some important secret papers hidden 
away inside it.”
The chaplain sagged limply beneath the mountainous weight of his despair. “I don’t 
have any important papers hidden away inside it,” he stated simply. “I didn’t even 
want it to begin with. Here, you can have it and see for yourself.”
(Heller 1994: 262-4)
Clearly, the memorable scene is Heller’s reference to the famed Hiss pump­
kin. The historic Alger Hiss Case appeared before the House Un-American 
Activities Committee from 1948 through 1950. The former American public 
AMBIGUITY AND THE GROTESQUE ... 321
official Alger Hiss was accused by Whittaker Chambers, a self-confessed So­
viet agent and a longtime editor of the weekly newsmagazine Time, of having 
been a secret Communist between 1934 and 1938. Denying that he had ever 
even known Chambers, Hiss was convicted for perjury by a second trial in 
January 1950 and sentenced to a five-year prison term. In this notorious case, at 
a pretrial hearing, Chambers produced a selection of classified material and on 
December 2,1948 he led HU AC investigators to his Maryland farm, where from 
a hollowed-out pumpkin he exhibited several microfilm rolls of documents he 
said had been given to him by Hiss. The far-famed pumpkin papers turned out 
to be either blank microfilms or altogether unimportant technical documents.
Finally, Captain Black is cast as a man of McCarthy’s caliber and his 
Glorious Loyalty Oath Crusade reflects the spirit of the early Cold-War years. 
Loyalty oaths originated from a new loyalty program (Loyalty Probes) insti­
tuted by President Harry S. Truman on March 22, 1947. The Executive Order 
9835 inaugurated a loyalty check of all federal employees by the Civil Service 
Commission and the FBI. This was a nationwide initiative and hundreds of 
loyalty boards were set up across the country. A Loyalty Review Board coor­
dinated dismissal procedures and supervised the overall program. The standard 
for dismissal was the existence of “reasonable grounds [...] for belief that 
the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States” (Fried 
1991: 68). The loyalty ordinance required each employee to execute an affidavit 
stating whether or not they have ever been “members of or affiliated with any 
group, society, association, organization or party which advises, advocates or 
teaches [...] the overthrow by force, violence or other unlawful means of the 
Government of the United States of America” (Fried 1997:108). As a university 
professor, Heller himself ostensibly signed the required loyalty oath.
In Catch-22 the loyalty crusade is taken to absurd lengths. When in full 
swing, it makes all the squadron men sign the oaths “to get their pay from 
the finance officer, to obtain their PX supplies, to have their hair cut by the 
Italian barbers” (Heller 1994: 147). Captain Black’s reasoning is the following: 
“The more loyalty oaths a person signed, the more loyal he was” (Heller 
1994: 148). Any further modifications of the campaign, such as Continual 
Reaffirmation, the purpose of which was to “trap all those men who had become 
disloyal since the last time they had signed a loyalty oath the day before” 
(Heller 1994: 149), add up to the whole soapbox patriotism and render any 
emergency operations in the base utterly impossible. Like senator McCarthy 
and his associates’ artful maneuvers, Captain Black’s dogged politics increases 
the displeasure and consternation of his superiors. Infuriated by the ardent 
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crusader’s tactics, Colonel Korn reports: “It’s that idiot Black off on a patriotism 
binge [...] the best thing you can do is [...] hope he drops dead before he does 
too much damage” (Heller 1994: 150).
Historically, McCarthy was able to capitalize upon the climate of fear 
which he had in fact used in two ways. Edward R. Murrow’s report on senator 
McCarthy in the now-famous provocative news program See It Now catego­
rized that fear cogently into the fear of Communism that led people to listen 
to McCarthy’s charges, and the fear of being blacklisted by the senator which 
intimidated people from speaking out against him.5 Through the long lens of his­
tory, McCarthyism still remains a controversial and complex phenomenon. With 
the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, a number of new 
archival sources have become available to the public which throw much-needed 
light on the McCarthy era. Released in the late 1990s, the Venona transcripts are 
forcing the revision of many of the prevailing myths about the internal threat 
of Communism to American democracy. Some 2,900 intercepted and decoded 
Soviet messages prove that there was a large scale Communist penetration of 
the U.S. government and that Communist spies passed on valuable information 
to the KGB. The deciphered cables identify 349 citizens, immigrants and per­
manent residents of the United States who had had a covert relationship with 
Soviet intelligence agencies. John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr (1999: 9), 
authors of Venona. Decoding Soviet Espionage in America, presume that Amer­
ican cryptanalysts in the Venona Project deciphered only a fraction of the Soviet 
intelligence traffic and that “it [is] only logical to conclude that many additional 
agents were discussed in the thousands of unread messages.”
5 For a fuller treatment of Murrow’s report see O’Connor (1987: 5-16). Murrow’s probably 
most famous broadcast of March 9, 1954, which focused on the threat to American liberties posed 
by the activities of the Wisconsin senator, is often credited with having significantly contributed to 
Joseph R. McCarthy’s downfall.
The predominant view among American literati, most of them of liberal 
or leftist beliefs, was that the concern about domestic Communism in the 
late 1940s and 1950s was without justification. The culture of fear attracted 
attention of those who were affected by McCarthy’s assaults as well as those who 
wrote on McCarthyism from the post-Cold War perspective. A gallery of red 
hunters caricatured by Joseph Heller appear and reappear in the works of Arthur 
Miller, Norman Mailer, Lillian Hellman, Mary McCarthy, Howard Fast, Robert 
Coover, E. L. Doctorow, Philip Roth, Tony Kushner and others. Heller himself 
pointed out repeatedly that his unreal novel reflects real themes. In one of the 
interviews the writer referred to his work as a “novel of comment” in which 
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“there are comments about the loyalty oath, about the free enterprise system, 
about civil rights, about bureaucracy, about patriotism” (Krassner 1992: 8). 
When asked about his political philosophy and major influences for Catch-22, 
he said unambiguously:
It’s the idea of being charged with something and not knowing what it is [...]. The 
thing that inspired that was the congressional hearings that were going on then - this 
was the period of McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee. We 
had state committees as well as loyalty oaths [...]. I wanted to create an impression 
of our society at that time and with a literary consciousness. That’s why the book 
is replete with literary allusions and quotations or misquotations.
(Heller qtd. in Gold 1992: 59)
To conclude, just as the writer’s parody of McCarthyism in Catch-22 re­
mains clearly evident, his crucial point seems ambiguous. Following the concep­
tion delineated by Klehr, Haynes and Firsov (1995: 326-7), who said that “the 
situation in America in the late 1940s and 1950s was much more complicated 
than is suggested by the view that an idealistic, innocent Communist movement 
was persecuted by a paranoid security apparatus. Although many innocent peo­
ple were harassed, the secret world of the CPUSA made such excesses possible,” 
Heller tempts the reader to trace darkening tones within the novel where all 
seemingly clear-cut distinctions become blurred. Most characters may just as 
well be perceived as both oppressors and victims of circumstances, and the 
common acceptance of the image of the military industrial complex as the 
only enemy is just a partial truth. Yossarian, Dunbar, Wintergreen, Milo, Korn, 
Black, Cathcart, Scheisskopf, Dreedle, Major Major, Clevinger, and Nately all 
thrive on abuse, recrimination, and slander - a confirmation of a slogan which 
Heller (qtd. in Merrill 1996: 151) seems to be endorsing for all its ambiguity 
and grotesque: “we have met the enemy, and it is us.”
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Julie Campbell
University of Southampton
The Legacy of Samuel Beckett 
in Paul Auster’s Work
Beckett’s presence can be strongly sensed in Auster’s work, especially in his 
early novels. It seems to me unmistakable in The New York Trilogy (1987), 
In the Country of Last Things (1987) and in the fascinating biography of his 
father, The Invention of Solitude (1982), which I find a remarkable work. These 
works have a sparseness and an abstract quality which encourage a sense of 
being plunged into an atmosphere very reminiscent of the kind we meet in 
a Beckett text, with strong imagery of aloneness, of life lived at the margins, 
of deprivation and hunger. Yet when we move onto a novel such as Moon 
Palace (1989), which can be described as a “baggy monster” in relation to its 
range of characters, its diverse settings, its embedded narratives and breadth of 
vision, references to Beckett’s work are still strongly present, and I am thinking 
especially of allusions to Endgame (1958).
I think it is important to recognize that Auster has his own voice, and 
his own specific themes and situations which he returns to again and again. 
Family relationships are very often examined, especially the relationship (or 
more pertinently, the lack of one) between father and son, explored with such 
poetic intensity in The Invention of Solitude. Hunger and solitude become an 
intrinsic part of his wider interest in journeys and quests, allowing a inward 
journey into the psyche, which provides an opportunity to explore and discover 
identity while displaced from the world of competition, consumerism and the 
various ways that the outer world forces us to ignore and reject the inner self in 
the ongoing struggle to make a living, make a “success” of our lives. His work 
often features journeys, money gained and money lost, chance and coincidence, 
love and death, and mysteries without solutions.
It seems to me that Beckett holds an important place in Auster’s develop­
ment as a writer, and this is especially true in the early stages. I am going to 
begin by discussing an early play, which Auster himself describes as a bit of 
a disaster, “Laurel and Hardy Go to Heaven” (written 1976/77; published in 
Hand to Mouth in 1997) which is somehow too close to Beckett, too derivative, 
in the sense that it can be seen to have stifled his own artistry and his own
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imagination. In order to find a voice of his own Auster needed to get further 
away from Beckett. But this does happen, and rather triumphantly, later on. The 
early play is very much a reworking of Waiting for Godot. It is not a slavish 
reproduction, but it is hedged around on all sides by what appears as a need, 
conscious or not, to write a play like Beckett, or more particularly, a play like 
Godot. (It is interesting to recognize that Beckett chose never to write a play 
quite like Godot again). I think we need to go to The Music of Chance to find 
“Laurel and Hardy Go to Heaven,” completely refashioned and reconceptual­
ized, resurfacing within the novel form, and now really working on its own 
terms. The original play can be glimpsed lying beneath and operating as a cen­
tral core of the narrative. It is a fascinating revision, and in a sense we come 
full circle in that the novel was adapted into a film (directed by Peter Haas, 
1993), and very effectively. It still holds onto its strangeness and mystery, a feat 
not always pulled off when experimental fiction is converted into film. And 
Beckett is still there, but by 1990, when the novel was first published, Auster’s 
own voice has developed and moved further towards what is unmistakably his. 
It clarifies that he used Beckett, in a sense, as a mentor, learned from him and 
moved forward. Beckett could have been a dangerous influence, and blocked 
this movement forward, but instead, for Auster, he was a place to start from, 
to develop from, as he created his own voice.
“Laurel and Hardy Go to Heaven” was one of three plays written dur­
ing a six-month stay in Berkeley in 1976. In Hand to Mouth Auster (1998: 
101) writes that
The farthest thing from my mind was to do anything with them in a practical sense. 
As far as I was concerned, they were hardly more than spare, minimalist exercises, 
an initial stab at something. [...]
But John Bernard Myers decided to stage the Laurel and Hardy play. It was not 
a success. The version published in Hand to Mouth is the result of a thorough 
reworking. Auster (1998: 104-5) considers that
The performances had been only part of the problem, and I wasn’t about to palm 
off responsibility for what had happened on the director or the actors. The play was 
far too long, I realized, too rambling and diffuse, and radical surgery was needed 
to mend it. I began chopping and trimming, hacking away at everything that felt 
weak or superfluous. [...]
It is still not great drama, but does hold interest, and I do admire Auster’s 
decision to publish it.
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It is useful to consider the play in relation to Godot, and I will put forward 
a few ideas about links that can be made between the two plays. “Laurel and 
Hardy Go to Heaven” is a two-hander: the two characters are described as 
“Stan Laurel, a builder of walls; Oliver Hardy, a builder of walls” (Auster 
1998: 109). Thus, immediately we are introduced to them, the characters are 
defined by what they do. Unlike Godot this will be a play in which something 
will be done, where something happens: a wall is built. The stage is bare, 
apart from a “heap of stones,” which might well bring to mind the “abode of 
stones,” a phrase so often repeated in Lucky’s tirade. I visualize the two actors 
as looking as much like Laurel and Hardy as possible. This would provoke 
strong expectations in the audience, especially signalling the kind of comedy 
that is associated with this famous double act. Here is how the play begins:
Laurel enters right. Slowly, cautiously, as if in a daze. He is wearing denim overalls 
and work boots and carries a satchel over his shoulder. A bowler hat sits on his 
head. He stops, turns, and stares back in the direction he has just come from.
Hardy enters left. Same clothing, same satchel, same bowler hat. He moves pur­
posefully, crossing the stage with great strides. In the dimness he crushes into Laurel 
from behind. They both fall down, groaning. (Auster 1998: 109)
The two characters are clearly distinguished by their movements and body 
language: one cautious, the other purposeful. This also brings to mind the 
characters in Act Without Words II (1959), which also fits in with the focus on 
doing, rather than waiting, in this play. And the dialogue begins:
HARDY: (Recovering. Touching Laurel’s face.) Is it you?
LAUREL: Yes, yes. (Pause.) I think so. (Doubtful, touching his face.) Is it me? 
HARDY: Yes. Of course it’s you.
LAUREL: And you? Are you you?
HARDY: Yes. Of course I’m me. (Pause.) I’m me, and you’re you.
LAUREL: It looks like we’re both here, then, doesn’t it?
HARDY: (Standing up, stretching. Enthusiastically.) And so... another day begins. 
LAUREL: You don’t have to be so happy about it.
HARDY: (Stops. Seriously.) You shouldn't talk like that. You know I’m not happy. 
LAUREL: You certainly look happy. You certainly sound happy.
HARDY: That’s what we call “putting up a good front.” It's a way of tricking myself 
into being something other than what I really am. (Pause. Brightly.) I pretend. 
(Begins walking toward the heap of stones.) (Auster 1998: 109-10)
And that’s enough to give you the idea. If you are like me you may well be 
groaning at this stage, alongside the characters, because it does have that off- 
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putting flavour of a none-too-expert stab at “doing Beckett.” It reminds me of 
the opening of Act 2 of Godot. I’m trying my best to “see” it as a performance. 
This is Laurel and Hardy, not Didi and Gogo, and if the actors play this aspect 
up sufficiently there is plenty of room for comedy, but on the page none of this 
comes alive for me. It is not a comic play in any straightforward sense, and 
maybe, like Godot, it could be termed a tragicomedy. There are many direct, 
as well as less direct echoes: “This can’t go on” (Auster 1998: 141); “Do you 
think we’re alive?” (Auster 1998: 143); “Has it ever occurred to you that we’re 
already dead?” (Auster 1998: 153); “Do you think someone is watching us?” 
(Auster 1998: 158); “Nothing is going to happen” (Auster 1998: 164). Auster 
has, however, chosen to have two trees rather than one (Auster 1998: 147). 
There are hints that this is some kind of purgatory, that the two characters 
are being punished for unnamed sins. “Heaven,” it would appear, is a gloomy, 
barren place, full of toil and suffering.
It could be suggested that this is a kind of sequel to Godot. The two 
characters have at last met Godot, and he has set them a task: to build a wall. 
And they do build a wall. No reason is given for this, and it is possible that they 
build this same wall every day. But at the end of the play, when darkness falls, 
the wall has been built. Something has been done.
I think it is only when “Laurel and Hardy Go to Heaven” is looked at again 
from the new perspective provided by The Music of Chance that this “spare 
minimalist exercise” begins to gain an identity of its own. This novel has this 
early play embedded within it, but the abstractions have been concretized, 
fleshed out, and to some extent, made explicable. But there is still a mystery 
at the core, and although many questions are answered, many are not, and 
new questions are posed. Godot can also be glimpsed, almost unrecognizable 
now, but still holding an important place. The two main characters, Pozzi and 
Nashe, could be read as allusions to Pozzo and Lucky, but they are more akin 
to Didi and Gogo. We witness their first meeting, unlike the characters in 
Godot and “Laurel and Hardy Go to Heaven.” Pozzi has been beaten, but we 
are told why and by whom. Things are being explained to us. Things would 
seem to be making sense. As I have suggested, certain abstractions have been 
concretized for us, but mysteries remain. There is an underlying sense of threat 
and an uneasiness that is reminiscent of Godot. In Godot Gogo and Didi discuss 
salvation, and Didi’s suggestion: “Suppose we repented” is met with Estragon’s 
questions: “Repented what?” “Our being bom?” (Beckett 1978: 11). Such an 
idea is unsettling within the bleak atmosphere of the play, and it is very definitely 
present in Auster’s novel. The ideas of having “no rights” (Beckett 1978: 19), 
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of being punished (Beckett 1978: 93) and, alternatively, the prospect of being 
“saved” (Beckett 1978:94), which go so far in creating that strangely fascinating 
sense of threat in Godot, when they resurface in The Music of Chance - which 
is, in so many ways, so different in its richness, colour, movement and interest 
- still retain their power. There is a bleakness underlying the surface vibrancy, 
a dark allegory concerning punishment, retribution, somehow to do with the 
sin of having been bom.
My thesis is that there is a perceptible line that links the three texts, leading 
from Godot to “Laurel and Hardy Go to Heaven” to The Music of Chance. 
Auster’s fascination with the idea of two characters being punished, seemingly 
forever, by being forced to build a wall, a futile purposeless wall, was not filed 
away in his desk along with the play. He returned to it. He spoke about how 
he “couldn’t get rid of the idea. It plagued me and haunted me for [...] years”; 
“the wall - those stones had been standing inside me for years” (Auster 1996: 
153). The task was how to place this central image within a novel. How would 
he get the characters into this situation? How could it happen in a way that 
could be made acceptable within a prose fiction format? And this is what The 
Music of Chance achieves. A set of circumstances, chance and coincidence, 
bring the two protagonists together at just that moment when they can be of 
use to each other: “It was one of those random, accidental encounters that seem 
to materialize out of thin air” (Auster 1992: 1). It could be suggested, as it 
could with “Laurel and Hardy Go to Heaven,” that they meet their Godot - 
in this case, in Flower and Stone. Flower and Stone are not Pozzo and Lucky, 
although Flower’s overbearing and self-satisfied demeanour is reminiscent of 
Pozzo. Flower and Stone are the god-like figures who mete out the punishment: 
paternal but without love; absent, but unfailing in their power to control, to 
create suffering and to deny freedom.
I am particularly interested in this idea of punishment. It is the central 
focus of “Laurel and Hardy Go to Heaven.” The building of the wall seems 
completely futile and pointless, as we are given no sense of the purpose of the 
wall. Laurel suggests they stop building it:
LAUREL: If we stopped working now, if we both just refused to go on, don’t you 
think it would force them to act? (Auster 1998: 158)
We are kept in the dark as to who or what “them” refers to. But Hardy decides 
that if they (Laurel and Hardy) do stop “they” (the unnamed persecutors) 
would “give us more work tomorrow to make up for it” (Auster 1998: 158). 
So whoever “they” are, it seems, they are relentless in their persecution, and 
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there is no escaping the hard, exhausting work. In The Music of Chance Pozzi 
and Nashe are forced to build a wall to settle a gambling debt. As soon as the 
question of how they will repay what they owe is raised, the idea of punishment 
is also put forward: “A punishment would have to be meted out, that was 
certain” (Auster 1992: 105). Nashe compares their predicament to being in 
prison (Auster 1992: 119); he will be “like some convict sentenced to a term 
of hard labor” (Auster 1992: 127). But Nashe also sees building the wall as 
a chance of salvation. He says nothing to Pozzi
about what truly concerned him - nothing about the struggle to put his life together 
again, nothing about how he saw the wall as a chance to redeem himself in his own 
eyes, nothing about how he welcomed the hardships of the meadow as a way to 
atone for his recklessness and self-pity [...]. (Auster 1992: 127)
It seems to me to be a strange reaction. He seems to be welcoming the task 
as a punishment that will involve atonement and bring redemption. Again the 
building of the wall, as in the play, seems quite futile. Flower and Stone bought 
a ruined Irish castle on a visit to Ireland, basically just a heap of stones, and 
had it shipped back to America. Their plan is, not to have the castle rebuilt, 
but to have the stones built into a wall that will be situated diagonally across 
a field. Flower envisages it as “a monument”:
“Rather than try to reconstruct the castle, we’re going to turn it into a work of art. To 
my mind, there’s nothing more mysterious or beautiful than a wall. I can already see 
it: standing out there in the meadow, rising up like some enormous barrier against 
time. It will be a memorial to itself, gentleman, a symphony of resurrected stones, 
and every day it will sing a dirge for the past we carry within us.”
“A Wailing Wall,” Nashe said. (Auster 1992: 86)
So we see that this wall is endowed with huge symbolic significance, including 
religious resonances. We also discover that the name of the man who will be in 
charge of the work has the ominous name of Calvin. It will be a “monument,” 
“a work of art,” “a barrier against time,” “a symphony.” The only utilitarian pur­
pose this wall has is the “educational value”; it is “something that will teach the 
culprits a lesson” (Auster 1992: 105). But what are these “culprits” being pun­
ished for? For losing at cards? And why does Nashe welcome the punishment? 
I think that, in order to try and shed some light on these questions, it is interesting 
to consider a theme often returned to in Auster’s work: the absent father.
When Nashe learns of his father’s death “he had not seen his father in over 
thirty years” (Auster 1992: 2). His father had walked out when he was two. 
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Nashe’s wife has left him, and their two-year-old daughter is now living with 
Nashe’s sister. His mother died four years ago. Against this background Nashe 
discovers that his father has left him “a colossal sum - close to two hundred 
thousand dollars” (Auster 1992: 2). Nashe considers it “a peculiar way to make 
amends” (Auster 1992: 3). This is true. The father has absented himself from 
his children’s lives, and this can never be “amended.” There is a strange parallel 
in Pozzi’s childhood. He can remember meeting his father only twice in his life: 
once when he was eight, once when he was “eleven, maybe twelve” (Auster 
1992: 40). On both occasions he turns up in a big Cadillac and gives him 
a hundred-dollar bill - again “a peculiar way to make amends” for his absence.
Reading The Invention of Solitude provides very strong evidence of why 
the idea of an absent father has such an important place in Auster’s work. Auster 
writes about his father directly after his death. He tells us:
Even before his death he had been absent, and long ago the people closest to him 
had learned to accept this absence, to treat it as the fundamental quality of his 
being. (Auster 1989: 6)
It was never possible for him to be where he was. For as long as he lived, he was 
somewhere else, between here and there. But never really here. And never really 
there. (Auster 1989: 19)
It is a fascinating story, not least, for me, because there is so much in his 
portrait of his father that reminds me of my own. His words: “You do not 
stop hungering after your father’s love, even after you are grown up” (Auster 
1989: 19) affect me deeply, and this strikes me as a statement of truth, along 
with all the enormity of the feelings it involves, including a sense of failure, 
loss, a fundamental feeling of not being good enough, somehow not being 
authenticated. I would take the statement further, to suggest that this hunger 
does not stop, even after your father’s death. It then moves from hungering after 
the impossible to hungering after the totally impossible. “From the beginning, 
it seems,” Auster recognizes, “I was looking for my father. Looking frantically 
for anyone who resembled him” (Auster 1989: 21). He speaks of a “craving” 
(Auster 1989: 21) and “a desire to do something extraordinary, to impress him 
with an act of heroic proportions” (Auster 1989: 23). He cannot really believe 
in the man his father appears to be,
so implacably neutral on the surface [...] who lacked feeling, who wanted so little 
of others. And if there was not such a man, that means that there was another man, 
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a man hidden inside the man who was not there, and the trick of it, then, was to find 
him. On the condition that he is there to be found.
To recognize, right from the start, that the essence of this project is failure.
(Auster 1989: 20)
He realizes that his parents’ relationship is loveless, and considers his own 
conception: “a passionless embrace, a blind, dutiful groping between chilly 
hotel sheets [which] has never failed to humble me into an awareness of my 
own contingency” (Auster 1989: 18). It is a powerful and moving account of 
an absent father who “was never really there.”
If we consider again Auster’s recognition that “From the beginning, it 
seems, I was looking for my father. Looking frantically for anyone who resem­
bled him” (Auster 1989: 21), I think we can gain an insight into Nashe’s own 
quest for some kind of salvation. After his father’s death, Nashe’s life changes. 
This can be related to Auster’s own experience. At a time when, Auster recalls, 
“I don’t think I’ve ever been closer to feeling that I was at the end of my 
rope” he leams of his father’s death, and his inheritance; “The money changed 
everything for me; it set my life on an entirely different course” (Auster 1996: 
128). He considers that “In some sense, all the novels I’ve written have come 
out of that money my father gave me”:
It’s impossible to sit down and write without thinking about it. It’s a terrible equation, 
finally. To think that my father’s death saved my life. (Auster 1996: 132)
With Nashe the result of the inheritance does not bring about this kind of rebirth, 
or salvation, yet when Nashe’s feelings are described we have a strange mix of 
allusions to death and life, and to a detonation, a “big bang”:
He felt like a man who had finally found the courage to put a bullet through his 
head - but in this case the bullet was not death, it was life, it was the explosion that 
triggers the birth of new worlds. (Auster 1992: 10)
But in a very real sense he is turning his back on life. One by one he discards all 
the people and things that have given him rootedness and a reason for living. He 
decides to leave his daughter with his sister, becoming an absent father himself; 
he gives up his job, sells his house; he takes to the road in a new red two-door 
Saab 900. Is he looking for a father substitute? Is he escaping? The opening 
sentence of the novel describes his constant driving, constant movement: “For 
one whole year he did nothing but drive, traveling back and forth across America 
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as he waited for the money to run out” (Auster 1992: 1). It is aimless, continuous, 
with no apparent goal, “no definite plan” (Auster 1992: 11).
Speed was of the essence, the joy of sitting in the car and hurtling himself forward 
through space. That became a good beyond all others, a hunger to be fed at any 
price. Nothing around him lasted for more than a moment, and as one moment 
followed another, it was as though he alone continued to exist. He was a fixed point 
in a whirl of changes, a body poised in utter stillness as the world rushed through 
him and disappeared. The car became a sanctum of invulnerability, a refuge in 
which nothing could hurt him anymore. As long as he was driving, he carried no 
burdens, was unencumbered by even the slightest particle of his former life. That is 
not to say that memories did not rise up in him, but they no longer seemed to bring 
any of the old anguish. (Auster 1992: 11-12)
This speaks of escape. The car is a “refuge” from the world. He is, in a sense, 
absenting himself from life, and from the “old anguish.” It is possible to read this 
constant driving, constant movement, as creating the kind of absence Auster 
recognized in his father: “he was somewhere else, between here and there. 
But never really here. And never really there” (Auster 1989: 19). Auster has 
described the “true subject” of The Music of Chance as an exploration of 
the “question of freedom” (Auster 1996: 153), and has also stated that it is 
“a book about walls and slavery and freedom” (Auster 1996: 122). “Little by 
little,” we are told, Nashe “had fallen in love with his new life of freedom 
and irresponsibility” (Auster 1992: 11), but the car, his “refuge” from the 
world is also a kind of cage, whilst the endless driving is also a kind of 
enslavement. In time the money begins to run out, and Nashe is forced back 
into the world; something must be done, and the card game between Pozzi 
and Flower and Stone would seem to be the answer, in order to ensure that 
the “freedom and irresponsibility” does not have to end. Auster speaks of how 
he “wanted to explore the implications of the windfall I had received after 
my father’s death” in this novel (Auster 1996: 153), and the implications, 
in relation to Nashe, are very different from Auster’s. Auster’s movement 
is into creativity: life out of death; Nashe moves, it seems inexorably, from 
life into slavery and death. Freedom itself becomes like a kind of death: an 
absence from life.
Entering Flower and Stone’s house is like entering an unreal world: “it was 
difficult for him not to think of the house as an illusion” (Auster 1992: 69). 
Pozzi has described Flower and Stone as like Laurel and Hardy:
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That’s what I call them, Laurel and Hardy. One’s fat and the other’s thin, just like 
old Stan and Ollie. They’re genuine pea-brains, my friend, a pair of poor chumps.
(Auster 1992: 30)
Nashe recalls this description as they enter the house: “More than anything else 
it made him think of a movie set” (Auster 1992: 69). But Pozzi’s assessment is 
only taking in their superficial appearance. They are not the Laurel and Hardy 
from Auster’s play - these are the roles forced on Pozzi and Nashe - and there 
is something far more threatening about them than is ever apparent in the comic 
films of the actual Laurel and Hardy, as Nashe begins to recognize.
They are about to play a game of cards, an adult form of a play with 
a purpose: making money. But before they begin to play we learn how Flower 
and Stone spend a great deal of their time. Stone spends his time creating 
a miniature scale model of a city: “the City of the World” (Auster 1992: 79). 
Flower declaims that it “is more than just a toy” (Auster 1992: 79); there is 
a childlike quality to this occupation, but it goes further than this. In this house 
of illusion Stone has created a miniature world in which time is simultaneous: 
“Everything in it happens at once” (Auster 1992: 79). Ominously there is 
a prison, with prisoners “working happily at their various tasks [...]. They’re 
glad they’ve been punished for their crimes” (Auster 1992: 80). It is, for Stone, 
“a utopia”; a model of how the world should be. Nashe can think of the model 
as “charming [...] deft and brilliant and admirable,” but at the same time as 
“bizarre” and “totalitarian,” with a “hint of violence, an atmosphere of cruelty 
and revenge” (Auster 1992: 87). When Nashe revisits the model, whilst the 
poker game is being played, he finds that
the overriding mood was one of tenor, of dark dreams sauntering down the avenues 
in broad daylight. A threat of punishment seemed to hang in the air.
(Auster 1992: 96)
Flower is a collector: books, cigars, and finally, his “historical memorabilia” 
(Auster 1992: 82). Nashe finds this collection “curious,” “a monument to trivia 
[...] with articles of such marginal value that Nashe wondered if it were not 
some kind of joke” (Auster 1992: 83). They are relics from the past, but
It was all so random, so misconstrued, so utterly beside the point. Flower’s museum 
was a graveyard of shadows, a demented shrine to the spirit of nothingness [...]. 
The fascination was simply for the objects as material things, and the way they 
had been wrenched out of any possible context, condemned by Flower to go on 
existing for no reason at all: defunct, devoid of purpose, alone in themselves now
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for the rest of time. It was the isolation that haunted Nashe, the image of irreducible 
separateness that burned into his memory, and no matter how hard he struggled, he 
never managed to break free of it. (Auster 1992: 84)
Here Nashe is having a premonition of his own situation in the near future. He 
will be “condemned by Flower to go on existing for no reason: defunct, devoid 
of purpose,” just as Didi and Gogo seem condemned to wait for a Godot who 
never comes, and like Laurel and Hardy in the play, will be building a wall 
“for no reason at all,” except to create a new object for Flower’s collection. 
There is a blank space in Stone’s City in which he plans to build a model of 
the house and grounds, which will include the wall, and there is the fascinating 
image in the film of Stone erecting his tiny replica wall simultaneously with 
the construction of the big wall by Pozzi and Nashe. This gives us a sense of 
the godlike quality Flower speaks of when he declares that “at times I feel that 
we’ve become immortal” (Auster 1992: 75). Nashe steals the little models of 
Flower and Stone from the City, but it is they who have “wrenched” Pozzi and 
Nashe out of their lives and “condemned” them to build their wall. Pozzi and 
Nashe, like the smiling convicts, will become a part of Stone’s City. They will 
also be featured as inhabitants of an even smaller City, “a model of the model” 
(Auster 1992: 81). The image created here is of complete powerlessness, the 
shrinking to a miniature model of the self, followed by a further shrinking to 
an almost unimaginably tiny size; it has the quality of nightmare. Stone, in 
contrast, becomes magnified into a giant, all-powerful god, ruling over a world 
that he has reduced to a diminutive toy.
Flower and Stone seem “essentially harmless,” but Nashe sees something 
darker behind the appearance. Stone, “whose manner was so humble and be­
nign,” has built a City with “an atmosphere of cruelty and revenge” (Auster 
1992: 87). Flower is also “ambiguous”: at times “sensible,” at times “like a lu­
natic,” the “mask” always seeming in danger of slipping (Auster 1992: 87). 
The dinner they are served before the card playing begins is “a kiddie banquet, 
a dinner fit for six-year-olds” (Auster 1992: 88). Flower and Stone appear at 
this point as “no more than grown-up children” (Auster 1992: 87), blunting 
some of Nashe’s earlier feelings of unease. But it seems that Flower and Stone 
are lulling their guests into a false state of security, and even encouraging a re­
gression into a childlike state. They are playing at being children, and it seems 
that this is infectious. When Nashe steals the little figures “it is the first time he 
has stolen anything since he was a little boy” (Auster 1992: 97). When Pozzi 
loses all their money, it seems clear that the play-acting has paid off. We now 
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see a very different Flower: “His expression made Nashe think of a high school 
principal sitting in his office with a couple of delinquent kids” (Auster 1992: 
105). Flower is now seen, not as childlike, but in the position of a father figure. 
The roles have been reversed; the power dynamics are now clear.
Nashe’s compliance in the scheme of building a wall is surprising. He finds 
“himself giving in to the idea of the wall as the only solution to his predicament” 
(Auster 1992: 109). He is “giving in”; he sees it as “almost a relief to have the 
decision taken out of his hands” (Auster 1992: 110). It is “a chance to redeem 
himself,” “a way to atone” (Auster 1992: 127) - but atone for what? There 
is a strong suggestion of Pozzi and Nashe being forced back into childhood. 
The ten thousand stones, when first seen, appear “like set of children’s blocks” 
(Auster 1992: 116). The “little red wagon” (Auster 1992: 129) which they are 
given to haul the stones to the wall, is a “Fast Flyer, the same kind of children’s 
wagon that Nashe had bought for his daughter on her third birthday. It seemed 
like a joke [...]” (Auster 1992: 130). It is a long way from the “red two-door 
Saab 900 - the first unused car he had ever owned” (Auster 1992: 4), which 
must have felt, for Nashe, like a powerful symbol of adulthood, of manhood. 
This car he has now lost, along with all his money, in the poker game.
Auster spoke, in The Invention of Solitude, of “looking for my father, 
looking frantically for anyone that resembled him” (Auster 1989: 21). It can 
be suggested that Nashe was also looking for his father, and Flower and Stone 
now seem to resemble an idea of his father, a father that he never knew. Auster 
wrote of how he wanted his father “to take notice of me” (Auster 1989: 21), of 
“a desire to do something extraordinary, to impress him with an act of heroic 
proportions” (Auster 1989: 23). This seems to be how Nashe sees the building 
of the wall: as “an act of heroic proportions,” as a way to make a father substitute 
“take notice” of him at last. He is certainly disappointed when Flower and Stone 
do not come out to watch the wall being built. Pozzi and Nashe are overseen 
throughout the building work, but by Calvin, employed by Flower and Stone, 
a mere representative. Didi and Gogo wait, Godot never comes; Laurel and 
Hardy build a wall, “they” never come. Flower and Stone never come to watch 
the building of the “monument,” the “work of art” (Auster 1992: 86).
Walls can be viewed in many different ways. Flower declares that his wall 
will be a “barrier against time” (Auster 1992: 86). Like the fence “encompassing 
the entire extent of Flower and Stone’s domain,” barriers can “keep things out” 
and keep “things in as well” (Auster 1992: 126). You can be inside the prison, 
or you can be outside: a wall can be a barrier to freedom, or a protection from 
a threat. A wall can be “a symphony of resurrected stones” or a “Wailing Wall” 
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(Auster 1992: 86). In “Laurel and Harvey Go to Heaven” and The Music of 
Chance a wall can also be a means of punishment. A wall can also become 
a poignant metaphor for the absence of emotional contact. Auster recognized 
that no matter what he did to impress his father, “his reaction would have been 
exactly the same. Whether I succeeded or failed did not essentially matter to 
him” (Auster 1989: 24). There is “Nothing to be done” (Beckett 1978: 9), as 
Gogo declares so bleakly. Auster feels that he and his father “were fixed in an 
unmoveable relationship, cut off from each other on opposite sides of a wall” 
(Auster 1989: 24). A wall can symbolize the absence of love.
Auster writes of the desire to find his father, but also of the need “to 
recognize, right from the start, that the essence of this project is failure” (Auster 
1989: 20). In Godot, Godot never comes, and a sense of failure haunts the 
play, right from the start. Godot, as the absent character, has been interpreted in 
many ways over the years, and of course should never be tied down to any fixed 
interpretation. But one way of reading the play is to see these two characters, 
Didi and Gogo, as lost, as Pozzi and Nashe seem lost, without direction or 
purpose or aim, apart from waiting for someone who will never come, someone 
who they seem to hope will change their destiny:
VLADIMIR: We’ll hang ourselves tomorrow. (Pause.) Unless Godot comes. 
ESTRAGON: And if he comes?
VLADIMIR: We’ll be saved. (Beckett 1978: 94)
Death or Godot, this is the bleak choice. At the ending of The Music of Chance 
there is also a strong sense of failure. The wall is not finished, and although we 
cannot know for sure, Pozzi seems to have died, and Nashe, too, it seems, also 
dies when he crashes the Saab. There is an interesting codicil, however. In the 
film Nashe does not die. Auster, himself, in a Hitchcockian cameo, drives by 
and picks him up from the side of the road, mirroring the way Nashe picked 
up Pozzi. So there is some kind of salvation, in the film version at least, with 
the creator seemingly taking pity on his creation, after all the suffering he has 
put him through. Nashe has finally found his father.
In “Twentieth-Century French Poetry” in The Red Notebook Auster 
(1996: 46) lists poets who have translated French poetry. Auster has also trans­
lated many French poems. The list, which includes Beckett, includes “many 
of the most important contemporary American British poets [that] have tried 
their had at translating the French,” and he considers that “it would be difficult 
to imagine their work had they not been touched in some way by the French.” 
This seems to me to be a very good way of considering Auster’s relationship 
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to Beckett’s work: it would be difficult to imagine his work had he not been 
“touched” by Beckett. He speaks about the “tremendous hold” Beckett had 
over him, and at one time admits that “the influence of Beckett was so strong 
that I couldn’t see my way beyond it” (Auster 1996: 105). In terms of Auster’s 
creative life Beckett has a role as a father figure. But Auster has had many 
fathers, many influences. “That’s why,” Auster (1996: 144) explains, that “The 
Book of Memory” (the second half of The Invention of Solitude) “is filled with 
so many references and quotations, in order to pay homage to all the others 
inside me.” Auster is proud of the “dozens of authors” (Auster 1996: 144) who 
have gone towards making him the writer that he is. He has found his way 
beyond Beckett, and, refreshingly, is happy to acknowledge the legacy - of 
Beckett and of others - in is work. It is another kind of inheritance, which, 
alongside the inheritance from his father, “all the novels [he has] written have 
come out of’ (Auster 1996: 132).
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Media Simulation and Manipulation in Two Novels 
of Philip K. Dick from the 1960s
Elisabeth Kraus (Kraus and Auer 2000: 1) suggests that for some time now 
we have been cautioned to “put our traditional (Enlightenment) notions of 
the truth or reality into quotation marks, since our experience of the real is 
always mediated through an empire of signs, as Roland Barthes put it.” The 
ever evolving, ever more sophisticated information technologies have offered 
new powerful means of manipulating data - and in consequence of hacking, 
warping or even inventing new reality.
What becomes increasingly important is the awareness of the manipula­
tion of reality and understanding how and to what extent the mass media have 
invaded or even colonised our minds, in what way they influence our uncon­
scious, by distorting “not only our fantasies, dreams and desires, but our very 
concept of reality" (Kraus and Auer 2000: 1). After initial optimism about the 
role of the media in society in the 1960s1, the persisting attempts of mass media 
to totally manipulate society are ever-increasingly noticeable. The French soci­
ologist Jean Baudrillard (after Kraus and Auer 2000: 1) claims that the modem 
visual technologies have created a new culture of images, signs, and codes, 
which is “impenetrable to old forms of resistance.” Baudrillard points to mass 
media as one of the most important invaders of our reality, and whatever atti­
tude one may have toward Baudrillard’s thought, which is often ambiguous and 
unsystematic, it does provide us with an intriguing critique of contemporary, 
image saturated age.
1 See the works of e.g. Marshall McLuhan or Hans M. Enzensberger.
Baudrillard developed his most seminal ideas in the 1980s, but, obviously, 
he was not the first to notice the malevolent force behind mass media. As early 
as the beginning of 1960s, an American Science-Fiction writer, Philip K. Dick, 
was already exploring the possible dangers that mass media pose. Different 
from the predominantly optimistic visions of “mainstream” American Science 
Fiction writers, Dick stood out as the gloomy prophet of the things to come. In 
his earliest fiction he struggled to expose the influence mass media exercised
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over American society, and envisaged how they are bound to become the means 
of reality bending manipulations for the power elite.
The two novels discussed in this essay, The Simulacra and The Penultimate 
Truth, come from the 1960s, and do not belong to Dick’s most celebrated 
achievements, however, they do deserve some serious attention as they approach 
a problem that continues to be relevant even now, about 40 years after they 
were published.
The Simulacra published in 1964 is a conglomerate of nearly all themes 
found in early Philip K. Dick’s fiction. The novel features a repressive police 
state, huge powerful business cartels, a charismatic cult leader, fascinating 
and ruthless female character, time travel, psychic powers, Nazis, androids, 
emigration to Mars, mind and reality manipulating media, and simulacra. What 
it lacks is the idea of a conceptual breakthrough from ordinary reality into 
a different one, “a higher or altered state of consciousness” (Mackey 1988: 65), 
which is so characteristic of Dick.2 On the other hand, however, it does stress 
the fact that the manner in which society seems to be structured is a mere 
fake, and the media manipulate it so that the bona fide centres of power are 
concealed, unknown to ordinary members of society.
2 In fact, all major novels of Philip K. Dick contain this theme.
The story takes place in Dick’s typical near future dystopia-disguised-as- 
utopia, and the dystopian character of the world is immediately obvious. The 
USE A (America and Europe merged into one state) is ostensibly ruled by the 
First Lady, Nicole Thibodeaux, whose husband is regularly replaced in mock 
elections. The striking matriarchal system is actually a cover for the council, 
which governs the country from behind the scenes. Nothing is what it seems; 
people seem to live in a kind of hyperreal, simulated universe. Jean Baudrillard 
(1991: 3) discussing the novel makes a very apt comment in his SFS essay:
Dick does not create an alternate cosmos nor a folklore or a cosmic exoticism, nor 
intergalactic heroic deeds; the reader is, from the outset, in total simulation without 
origin, past, or future - in a kind of flux of all coordinates (mental, spatio-temporal, 
semiotic). It is not a question of parallel universes, or double universes, or even of 
possible universes: not possible nor impossible, nor real nor unreal. It is hyperreal. 
It is a universe of simulation [...].
The world shown in the novel has lost touch with actual reality. Nicole 
herself died long time ago and since then has been replaced by a succession 
of actresses merely playing the role of the First Lady, deprived of any power 
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whatsoever. Her husband, called derAlte, as he is always elderly, is a mechanical 
contraption, a perfect simulacrum produced by a large cartel. The masses are 
kept unenlightened by television broadcasts starring the First Lady, an ultimate 
tastemaker, who is adored by most of the people. She is called “the most 
synthetic object in our milieu [.. .]”(Dick 1977: 98) or “An illusion. Something 
synthetic, unreal [...]” (Dick 1977: 119) for her role is not much different from 
the one her android husband plays, being a tool, an instrument of the big-scale 
fraud. She is a metaphorical android, an idea Dick will come back to on many 
occasions, a human deprived of humanism, being a mere tool, a product of 
mass media and the power elite.
It is only a select cast of people (the so-called Ges) that actually know the 
truth about how things really are, whereas nearly all characters in the novel are 
mired in the common delusion. Richard Kongrosian, a psychokinetic pianist, 
is deeply in love with the First Lady, evidently unaware of her fakeness. Al 
Miller and Ian Duncan, dream of performing in front of her in the White House, 
which they eventually do, but it only leads to their bitter disappointment as 
they discover the truth. Douglas Mackey (1988: 65) rightly compares these 
obsessive feelings towards Nicole with the relationship between Louis Rosen 
and Pris Frauenzimmer in We Can Build You (1972); however, here we deal with 
the whole society being schizophrenic, as a private delusion becomes public 
belief, and the central point, around which the society structures its universe is 
fake, a total simulation, “an image without substance” (Mackey 1988: 65).
The simulation is further perpetuated by the image of Mars as a favourite 
emigration destination. It is an idealized place people dream about and nearly 
all characters are sooner or later tempted to stop at one of the jalopy jungle 
outlets (similar to our used car dealerships) to purchase their own one-way 
minispaceship to get to the red planet. They are helped by papoolas, perfect 
simulacra of furry telepathic Martian creatures that use subliminal techniques 
to ensnare people with promises of unlimited freedom in the new world.
The actual situation on Mars is, however, never presented; never are we 
shown what the emigrants’ life is like, just like the characters in the story the 
readers are fed commercials and promises. Mars seems to be rather a legend, 
a sort of promised land people have not much idea about. It is a place to dream 
of escaping to, an ultimate consolation, but still only a dream, which not many 
are to fulfil. Bearing in mind Dick’s other visions of Mars from the same period 
of his career (e.g. Martian Time Slip (1964) or The Three Stigmata of Palmer 
Eldritch (1965)), which are ratherbleak, grim and sterile, making Mars a place 
people wish they could emigrate to sounds more like an ironic joke on his part.
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An intriguing fact, which might cast some more light on the reality on Mars, is 
that people deciding to take this step and emigrate take the illusion with them 
by purchasing android neighbours to keep company.
A man, when he emigrated, could buy neighbors, buy the simulated presence of life, 
the sound and motion of human activity - or at least its mechanical near-substitute - 
to bolster his morale in the new environment of unfamiliar stimuli and perhaps, god 
forbid, no stimuli at all. And in addition to this primary psychological gain there 
was a practical secondary advantage as well. The famnexdo group of simulacra 
developed a parcel of land, tilled it and planted it, irrigated it, made it fertile, highly 
productive [...]. The famnexdo were actually not next door at all; they were part 
of their owner’s entourage. Communications with them was in essence a circular 
dialogue with oneself; the famnexdo, if they were functioning properly, picked up 
the covert hopes and dreams of the settler and detailed them back in an articulated 
fashion. Therapeutically, this was helpful, although from a cultural standpoint it 
was a trifle sterile. (Dick 1977; 58-9)
What the escape to Mars really means then is exchanging one illusion for 
another. There is no escape from the fake reality, the world of The Simulacra is 
a simulated fake, Ersatz world without any way out. Whatever the characters 
turn to is not authentic.
As Hazel Pierce (1983: 126) states, the author “pushes rather than leads 
the reader, shouts rather than hints at the overt manipulation of our minds 
and our behaviour [...]”. The means for that manipulation is the advertising 
industry, pursuing the most effective ways to seduce a possible buyer. One 
of the techniques is the already mentioned papoola, a tool for mind-bending, 
which deprives the listener of free choice, infusing them with positive feelings, 
thus winning them to purchase.
A more irritating device for advertising is the Nitz commercial, a syn­
thetic life form programmed to convey a particular message, which stubbornly 
squeezes into cars and houses attaching itself to a person and repeats the mes­
sage shrieking repeatedly. The Nitz commercials are practically everywhere, 
they add to the overall image of chaos and image saturation of the society, in 
which nothing is what it initially seemed to be. The whole power elite, media, 
social system, and the law constitute a sophisticated fraud.
People live in communal buildings, divided on the basis of their intelli­
gence, education, wealth and moral standards, with frequent meetings, voting, 
and fruitless political discussions. This promotes stagnation of human free will 
and initiative, which is further completely negated by the advertising gimmicks. 
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Ordinary people have become mere pawns in this political game, expendable 
and devoid of free will, and the government is just a face-saving device for the 
ruling elite coupled with business cartels.
The novel ends with an image of violent civil war perpetrated by the anti­
government organization called the Sons of Job, as well as by the opposing 
forces within the ruling council. It is yet another area, in which simulation is 
visible. As an illegal revolutionary faction The Sons of Job negate the totalitarian 
system and finally start a coup, however, it turns out to be yet another fabrication, 
as the charismatic leader of the organization is, in fact, a prominent member 
of the secret council that rules the country. So, if the coup is to be successful 
it will only be a cabinet coup; the power will merely change hands and the 
general situation of the society will not be altered. The exposure of simulation 
does not necessarily have to lead to the collapse of the system, Nicole broods 
over her position in the society:
Perhaps the potency of her presence, the old magical power of her image, would 
prevail. After all, the public was accustomed to seeing her. They believed in her, 
from decades of conditioning. The tradition-sanctified whip and carrot might still 
function [...]. They’ll believe, [...] if they want to believe [...] How many [...] 
could break with the reality principle? Believe in something they knew intellectually 
was an illusion? (Dick 1977: 195, emphasis mine)
Dick is raising a disquieting question that the distinction between reality and 
illusion, which is blurred by the simulacra, might not matter after all, as the 
media management performs on a subrational level and, in fact, exploits human 
vulnerability to believe in an image, consequently it is already too late to 
divert this process.
Dick does not offer much solace, as everything that we touch turns into 
something totally different. He ends the novel with a bitter, ironic image of 
chuppers, a species of man vaguely similar to Stone Age people, an after­
effect of radioactive fall out. The chuppers lead their lives in remote villages, 
separated from the rest of the society, but when the power struggle escalates 
into an all-out conflict, they gather round TV sets observing the televised war. 
This is a hint that “homo sapiens has had his time at bat” (Pierce 1983: 128) 
and the new species is now ready to take over, which is evidently a bitter joke 
on Dick’s part. Still, these Neanderthal-like characters provide a contrasting 
point to the world of numbed emotions, flattened experience, and deadened 
humanity, which the world of The Simulacra is.
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Dick further explores his suspicion of the media’s capacity for manipulation 
in a novel from 1964, The Penultimate Truth. The novel is an extension of 
a short story “The Defenders,” and its world is divided between two societies: 
those who live and work underground in huge housing complexes, called tanks, 
and the “neo-feudal elite” (Seed 1995: 209) living on extensive estates on 
the surface3. Such situation evidently perpetuates an information gap between 
those who rule and the mass in the tanks. The reason a large part of society 
stays underground is their conviction that a nuclear war is being fought on the 
surface, and waged by cybernetic soldiers, called “leadies,” which they have to 
produce in large quantities. This conviction is greatly reinforced by the media. In 
reality, however, the war has long been over and the western world is governed 
by an international body in Geneva, and the “leadies” are used by the elite as 
servants and workers on the huge estates. The war then is a fiction that keeps 
the subterranean masses in a subservient position. Dick creates two strands of 
narrative that converge and both work to expose the truth about the war and the 
regime. On the surface, Joseph Adams works as a government official in the 
propaganda section and gradually penetrates the mechanism of the system that 
he hates. Underground, Nicholas St. James is manoeuvring his way up in an 
attempt to find a replacement pancreas for a member of his tank, in the process 
of which he will ultimately discover the truth about the actual situation.
3 The situation when a society is divided into two categories, and the ones living and working 
inside a fabricated world are kept in the dark about the surrounding world has often been used in 
S-F literature and film. A good example is the Polish S-F comedy Seksmisja where the underground 
world is inhabited by a female totalitarian society, which is misinformed about the living conditions 
on the surface. The leader of the no-male community is in fact a fake, a relict male dressed up as 
a woman, who enjoys an indulgent life in a comfortable modem villa on the surface; or a Hollywood 
super-production The Island, where a society of clones is raised in order to provide “spare” organs 
for the rich. This idea, in turn, is similar to Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel Never Let Me Go, where people 
are raised and brought up in closed youth centres, only to be used as organ donors when they are 
older.
The world of the novel is conditioned by and dependent on the flow of 
information through the media. The main medium used to maintain the status 
quo is television. Under the surface, the tankers gather every day to watch the 
news bulletin and they are fed the images of cities being blasted to atoms as 
the war sweeps the surface of the Earth. They refer to the TV sets as their sole 
window on the world above, and do not question the images they see as the 
propaganda machine holds them tightly in its claws. A popular question-and- 
answer program, for example, is in fact, an effective way for strengthening 
collective obedience by prompting the participants to answer in the right way.
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On the other hand, there is a tanker, who records the Protector’s addresses 
and when viewing them again spots minor inconsistencies. These discrepancies 
reveal the war as a gigantic lie, but what is also implied here is that the role of 
the media in perpetuating the deception can eventually be disclosed.
Simulation is the fundamental defining process in the novel. The regime 
makes use of a guild of fabricators, who are devoted to inventing and creating 
a “universe of authentic fakes” (Dick 1978:37). This is a prime example of what 
George Slusser called destabilising of history in Dick’s fiction. Commenting 
on The Man in the High Castle, which is very much devoted to the production 
of fake fakes, he argues that:
The word history places the burden of the event not only on the thing but on the 
mind that seeks to place it. [...] to consider a thing as history is to accept its 
replication [...]. History [...] in Dick is made to function so as to undo its own 
fixity. By fixing a thing, we allow it to replicate. And in the proliferation of like 
events we lose sight of the authentic one, do not know its place or ours.
(Slusser 1992: 207)
Adams is a perfect illustration of that notion, as, for example, he is confused 
whether to value a bust he has found in the post war rubble or treat it as yet 
another fake. The omnipresence of simulation brings on confusion over what is 
authentic and the boundary between authenticity and sham has become blurred 
or even indistinguishable.
The narrative is punctuated by revelations that yet suspend the truth to some 
concluding point, which eventually never comes, hence the title The Penulti­
mate Truth. Adams realises that the President of the US is a simulacrum, but 
not only that, he/it has an identical counterpart in Russia, Adams discovers that 
the Eisenbludt4 studios in Moscow have made two dissimilar documentaries on 
the history of Europe, and, simultaneously, he becomes involved in a govern­
mental plan to produce ancient artefacts. All three cases involve a principle of 
recession, as David Seed (1995: 210) suggests. Adams’s initial realisation that 
the President is lying is supplanted by a shock of the knowledge that the lie goes 
further up, and the agents of manipulation are technicians maintaining the sim­
ulacrum president. The two films present contrasting versions of history after 
the war, and each of them contains discrepancies that emphasise their status as 
fiction. Finally, the governmental intrigue in Geneva, between the director (who 
himself is hardly a human being, as his organs have been replaced by prosthetic 
4 David Seed suggests this is an allusion to Eisenstein and the UFA propaganda studios in the 
Third Reich (1995: 211).
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ones, and only his brain remains original) and his opposition shows that once 
you possess power over the media you are able to fake anything, even ancient 
history. A contrasting process of, actually growing in status, concerns David 
Lantano, a Cherokee Indian, who exists between reality and illusion. He is an 
actor who played the role of a charismatic leader in the bogus propaganda news 
stories and in this way comes to embody the typical qualities of leadership, 
while being no more than yet another fakery.
Lantano is similar to Benny Cemoli, a character from a 1960 short story 
“If There Were No Benny Cemoli.” The story provides a further interesting 
study in the power of mass media. After an apocalyptic war people on Earth 
are struggling to rebuild the civilisation when a host of spaceships arrives. 
The spaceships carry people from Alpha Centauri, who arrive to help the lo­
cals rebuild the civilisation, but also punish the culprits in the atomic war. 
The Centaurians establish efficient administration and police forces, but the 
Earthmen, having expected the aliens’ arrival, have prepared a trick to play 
on the invaders. They sabotage the headquarters of New York Times, which is 
a fully automated, homeostatic newspaper, which gathers data on its own and 
publishes itself regularly. The newspaper starts reports on a fully fictitious man 
called Benny Cemoli, who, as it is claimed there, seems to be the person respon­
sible for the apocalyptic nuclear war. The police apparatus of the Centaurians 
instantly focuses on Cemoli, launching a detailed investigation into the man, 
and consequently letting the real culprits get away.
Dick stresses the importance of mass media in creating public figures, 
events or trends, in his opinion reality is always mediated. As one of the 
Centaurian bureaucrats thinks: “We are only real so long as The Times writes 
about us; as if we were dependent for our existence on it” (Dick 1991: 183). 
The power of the media to establish and demolish is far too great, and as Dick 
himself believed “at least half the famous people in history never existed [...]” 
(Dick 1991: 376) but were a product of mass media.
Both novels on one hand deal with the role of mass media in assisting 
power elite in getting into office and then maintaining this office, and on the 
other they show the political consequences of the disinformation techniques, 
disinformation in the meaning of spreading to a specific target group false, 
incomplete, or misleading information. A practice common in both the USA 
and Soviet Union in the 1960s and later (Shultz and Godson 1984: 37). The 
power elite of The Penultimate Truth as well as The Simulacra is nothing short 
of the totalitarian regime in Orwell’s 1984, as it systematically sustains its 
power by a torrent of falsifications covered up by an image of a father-like 
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leader with everyone’s good as his sole goal. In The Penultimate Truth the 
impression created by the media is that the Protector addresses each person 
individually, which exposes how the image is capable of securing submission 
of each individual, even though the image is counterfeit. The same situation 
takes place in The Simulacra, with the First Lady and DerAlte. Both novels thus 
are tales of almost unlimited manipulability of facts and images, of dictatorship 
of bureaucracy that holds on to power thanks to their ability to manipulate and 
control the truth with the use of different media.
What is easily discernible here is one of the central motifs that run through 
Dick’s fiction: reality is never given and unmediated; it is always managed 
by dominant ideological elites in order to gain or maintain their political role. 
Dick himself suggested that this was his: “[...] underlying premise [...] that 
the world we experience is not the real world [...] the phenomenal world is 
not the real world, it’s something other than the real world. It’s either semi- 
real, or some kind of forgery” (Rickman 1998: 128). His fiction, especially 
early fiction, contains numerous examples of characters who suddenly find that 
reality is not what they used to think it was, that it is “something other” to 
repeat Dick’s words. The main idea, however, is that the real can in no time 
transform itself, or that it turns out to be only a mere façade perpetrated by 
some malevolent forces.
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Comparative Literature
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The Motif of Darkness in John Dowland’s
“In Darkness Let Me Dwell” and George 
Harrison’s “Beware of Darkness”
The aim of this paper is to present and compare the use of the motif of darkness 
in two English lyric songs that have come to be recognized by scholars and 
critics to be among the finest examples of both the craft of musical composition 
and the art of constructing a refined lyrical utterance to contribute to the over­
all sophisticated quality of the respective pieces. Despite being composed in 
relative distance from each other they nevertheless share a lot of both musical 
and poetic tradition although their treatment of the central imagerial motif is, 
as shall be seen, quite contrastive.
The first of the songs in question is John Dowland’s composition “In 
Darkness Let Me Dwell.” It was published1 by the composer’s son Robert in the 
year 1610 as part of the collection called A Musicali Banquet, which included 
a selection of lyric songs in English as well as in several other European 
languages and the choice argues careful consideration and fine taste on the 
part of the editor. “In Darkness Let Me Dwell” is one of the three which 
are by John Dowland. Despite this relative lack of prominence, for the song 
was never included in the four basic collections of Dowland’s songs which 
were published between 1597 and 1612, the composition has since come to be 
recognized as counting among the most distinctive examples of the art of the 
English Renaissance songcraft (Sola Pinto 1966: 67, 125-27).
1 All the following data is based on the liner notes to the collected works of John Dowland by 
Rooley 1997: 29 (see References).
Its enduring appeal seems to be to a large extent the result of the fact that the 
song manages to encapsulate a lot of the period’s aesthetic ramifications in the 
form of a clear-cut, straightforward imagery. This imagery derives directly from 
the contemporary cult of Melancholy, which was one of the most prominent 
elements in the literary atmosphere of the early seventeenth century in Jacobean 
England. The interest in melancholy as both a psychological condition in the 
medical sense and a phenomenon affecting man’s spiritual and artistic life is in
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itself a complex affair for it influenced, sometimes in a forceful, sometimes in 
a subtle way, virtually every aspect of the country’s cultural life. It thus extends 
from contemporary medical writings, through the music of Dowland and Byrd, 
the poetry of Donne and other metaphysical poets, the conservative “Golden 
Age” poetry of Samuel Daniel, Michael Drayton and George Chapman,2 to 
the character of Hamlet. The culmination of the fascination with Melancho­
lia was of course the well-known Anatomy of Melancholy by Robert Burton 
published in 1621, which in its way seeks to connect all the divergent strains 
of thought which had accumulated over the concept. Thus Burton develops 
the commonly shared idea which treats melancholy as an essentially mental 
condition originating from the excess of cold and dry quality in the balance of 
the four humours and resulting not only in languishing depression, but also in 
states of aimless agitation, restlessness and delusions. Quoting both European 
and Arab psychiatrists, Burton stresses the unique role of art and especially 
music and dancing in curing the condition.3
2 The term is used in the sense it has in Lewis 1968: 464-535.
3 For more on the topic, see Radden 2002: 129-6.
The understanding of this leads to a full appreciation of the nature of 
the link between melancholy and art. In this view, while the condition itself 
is not evidently positive, it potentially produces the right mental condition 
for the catharsis which art is in the natural position to offer. Thus music and 
poetry, which seem to obsessively concentrate on describing and defining the 
unwholesome mental state, offer by this very characteristic, an opportunity to 
undergo a process which in its essence is a therapeutic one.
All this leads one to the theme of darkness which had come to be a central 
motif to convey the notion of Melancholia in poetic imagery among the artists 
and intellectuals connected to the person of Lucy Russell, the Countess of 
Bedford, who emerged at that time as the pivotal figure in the patronage of 
artists within the Pembroke/Essex baronial circle, supporting the likes of Daniel, 
Drayton, Dowland, and Donne. Of these it is perhaps John Donne’s literary 
output which was most intimately affected by the patronage and the friendship 
and this is evident in his verse epistles written to the Countess. Similarly, two 
most accomplished poems dealing with the melancholic state - “Twickenham 
Garden” and “A Noctural upon Saint Lucy’s Day” - were also composed by 
him. It is especially the latter which lays the blueprint for the use of the imagery 
of darkness for a poetic analysis of the melancholic mood. There the description 
of the melancholy endured on the year’s shortest day and caused by the death of 
THE MOTIF OF DARKNESS ... 353
the beloved is conveyed through a series of images developing from the notion 
of darkness in the sense of privation, absence or “nothingness.” Although 
the contemplation of darkness here ends in despair, nonetheless it offers the 
purification necessary to experience the pain in the proper, conscious way 
which paradoxically will ultimately result in the obliteration of the pain itself:
He ruin’d me, and I am re-begot
Of absence, darkness, death - things which are not.
What John Dowland does in his song is aiming at the same set of connotations 
via conventional allegory:
In darkness let me dwell,
The ground shall Sorrow be;
The roof Despair to bar
All cheerful light from me,
The walls of marble black
That moisten’d still shall weep;
My music hellish jarring sounds
To banish friendly sleep.
Dowland’s song is not only simplified in metre (as one switches from the 
complex rhyme pattern of an iambic pentametre stanza in Donne to an abcb 
arrangement of iambic trimetre lines in Dowland), but in the whole poetic 
apparatus as well. Nevertheless its allegorical framework is effective enough to 
successfully convey the underlying poetic meaning. Thus in Dowland’s song 
darkness is the inside of a windowless house, where the conditions are defined 
by negative inference: there is no light there, no rest, no peace, and even time 
and space become obliterated. This is because with no light and the walls being 
made “of marble black” one cannot define physical dimensions.
Furthermore the “jarring sounds” will not only induce extreme physical 
fatigue, which makes time orientation difficult, but will also prevent the speaker 
from conceiving of anything in terms of spatial orientation since the persistent 
existence of discord will make it impossible for proper music to enter the 
interior. Proper music, in contemporary understanding of the term, means sound 
which is arranged in time according to the notion of harmony, which, as all 
medieval and Renaissance psychology explained, is conceived of through an 
essentially spatial mental layout. Thus all possible mental sequencing of time is 
banished from the house of Melancholy with even the walls weeping incessantly 
so as to avoid being subject to any measurement.
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An interesting thing is that even the very structure of the house is designed 
to disorientate the inmate. This is because it seems that the natural allegorical 
design of the “ground” and the “roof’ is in fact inverted here and while the 
natural allegorical logic would possibly have made the roof out of sorrow and the 
ground - indicating the bottom-line - out of despair Dowland inverts the scheme 
and the purpose appears to be to even further alienate and disorientate the 
inhabitant of the house by altering even the most basic of all spatial landmarks 
- the up-and-down orientation points.
Within such a framework darkness stands for the ultimate form of privation 
which is not only sensory and ultimately mental, but which is, as Donne more 
articulately puts it, “an elixir” of nothing, i.e. an emptiness arrived at through 
a condensation of ordinary emptiness, and hence one which is a more intense 
form of it. As such it combines the claustrophobic sense of the voluntary 
confinement with the sense of being lost in time and space.
The voluntary nature of this confinement is, however, important here as the 
lyrical persona enters the house of Melancholy willingly and with no illusions 
as to its character:
Thus wedded to my woes
And bedded to my tomb,
O let me living die,
Till death do come.
Thus the persona will “dwell” in the house - not properly speaking live, not 
wait and, significantly, not even exist. Just like in Donne’s lyric, being situated 
inside darkness means being situated inside nothing and it similarly aims at 
conveying the idea of a cathartic escape from the experienced pain paradoxically 
achieved by attuning all of one’s senses to the experience. The resulting state in 
which one will “living die” is in its essence a scheme which aims at transferring 
the experience out onto the surrounding. In this way dwelling in darkness is 
a way of preventing darkness from dwelling in you. This is because, although 
the reality of darkness is here all-encompassing and seemingly inescapable, it 
becomes dependent on the person of the observer as it is his conscious choice 
to be submerged in the trans-like state of contemplating the distillation of one’s 
own misfortune.
Thus by projecting the tormenting experience onto the surrounding reality 
the persona himself becomes in a sense liberated from it as the contemplation 
of pain brings the fragmented perception back into focus and balance.
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Let us now turn to the second of the two lyrics with which our present 
argument is concerned. The song in question is George Harrison’s composition 
“Beware of Darkness,” which dates from 1970 when it constituted one of the 
many musical gems gracing the musician’s debut album All Things Must Pass - 
originally a triple-vinyl collection which has since achieved the status of one of 
the very greatest artistic exercises in its musical genre.4 The two compositions 
offer possibilities of an interesting and revealing comparison by virtue of being 
closely approximate in formal characteristics and means of expression and 
most importantly, of course, by virtue of making the concept of darkness the 
cornerstone of their poetic imagery.
4 For the additional critical background, see Greene 2006: 139-84; Allison 2006: 110-15; 
Giuliano 1997: 85-158; for the biographical context, seeClayson 1997:220; Shapiro 2003:113-50.
5 The song was apparently conceived during the musician’s hospital visits to his mother dying 
of cancer.
The comparison is also interesting because the way in which George Harri­
son’s lyric develops this motif is quite divergent from the Renaissance composer. 
There are indeed two fundamental points of difference which account for the 
latter of the two lyrics using the concept of darkness in a distinctly different way. 
The first is that, with the cult of Melancholy being long confined to cultural 
history, “Beware of Darkness” substitutes for it a deeply spiritual, religious 
perspective which, although introduced into the lyric by subtle understatement, 
nevertheless permeates its entire imagery and message. The second point, which 
corresponds closely to the first, but this time relates directly to the form of the 
song, is that instead of an intimate lyric confession, as was the case in Dowland, 
Harrison’s song takes the form of an endearingly intimate address.
Watch out now,
Take care, beware of falling swingers
Dropping all around you,
The pain that often lingers in your fingertips
Beware of darkness
Although it is difficult to imagine leaving aside the autobiographical data 
concerning the composition of the song,5 no circumstantial context is able to 
account for the subtle turn of phrase which gives special forcefulness to the 
song’s unassuming utterances. The tone of the opening lines effortlessly devel­
ops the close relation between the speaker and the addressee and it automatically 
positions the lyric in the tradition of poems where the emotional closeness is 
a springboard for unpremeditated moral advice. In this context one cannot but 
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think of lyrics such as Chaucer’s “Truthe,” Kipling’s “If,” Dylan Thomas’s “Do 
Not Go Gentle Into that Good Night,” and Bob Dylan’s “Forever Young.” As 
one may expect, it is the poem by Dylan Thomas that corresponds most closely 
to Harrison’s lyric, although darkness is here not the blind massive force of 
unpremeditated annihilation depriving the dying of life and of pain in a way 
of natural kindness, just like it is not a soothing ingredient of a potentially 
therapeutic psychological exercise.
Indeed, in stark contrast to Dowland, it is precisely dwelling in darkness 
which is to be avoided at all cost and, in stark contrast to Dylan Thomas, the 
idea of the inevitability of surrender is also to be strenuously resisted. This is 
because in Harrison’s song darkness is also a force of negation, but this time it 
is an active, powerful and vicious force pursuing the destruction of something 
which the song, in a masterful feat of well-pointed understatement, does not 
overtly name, but the loss of which seems to constitute the ultimate loss. One 
can immediately spot the heavily sinister undertone which accompanies the 
word “darkness” every time the speaker utters it. Thus, when, by contrast, in 
Dowland’s lyric the word is a descriptive term for the gloominess of mood 
accompanying Melancholy, in Harrison the word indicates a kind of intelligent 
black hole sucking in goodness in order to maintain and define its own exis­
tence. It is therefore a force much stronger than Dowland’s Melancholy, most 
importantly in the sense that it cannot be cheated to yield a therapeutic result 
not only because it seems to be in some way intelligent but because it is so 
thoroughly evil that no effort can produce any good result while partaking 
of its power.
One may therefore ask for the reason why the word “darkness” closes each 
section of the speaker’s utterance since it is at the same time bestowed the 
insidiously sinister air. The reason seems to be that what darkness stands for in 
the lyric represents a force which irreparably destroys the very core of one’s 
being and is therefore harmful in an ultimate way, but which is for most of the 
time disguised as something else when it is actually encountered in everyday 
life. Hence the naming of “darkness,” in the hushed, almost reverent way in 
which the celebratory tone is contrived to allay the naked primitive terror which 
the word conjures up, is designed to serve as a way to emphasize the need to at 
all cost defend oneself, or someone dear and precious, against what the word 
represents and in order to do this one has to identify “darkness” behind the veil 
of everyday reality. The risk inherent in the repeated mention of the dreaded 
word is apparently worth taking because to fall for “darkness” would be worse 
than the worst fear of what the word itself portends.
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Thus “darkness” seems to lurk here inside various things - it is equally 
present in the false promise inherent in the life of the “swingers,” or social 
climbers of a robustly egotistic persuasion, and in the lives they change by the 
way they live theirs, as well as in the lives of those for whom the emotional 
burden of a deeply experienced personal loss makes it impossible to regain 
mental equilibrium (and it is here worth noting how superbly effective the line 
about the “pain which lingers in your fingertips” is in imaginatively evoking 
the depth of the feeling). One may easily notice that, despite the two walks 
of life being mutually exclusive in a very firm way, the danger of “darkness” 
is part of both experiences.
The second stanza of the song develops the idea further by adding another 
possibility, this time it is the entanglement in the endless maze of one’s own 
private mind, stemming, as it often may, from the observation of all the negative 
aspects of the outside world:
Watch out now,
Take care, beware the thoughts that linger
Winding up inside your head
The hopelessness around you
In the dead of night
Beware of sadness
The next section of the lyric brings in more of the spiritual dimension, 
which also positions the song in contrast with “In Darkness Let Me Dwell.” 
While in Dowland’s song the mental pain was considered the ultimate threat, in 
Harrison’s song what is thought of as a greater danger is the fact that the pain 
involved in the contact with “darkness” diverts one from the destined course of 
one’s life. Thus the purpose of life is not, as in Dowland, personal gratification, 
but it appears to function as part of a greater design which transcends the indi­
vidual mind - in other words one does not live in order to be happy but to fulfil 
a mission for which one is placed in life by a force beyond one’s own volition:
It can hit you, it can hurt you -
Make you sore and what is more
That is not what you are here for.
The last section of the song begins with a juxtaposition of a crowd of 
dancers made up of those whose have chosen not to answer to the destiny 
bestowed on them, and the solitary “unconscious sufferer” who, while he may 
or may not be part of the dancing crowd (notice the understatement again), 
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is not able to discover his mission in life because, in some similarity to the 
speaker in Dowland, he cannot isolate and focus on the precise nature of 
his pain. However, it is also here that Dowland and Harrison part company. 
This is because, while in Dowland’s song the liberation is achieved through 
a manipulation of reality, Harrison invokes Maya - the deity which in the 
Indian religions is responsible for creating all manner of illusions and false 
appearances, and which, specifically in Hinduism, needs to be overcome in 
order to achieve the true vision of the divine essence:6
6 See Eliade 1994b: 129-37; Eliade 1994a: 33-51.
Watch now, take care
Beware of soft shoe shufflers
Dancing down the sidewalks,
As each unconscious sufferer
Wanders aimlessly,
Beware of MAYA
Watch now take care,
Beware of greedy leaders
They’ll take you where you should not go,
While Weeping Atlas Cedars
They just want to grow - 
Beware of darkness.
Now it is important to realize that, although the stylistic use of the concept 
is similar, Maya is not strictly speaking the “darkness” which has been defined 
as the ultimate threat of spiritual existence. It is more that the danger of not 
seeing through the appearances of life is that Maya may prevent one from 
identifying some strands of human experience as leading not just to pain and 
sadness, but, more crucially, into “darkness.” Hence all the illusions of life are, 
as it were, the tool of “darkness” used to waylay the unwary into a trap.
Indeed the idea of the dangers of life stealthily sucking in one not on his 
proper guard is restated once again in the last lines of the song and it is also 
here that the religious perspective reasserts itself again in the careful phrasing 
chosen for the closing verses. The danger represented by the “greedy leaders” 
consists in drawing one into compromising what may be called the pure form of 
life and substituting it for ideologies imitating the true values of life by offering 
life-defining philosophies which are, however, based on the greed and ambition 
of some and the denial of the fullness of existence for many.
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Here the notion of the inherent nature of life as a mission returns in the 
line warning that shallow ideologies is where “you should not go” not because 
of an arbitrary prohibition (and therefore not “where you mustn’t go”) but 
because to live one’s life to the full is to live it according to the way it was 
objectively designed to be lived. Therefore, just like the Atlas Cedars fulfill their 
vocation by living to the full their natural mission to grow (which, importantly, 
is not the same as having the opportunity to grow to the full) the human life is 
also thought of here a mission to achieve the fullness of life (and the careful 
use of understatement is also worth noting here), while “darkness” is a force 
which seeks to make one accept pain, frustration and the sense of loss as the 
ultimate reality.
Hence the reason why in George Harrison’s song the illusion inherent in 
darkness cannot be put to a good use is that the imagery of the song builds on 
reference to an objective reality which is independent of the mental reality of the 
speaker, and the illusion of the reality of pain is also in its roots conditioned from 
the outside even if it works solely within the realm of individual psychology.
As may be now observed, the understanding of the concept of darkness and 
its role in the imagery of the two respective pieces is markedly different, but 
in either case it is developed with a commendable poetic precision where the 
craft of the word goes side by side with the musical accomplishment and thus 
it is to be hoped that the comparative study of the two songs has revealed the 
potential of this form of artistic expression for putting forward lyric arguments 
of considerable sophistication and intellectual depth.
Thus the juxtaposition of the two lyrics undertaken here has been designed 
to display some of the semantic possibilities exploited by those searching for 
a more profound meaning behind concepts and ideas current in their time. This 
search frequently yields rich and multifarious, though incompatible, results 
whereby the interplay of contradictory meanings may invest notions like that 
of darkness with the subtle form of ambiguity inherent in concepts the con­
templation of which has, over the ages, proved both puzzling and invigorating 
to generations of artists.
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Hyperbole and Understatement in the Depiction 
of the Emotions
Oft with true sighs, oft with uncalled tears, 
Now with slow words, now with dumb eloquence [...]
(Philip Sydney: Astrophel and Stella [1591] etext)
The language of the emotions seems to be infinitely varied. Their expression can 
run the whole gamut from elaborate eloquence to reservedness and understate­
ment, from verbosity to suggestive body language. In every culture, however, 
the expression of the emotions is also subject to particular display rules which 
regulate what and how much a speaker may appropriately express under what 
circumstances. In my paper, I want to analyse the display rules in operation in 
English literature with regard to the description of pain and desire which, at first 
sight, are not only situated at opposed poles of human experience, but also seem 
to be regulated by entirely different rules of decorum. The article will illustrate 
that despite the remarkable consistency of pain and love metaphors used in 
a wide range of poetry and prose, acceptability of emotional rhetoric and the 
use of stylistic excess or understatement in a text is still strongly dependent on 
genre, gender, culture and context. Examples will be drawn from a wide range 
of texts in poetry and prose; for reasons of scope, drama will not be considered.
Psychologists, physicians and literary scholars have all emphasised the dif­
ficulty of expressing physical pain in words. Extreme pain, “actively destroys” 
(Scarry 1985: 4) language, completely resists narrative embodiment (Wand­
less 1991: 52) and reduces the sufferer to cries and groans (which, indeed, are 
the natural language of pain, just as they are, in fact, the language of sexual 
pleasure). Even in such cases, however, the body is not mute but inarticulate, 
speaking in pains and symptoms (Frank 1995: 2). Yet even under less traumatic 
circumstances the number of lexicalised pain words in the English language 
is fairly limited. Many pain words in English (as the carefully researched Me 
Gill pain questionaire shows) are metaphorical and refer to temporal, thermal 
and pressure dimensions of pain, to its intensity and fluctuation, and to the 
sensory, affective and evaluative content of the experience (Melzack and Katz
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1992: 153). Thus pain may, for instance, be described as pricking, boring, 
drilling, stabbing or lancinating (on a rising scale regarding the intensity of 
the sensation), or be graded as hot, burning, scalding and searing. Depending 
on its intensity, pain can feel dull, sore, hurting, aching or heavy; depending 
on duration it can be transient, intermittent, rhythmic or constant. From an 
evaluative angle it can, for instance, be described as annoying, troublesome, 
miserable, intense or unbearable. Many of these expressions take the form of 
metaphors trying to find equivalents to the elusive nature of pain, so difficult to 
communicate to interlocutors, in common experiences within our culture, such 
as pricking or burning: “When fevers bum, or agues freezes” (Bums, “To the 
Toothache,” see below) or “a sharp piercing pain like a red-hot needle” (Lodge 
1995: 3, 4). However, as I have pointed out elsewhere (Rubik 2008: 258), 
comparisons with stabbing, for instance, invoke what speakers imagine violent 
penetration would feel like, rather than reflecting real-life experience. We thus 
learn rhetorical idioms to verbalise bodily dysfunction (Kleinman 1988: 13), 
but genuine communication about the subjective experience of the affliction 
itself remains precariously imprecise.
Intuitively, we would think that the range of words available to us for the 
expression of love is infinitely more varied. Virginia Woolf herself stated that 
“[t]he merest schoolgirl when she falls in love has Shakespeare, Donne, Keats 
to speak her mind for her,” whereas there are no literary precedents for the ex­
pression of pain (Woolf 1994: 318f). Cognitive linguists like Kovecses (2000), 
however, have pointed out that when we speak of love in the English lan­
guage, we usually also draw upon a fairly limited range of some 10 conceptual 
metaphors. Love - or lust - is conceptualised as FIRE; HUNGER; ANIMAL; 
WAR; DISEASE AND INSANITY; NATURAL FORCE; RAPTURE; OPPO­
NENT, and PRESSURE IN A CONTAINER.
Here are some typical examples: In Manley’s New Atalantis (1991: 19,41, 
33), the amorous Duchess is overcome with “transport” at her (false) lover’s 
vows; Chariot is a “lovesick maid,” and the Duke is “regularly possessed. [...] 
That fatal night the Duke felt hostile fires in his breast. Love was entered with 
all his dreadful artillery: he took possession in a moment of the avenues that 
lead to the heart.” Manley’s description thus blends images from the concep­
tual metaphors of RAPTURE, INSANITY; FIRE and WAR/OPPONENT. Jane 
Eyre is quite overcome by an unexpected encounter with Rochester: “[...] ev­
ery nerve I have is unstmng: for a moment I am beyond my own mastery,” 
and a confession of love is wrung from her: “I said this almost involuntarily, 
and, with as little sanction of free will, my tears gushed out,” since “I could 
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repress what I endured no longer” (Bronte 1966: 272, 279, 280). Here, the im­
agery seems to be taken from PRESSURE IN A CONTAINER and NATURAL 
FORCE. Later, after the interrupted wedding, her resistance drives Rochester 
half mad: “Jane, you must be reasonable, or in truth I shall again become fran­
tic,” and “[h]e seemed to devour me with his flaming glance: physically, I felt, at 
the moment, powerless as stubble exposed to the draught and glow of a furnace” 
(Bronte 1966: 331, 344). In this passage the metaphors of FIRE , MADNESS, 
HUNGER, ANIMAL and NATURAL FORCE are linked. In Wide Sargasso 
Sea, the male character employs the image of HUNGER/THIRST when he 
feels that Bertha “had left me thirsty and all my life would be thirst and longing 
for what I had lost before I found it” (Rhys 1968: 141). Lovelace, in Clarissa, 
is riven by the ANIMAL force of his passion: “[...] the rage of love, the rage 
of revenge is upon me! By turns they tear me!” (Richardson 1962: 194)
Complete reconceptualisations of love in terms of different metaphors are 
rare, though poetic elaboration is more frequent, in which ideas taken from the 
10 basic conceptual metaphors are developed further: thus Lawrence (1987: 
313f.) speaks of a
dark flood of electric passion she released from him [...] She had established a rich 
new circuit, a new current of passional electric energy, between the two of them, 
released from the darkest poles of the body and established in perfect circuit. It was 
a dark fire of electricity that rushed from him to her, and flooded them both with 
rich peace, satisfaction.
Lawrence thereby modifies and expands the original concepts of LOVE IS 
FIRE and LOVE IS A NATURAL FORCE. In New Atalantis Manley, elabo­
rating the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS DISEASE, compares guilty passion 
to an “irremediable poison” (1991: 32) infecting the body and weakening the 
moral stamina. Restoration comedy is particularly inventive in its (often misog­
ynist) imagery, yet even comparisons of would-be lovers to “Huntsmen,” who 
“lose more time [...] in starting the game, than in running it down” (Wycherley 
2000: 175) in fact draw upon an ANIMAL concept, and the analogy of sexual 
abstinence and fasting obviously utilises the HUNGER metaphor: “Faith, long 
fasting, child, spoils a man’s appetite.” [...] “And would you fall to, before 
a priest says grace?” (Behn 1992: 192f.). Even such far-fetched images as liken­
ing love relations to a card game: “a man can never quietly give over when 
he’s weary” (Etherege 2000: 308), or business relations: “of all old Debts Love 
[...] is paid the most unwillingly,” (Wycherley 2000: 175) can ultimately be 
traced back to the concept of an OPPONENT to be cheated. That does not mean 
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that complete innovation is entirely impossible. “Mistresses are like Books; if 
you pore upon them too much, they doze you [...]” (Wycherley 2000: 176) is 
certainly an unusual simile, though, after all, it likens the ennui of sated passion 
with a NATURAL FORCE of drowsiness impossible to resist.
In both the descriptions of love and pain, however, the difficulty not only 
consists in finding the adequate word to convey an individual experience, but 
also of striking a balance between tact and immediacy. Descriptions of the 
emotions are thus not merely a matter of the lexicon, but also of taboo and 
decorum. There are rules of display which differ from culture to culture and 
are also contingent on class, gender and age as well as on genre. Especially 
experts working with pain patients have recently become increasingly aware 
of the problems such cultural codes present for the diagnosis and treatment of 
illnesses especially in multi-cultural societies. Although the acuity of the senses 
responsible for registering pain sensations is the same in all normal people (Wall 
1999: 63), tolerance levels and rules of display vary culturally and according to 
context (even depending, in experiments, as Wall (1999: 67) has pointed out, 
on “whether the person applying the stimulus is male or female, a professor, 
a technician or a fellow student.”). Conversely, sympathetic response by the 
environment to the patients’ suffering also significantly hinges on social and 
gendered expectations:
In a large hospital, female nurses shared the responsibilites for postoperative patients 
in both male and female wards. It was found that the consumption of analgesics 
was much higher in the male wards than in the female wards. The nurses were 
carefully observed and interviewed. Their consistant attitude was that if a male 
patient complained of pain it must be serious because everyone knew that male 
patients were a tough lot and should be taken seriously. On the other hand, they had 
a different attitude to their fellow females, who were generally considered by these 
nurses to make a great fuss about minor problems and therefore were to be brushed 
off with a minimal response. (Wall 1999: 69)
Such surveys show that hospital staff tend not to take seriously patients’ 
complaints if in their own estimation (based on stereotype) the pain display is 
“inappropriate” to a given situation. In multi-cultural societies, patients may 
well be admonished to “control themselves” if they fail to conform to what 
is considered generally acceptable display in the host culture, though entirely 
different rules may apply in the patient’s own cultural background. Indeed, even 
the very notion of what is an illness differs between cultures, as it did from 
one historical period to another (Kleinman 1988: 11). Interpreters may well 
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be needed in hospitals as cultural mediators to explain culturally contingent 
forms of pain behaviour.
Since display rules of what may legitimately be expressed by whom, to 
what extent and under what circumstances are internalised from a very early 
age on, writers can generally predict quite accurately the expectations of read­
ers from the same cultural background and hence “what it standardly takes” 
(Carroll 1997:205,206) to elicit sympathy or antipathy for a particular fictional 
character who is in love or pain. Many critics have argued that focalization is 
the decisive point in evoking reader empathy. But in fact the situation is much 
more complicated. Focalization no more automatically evokes sympathy than 
any other stylistic device. Reader emotions are manipulated by a complicated 
and delicate interplay of various stylistic features in which choice of words, but 
also the length of the description and detail dwelt upon play a decisive role as 
well. Robert Bums’ humorous poem “Address to the Toothache. Written when 
the Author was grievously tormented by that disorder” is an excellent example.
My curse upon your venom’d stang, 
That shoots my tortur’d gums alang, 
An’ thro’ my lug gies mony a twang, 
Wi’ gnawing vengeance, 
Tearing my nerves wi’ bitter pang, 
Like racking engines!
[■■•I
Adown my beard the slavers trickle 
I throw the wee stools o’er the mickle, 
While round the fire the giglets keckle, 
To see me loup,
While, raving mad, I wish a heckle 
Were in their doup!
[...]
Where’er that place be priests ca’ hell, 
Where a’ the tones o’ misery yell, 
[•••]
Thou, Toothache, surely bear’st the bell, 
Amang them a’!
[...] (Bums [1786]: etext)
The vivid description of the toothache is doubtless convincing. Bums employs 
an impressive number of lexicalized pain words to describe the qualia of his 
affliction. Evaluative adjectives give an insight into the subjective experience 
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of the pain, which is also inscribed on his body. Body language and somatic 
symptoms act as metonymic indicators of pain both in real life and in literature. 
Yet spending so much time on complaining and detailing the agony caused by 
what is, after all, a minor illness, creates the impression of snivelling. It is exactly 
here that rules of pain behaviour mentally klick into operation: the sufferer’s 
frantic demeanour will, in an English context, be considered as inappropriate 
behaviour for a man, as will the linguistic hyperbole - he likens toothache to 
the worst torture in hell. In addition, the broad Scottish dialect and the ingenuity 
of finding so many rhyming pain words for the aaabab rhyme scheme, add to 
the humorous tone. All in all, the speaker is thereby turned into an object of 
ridicule rather than empathy.
Surprisingly, hyperbole seems acceptable in Winscom’s “The Head-Ach,” 
possibly because the speaker is a woman, for whom different display rules 
apply. She, too, somewhat exaggeratedly speaks of her headache as “agonizing,” 
“torture,” “worse than death”; but she suppresses her pain display for the sake 
of decorum: hers is a “silent anguish,” an “unutterable sigh.” The poem adopts 
a confessional tone and casts the reader as confidante and possible counsellor 
(rather than as an amused spectator, as in Bums’ poem).
[...] In each successive month full twelve long days
And tedious nights my sun withdraws his rays!
Leaves me in silent anguish on my bed, 
Afflicting all the members in the head;
Throug [sic!] ev’ry particle the torture flies,
But centers in the temples, brain and eyes;
The efforts of the hands and feet are vain,
While bows the head with agonizing pain;
While heaves the breast th’unutterable sigh,
And the big tear drops from the languid eye.
For ah! my children want a mother’s care,
A husband, too, should due assistance share,
Myself for action form’d would fain thro’ life
Be found th’assidous - valuable wife;
But now, behold, I live unfit for ought;
[...]
Ye sage Physicians, where’s your wonted skill?
In vain the blisters, bolusses and pill;
[...]
In vain the British and Cephalic Snuff,
All Patent Medicines are empty stuff;
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The launcet [sic!], leech, and cupping swell the train
Of useless efforts, which but gave me pain;
[...]. (Winscom 1774: 152-155)
Physicians (Wall (1999), Frank (1995), Kleinman (1988)) have recently stressed 
the influence the patient’s attitude to the illness has on the perception of pain. 
Interpretations may range from suffering as the wages of sin to meaningless 
existential torture, and subjective experience of pain will vary accordingly. In 
Winscom’s case, the lyrical speaker’s suffering is obviously aggravated by her 
feeling of guilt towards her husband and children for neglecting her duties, 
and by the discrepancy between her sickly state and her own active self image 
(she is unable to render “due assistance” and “care,” indeed “unfit for ought”). 
The location of her pain in “the temples, brain and eyes,” its regular recurrence 
and the sensitivity to light (in a line not quoted above the illness threatens to 
“dissolve my sight”) allow us to surmise that Winscom probably suffered from 
severe migraine. The list of useless remedies she tried -though some may seem 
odd to a modem reader - does not give the impression of excessive self-pity 
but rather serves as proof of the severity of the illness and her desperate search 
for relief, thereby inviting a sympathetic reaction on the part of the reader.
Whether or not readers are willing to accept a lengthy dwelling on pain, of 
course, also very much depends on the seriousness of the case. The description 
of her own mastectomy, which Fanny Bumey gives in a letter to Esther Burney, 
though long and horribly detailed, never seems exaggerated or self-pitying. 
Quite on the contrary; considering that the operation was performed without 
anaesthetic, one wonders how a patient could remember so clearly and describe 
with such precision. There is no need to dwell extensively on the qualia of 
the sensations; the physical symptoms - her screaming, fainting, blanched 
face, metonymically indicate the excrutiating pain, and the mere description 
of the incision and scraping will send a sympathetic shudder down the spine 
of every reader.
Yet when the dreadful steel plunged into the breast - cutting through veins - arteries 
- flesh - nerves [...] I began a scream that lasted unintermittingly during the whole 
time of the incision -1 marvel that it rings not in my Ears still! so excrutiating was 
the agony. When the wound was made, & the instrument was withdrawn, the pain 
seemed undiminished, for the air that suddenly rushed into those delicate parts felt 
like a mass of minute but sharp & forked poniards that were tearing the edges of 
the wound [...] presently the terrible cutting was renewed & worse than ever, to 
separate the bottom, the foundation of this dreadful gland from the parts to which it
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adhered [...]. Oh Heavens! I then felt the Knife <rack>ling against the breast bone
- scraping it! (Burney 1985: 612)
Burney uses plenty of evaluative and affective pain words, yet she comes across 
as remarkably brave and self-disciplined, considering the acuteness of pain we 
are invited to imagine. Indeed, the passage seems anything but hyperbolic. It 
is, however, essential that this description occurs in a private letter and thus has 
the status of a confidential unburdening to a relative, and was not meant for 
publication and thus subject to different rules of decorum and taboo.
In contrast, when the unlikeable main character in Atwood’s novel Bod­
ily Harm doubles over, collapses, writhes on the floor and thinks she will die 
because she has contracted diarrhoea in prison - while other inmates are toru- 
tured to death - the description of her agonized personal experience renders 
her contemptible rather than pitiable.
Rennie doubles over [...] she can feel the sweat dripping down her back, she’s 
dizzy, she hates pain. She’s been invaded, usurped, germs taking over, betrayal of 
the body.
[...] her head is the size of a watermelon, soft and pink, it’s swelling up, she’s going 
to burst open, she’s going to die [...].
“You okay?” says Loma. [...] “It’s only turistas. Montezuma’s Revenge, the tourists 
call it. Everyone gets it sooner or later. Take it from me, you’ll live.”
(Atwood 1982: 86) 
Hypochondria and exaggerated moaning and groaning are generally considered 
as contemptible and/or ridiculous in English and, indeed, European culture 
(viz. the figure of the malade imaginaire), unless the patient is a child, as in 
Hemingway’s story “A Day’s Wait,” whom the reader regards with a mixture 
of pity and amusement.
How strongly pain descriptions are dependent not only on cultural taboos 
but also on genre conventions is evinced by Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko, which 
reports in gruesome detail how the hero was tortured and slowly dismembered, 
but conceals the operation of pain on the body and leaves out all somatic details 
metonymically suggesting his agony.
[...] but they [...] whipped them in a most deplorable and inhumane manner, 
rending the very flesh from their bones; [...] and then rubbed his wounds, to 
complete their cruelty, with Indian pepper [...] the exuctioner came, and first cut 
off his members, and threw them into the fire. After that, with an ill-favoured knife, 
they cut his ears, and his nose, and burned them; he still smoked on, as if nothing 
had touched him. Then they hacked off one of his arms, and still he bore up, and held 
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his pipe. But at the cutting off the other arm, his head sunk, and his pipe dropped, 
and he gave up the ghost, without a groan, or a reproach. (Behn 1992: 140)
Oroonoko, who is modelled on the heroes of heroic tragedy, shows no outward 
signs of pain or emotional disturbance even when his wounds are rubbed with 
red pepper and he is tom limb by limb - descriptions which make the reader 
wince and give us “an opportunity to feel torture vicariously” (Campbell 1999: 
275). In contrast to his supemational courage and stamina in facing physical 
pain, however, the hero showed plenty of distress in an earlier scene when 
he mourned the beloved wife he had just killed to save her from rape and 
enslavement (cf. Morris 1991: 58-60). His emotional agony indeed leaves him 
quite emasculated.
But when he found she was dead [...] his grief swelled up to rage; he tore, he raved, 
he roared, like some monster of the wood [...]. A thousand times he turned the fatal 
knife that did the deed, towards his own heart [...] grief would get the ascendant of 
rage, and he would lie down by her side, and water her face with showers of tears 
[...]. (Behn 1992: 131 f.)
Display rules obviously decreed that a hero was allowed to verbalize emotional 
suffering at great length but could not give in to physical pain without loss 
of face.
Indeed, Elizabethan or seventeenth century prose texts do not spell out 
a victim’s experience of and response to physical pain, though they may describe 
torture at length. As, for instance, in The Unfortunate Traveller, which employs 
horribly suggestive pain words and details the wounds produced on various 
parts of the body by diverse torture instruments. Nashe’s readers, of course, 
were used to public executions and may have accepted forms of punishment 
that seem sickening to a modem sensibility, if the torture was inflicted on figures 
which were portrayed as inveterate villains (such as the Jew or Cutwolf)- The 
reader’s sympathy for their suffering is also curbed by the absurd similes Nashe 
employs: “His nailes they ... under-propt... with sharpe prickes, like a Tailors 
shop window halfe open on a holy daie” (Nashe 1966: 316).
When it comes to descriptions of love, overstatement, one would think, is 
much more acceptable, indeed expected. Especially Elizabethan poetry is full 
of exstatic praises of a beloved or descriptions of love-sickness (as in Sidney’s 
Astrophel and Stella quoted as an epigraph), and who will not think of Romeo 
and Juliet when it comes to the portrayal of romantic love. Rhapsodic rhetoric 
of love, interestingly, is equally acceptable in women’s poetry: Aphra Behn 
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gained a reputation for love poetry which inverts the traditional gender roles. 
In contrast, a marked absence of enthusiastic rhetoric, as in Cummings’ poem 
“may I feel said he,” which completely eschews expressions of rapture and 
insight into the lovers’ minds, is likely to produce the impression of a merely 
casual love affair and emotional shallowness.
“may I feel said he
(i’ll squeal said she/just once said he)
it’s fun said she/[...]
(tiptop said he
don’t stop said she/ oh no said he)
go slow said she [...]” (Cummings 1987: 1686)
How difficult and problematic it is to generalise on such issues, however, 
is proved by the fact that Lovelace’s hyperbolic assertions of love for Clarissa, 
in the context of the novel, give the impression of self-stylization and per­
formance rather than genuine emotion. The acceptability of hyperbole in love 
descriptions, indeed, is mainly true for poetry. In narrative, as opposed to po­
etry, different display rules seem to apply. The caution, “The lady does protest 
too much, methinks,” apart from formulating a gendered display rule as regards 
romantic love vows, also applies to prose in general: a character who utters 
extravagant vows and declarations often stands in danger of losing credibility: 
being too elaborate, too artful and too insistent is regarded as suspicious. It is 
symptomatic that Virginia Woolf, when she enumerated the schoolgirls’ models 
for romantic love rhetoric I quoted above, should have thought exclusively of 
poets: Shakespeare, Donne and Keats, each famous for rhapsodic love lyrics.
In general, love descriptions in prose tend to be much more restrained. 
Jane Austen, of course, is famous as an extreme case of reticence, avoiding any 
lengthy love scenes and famously cutting short reader expectations by refusing 
to put on paper what Emma said to Mr Knightley: “She spoke then, on being so 
entreated. - What did she say? - Just what she ought, of course. A lady always 
does” (Austen 1996: 354). Such stylistic restraint cannot merely be put down 
to nineteenth century female decorum. Almost 200 years later, when Winterson 
in Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit is hardly less reticent. When the lesbian 
heroine falls in love with another woman,
[t]here was something crawling in my belly. I had an octopus inside me. And it was 
evening and it was morning; another day. After that, we did everything together, 
and I stayed with her as often as I could. [...] “Do you think this is Unnatural
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Passion?” I asked her once. “Doesn’t feel like it. According to Pastor Finch, that’s 
awful.” She must be right, I thought. (Winterson 2001:86)
Body language, of course, is often made to stand in for verbal declarations: if 
a character exhibits somatic symptoms such as an increased heart rate, blushing, 
dizziness, physical weakness, inability to think, and the like (Kovecses 2000: 
123f.), he or she is assumed to be in love. Jane Eyre is a case in point: her love 
is written on her body, though she is also explicit enough about her emotions 
(one of the many generic signs of romance in the novel).
I was experiencing an ordeal: a hand of fiery iron grasped my vitals. Terrible 
moment: full of struggle, blackness, burning! Not a human being that ever lived 
could wish to be loved better than I was loved; and him who thus loved me 
I absolutely worshipped: and I must renounce love and idol. (Bronte 1966: 342)
On the whole, however, hyperbolic love rhetoric in prose can easily give the 
impression of sentimentality and is, indeed, the staple diet in the love stories 
of Robinson, Pilcher, Deveraux and the ilk, where authors dwell extensively 
on the overwrought feelings of their protagonists.
“Look, you and I both know that we’re attracted to each other. From the moment 
I first saw you my palms have been sweating.” [...] Jace started to say something, 
but instead he pulled her into his arms and kissed her with the passion he’d been 
feeling since he met her. His hands ran over her back, up her neck, through her hair, 
then back down again, while his mouth overtook hers, his tongue touching hers, 
invading her mouth. (Deveraux 2007: 192 f.)
Alternatively, lengthy and ecstatic descriptions of love scenes are, of course, 
also found in erotic or pornographic literature. Texts like Fanny Hill brim with 
florid descriptions of lascivious touches, fires of passion pulsing through veins 
and similarly prurient passages.
Of course, in fiction the range of individual styles is enormous. Both 
Lawrence and Hardy, for instance, are canonical writers who do not shy away 
from lengthy descriptions of love and desire. The ecstatic description of Angel’s 
love for Tess (focalized through the young man’s point of view) indeed has 
a strong resemblance to poetry.
How very lovable her face was to him. [...] her mouth he had seen nothing to equal 
on the face of the earth. To a young man with the least fire in him that little upward 
lift in the middle of her red top lip was distracting, infatuating, maddening. He had 
never before seen a woman’s lips and teeth which forced upon his mind with such 
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persistent iteration the old Elizabethan simile of roses filled with snow.
(Hardy 1974: 190)
Although Lawrence is famous for the convincing metaphors he finds for phys­
ical attraction, even in his fiction lengthy descriptions of desire often focus on 
obsession rather than love - as in “The Prussian Officer,” or in “The Fox.” The 
latter story extensively describes the madness of frustrated love, while the love 
scenes between the boy and March are comparatively short.
He set his teeth, and for a moment went almost pale, yellow round the eyes with 
fury. He said nothing and saw nothing and felt nothing but a livid rage that was 
quite unreasoning. Balked! Balked again! Balked! He wanted the woman, he had 
fixed like doom upon having her. He felt that was his doom, his destiny, and his 
reward, to have this woman. She was his heaven and hell on earth, and he would 
have none elsewhere. (Lawrence 1960: 144)
Indeed, overstatement often spells out madness or infatuation rather than gen­
uine love - as in the long and obsessive description the male narrator gives 
of the mysterious She in Rider-Haggard’s novel. As soon as she has unveiled 
her face, the narrator falls under her spell, “eat[ing] out [his] heart in impotent 
desires” (Rider-Haggard 2001: 158). Her beauty blinds him, her silvery voice 
charms him, her perfume dazzles him.
1 could bear it no longer. 1 am but a man, and she was more than a woman. [...] 
then and there I fell upon my knees before her, and told her in a sad mixture of 
languages [...] that I worshipped her as never woman was worhsipped, and that
I would give my immortal soul to marry her [...]. (Rider-Haggard 2001: 193)
What is described here, however, is not a genuine love scene, but, in fact, 
a confrontation with the abject, with a sexuality and a female power outside the 
social law, which is threatening madness and death to the man, not fulfilment. 
Similarly, the elaborate descriptions in Manley’s New Atalantis depict obses­
sive erotic appetite and corrupt excess. The indulgence in sensuous detail and 
sophisticated elaboration mirror the characters’ lack of moral restraint.
This paper has shown that images describing physical pain and love or lust 
tend to draw on a fairly limited fund of conceptual metaphors, though they can 
be linked in a variety of innovative combinations. It has also become obvious 
that the display rules for love and pain are not so antithetical in English culture 
as one might suppose. It is indisputable that rules of decorum in the descriptions 
of these emotions have a decisive influence on the reaction of readers to literary 
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texts. However, given the infinite variety of literary styles, it is, of course, diffi­
cult to formulate any rules. Whereas readers seem to expect hyperbole in poetry, 
it may (but need not!) give an impression of sentimental excess, insincerity or 
prurience in prose. Reticence may function as anti-climax, especially in poetry, 
whereas in prose both hyperbole and understatement may be equally effective. 
It is essential to remember, however, that response to emotional rhetoric in 
a particular text certainly depends not only on a successful conceptual blend 
to express the respective feeling and on the stylistic excess or restraint of its 
expression but on an almost infinite variety of interconnected effects relating to 
genre and point of view, but also to the gender and age of a speaker, and to the 
text’s addressee and context. Descriptions employing very similar images or 
stylistic features may hence still challenge entirely different responses because 
of a reader’s sense of what is appropriate for a man or a woman, a hero or 
a villain, for public display or private confession, for omniscient or focalised 
narration, for poetry or prose, in the past or in the present.
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Byronie Outcasts and Polish Exiles
Every student of Polish literature knows that English and German poetry played 
a significant role in the Polish Romantic breakthrough. Most of us studied 
the Byronie hero on the basis of Mickiewicz’s translation of The Giaour at 
school, and view him as an antecedent of Mickiewicz’s Konrad Wallenrod, the 
mysterious remorse-tom national avenger figure. But I strongly suspect that 
because we are so familiar with this subject, we tend to ignore the intricacies 
involved in the Polish reception of British literature at the turn of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.
Mickiewicz’s pronounced aim was to create Polish national literature, 
which he perceived as only beginning to develop in the poetry of Julian Ursyn 
Niemcewicz and Franciszek Karpiński:
Ancestors develop the language; that is what the poet has to find; that is what 
influences him. One has to wait a long time before the language [parallel to that] in 
which Don Juan was written develops.1
1 “Przodki kształcą język, to poeta znajdować musi, to na niego oddziaływa. Nim w Polsce 
język, jakim Don Żuan pisany, ukształci się, długo czekać trzeba” (qtd. in Żmigrodzka 1956: 122), 
my own translation. All translations in this article are mine unless otherwise indicated.
Byron’s Don Juan with its complex challenge of literary and social conventions 
is seen here as an unachievable model. Mickiewicz believes that medieval 
ballads and romances offered the springboard on which English literature was 
able to develop, and such a tradition for him started only recently, that is at 
the end of the eighteenth century, to be developed in Polish poetry. In the 
case of Niemcewicz, translations and adaptations from English played a crucial 
part in this process.
What I propose to do in this paper is to examine Polish translations of two 
English poems dealing with the theme of exile: firstly Niemcewicz’s translation 
of Matthew Lewis’s poem “The Exile” and then Mickiewicz’s translation of the 
“Good night” song from Canto I of Childe Harold, and show how two strongly 
stylized English poems drawing on popular conventions were rewritten to suit 
the Polish needs.
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But I would like to start, with the poem for which at that point Mickiewicz 
believed that it was not possible to create a Polish equivalent. In Canto II of 
Byron’s Don Juan after the discovery of his affair with Julia, Juan bids farewell 
to his native Spain:
“Farewell, my Spain! A long farewell!” he cried,
“Perhaps I may revisit thee no more,
But die, as many an exiled heart hath died, 
Of its own thirst to see again thy shore: 
Farewell, where Guadalquivir’s waters glide! 
Farewell, my mother! And since all is o’er, 
Farewell, too dearest Julia! - (here he drew
Her letter out again, and read it through.) (st. 18, Byron 1958: 63)
As Paul Elledge notes (1991: 43; 56 note 1), the passage records one of nu­
merous “dissociative events” in Byron’s poetry. Byron is clearly parodying 
conventional farewell poems and songs, and Juan’s lament is soon to be cut 
short by a fit of retching caused by seasickness. The elegy on which Byron 
might possibly be drawing is Matthew Gregory Lewis’s poem “The Exile,” 
which was published in Lewis’s The Monk and often reprinted in periodicals, 
for example, in Coleridge’s review of the novel. In 1797 Coleridge had erro­
neously predicted that the “following exquisitely tender elegy [...] will melt 
and delight the heart, when ghosts and hobgoblins shall be found only in the 
lumber-garret of a circulating library” (Coleridge 1797). In The Monk the song 
appears as a lament of Gonzalvo on leaving Spain for Cuba, and is shown by 
Elvira to Lorenzo to prove that there is no greater torture than leaving one’s 
homeland. We are dealing with a stylization of traditional farewell songs:
Farewell, Oh native Spain! Farewell for ever!
These banished eyes shall view thy coasts no more;
A mournful presage tells my heart, that never
Gonzalvo’s steps again shall press thy shore. (Lewis 1998: 215)
By incorporating the cliched phrases and the actual rhyme (No more/shore) from 
“The Exile,” Byron may be seen as exposing the predictability and banality 
in Juan’s lament.
Interestingly, a translation of Lewis’s poem closes the second volume of 
Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz’s Miscellaneous Writings in Verse and Prose (Pisma 
rozmaite wierszem iprozq) published in 1805, where it appears as “Wygnaniec” 
(“The Exile”), subtitled “Elegy imitated from the English, composed at sea on 
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the author’s leaving his homeland in 1804” (“Elegia naśladowana z angiel­
skiego; pisana na morzu w czasie oddalenia się autora z oyczyzny”). Right 
from the beginning Niemcewicz’s tone is much more personal than that of 
Lewis’s original:
Żegnam cię o oyczyzno! żegnam cię na wieki!
Smutne przeczucie w piersiach odzywa się tkliwych,
Że te oczy, te łzami zroszone powieki
Już więcey nie zobaczą twych brzegów szczęśliwych. (Niemcewicz 1805: 427)
I bid thee farewell oh my homeland! I bid thee farewell for ever!
A sad presage awakens in my tender bosom
That these eyes, these tear-dimmed lids
Will never again see thy happy shores.
Lewis’s “native Spain” is replaced by “homeland” and “Gonzalvo” is replaced 
by the speaker whom the reader is clearly expected to identify with Niemcewicz, 
as suggested by the authorial note. While, as Juliusz Kleiner has noted (1981: 
147—48, note 8), Niemcewicz is quite faithful to the original in spite of omitting 
two stanzas from Lewis’s poem, his version is imbued with personal feeling. 
Lewis’s generalized images tend to be replaced by much more particular and 
more strongly emotionally marked terms. Thus, for example, Lewis’s lines 
(which echo Thomas Gray’s elegy):
No more my arms a Parent’s fond embraces,
No more my heart domestic calm must know;
Far from these joys, with sighs which Memory traces,
To sultry skies and distant climes I go. (Lewis 1998: 216)
Become in Niemcewicz’s version:
Już mnie matka do swego nie przytuli łona,
Już nie uyrzę przyjaciół, ni braci kochanych;
Próżno drogie wspomnienia wraca myśl strapiona, 
Spieszę do parnych niebios, i krain nieznanych.
My mother will never again hold me to her bosom
I will never again see my friends nor beloved brothers
In vain do distressed thoughts trace fond memories
I go to sultry skies and unknown lands.
The “parent” is substituted by “mother,” abstract “domestic calm” and “joys” by 
the concrete “friends” and “brothers.” Ifwe choose to look at Lewis’s poem from 
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the post-colonial perspective, we could say that he uses the demonized vision of 
all the perils that await white man in the West Indies, where Gonzalvo goes as 
a Spanish colonist, to hyperbolize the speaker’s alienation from society which 
he after all leaves because of his decision to marry for love. The horror of tigers, 
snakes, the yellow plague and the boiling heat which is bound to make him “die 
by piece-meal in the bloom of age” (Lewis 1998: 216) is nothing as compared 
to his homesickness. Though Niemcewicz includes Lewis’s Gothicized exotic 
imagery in his adaptation, the images of mental agony of the speaker are 
presented in much more subdued tones without the strong medieval stylization, 
which is striking in Lewis.
Niemcewicz’s adaptation of Lewis’s “The Exile” was meant to be read 
as a personal confession of displacement on the part of the man who in 1804 
thought that he was leaving his country for good to settle in the United States. 
Thus the theme of exile, which for Lewis was a pretext for a tender elegy, and 
which actually involved the colonization of the Caribbean, acquired poignant 
immediacy in the context of early nineteenth-century Polish history.
For Byron, on the other hand, Juan’s homesickness is partly a natural feeling 
fuelled by his love for Julia, and partly a re-enactment of conventional grief 
fed by cultural conventions, which is emphasized by Juan casting himself in 
the role of an exile and a constant lover. Byron’s narrator sympathizes with his 
naivety, simultaneously assuming the stance of a man of the world:
So Juan wept, as wept the captive Jews
By Babel’s waters, still remembering Sion:
I’d weep - but mine is not a weeping Muse,
And such light griefs are not a thing to die on;
Young men should travel, if but to amuse
Themselves; and the next time their servants tie on
Behind their carriages their new portmanteau,
Perhaps it may be lined with this my canto. (st. 16, Byron 1958: 62-3)
Already in 1812, in the song “Good night” from Canto I of Childe Harold 
Byron provided a radical rewriting of the traditional farewell song, and it is 
intriguing why this song was one of the first poems by Byron that Adam Mickie­
wicz translated. It was published in Dziennik Warszawski (Warsaw Journal 3: 
69-72) as “Pożegnanie Czajld Harolda” (“Childe Harold’s Farewell”) in 1826 
at the time when Mickiewicz was exiled into Russia, travelling in the Crimea. 
However, we know that he had started working on his translation of “Good 
Night” in May 1823 in Vilnius and Odyniec recollects Mickiewicz suddenly 
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growing pale on reading out the words “Kiedy nikt po mnie nie płacze” (When 
no one cries for me) from his translation (Kleiner 1995: 452, note 12).
Byron’s text appears in Canto I as a song that Harold sings on leaving 
England. It glorifies the life of the self-exiled, alienated protagonist, who has 
no regrets on leaving his homeland.2 In his preface Byron declares that the poem 
was suggested by “Lord Maxwell’s Good Night” from Walter Scott’s Minstrelsy 
of the Scottish Border (Byron 1980: 4), but the Scottish ballad is essentially 
verbally echoed only in the opening “adieu” and closing “good night.” Lord 
Maxwell bids farewell to his mother, his wife and his lands, which he has to 
flee as he is guilty of murder he committed avenging the death of his father:
2 For a reading of the poem as fraught with ambiguities concerning Byron’s attitude towards 
parting, see Elledge 1986.
Adieu! Dumfries, my proper place,
But and Carlaverock fair!
Adieu! my castle of the Thrieve,
Wi’ a’ my buildings there;
Adieu! Lochmaben’s gate sae fair,
The Langholm-holm, where birks there be:
Adieu! my ladye and only joy,
For, trust me, I may not stay wi’ thee.
“Lord Maxwell’s Good Night”
Byron’s Harold has no regrets and flaunts his self sufficiency and cynicism as 
contrasted with natural homesickness of his page and of his yeoman. The very 
focus of the song is on the moment when the “native shore” disappears from 
sight at sunset. While in Lewis’s “Exile” the speaker wants the ship to keep still 
so that he can behold his native shore, Harold embraces the swift movement 
of the ship and glorifies his alienation: “With thee, my bark, I’ll swiftly go / 
Athwart the foaming brine; / Nor care what land thou bear’st me to, / So not 
again to mine.” This is not to say that that there are no traces of melancholy 
in the poem, and it is particularly these phrases that Mickiewicz emphasizes 
and develops in his translation.
In his fundamental work on Mickiewicz, Juliusz Kleiner expresses his 
bewilderment on Mickiewicz’s decision to translate Byron’s poem:
One cannot but wonder how someone who on publishing the poem had already 
experienced bidding farewell to his native land could have included in the editions 
of his poetry stanzas whose beginning and end: “Fare thee well, my beloved na- 
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tive land,” “Fare thee well, dear homeland” ironically distort allegedly heartfelt 
epithets.3
3 Dziwić się można, że strofy, w których początek i koniec: “Bywaj mi zdrowy, kraju kochany!” 
- “Bądź zdrowa, luba ojczyzno!” - ironią wykrzywia epitety rzekomo serdeczne - że strofy takie 
pomieścił w wydaniach poezyj swoich ten, który drukując je wiedział już, co znaczy pożegnanie 
ziemi rodzimej (Kleiner 1995: 453).
However, it is hard to read Mickiewicz’s translation as a cynical version of 
traditional farewell songs. Wacław Borowy (1999: 169-70) argues that Mic­
kiewicz completely ignores the ironic overtones of the original and imbues his 
version with strong lyricism. Or it may be more accurate to say that through his 
choice both of the vocabulary and of the rhythm he underscores the emotional 
ambiguity of the song: the notes of lament are more markedly audible under 
the decadence and world-weariness of Harold.
Adieu, adieu! My native shore
Fades o’er the waters blue;
The Night-winds sigh, the breakers roar,
And shrieks the wild sea-mew.
Yon Sun that sets upon the sea
We follow in his flight;
Farewell awhile to him and thee,
My native Land - Good Night! (Byron 1980: 13)
Characteristically, Mickiewicz appropriates Byron’s text to express the lament 
over the life of an exile:
Bywaj mi zdrowy, kraju kochany!
Już w mglistej nikniesz powłoce,
Świsnęły wiatry, szumią bałwany
I morskie ptactwo świergoce.
Dalej za słońcem, gdzie jasną głowę
W zachodnie pogrąża piany!
Tymczasem słońce, bywaj mi zdrowe,
Bywaj zdrów, kraju kochany! (Mickiewicz 1998: 158)
Byron’s “adieu” is translated as “fare thee well,” which might be a conscious 
echo of Byron’s famous “Fare Thee Well,” the translation of which entitled 
“Bądź zdrowa” Niemcewicz published in 1820. Mickiewicz in the very first 
line uses the apostrophe to “[his] beloved country,” which replaces Byron’s 
“native shore.” The speaker’s alienation from the world expressed by Byron’s
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“And now I’m in the world alone, / upon the wide, wide sea” (obviously 
inspired by Coleridge’s The Ancient Mariner) is replaced by “I am roaming 
in the wide world I Living the life of an exile” (“Teraz po świecie błądzę 
szerokim /1 pędzę życie tułacze,” Mickiewicz 1998: 160-61, st. 9). A rather 
condescending Byronie refusal to “groan for others / When none will sigh for 
me?” is substituted by the melancholic “Za kim mam płakać? Za kim i po 
czym / Kiedy nikt po mnie nie płacze” (Why should I cry / For whom and 
over whom? / When no one cries for me). Mickiewicz is obviously not willing 
to faithfully follow the Byronie model, though there are enough echoes of the 
original to make Kleiner wonder why someone as devoted to his homeland as 
Mickiewicz could have chosen this passage for his translation (Kleiner 1995: 
453). There is a certain dramatic irony in the fact that Mickiewicz made his 
translation in May 1823, a few months before his arrest for being a member 
of a nationalist organisation in October and a sentence of exile to Russia as 
though anticipating his future life of an exile.
In his unpublished article on Goethe and Byron written in 1827 Mickiewicz 
presents Byron’s poetry as personifying the British spirit:
American Revolution and the long and continuous war with France, party divisions 
among the English themselves - all that preoccupied the public; there emerged 
a great number of new conceptions, ideas and emotions; however, there was no 
poet to express them. That was an enormous mass of combustible subterranean 
materials, searching for a new crater in the local mountains.4
4 Rewolucja amerykańska, uporczywa i długa wojna przeciwko Francji, stronnictwa dzielące 
opinią samych Anglików, wszystko to zajmowało publiczność; wyrobiła się wielka liczba nowych 
wyobrażeń, myśli i uczuć, brakło tylko poety, który by je wyśpiewał. Była to ogromna masa 
palnych podziemnych materiałów, szukająca w okolicznych górach nowego krateru (Mickiewicz 
1999:250-51).
Mickiewicz seems to be drawing on Byron’s description of poetry as “the lava 
of the imagination” (Byron 1974: 179), but he replaces Byron’s individual 
torrent of passions and thoughts with the new ideas of the turbulent turn of the 
century in Britain. This is linked to his belief that poetry needs to be perceived 
in historical terms as a product of a given age and culture. Mickiewicz sees 
Byron’s poetry as subjective, characterized by passion, but this, for him, is 
indicative of the British feeling at the time. Byron is presented as the one 
providing other European poets with the creative impulse, including implicitly 
Mickiewicz, whom another Polish poet Krasiński referred to as the “Polish 
Byron” (qtd. in Windakiewicz 1914).
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Mickiewicz’s reading of Byronic poetry as originating in the spirit of the 
age has its counterpart in the twentieth and twenty-first century criticism. Philip 
Martin reads the Byronic hero in Childe Harold as
the psychological consequence of [...] alienation from the meaningful progress of 
history, a piece of self-fashioning which, however equivocal and awkward, repre­
sents a detached and wounded psychology that Byron understands as appropriate 
to the modem condition of historical and political bafflement. (Martin 2004: 97)
This may very well account for the popularity of Byron’s poetry on the 
Continent, much more directly affected by the vagaries of history than Britain. 
Mickiewicz’s translation of “Good Night” illustrates on the one hand the at­
tractiveness of Byron’s sceptical and misanthropic stance; on the other hand, 
it reveals Mickiewicz’s unwillingness to embrace it full-heartedly. His speaker 
would like to break free of the societal bonds, but cannot help expressing his 
emotional ties to his homeland.
In his recent lecture Stuart Curran spoke of displacement as one of the 
central themes in the European literature of the turn of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and saw this as a political and economic consequence 
of turbulent political events, starting with the partitions of Poland through the 
French Revolution to the Napoleonic wars. He suggested that Byron and Shelley 
went against this general pattern and embraced “placelessness,” which could 
be attributed to their aristocratic, cosmopolitan background. If one accepts his 
claim, it becomes intriguing why precisely those two English poets appealed 
most to the imagination of the displaced and dispossessed in such countries as 
Poland and Greece. Of course, the most obvious reason lay in their well known 
declarations of opposition to all forms of tyranny. But I would argue that at 
least in the case of Mickiewicz’s readings of Byron’s poetry there occurred 
a case of appropriation of Byron’s “placelessness” similar to the process which 
I presented in the case of Niemcewicz’s translation of Lewis’s “Exile.” What in 
Byron’s poetry serves as an expression of placelessness becomes transformed 
into a lyrical expression of the sense of displacement. Unlike Byron’s Harold, 
who eagerly embraces his cosmopolitan alienation from his homeland, Mic­
kiewicz’s speaker depicts himself as a “displaced” person, not surprisingly as 
after all he is writing in Polish, the language of the displaced.
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Weak Authorities: Authorship and Meaning 
in the 1890s
When, in the preface to David Copperfield, Charles Dickens refers to the main 
character as the author’s “favourite child” (“like many fond parents, I have 
in my heart of hearts a favourite child. And his name is DAVID COPPER- 
FIELD,” 1965: 11), he is not only reinforcing the link between real and fictional 
world, and adding a supplementary guarantee of truthfulness and authenticity 
to his novel; he is also speaking of the relationship between the author and 
his imaginary progeny as if it were a blood link. This is symptomatic for the 
Dickensian model of authorship - one that is based on intimacy and friend­
ship with the reader (Ferguson 2001: 740-44). This presupposes a common 
ground of shared values, and a relationship of mutual understanding and trust. 
As Susan L. Ferguson notes in her analysis of Victorian authorship, “Dickens 
initiated the characteristically Victorian relationship between the writer and 
his public, a ‘communion’ described by Thackeray as ‘something continual, 
confidential, something like personal affection’” (qtd. in Ferguson 2001: 743). 
Dickens himself states as much when he declares that he wants his relationship 
with his audience to be governed by “a perfectly unfettered, cordial, friendly 
sentiment” (qtd. in Ferguson 2001: 742).
This cordial “communion” is not merely a matter of public readings and 
popularity of the author as a person (which Dickens was particularly successful 
at), but also a matter of textual protocols. For the Victorian reader, the author 
always hovered behind the text as a source of meaning and legitimacy. This 
presence was surely not a real, palpable one - unless it was, like in the case of 
Dickens, sustained by the voice of the performer of public readings - but the 
Victorian reader was used to searching for a “speaker” who vouched for the 
truth value of the fiction. In his discussion of the relationship among author­
ship, implied author, and narrative voice, Richard Aczel (1998: 475) quotes 
Didier Coste’s definition of the authorial voice as “the product of the reader’s 
quest for the origin of the text.” This definition is particularly true in the case 
of the Victorian reader, whose quest for an author-image behind the text is 
part and parcel of the interpretative process. The act of reading involved the
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underlying assumption of an authorial presence, and meaning was implicitly 
equated with tracing back authorial intentionality. At the other end, writers 
were aware of this assumption, and the way in which they encoded their au­
thorial position in the text reflected it. There are several ways in which the 
authorial figure descends into the text, the most obvious of which being the 
use of “I” either in first person narratives or in the narrator’s comments or 
digressions. As Hochman (1996: 177) demonstrates, “In the nineteenth century 
the storytelling ‘I’ in fiction was emphatically associated with the figure of 
the novelist, a human being who seemed to become accessible to the reader 
through the process of reading.” Additionally, such implicit equivalences be­
tween author and narrator were frequently underscored by the existence of 
recognizably autobiographical elements (like in the case of Dickens), and by 
the presence of commentary and evaluation from the narrator, who explic­
itly or implicitly positions himself in relation to the value system promoted 
by the text (a value system which he shares with his public). These elements 
amount to a very powerful authorial presence in the text, one that combines 
the moral authority of Carlyle’s writer-teacher and the intimacy of the Dick­
ensian “friend.”
Towards the end of the century, with the arising complications in moral 
stance, the intensifying of textual experimentation, and the shifting role of 
the reader, the position of the author became less straightforward. Speaking 
of shifting views towards authorship in the work of Henry James, Hochman 
(1996: 177) notes that “[bjetween the 1880s and the tum-of-the-century [...] 
several changes occurred in widely-held assumptions about the pleasures of 
fiction-reading and the grounds of connection between writer and reader. Like 
the contact between doctor and patient, manufacturer and customer, novelist 
and editor (and many others), the relationship between reader and author was 
transformed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century by a sense of growing 
distance and impersonality.” What was lost was precisely the sense of intimacy 
and shared ground omnipresent in the work of the likes of Dickens. “The 
common belief that fiction fosters an imaginatively rich and even personal 
relationship between writer and reader was progressively eroded in the final 
decades of the century,” Hochman notes, tracing this tendency at a textual level 
in what she calls “the rhetoric of authorial self-effacement” (1996: 177). Most 
1890s writers no longer saw themselves as teachers/preachers, partly because 
there was no longer a stable shared set of values to be transmitted or reinforced. 
The changes in the economic aspects of publishing also meant that they were 
targeting a different type of audience than the huge masses which Dickensian 
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friendliness had rallied - an audience with which they might or might not be 
on “friendly” terms.
The present paper will look at several modes of “authorial self-effacement” 
in the fiction of the 1890s, by focusing on authors some of whom are minor, 
however symptomatic of the trends which melt into the experimentalism of the 
1890s and ultimately into the evolutions that lead to Modernism. The first of 
these modes is that of Medievalism, illustrated through William Morris’s Child 
Christopher and Goldilind the Fair, where “authorial self-effacement” follows 
a model of collective authorship. Secondly, George Du Maurier’s Trilby offers 
a model of the author who relinquishes his power politely to the reader; he 
owes a lot to the Victorian author-reader complicity, but is far less certain of the 
meanings he wants to convey through it. Thirdly, the more experimental writers 
of the 1890s (Oscar Wilde, but also the younger Aubrey Beardsley and Max 
Beerbohm) use self-contradiction intentionally, from a very assertive position 
which makes meaning disruption even more intense; in the case of Beardsley 
and Beerbohm, this is seconded by irony and self-irony.
The socialist William Morris advocates the return to an idyllic classless 
society based on a fantasy of the Middle Ages, which involves a model of 
the artist-craftsman whose humanism is less individualistic, and voice far less 
assertive than that of the Mid-Victorian writer. As a consequence, in both 
Morris’s literary and visual work there is a traceable attempt at replicating the 
medieval model of collective authorship, in which the artist perceives himself at 
most as a craftsman whose personal identity is unimportant, and who frequently 
works together with other craftsmen. In Child Christopher and Goldilind the 
Fair (1895), he replicates the neutral voice of the folk tale, whose shared 
authorship gives it a collective, traditional authority - not one based on the 
genius or truthfulness of one single writer, but one that sounds as if it has been 
legitimized by the story having been told and retold over centuries. Morris 
as a Victorian vanishes entirely behind the medieval mask, with hardly any 
authorial intervention in the text. On the one or two occasions when authorial 
intrusion does occur in the narrative, Morris suitably employs the first person 
plural in a way which once again suggests that the author is blending in with 
a whole community of storytellers: “But now leave we Christopher and these 
good fellows of the Tofts and turn to Goldilind” (1995: Ch. 11). This seems to 
involve the reader in the story-sharing community, in which the voice that tells 
the story is less important than the story itself.
Moreover, one of the instances of authorial presence in the text actually 
weakens rather than strengthens the position of the author, by emphasizing, 
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in the same demure first person plural, a limitation in knowledge: “Now as to 
Squire Simon, whether the devil helped him, or his luck, or were it his own 
cunning and his horse’s stoutness, we wot not” (Ch. 9). The text is pervaded 
by a lack of authorial assertiveness, although this weakening of the authorial 
position does not dramatically disrupt the Victorian complicity between au­
thor and reader. The authorial presence is discrete and muted, yet the story 
still unfolds against the backdrop of shared values, with no ambiguity as to 
what the moral stance towards characters and situations should be. The fairy 
tale structure serves Morris’s socialist ideas in that it allows him to make his 
statement in a way which appears natural, commonsensical, and universally 
recognizable. The author is not needed in the text, as he speaks with the voice 
of communal tradition. He does not need to be an assertive presence, as the 
text stands on its own, as if ready to be perpetuated by the next generation 
of storytellers.
In the work of George Du Maurier, on the other hand, the weakening of the 
authorial position arises from quite different sources. As a Punch cartoonist, 
Du Maurier began as a satirist whose critical stance and support for the mid­
Victorian moral values was unmistakable. However, with his late literary work 
of the 1890s and especially with Trilby (1894), Du Maurier’s authorial stance 
becomes more complicated. If his formation as a visual artist occurred earlier, 
in a mid-Victorian cultural atmosphere, his formation as a writer, in later life, 
in the company of literary friends such as Henry James, displays adherence to 
another, more innovative set of aesthetic values.
Trilby weaves together autobiographical notations based on the author’s 
own experience of the artistic milieu and the Gothic plot of the young Paris girl 
who falls prey to the hypnotic powers of the evil musical genius Svengali. The 
text overlaps at least three different genres - the Late Victorian Gothic, the Mid­
Victorian memoir/ autobiographical fiction, and the Decadent novel relating the 
bohemian lives of artists. Du Maurier preserves the satirist’s detachment even 
in the portrayal of the protagonists, thus relativizing his attitude towards them, 
and inducing a critical-sympathetic reaction on behalf of the reader.
Consequently, the moral positioning of the authorial voice becomes less 
straightforward. While Svengali is clearly on the demonic side, exerting at most 
the fascination of pure evil, the protagonists (Little Billee and Trilby herself), 
as well as the host of secondary characters that surround them, are treated with 
a combination of approval and disapproval, warmth and biting irony, drama 
and humour, which dissolve Du Maurier’s authorial stance. He stands behind 
the text as a shifting and indecisive figure, whose presence is less that of an 
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authority summoned to confirm the truth value of the text and more that of 
a commentator who openly declares his limitations.
Indeed, authorial intrusions are very frequent in the text, unlike in the 
case of Morris. The colloquial, informal tone of such intrusions has a playful 
familiarity which would not have suited the illo tempore solemnity of the 
latter. However, like in Morris’s novel, the authorial voice states its impotence, 
its lack of knowledge and its indecision on almost every occasion. In the 
rendering of Trilby’s vocal feats when under the influence of Svengali, the 
authorial voice plays upon its own incapacity to render the whole beauty of the 
music, and then, still playfully, claims that the best reports of Trilby’s voice 
are inaccessible to him: “Would that I could transcribe here Berlioz’s famous 
series of twelve articles, entitled ‘La Svengali,’ ” which unfortunately “are now 
out of print,” while Théophile Gautier’s article is lost because “I forget in 
which journal this eloquent tribute appeared” (1994: 253-54). Du Maurier is 
using here one of the favourite strategies of the fin de siècle Gothic - namely 
he understates and under-explains at the moments when the reader expects 
a hyperbole, thus relying on the reader’s imagination to maximize horror. But 
it also simultaneously implies that the author relinquishes his hold on the 
narrative to a certain extent, placing himself in a less authoritative position than 
had hitherto been common in fiction.
The authorial voice in Trilby is polite and civilized, humouring the reader, 
often announcing what the text is about to do and why - yet often ironic in its 
make-believe humility. At first sight, Du Maurier speaks in a very Dickensian 
voice, professing the friendliness and intimacy that pervaded the work of the 
mid-Victorian writer. The authorial “I” descends on several occasions into the 
third person narrative to comment, digress or evaluate. However, while in 
Dickens the authorial presence retains its amiable yet indisputable authority, 
Du Maurier adopts a far weaker and more indecisive position. In contrast, Du 
Maurier’s authorial intrusions are almost always associated with instances of 
powerlessness and moral ambiguity. In the initial description of Trilby, in which 
we are told that “she had all the virtues but one” (1994: 40), the authorial “I” 
descends into the text to confess to his limitations: “I have found it impossible 
so to tell her history as to make it quite fit and proper reading for the ubiquitous 
young person so dear to us all” (Du Maurier 1994: 40). Trilby’s lack of virtue 
must be mentioned, but there is no “proper” way of putting it. “Most deeply 
to my regret,” the narrator continues, “For I had fondly hoped it might one 
day be said of me that whatever my other literary shortcomings might be, 
I at least had never penned a line which a pure-minded young British mother 
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might not read aloud to her little blue-eyed babe as it lies sucking its little 
bottle in its little bassinette,” yet “Fate has willed it otherwise” (Du Maurier 
1994: 41). The author playfully declines his responsibility towards his fictional 
world, attributing its workings not to himself as puppeteer in chief, but to 
“Fate.” He mimes a sigh of resignation in face of his linguistic and authorial 
powerlessness, while simultaneously providing the reader with a moral portrait 
that is highly ambiguous. If in the case of Dickens moral sympathies were as 
clear-cut as they could be, in Du Maurier “poor Trilby’s one shortcoming,” 
which the author wishes he “could duly express in some not too familiar 
medium-in Latin or Greek, let us say” (1994:41), is presented with both overt 
condemnation and covert sympathy. The shared system of values is still alluded 
to (the virtues and vices mentioned are still recognizably Victorian), yet what 
is labelled as a vice is also excused by other qualities (“she was the warmest, 
most helpful, and most compassionate of friends,” “she had no vanity” and 
had “a virginal heart,” Du Maurier 1994: 42), and even turned into a lovable 
quality: “she followed love for love’s sake only, now and then, as she would 
have followed art if she had been a man” (Du Maurier 1994: 41). Vice and 
virtue become overlapped to the point in which the narrator himself refuses 
to choose “Whether it be an aggravation of her misdeeds or an extenuating 
circumstance” (Du Maurier 1994: 41), thus relinquishing his position as holder 
of moral solutions, and allowing a sense of uncertainty to pervade the story. 
This ambivalence is heightened and complicated by irony and self-irony: Trilby 
herself is treated with simultaneous sympathy and irony, such as when she is said 
to have “Sheer gaiety of heart and genial good-fellowship, [and] the difficulty 
of saying nay to earnest pleading” (Du Maurier 1994: 42), i.e. to be ready to 
engage in sexual activities because of the fact that she is a friendly girl who 
is unable to say no.
Similarly, the authorial voice is also self-ironic, as the humble account of his 
inabilities is always made with a wink of complicity towards the reader: when 
he descends into the autobiographical account of quite recognizable characters 
who inhabited Late Victorian studios (and would thus be perceived as an “eye 
witness account” by the reader - one that should confer extra authority to the 
authorial voice), the narrator glosses: “It might be worth while my trying to 
sketch some of the more noteworthy [characters], now that my story is slowing 
for a while - like a French train when the engine-driver sees a long curved 
tunnel in front of him, as I do - and no light at the other end!” (Du Maurier 
1994: 107) The narrator is still an engine driver, but one whose influence upon 
the pre-determined track and travel speed is very limited. The literary ride, upon 
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which his job as an author seems to have embarked him more or less willingly, is 
hardly controllable, it slows down and speeds up by its own accord, and proves 
to be slightly frightening, what with the dark tunnels ahead. The metaphor is 
revealing: the responsibility of taking readers to a destination (one that the 
engine driver seems quite unaware of) belongs to either “Fate,” or the railway 
company, but certainly not to the author.
In Oscar Wilde’s work, the systematic use of contradiction (contradiction 
of readers’ expectations, contradiction as rhetorical mechanism, within the om­
nipresent paradoxes, and self-contradiction) results in a noticeable weakening 
of authorial position, perhaps best illustrated by The Portrait of Mr W. 77., in 
which, despite the use of the first person narrative and of the narrative voice 
which rings distinctly Wildean, the reader is left without any authorial anchor 
to guarantee the truth value of the ideas unfolded in the text.
In a Victorian novel, the first person narrative would normally have en­
dowed the text with more credibility, as it would have been “emphatically 
associated with the figure of the novelist, a human being who seemed to be­
come accessible to the reader through the process of reading” (Hochman 1996: 
177). The Victorian mind would readily have embarked with what it perceived 
as “Wilde” upon the voyage of discovering Cyril Graham’s theory. This identi­
fication would have been reinforced by both the essay-like tone of most of the 
narrative and by the Wildean ring of statement on forgeries and aestheticism in 
the beginning: “I insisted that [the] so-called forgeries were merely the result of 
an artistic desire for perfect representation; that we had no right to quarrel with 
an artist for the conditions under which he chooses to present his work; and that 
all Art being to a certain degree a mode of acting, an attempt to realise one’s own 
personality on some imaginative plane out of reach of the trammelling acci­
dents and limitations of real life, to censure an artist for a forgery was to confuse 
an ethical with an aesthetical problem” (Wilde 2001b: 80). Recognisable ideas 
from Wilde’s own aesthetics are present in the passage - such as the perfection 
of representation which overrides both artistic intentionality and any ethical 
concerns; the importance of masks; and the separation between ethics and aes­
thetics. Such ideas are recurrent in Wilde’s writing, and repeatedly voiced in 
works where one presupposes an unquestionable authorial intention endorsing 
them - such as the essays or the Preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray (Wilde 
2001a: 7), where one expects (at least in theory) to find “Wilde’s own” ideas.
However, the very same statement raises questions about the ethical posi­
tion of the “author,” as he supports forgeries, an idea which the Victorian reader 
is quite likely not to share. Thus, it questions the identification of the reader with 
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the author as a moral centre of the work, and anticipates the crisis of authorship 
that will subsequently be dramatized by the story. But at this stage this signal 
remains a mere foreshadowing, and is soon forgotten in the incursion Erskine 
offers into Cyril Graham’s theories regarding Shakespearean authorship. While 
the theory unfolds, the narrator retains a tone of commonsensical disbelief to­
wards both Cyril and Erskine, placing himself on the same side of the argument 
as the reader, and sharing the latter’s (and the Victorian) “common knowledge” 
of the identity of W. H. The reader’s identification with the narrator’s position 
is almost complete, with Wilde’s authorial figure constantly in the background, 
which makes the reversal of positions even more alienating. When the narra­
tor exclaims to Erskine, “I believe in Willie Hughes!” (Wilde 2001b: 83), the 
reader is left disconcerted, and the identification between narrator and author 
is shattered. In what follows, the role of the “voice of reason” and common 
sense is switched several times between the two main characters, Erskine and 
the narrator, to the point in which the reader is left with no one to trust, and the 
authorial identification with the narrator is completely annihilated.
Moreover, problematic authorship is also the main theme of the story. The 
search for the meaning of Shakespeare’s sonnets becomes a search for bio­
graphical details, re-enacting Victorian interpretative habits, which too readily 
(in Wilde’s view) equate artistic truth with real-life truth, and aesthetic meaning 
with authorial intentionality. The incursion in Shakespearean authorship proves 
fascinating, but futile. It reads as a symmetrical counterpart to Henry James’ The 
Figure in the Carpet: the latter dramatizes the search for an overarching mean­
ing, for the central “design” in a work of art, in much the same way in which 
Wilde dramatizes the quest for the author’s biographical person in relation to 
the work and to its meaning. Both stories are designed to disprove the possibil­
ity of arriving at authorial intentionality, and in both of them the consequences 
of this fallacy are just as deadly. As Erskine declares, “there is something fatal 
about the idea” (Wilde 2001b: 83). Once again, like in both The Picture of Do­
rian Gray and The Figure in the Carpet, playing with the boundaries between 
literature and reality seems to unleash monsters, and provides the ground for 
an uncanny, and (in The Picture of Dorian Gray) even Gothic development of 
the plot. Interestingly, this uncanny development unfolds on a level which once 
again increases the distance from any possibility of a literal or biographical 
interpretation of the story, and makes identification between the narratorial “I,” 
or any of the characters, and the authorial position even less likely.
Thus, in The Portrait of Mr W. H., authorship is systematically attacked 
from a multiplicity of directions, both by the text itself and from within the 
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fictional world of the text. Where Shakespearean authorship is concerned, 
details of the author’s biography are sought in order to legitimize a certain 
interpretation of his works - yet some of these details are unreachable, as the 
existence of Willie Hughes can neither be proved, nor disproved; others are 
simply invented - such as the portrait, commissioned to corroborate literary 
evidence with extra-literary evidence, as if somehow anchoring the theory into 
the real world were the only way of proving it beyond the shadow of a doubt. 
Although the appearance of the portrait suddenly seems to confirm the validity 
of the theory, the proof that the portrait is a forgery does not implicitly disprove 
it either. Neither is it proved, nor disproved by the two main voices in the 
story - Erskine and the narrator. Erskine’s own suicide at the end, mimicking 
Cyril Graham’s last and extreme attempt to prove the theory, is just as fake as 
the portrait. The revelation that Erskine has actually died from quite different 
causes leaves the reader in the total dark about whether he eventually believed 
in the theory or not. Implicitly, the reader is left in the dark as to who to side 
with, as both Erskine’s and the narrator’s belief in the theory is eventually 
uncertain. The only possible moral of this parable is that there is no possible 
moral, or at least that conventional ways of reading, based on inferring a stable 
author behind the text, will not yield one.
As for the portrait itself, its authorship could not be harder to pin down: 
it is allegedly painted by an unknown Elizabethan artist, who turns out to be 
an obscure contemporary painter who has forged it for money. His authorship 
is illicit, and by force of circumstances the work must stand on its own, the 
link with its source not only completely severed, but misleading. No tracing 
of authorial intentionality or “message” is possible in this case because the 
painting is conceived to misdirect any interpretative approach based on extra- 
textual elements. If the viewer attempts to interpret by contextualization, then 
he is doomed to failure, as he will see the work through the fake context of 
the Elizabethan age.
Consequently, the story lists a whole range of counter-arguments to autho­
rial authority over the text: narrators are, and are not identifiable with authors; 
biographical details are elusive, and easy to forge; authors can be whimsical, 
and change their mind after, or even during text production; they can be com­
pletely unknown, or put on a mask and pretend to be someone else altogether 
(like in the case of the forged painting). Thus, authorial intentionality remains 
beyond reach, and the author is completely effaced.
The quest for the origin of the text is proved to be an interpretative fallacy, 
just as in James’s The Figure in the Carpet. Yet, at the same time, it exerts an 
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ongoing fascination, as if Wilde recognized it as a need of the reader, but one 
that will be systematically refused by the text. Just as the condition of the artist 
remains, romantically, that of not being understood, the condition of the reader 
should involve an acceptance of limitations in terms of understanding textual 
meaning. Aesthetic communication is a fake (or, in less offensive terms, virtual) 
communication which takes place at the level of the text, but it forbids any true 
communication between the real, biographical persons of author and reader.
Like Oscar Wilde, both Aubrey Beardsley and Max Beerbohm put on tex­
tual masks to the point in which their authorial position becomes indiscernible; 
like Wilde, they both possess paradoxically strong voices, but voices to which 
they add their own mark - a dimension of self-irony. And, this time quite unlike 
Wilde, who programmatically deletes any allusion to his biographical presence 
in his fiction, and even in his essays, Beardsley and Beerbohm both project 
themselves into the text, be it literary or visual, and both deconstruct their pres­
ence until it bears no identification with any definitive authorial authority. Like 
the Great Masters, they draw self-portraits, or include self-portraits in larger 
compositions, but these are stylized or caricatured. Beardsley’s prose some­
times includes a narratorial “I,” but one that mimics weakness and humility. 
Beerbohm writes his fiction and essays in a way that often resembles memoirs, 
blending autobiography and fiction until they become indiscernible and the 
reader is lost among the various authorial masks.
Thus, in Beardsley’s Story of Venus and Tannhäuser, the authorial “I” is 
present, but misleading, and not authoritative. In the complimentary letter that 
serves as an introduction, Beardsley adopts a pose of humility towards his 
invented patron, and an apologetic tone for the naughtiness of his own text, 
which clearly place the authorial voice already in the realm of the fictional. 
The tone is self-ironic, mimicking an old-fashioned submissiveness towards 
a figure of authority, as Beardsley speaks of himself as a “humble scrivener” 
(Beardsley and Glassco 1959: 15), but the addressee himself is an object of 
irony, which denounces the whole humbleness as subversive. Just as subversive 
is the playfully underscored weakness of the authorial intrusions in the rest of the 
story, where the voice echoes Dickensian friendliness and displays an impotence 
a la Du Maurier, but at points in the text where the naughtiness builds up to 
a maximum. Thus, on several occasions, the narrator declares his limitations and 
his incapacity to render fully the details of the erotic encounters described, yet 
the eroticism is maximised rather than attenuated by this playful understatement. 
Due to the unrestrained explicitness of the erotic details in the story, the reader 
can only doubt the narrator’s claimed incapacity to say everything out loud.
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Therefore, the narrator places himself in a position of diminished reliability, 
and the gap between this narratorial mask and the biographical person of the 
writer, already established by the lack of autobiographical associations and by 
the utterly fictional introduction, is further deepened, despite the fact that there 
are several authorial alter egos in the story (besides Tannhäuser himself, there 
is a character named the “Abbé”- a clear play on Beardsley’s own initials - yet 
with no other identifiable authorial function).
In Beerbohm’s prose, fictional or non-fictional, irony once again leaves his 
authorial stance ambiguous - maybe even more ambiguous than in the case of 
Oscar Wilde, as in a piece The Pervasion of Rouge, the reader is unsure whether 
Beerbohm criticizes Decadence, is affiliated with it, or both. The short story 
The Happy Hypocrite (1897) further illustrates this use of irony as a vehicle of 
authorial self-effacement, despite the fact that, once again, the author explicitly 
writes himself into the text. The story is written in the third person, but with 
a very intrusive first person narrator, commenting and digressing, especially 
over the first pages, upon his main character, the decadent Lord George Hell. The 
narrator constantly evaluates and positions himself in relation to the character, 
in a way which, in someone like Dickens, would have been a mark of ethical 
complicity between author and reader. However, in Beerbohm the ironic tone 
undermines this complicity, and induces a degree of detachment.
Thus, very early on the narrator waives his opportunity to fully describe 
the “naughtiness” of his protagonist: “I will not trouble my little readers with 
a long recital of his great naughtiness. But it were well they should know 
that he was greedy, destructive, and disobedient” (Beerbohm 1940: 665). This 
playfully diminutive treatment of his audience, addressed as “little readers,” 
as if the story were a story for children, places the narrator in a position of 
authority; he chooses to leave out parts of the story - simultaneously mimicking 
a friendly protectiveness towards the reader, and flashing at him the superiority 
of the ironist. But he is also quick to decline explicitly any responsibilities in 
making judgments about the character, yet at the same time implying what the 
judgment should be: “My little readers will then, I think, acknowledge that 
any angry judgment they may have passed upon him must be reconsidered 
and, it may be, withdrawn. I will leave his lordship in their hands” (Beerbohm 
1940: 665). Lord George Hell is presented as being highly “naughty;” then, the 
reader is told authoritatively that he “must” reconsider any “angry judgment” 
on him, because he “did, at last, atone for all his faults, in a way that was never 
revealed to the world during his lifetime” (Beerbohm 1940: 665); and authority 
is waived immediately, as “his lordship” is left “in [the readers’] hands.” This 
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announces a story of sin and repentance, possibly one with a moral, as would be 
fit for a young audience; however, it also announces a story in which the whole 
parable may unfold in the register of parody: from the very beginning, Lord 
George Hell’s evil nature is caricatured and ridiculed. His very name signals this, 
alongside the menial sins he is condemned for - such as the fact that “he often 
sat up at Carlton House until long after bed-time, playing at games” and “he 
generally ate and drank more than was good for him” (Beerbohm 1940: 665).
Despite his initial demonstrations of authority, the narrator also appears 
slightly unsure of what is going on in his third person narrative: “I think he was 
proud of being horrid” (Beerbohm 1940: 665). He uses elements of the genre of 
the memoir - the one which was later on to become his personal mark (such as, 
for instance, in his 1919 story collection Seven Men, where fiction and memoir 
are welded together until they become indistinguishable). He uses the “I” of 
the eye witness who cares for the accuracy of his report - as the story comes 
complete with footnotes and references to invented quotations. However, the 
eye witness account is undermined by the fact that the narrator has witnessed 
everything but what is essential for the story: “I am glad I never saw his lordship” 
(Beerbohm 1940: 666). The very eye witness status of the narrative voice is thus 
tinged with self-irony, as it displays an infallibility fraught with limitations.
The narrator sometimes resorts to an inclusive “we” to denote the com­
plicity with his readers: “after this, we can hardly be surprised when we read 
that he “seldom sat down to the fashionable game of Limbo with less than 
four, and sometimes with as many as seven aces up his sleeve. We can only 
wonder that he was tolerated at all” (Beerbohm 1940: 667). Thus, he hints at the 
shared ground of moral values that had been the basis of narrative protocols in 
Victorian fiction, but does so playfully, once again marking this by the menial 
nature of the Lord’s “sin.” The narrator’s apparent friendliness, Dickensian as 
it may sound, is a mere textual strategy by which courtesy is used to lure the 
reader into the game the text wants him to play.
Like Aubrey Beardsley, Beerbohm writes himself into the text, but under­
mines his persona by irony, and by giving the narrator’s voice the attributes of 
fiction. Despite their very personal styles and their assertiveness, both Beards­
ley and Beerbohm clearly signal they cannot and should not be taken seriously, 
and that their position as authors is at most a textual pose.
A similar tendency to weaken authorial position pervades the more experi­
mental works of the 1890s: Henry James pleads for objective fiction from which 
the author has been fully effaced; Joseph Conrad relativizes the truth value of 
his core narrative by introducing frames and fallible character-narrators such as 
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Marlow. The Gothic fiction of the 1890s does the same, making use of “found” 
manuscripts, collating parts written in different genres by different characters 
(their letters, diaries, confessions), or resorting to “hearsay” as the author claims 
to have learned the story from a direct participant or witness. Wells’s The Is­
land of Dr Moreau is preceded by the introduction written in the first person, 
in which a nephew of the protagonist claims to have found Prendick’s story as 
a manuscript, and expresses his doubts as to its truthfulness. Stevenson’s Dr 
Jekyll and Mr Hyde begins as a detached third person narrative with no autho­
rial intrusions, and ends with two first person confessions, one by Dr Lanyon 
and one by Jekyll himself, unmediated by any narrator. Stoker’s Dracula col­
lates several characters’ diaries, letters, and newspaper cuts, unmediated by any 
authorial presence, and introduced only by the chapter titles.
This weakening of the authorial position can thus be linked to the weakening 
in the traditional mechanisms of mimesis and in the Victorian assumptions of 
a truth that lies behind the text. As Barthes (1967) says when he announces 
The Death of the Author, “to write can no longer designate an operation of 
recording, of observing, of representing, of ‘painting’ (as the Classic writers 
put it),” and simultaneously “Once the Author is gone, the claim to ‘decipher’ 
a text becomes quite useless.” Barthes sees this weakening in the position 
of the author as inextricably linked to the fact that “true locus of writing is 
reading,” and suggests that “the birth of the reader must be ransomed by the 
death of the Author.”
It is my argument therefore not that the author died in the 1890s - with all 
their experimentations, the 1890s are not yet postmodern - but that he/she took 
an important step in that direction, with the questioning of Victorian textual 
protocols involving a questioning of authorial roles inextricably linked to the 
question of what, and if the literary text actually means.
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The “Pearl Effect”: Familial Taboos of the South 
in E. A. Poe, E. Glasgow, P. Taylor and W. Faulkner
As we read in Williamson’s biography of Faulkner (1993: 387), ironically as 
this may sound, the phenomenon of incest in the South should be linked to 
Southern gentlemen’s shyness with women other than their mothers, sisters or 
first cousins. The turn of the century chronicles of the South show that as far as 
crime rate in the region was concerned at the time, it was only the number of 
cases connected with incest that were constantly on the rise - although incest 
was then solely defined as a sexual relationship with a young girl closely related 
to her oppressor, and not a relationship between adults who would enter into 
a seemingly “innocent” marriage despite close kinship (Williamson 1993: 99). 
Moreover, it was almost a fashion in the nineteenth-century South to marry 
within pairs of brothers and sisters who were close friends, which led to all 
manner of irregularities concerning the children, especially upon the death of 
one of the spouses and the remarriage of the other (Williamson 1993: 388).
Further in his book, Williamson (1993: 401-2) defines what he calls the 
“pearl effect” as “the capacity of the Southern community for not seeing” what 
is perfectly visible otherwise, i.e. the truth about their own guilt, and taking 
appearances and wishful thinking for reality instead. In the South, as in an 
oyster’s shell, a grain of sand quickly ceases to be an irritant, and, lacquered 
over, creates a perfectly smooth surface of a pearl, which looks harmonious 
and beautiful to the outer world. Refusing to accept the truth about the past of 
their region, white Southerners become guilty of collective amnesia. By closing 
their eyes to the white abuse of familial relations in both the African American 
and the white contexts, they pretend that the problem does not exist, and thus 
perpetuate the “pearl effect.”
This collective amnesia of the South finds its literary manifestation in 
the recurrence in Southern American literature of the brother-and-sister theme 
invariably related to the motif of physical annihilation of one or the other, or one 
by the other (e.g. murder in Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher,” euthanasia in 
Glasgow’s “Jordan’s End,” fratricide in Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!, suicide
402 GRAŻYNA BRANNY
in his The Sound and the Fury), as ways of eliminating the irritant and erasing 
undesirable memory in order to restore the pearl’s smooth surface.
In his famous Gothic tale “The Fall of the House of Usher” (1840), Poe - 
himself a Southerner and a believer in vagueness as a mark of a story’s greatness 
- exploits the brother-and-sister motif, with all its ambiguities, using his literary 
method of an aesthetic effect for the purpose, thus altogether escaping the 
issue of the moral evaluation of the phenomena he describes, and therefore 
maintaining the “pearl effect.”
The resultant moral incapacitation of an outsider in Poe’s story - accom­
plished through the aesthetization of the collective memory of the South about 
incest - finds its manifestation in the mysteriousness, isolation and decadence 
of the Usher family, hermetically enclosed in the tale’s fictional world. What 
contributes to their state of alienation, paradoxically, is the presence in the story 
of the narrator, who, despite his outsidedness, is in reality Roderick’s former 
schoolmate and as such a safeguard of the “pearl effect” in the Usher family, 
which “had put forth, at no period, any enduring branch” as “the entire family 
lay in the direct line of descent” (Poe 1955: 129).
Succumbing to the pervasive influence of the house (and the family), the 
narrator is unable to perceive them from the position of an outsider. As a result, 
he is not only unaware of his own part in Lady Madeleine’s death but even 
incapable of recognizing the act as crime, the fact which likewise escapes the 
attention of the reader, who, just as the narrator, represents the outer world. Thus, 
ironically, in Poe’s story an outsider helps to sanction the ambiguous status quo 
of the Usher family rather than unveil it, for any intrusion into the hermetic 
reality of the South is instantly channelled, its perpetrator assimilated to become 
part of the reality whose disgraceful aspects he was originally meant to expose.
The abortive attempt of the brother at annihilating his twin sister in “The 
Fall of the House of Usher” can be perceived as both a failure to eradicate 
“the family evil” (Poe 1955: 131) and to violate the collective memory of the 
South about the brother-and-sister relationship, which, as the story shows by 
Madeleine breaking free from her live entombment to destroy her brother and 
the house, can be erased at no small costs. The history of the South is not a clean 
slate to be filled in anew: its familial taboos lie dormant in it like the remnants 
of the house of Usher at the bottom of the tarn.
An imitator of Poe’s Gothic tales almost a century later, Ellen Glasgow, 
leaves little room for speculation in her story of young Alan’s mysterious illness 
in “Jordan’s End” (1923). Her technique of Chinese boxes in introducing the 
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taboo theme of incest anticipates some grim family secret, guarding it jealously 
whenever the truth about the South is in danger of being exposed. Through this 
technique, the narrator - a doctor, who, as in Poe, is an outsider, becomes as if 
twice removed from the secret: by being called to Alan in replacement of the 
actual family doctor, and by being directed to the house through the agency of 
two dwarfed and hunched mulattoes, straight from the racial theories of the age, 
also twice removed from the family as their servants and racial others. Hence, 
Glasgow’s Chinese boxes in “Jordan’s End,” just as Poe’s aesthetization in 
“The Fall of the House of Usher,” function as safeguards of the familial taboos 
of the South and a manifestation of its collective amnesia in perpetuating 
the “pearl effect.”
As it appears upon a closer examination of Glasgow’s story, the author’s 
technique does not so much bar access to the secret of the Jordans’ hereditary 
disease - now affecting both the male and the female lines, excepting Alan’s 
young wife, Judith, as the first one to have come from outside of the family - as 
to the missing element of this and many other Southern puzzles - the brother- 
and-sister relationship, seemingly absent from the story other than through 
implication, in the presence in the house of three aunts, whose husbands are 
already confined to mental institutions. The missing link, however, appears with 
a little piece of pink baby garment crocheted by the three women in the family 
which already has a nine-year-old brother of the little sister-to-come.
The question is how the aunts, already affected by the family disease 
themselves, know what colour the baby’s garment should be if we do not even 
know that, or if, Judith is pregnant-unless they are indeed the Fates, as Glasgow 
refers to them symbolically, perpetuating the collective guilt of the South, while 
Judith and the narrator, albeit both outsiders to the family, although not to the 
South, are thus bound to secure the “pearl effect,” this unique ability of the 
South to absorb the inconvenient witnesses of the truth about itself in order to 
maintain the impeccable image of its own harmony.
What strikes one about Judith and the doctor is their refusal to feel guilty 
about their involvement in Alan’s unexpected death (hers through mercy killing 
and his through the prescription). What is more, Judith is ready to “assist” her 
little son, as she did his father, when “the time comes” (Glasgow 1966: 203), 
as she confesses to the doctor with remarkable, if not callous, composure. 
Her dream-like imperturbability over the matter of her husband’s sudden death 
matches the doctor’s inability to face the inconvenient reality, both evocative 
of Poe’s aesthetization of the collective guilt of the South:
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I had never seen a creature who appeared so withdrawn, so detached, from all 
human associations ... Wrapped in that silence as in a cloak, she walked across the 
windrifts of leaves ... Her step was so slow, so unhurried, that I remember thinking 
she moved like one who had all eternity before her. (Glasgow 1966: 214)
[...] I knew that the question on my lips would never be uttered. I should always 
remain ignorant of the truth. The thing I feared most, standing there alone with her, 
was that some accident might solve the mystery before I could escape.
(Glasgow 1966: 216)
Oddly enough, it is not the truth about the euthanasia that the doctor dreads 
but its disclosure, just as it is not the moral dimension of incest in her family 
that bothers Judith but its sheer physical aspect in the form of the hereditary 
disease - both attitudes targeted at preserving the “pearl effect.”
The mechanism of the collective amnesia of the South and its final expo­
sition is best illustrated by a contemporary short story of Peter Taylor, titled 
“Venus, Cupid, Folly and Time” (1959), where the truth about the South is ex­
ploded by an outsider in an attempt at counteracting the “pearl effect.” The role 
of the outsider in the story is performed by Tom Bascombs, Ned Meriwether’s 
close friend and a supplier of paper flowers for very mysterious and very sug­
gestive teenage brother-and-sister balls organized annually by the Dorsets, an 
elderly brother-and-sister couple in a small Southern town of West Vesey. At 
Ned’s instigation, Tom, the non-brother, plays a trick on the hosts by replacing 
Ned at his sister Emily’s side on one of those occasions.
The origin of the idea has nothing to do with its consequences and is 
passed over in silence in the story, except one seemingly insignificant comment 
provided by Ned and Emily’s elder and a former participant in a Dorset ball, 
who thus explains the reason why Emily and Ned quarrelled over which one 
of them knew Tom “first” and “better”: “We could have told him what it was, 
1 think. But we didn’t. It would have been too hard to say to him that at one time 
or another all of us in West Vesey had had our Tom Bascombs” (Taylor 1977: 
618). These puzzling words become clear only in the context of Faulkner’s 
Absalom, Absalom! The “Tom Bascombs” are Charles Bons, i.e. Southern 
brothers’ closest friends, to whom the former are prepared to give their sisters 
away in marriage without misgivings about the latter “touching] parts of [their] 
sister[s’] bod[ies] that [they] will never see and touch,” (Faulkner 1972: 328), 
as Henry Sutpen confides in his half-brother Charles Bon before finding out 
that they are related or that Bon has some black blood.
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The above interpretation is confirmed by Ned’s reaction to seeing his sis­
ter being kissed by Tom at a ball meant exclusively for brothers-and-sisters, 
a gesture received with approval by the Dorsets and the other brother-and- 
sister couples unaware of Tom’s identity. Appalled by the sight, Ned exclaims: 
‘“Don’t you know?’ he wailed, as if in great physical pain. ‘Can’t you tell? 
Can’t you see who they are? They’re brother and sister'.’" (Taylor 1977: 625) 
The subtle irony of that scene suggests that what Ned - the brother - is in 
fact shocked by is that it is Tom - the non-brother - rather than himself that 
is kissing his sister, i.e. they are kissing although they are not siblings rather 
than because they are. Ned’s reaction makes him similar to other Southern 
gentlemen - Henry Sutpen from Absalom, Absalom! and Quentin from The 
Sound and the Fury - in that he relegates the truth about himself and his in­
cestuous desire for his sister into the unconscious, thus inscribing himself into 
the collective amnesia of the South.
In Taylor’s story, exposed by a non-brother, the myth of the South is ex­
ploded on the borderline between reality and illusion, aestheticism and morality, 
art and sensuality. The suggestive ambiguity of the decorations accompanying 
the Dorset balls - subtly fragrant flowers and intimately lit sensuous paint­
ings of French and Italian masters, remain in keeping with the “doing pretty” 
manner and the “pearl effect” mentality of the South, which thus absorbs the 
inconvenient truths unto itself. In Faulkner, multiple narrators striving in vain 
to reconstruct a single Southern story, the author’s oxymoronic imagination 
in asserting presence by absence as well as his method of denegation (Pitavy 
1989: 45) can be perceived as manifestations of and a counteraction against the 
“pearl effect,” with a view to exposing the disconcerting truth about two major 
taboos of his region, incest and miscegenation.
Hidden under the guise of obsession over his imagined incest with his 
sister Caddy in The Sound and the Fury, lies Quentin’s obsessive fear of 
miscegenation and his morbid doubts as to his idiot brother Benjy’s, and thus 
also his own, racial identity: “I was not who was not was not who. [...] 
Benjamin the child of. How he used to sit before that mirror [...] Benjamin 
the child of mine old age held hostage into Egypt. O Benjamin. [...] They 
come into white people’s lives like that in sudden sharp black tricles that isolate 
white facts” (Faulkner 1954: 211). Absalom, Absalom!, seemingly concerned 
with the forbidden fruit of incest as applied to half-siblings (Judith and Bon), 
especially if one of them is a half-breed, rather than to a full-blooded brother- 
and-sister relationship (Judith and Henry), in fact features an act of fratricide 
triggered by the latter.
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Hence in The Sound and the Fury Quentin commits suicide not only on 
account of Caddy’s lost virginity, or his own obsession with time, but also 
because of his morbid preoccupation with the shadow of his own racially suspect 
self, so as to protect his sister from his own shadowy alter ego, as suggested by 
Irwin (1986: 34) in “Doubling and Incest,” while in Absalom, Absalom! Henry 
kills his half-brother to prevent miscegenation as well as incest that he cannot 
himself partake of. The seemingly absurd question that forces itself upon the 
reader at this point is whether in the South incest has perhaps been perceived 
as a preventive of miscegenation.
The parallel drawn in Absalom, Absalom', between the two half-brothers, 
Henry and Bon, on the one hand, and the two narrators trying to reconstruct 
their story, Quentin and his Canadian Harvard roommate, Shreve, on the other 
hand, puts Shreve and Quentin in an apparently impossible position of half­
brothers, one of them a half-breed, both tied to each other, like Henry and Bon, 
as Faulkner says, with an umbilical cord. Since Shreve’s racial and national 
identity seems unquestionable, of the two of them it is Quentin that emerges as 
a half-breed. The missing element of this double brotherly puzzle in the latter 
case, though, is the sister, whose existence Quentin never admits to Shreve in 
Absalom, Absalom! - until we meet Caddy in The Sound and the Fury. By 
analogy with the Henry-Judith-Bon trio then, Quentin’s silence about Caddy, 
paradoxically, establishes him and Shreve as rivals.
The clue to Shreve’s position in the Quentin-Caddy-Shreve trio can be 
found in The Sound and the Fury in the seemingly inconspicuous character 
of Versh (the anagram of Shreve), Dilsey’s black (or mulatto?) son, whom 
she assures at one point that he and his brothers have “jes es much Comp­
son devilment” (Faulkner 1954: 344) in them as does Jason, Quentin and 
Caddy’s greedy brother, suggesting thereby the existence under the Compson 
roof of a shadow family, a common enough phenomenon in the South. Ironi­
cally, Versh features as Quentin’s rival in both incest and miscegenation in an 
episode from their childhood, when, appalled by his daring gesture, Quentin 
prevents him from helping Caddy take off her dress when she muddies her 
drawers.
This interpretation would help to account for two inconspicuous but puz­
zling passages in The Sound and the Fury, which have not received enough 
critical attention (cf. Branny 1997: 153-4). The first is a folk story about the 
multiplying “bluegum” children (mulattoes?) who one day ate Quentin’s Grand­
father, in which Versh addresses Benjy, referring to his suspect identity, which 
Quentin is also troubled by in the already cited passage:
THE “PEARL EFFECT”: FAMILIAL TABOOS OF THE SOUTH ... 407
They are making a bluegum out of you. Mammy say in old time your grandpa 
changed nigger’s name, and he turn preacher, and when they look at him, he 
bluegum too. Didn’t use to be bluegum, neither. And when family woman look him 
in the eye in the full of the moon, chile bom bluegum. And one evening, when they 
was about a dozen them bluegum chillen running round the place, he never come 
home. Possum hunters found him in the woods, et clean. And you know who et 
him. Them blegum chillen did. (Faulkner 1954: 84-85)
The passage is reminiscent of the famous Shreve prophecy at the end of Ab­
salom, Absalom!, whereby the “bluegum chillerT become Bond Jim[s] (note 
the homophone with Benjy), who, as Shreve asserts, will one day “conquer the 
western hemisphere. [...] and will bleach out like rabbits and the birds [...] so 
in a few thousand years” he himself “will also have sprung from the loins of 
African kings” (Faulkner 1972: 378), the statement which puts Shreve in the 
seemingly impossible position of a half-breed.
The other puzzling passage, this time from Absalom, Absalom!, features 
Quentin and Shreve, “both being the father’’'’ (Faulkner 1972: 261-62), a seem­
ingly impossible option, thus appropriately marked by numerous maybe’s in 
Faulkner’s text, unless Shreve is indeed Versh, and thus the case of the South­
ern “pearl effect” in the making:
Maybe we are both Father. Maybe nothing ever happens once and is finished. Maybe 
happen is never once but like ripples maybe on water after the pebble sinks, the 
ripples moving on, spreading, the pool attached by a narrow umbilical water-cord 
to the next pool.... Yes, we are both Father. Or maybe Father and I are both Shreve, 
maybe it took Father and me both to make Shreve or Shreve and me both to make 
Father. (Faulkner 1972: 261-2)
Dilsey’s apocalyptic testimony about seeing “de beginnin, en now... de endin’’ 
(Faulkner 1954: 371) of the Compson family, her remark about her own chil­
dren’s “Compson devilment,” Versh’s hints about Benjy being “a bluegum“ 
child as well as Quentin’s obsession with the idea of a shadow, and his musing 
about his own and Benjy’s identity in front of a mirror, coupled with numerous 
other hints in the novel, confirm the existence of an extensive shadow family 
in the Compson yard, which most possibly includes the two seemingly white 
brothers - Benjy and Quentin, although the characteristic amnesia of the South 
rules out the possibility of admitting any such phenomenon (cf. Branny 2007: 
59-66 and 1997: 142-57).
Just as in his narrative section Benjy is constantly reported to be followed 
by the shadow of Versh and the other Gibson brothers - so in his obsession 
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with Caddy and the shadow Quentin in his section is constantly accompanied 
by the shadow of Shreve: just before his suicide he puts a letter to Shreve in his 
pocket, brushes his teeth with Shreve’s toothpaste, borrows a brush from him, 
with which he cleans his hat before leaving, and finally, and very significantly, 
puts his Grandfather’s watch, the one he got from his father, a mark of incest 
and miscegenation in the Compson household, into Shreve’s drawer.
Hence Shreve and Versh seem to function in The Sound and the Fury 
as “obverse reflection[s]” (Faulkner 1954: 106) of each other - and indeed 
literally so if one considers the name reversal - just as all blacks are of the 
whites in the South, as Quentin claims at the end of the novel. If Versh is 
indeed Quentin’s mulatto half-brother, and Shreve is Versh’s negative, then, 
in the Quentin-Caddy-Shreve trio it would have to be Quentin whose racial 
identity would be questionable - “both he and Shreve the father” - although 
Shreve is not a Compson, unless he is indeed Versh, and hence a Gibson, 
a mirror image, a shadow of the Compsons, charmed by the Southern “pearl 
effect,” Southern manner of “doing pretty,” into his oxymoronic negative - 
a white non-Amercan, non-Southerner, non-Compson, in confirmation of the 
phenomenon discussed in this paper.
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Spooky Houses in Western Fiction: From Poe’s 
House of Usher to Danielewski’s House of Leaves
Houses have played an important (thematic and/or allegorical) role in Western 
fiction during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries - right up to the present 
day. In Jungian terms the house can be viewed as an architectural model of the 
self (such as he formulates it in his Contributions to Analytical Psychology, 
1927, i.e. in the essay “Mind and the Earth”):
we have [...] to describe and to explain a building the upper storey of which was 
erected in the nineteenth century; the ground-floor dates from the sixteenth century, 
and a careful examination of the masonry discloses the fact that it was reconstructed 
from a dwelling-tower of the eleventh century. In the cellar we discover Roman 
foundation walls, and under the cellar a filled-in cave, in the floor of which stone 
tools are found, and remains of glacial fauna in the layers below. That would be 
a sort of picture of our mental structure. (Jung 1928: 118-19)
In the present paper I shall focus primarily on a number of haunted houses in 
Western fiction - from the Gothic mansion in Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Fall of the 
House of Usher” ( 1839) and the derelict priory in H. P. Lovecraft’s “The Rats in 
the Walls” (1923, 1924) to more recent thematic examples like the monstrous, 
scary and/or oversized/hyperbolic buildings in novels such as Stacey Levine’s 
Dra- (1997) or Danielewski’s House of Leaves (2000, 2001). And quite a few 
of these houses furthermore hover between the realm of allegory (like the 
Norwegian writer Tarjei Vesaas’ The House in the Dark, 1945, 1976) and the 
realm of poésie pure (like William Goyen’s The House of Breath, 1949).
According to Gaston Bachelard, commenting on architectural spaces and 
their symbolic connotations in The Poetics of Space (1958, 1964, 1994), the 
heights and the depths are certainly imbued with quite explicit connotations, 
i.e. to the extent that “the rationality of the roof’ is opposed to “the irrationality 
of the cellar” and to the extent that “[i]n the attic, the day’s experiences can 
always efface the fears of the night. In the cellar, darkness prevails both day and 
night, and even when we are carrying a lighted candle, we see shadows dancing
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on the dark walls” (Bachelard 1994: 18-19).1 Furthermore, the cellar “is first 
and foremost the dark entity of the house, the one that partakes of subterranean 
forces. When we dream there, we are in harmony with the irrationality of the 
depths” (Bachelard 1994: 18).1 2
1 “on peut opposer la rationalité du toit à l’irrationalité de la cave” (Bachelard 1998: 35) and 
“Au grenier, l’expérience du jour peut toujours effacer les peurs de la nuit. A la cave les ténèbres 
demeurent jour et nuit. Même avec le bougeoir à la main, l’homme à la cave voit danser les ombres 
sur la noire muraille” (Bachelard 1998: 36).
2 “mais [la cave] est d’abord l’être obscur de la maison, l’être qui participe aux puissances 
souterraines. En y rêvant, on s’accorde à l’irrationalité des profondeurs” (Bachelard 1998: 35). As 
has been pointed out by feminist critics, the Bachelardian model of the psyche may reflect what 
looks (primarily) like a patriarchal outlook, for of course, madwomen in the attic (pace Gilbert and 
Gubar and others) appear to disprove the very notion of the “rationality of the roof;” in Leonora 
Carrington’s short story “The Sisters” (1939, 1942) Drusille’s bird-like and vampyristic sister 
Juniper is thus precisely placed in the attic: “Perched on a rod near the ceiling, an extraordinay 
creature looked at the light with blinded eyes. Her body was white and naked, feathers grew from 
her shoulders and round her breasts. Her white arms were neither wings nor arms. A mass of white 
hair fell around her face, whose flesh was like marble” (Leonora Carrington: The Seventh Horse 
and Other Tales, New York: E. P. Dutton, 1988, p. 44).
3 Bachelard refers to the house in Henri Bachelin’s Le serviteur as “une zone de protection 
majeure” (Bachelard 1998: 45).
4 “Also heimlich ist ein Wort, das seine Bedeutung nach einer Ambivalenz entwickelt, bis es 
endlich mit seinem Gegensatz unheimlich zusammenfàllt. Unheimlich ist irgendwie eine Art von 
heimlich” (Freud 1982: 250).
Whereas Bachelard focuses primarily on the house as a sheltered space - 
or as a “major zone of protection” (Bachelard 1994: 31)3 - Sigmund Freud 
tends to be thematically preoccupied with the spooky or uncanny qualities of 
the house, which he exemplifies in his seminal essay “The Uncanny” (“Das 
Unheimliche” 1919). In his initial discussion of the etymology of the German 
word unheimlich Freud thus notices that “heimlich [i.e. homely or cosy] is 
a word the meaning of which develops in the direction of ambivalence, until 
it finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlich [i.e. uncanny]. Unheimlich is 
in some way or other a subspecies of heimlich [which incidentally also means 
secret]” (Freud 1985: 347).4 In this context we must therefore bear in mind that 
home and hearth can easily become uncanny or haunted places. Whereas the 
Victorian domicile is usually regarded as the castle of the bourgeois patriarch 
(according to the formula: “My home is my castle”) - and this homestead 
is furthermore inhabited by the “angel in the house” (in Coventry Patmore’s 
phrase), i.e. by a highly idealized and spiritualized housewife and mother - 
the aforementioned Freudian reflections implicitly undermine the ideological 
underpinnings of such a self-complacent set-up (as well as the character armour 
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of the master of the house). In “The Uncanny” Freud also takes up some aspects 
of the way(s) in which houses are portrayed in a literary context, and in this 
connection he thematizes the architectural uncanny in the following passage:
In the middle of the isolation of war-time a number of the English Strand Magazine 
fell into my hands; and, among other somewhat redundant matter, I read a story 
about a young married couple who move into a furnished house in which there 
is a curiously shaped table with carvings of crocodiles on it. Towards evening an 
intolerable and very specific smell begins to pervade the house; they stumble over 
something in the dark; they seem to see a vague form gliding over the stairs - 
in short, we are given to understand that the presence of the table causes ghostly 
crocodiles to haunt the place, or that the wooden monsters come to life in the dark, 
or something of the sort. It was a naive enough story, but the uncanny feeling it 
produced was quite remarkable. (Freud 1985: 367)5
5 “Mitten in der Absperrung des Weltkrieges kam eine Nummer des englischen Magazins 
Strand in meine Hände, in der ich unter anderen ziemlich überflüssigen Produktonen eine Erzäh­
lung las, wie ein junges Paar eine möblierte Wohnung bezieht, in der sich ein seltsam geformter 
Tisch mit holzgeschnitzten Krokodilen befindet. Gegen Abend pflegt sich dann ein unerträglicher, 
charakteristischer Gestank in der Wohnung zu verbreiten, man stolpert im Dunkeln über etwas, 
man glaubt zu sehen, wie etwas Undefinierbares über die Treppe huscht, kurz, man soll erraten, 
dass infolge der Anwesenheit dieses Tisches gespenstige Krokodile im Hause spuken oder dass 
die hölzernen Scheusale im Dunkeln Leben bekommen oder etwas Ähnliches. Es war eine recht 
einfaltige Geschichte, aber ihre unheimliche Wirkung verspürte man als ganz hervorragend” (Freud 
1982:267).
Freud is not very accurate with regard to his literary source (he does not 
indicate what issue of the Strand Magazine he had found his story in); but 
later scholars have found out that the story in question was L. G. Moberly’s 
“Inexplicable” published in volume 54 of Strand Magazine in 1917. According 
to Nicholas Royle (2003: 141, note 5), “Lucy Gertrude Moberly was an author 
of many novels, published in the early decades of the twentieth century; largely 
forgotten now, they were regularly reviewed, for example, in the Times Literary 
Supplement.” Freud is also somewhat inaccurate when he characterizes the 
domicile of the young couple in “Inexplicable” as a “furnished house.” Royle 
points out that:
In fact, it is a significant and emphatic point in the story that the house is very 
much a house (a property so substantial, indeed, that it transpires to have its own 
“cottage at the end of the garden” (p. 579)), and that it is not furnished: the mystery 
is why the owner or owners, or previous tenant or tenants, have left the table behind. 
In other words, whether through misremembering or misrepresentation, it is more
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specifically the case of a “haunted house” (“ein Haus in dem es spukt [...]”) than 
Freud’s summary might seem to suggest. (Royle 2003: 135)6
6 Cf. also on Freud’s reading of Moberly’s story Robin Lydenberg, “Freud’s Uncanny Narra­
tives,” PMLA 112 (October 1997): 1072-1086. As for L. G. Moberly’s story cf. L. G. Moberly: 
“Inexplicable,” illustrated by Dudley Tennant, Strand Magazine 54 (1917): 572-81. Cf. also Seek­
ers ofDreams: Masterpieces of Fantasy. Ed. & with Notes by Douglas A. Anderson (Cold Spring 
Harbor, NY: Cold Spring Press, 2005), pp. 241-52. The story is also reprinted in Strange Tales from 
the Strand. Selected and introduced by Jack Adrian. Foreword by Julian Symons (Oxford & New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992 (first published in 1991)), pp. 183-95. We notice that in this 
story - as in so many other classic examples of the fantastic - the everyday world and its would-be 
“normal” codes are in a spectacular manner undermined by “inexplicable” (allegedly supernatural) 
events, i.e. events that somehow disrupt the “natural” order of things.
The uncanny - or magical - object, i.e. the carved table, thus becomes the 
thematic centre of the plot; and the rest of the furniture becomes literally 
inessential, insofar as the table with the spooky crocodiles takes up all the 
narrative space, as it were. The “bestial” underpinnings of civilized life in 
middle-class England are thus explicitly thematized.
The Decline and Fall of the Gothic Manor-House from Edgar Allan Poe 
to H. P. Lovecraft
In The Gothic Revival: An Essay in the History of Taste (1928,1983) the English 
art historian Kenneth Clark comments on the widespread rehabilitation of so- 
called “Gothic” elements in eighteenth-century architecture and the way(s) in 
which ruins were cultivated by the nobility and the landed gentry during the 
same period; as a matter of fact, sham ruins were actually built [as ruins] by 
enterprising architects in eighteenth-century England, and according to Kenneth 
Clark (1983: 48-49),
[i]t would be interesting to know when the first Gothic ruins were built. [Horace] 
Walpole mentions one by Gibbs, which seems more improbable; but we know that 
Kent used the style, and I am inclined to make him responsible, for it was he who 
rebelled against the formal garden and brought into fashion romantic irregularities 
[... However,] the earliest [ruin] for which we have a date was built in 1746. It was 
the work of Sanderson Miller, an amateur architect of Radway, Warwickshire, and 
was built in his grounds at Edgehill [...] For all their forlorn absurdity, Miller’s 
sham ruins show knowledge of medieaeval architecture, and at least they are of 
stone. His rich clients could afford this concession to realism. But the average 
country gentleman gratified his imagination more cheaply: his ruins were of plaster 
or canvas.
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The picturesque style exemplified by these sham ruins is omnipresent in 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England (and to a certain extent also in the 
United States); and in 1839 Edgar Allan Poe certainly alludes to this would-be 
Gothic tradition in “The Fall of the House of Usher.” In a certain sense, it 
may be argued that those who built ruins had anticipated or pre-figured the 
eventual decline and downfall of the ancien régime, as it were - which is, of 
course, precisely the ultimate outcome of the plot in “The Fall of the House 
of Usher,” when
the barely-perceptible fissure” in the front wall of the manor-house in the last 
paragraph of the story “rapidly widened - there came a fierce breath of the whirl­
wind - the entire orb of the satellite [i.e. the blood-red moon] burst at once upon my 
sight - my brain reeled as I saw the mighty wall rushing asunder - there was a long 
tumultuous shouting sound like the voice of thousand waters - and the deep and 
dank tarn at my feet closed sullenly and silently over the fragments of the “House 
of Usher." (Poe 2000: 417)
Thus we notice how the depths swallow up the heights (the “tarn” swallows up 
the House of Usher). But this downward urge has already been foregrounded 
in various ways earlier in the story, e.g. when Roderick Usher (the lord of the 
manor-house) and his friend (the first-person narrator) bury Madeline (Roder­
ick’s apparently dead sister) “in one of the numerous vaults within the main 
walls of the building” (Poe 2000:409), i.e. carrying out what amounts to a “tem­
porary entombment” (allegedly taking into consideration the unusual character 
of her malady [is she quite dead?] and presumably also taking into consideration 
what amounts to a well-founded fear of grave-robbers) (Poe 2000: 409). When 
Roderick and his friend place Madeline’s “corpse” within this “vault” deep 
down within the main building, her body is certainly positioned on the level of 
what Gaston Bachelard terms “the dark entity of the house, the one that partakes 
of subterranean forces” (cf. the passage from The Poetics of Space, referring to 
the “topology” of the cellar or basement, quoted earlier in the present paper).
However this may be, the depths and their vaults are also thematized by 
Roderick Usher in his exertions as a painter:
[a] small picture represented the interior of an immensely long and rectangular 
vault or tunnel [cf. the vault where Madeline is buried (!)], with low walls, smooth, 
white, and without interruption or device. Certain accessory points of the design 
served well to convey the idea that this excavation lay at an exceeding depth below 
the surface of the earth. No outlet was observed in any portion of its vast extent, 
and no torch, or other artificial source of light was discernible; yet a flood of
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intense rays rolled throughout, and bathed the whole in a ghastly yet inappropriate 
splendor. (Poe 2000: 405-6)
Darkness itself is thus suffused with a mysterious aura of its own (its luminosity 
or “inappropriate splendor” is certainly against nature), which in its own way 
also adds to the spooky character of the whole set-up. And within this setting 
we are not at all surprised that the borderline between life and death itself 
can be transgressed - which takes place, when Madeline returns from her 
“temporary” entombment and brings about the death of her brother as well as 
the final downfall of the House of Usher (when the whole building is swallowed 
up by the “tarn”).
Edgar Allan Poe was undoubtedly the great precursor to H. P. Lovecraft 
(to adopt Harold Bloom’s terminology). As Lovecraft (2000: 43) himself for­
mulates it in his Supernatural Horror in Literature (first published in 1927):
Truly it may be said that Poe invented the short story in its present form. His 
elevation of disease, perversity, and decay to the level of artistically expressible 
themes was likewise infinitely far-reaching in effect; for avidly seized, sponsored, 
and intensified by his eminent French admirer Charles Pierre Baudelaire, it became 
the nucleus of the principal aesthetic movements in France, thus making Poe in 
a sense the father of the Decadents and the Symbolists.
Lovecraft also refers to Nathaniel Hawthorne’s archetypal The House of the 
Seven Gables (1851), and in this connection it is interesting to notice that he 
focuses on the metaphysics (or poetics) of the house in weird fiction: “The 
overshadowing malevolence of the ancient house - almost as alive as Poe’s 
House of Usher, though in a subtler way - pervades the tale as a recurrent 
motif pervades an operatic tragedy” (2000: 49). In Lovecraft’s own short story 
“The Rats in the Walls” (written in 1923, published in the pulp magazine Weird 
Tales in March 1924) a similar “malevolent” house (i.e. Exham Priory, rebuilt 
by its present owner, the first-person narrator) is placed at the centre of the 
plot. However this may be, it turns out that beneath the re-constructed priory 
there are further layers of architectural remains. A company of archaeological 
explorers discover downstairs
a twilit grotto of enormous height, stretching away farther than any eye could 
see; a subterraneous world of limitless mystery and horrible suggestion. There 
were buildings and other architectural remains - in one terrified glance I saw 
a weird pattern of tumuli, a savage circle of monoliths, a low-domed Roman ruin, 
a sprawling Saxon pile, and an early English edifice of wood - but all these were 
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dwarfed by the ghoulish spectacle presented by the general surface of the ground. 
For yards about the steps [down into this grotto] extended an insane tangle of human 
bones, or bones at least as human as those on the steps. (Lovecraft 2002: 105)
Here we are once more reminded of C. G. Jung’s model of the human psyche 
in his Contributions to Analytical Psychology’ (1927), where the chronological 
development of the human mind is portrayed as an instance of layering, as it 
were. And in the second-last paragraph of Lovecraft’s story this descent into 
the past is signalized as a linguistic déroute (or a linguistic break-down), where 
the first-person narrator traces a trajectory through a succession of languages, 
comprising archaic English, Middle English, Latin, and Gaelic, back to primi­
tive grunts or a primal scream: “ ’Sblood, thou stinkard, I’ll learn ye how to gust 
... wolde ye swynke me thilke wys? ... Magna Mater! Magna Mater!... Atys 
... Dia ad aghaidh s adodann ... agus bas dunach ort! Dhonas s dholas ort, 
agus leat-sa!... Ungl... ungl... rrrlh... chchch ...” (Lovecraft 2002: 108). 
According to S. T. Joshi (Lovecraft’s modem editor), the Gaelic text has been 
borrowed by Lovecraft from Joseph Lewis French’s The Best Psychic Stories 
( 1920) and translated by Fiona Macleod (alias William Sharp) as follows, “God 
against thee and in thy face ... and may a death of woe be yours... Evil and 
sorrow to thee and thine” (Lovecraft 2002: 384 note 33). The Gaelic passage 
is thus a curse, and we notice how the declarative and/or informative aspects 
of language are gradually toned down, whereas interjectional and/or purely 
“magical” uses of language become more and more important.
Ghostly Modernities in the Allegorical and the Poetical Modes
The allegorical mode has quite often been taken up in modernist fiction - and 
as far as the house metaphor is concerned, we notice that its history as an 
allegorical topos can at least be traced back to the Middle Ages, where John 
Gower’s House of Sleep (in his Confessio Amantis, ca. 1390) and Geoffrey 
Chaucer’s Housof Fame (probably written between 1379 and 1380) exemplify 
this trend. In modernist fiction we might mention Karel Capek’s The War with 
the Newts (1936) and Leonora Carrington’s The House of Fear (La Maison de 
la peur, written 1937-38, published in 1938, with illustrations by Max Ernst) 
as twentieth-century examples of the allegorical mode.
The Norwegian writer Tarjei Vesaas (1899-1970) makes allegorical use of 
the house topos in The House in the Dark (Huset i môrkret, 1945 ; English trans­
lation in 1976) - a novel about the German occupation of Norway ( 1940-1945), 
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written during the last months of the Second World War. According to Tarjei 
Vesaas’s English translator Elizabeth Rokkan,
The House in the Dark was written in Norway during the Second World War in 
unusual circumstances [...] By 1945 no one doubted that the war would soon be 
over, but in Occupied Norway there was much uncertainty as to how it would end 
[...]. [According to Vesaas’s wife, Haldis Moren Vesaas] [t]hat winter and spring 
of 1945 [Tarjei Vesaas] worked more steadily than he had ever done before, or 
would do later [...]. [When the manuscript was finished] [h]e made a solid zinc 
box for it, and buried it among the trees above the lake. Afterwards he took me 
[i.e. Haldis Moren Vesaas] there and showed me where he had hidden it, so that 
I should be able to find it again if he himself were gone when the time came to have 
it published. (Vesaas 1976: 7-8)
According to Elizabeth Rokkan, the novel may be characterized as “[pjart 
allegory, part parable,” and on one level it “describes the drab lives of the 
inhabitants of an enormous house that has suffered a catastrophe of supernat­
ural dimensions; on another [level] it depicts the struggle against the forces 
of darkness in poetic terms, combining biblical echoes with highly modem 
symbols” (Vesaas 1976: 9). From the very outset the “bewitched house” in 
question is portrayed as follows:
Here, beneath a single, gigantic, convex roof, are collected countless rooms and 
corridors and narrow passages, cut off from the rest of the world by dense, op­
pressive darkness. There are open courtyards inside this extensive house, but the 
darkness lies over it all like a crushing weight. If anyone were foolish enough to 
climb up on to the roof in an attempt to see something, he would simply feel as if 
his eyes had been tom out. He would come down again quickly and crawl away 
home. (Vesaas 1976: 11)7
7 Referring to “eit forgjort hus”: “Her er det samla, under eit einaste bylgjande kjempe-tak, 
tallause rom og gangar og smog - og skild frâ all verda med eit tett, tungt morker. Her er opne 
gàrdsrom inni dette vide huset, men morkret ligg over alt som ei krasande vekt. Om noken i orske 
kleiv opp pâ taket for â fà eit glimt av eitkvart, sâ ville det berre kjennast som augo var stungne ut. 
Han ville koma fort ned att og krabbe inn til seg sjolv” (Vesaas 1945: 7).
Arrows point in the direction of the centre of this enormous building - an 
obvious allusion to the totalitarian character (or aura) of this regime. What goes 
on in a totalitarian society can be characterized as (literally) unidirectional (or 
unidimensional). But at the same time the Resistance attempts to undermine the 
power of the centre by digging tunnels right up to the very centre (“The hidden 
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tunnelling goes right up to the hidden centre,” Vesaas 1976: 31).8 Occasionally 
an uncanny van picks up some of these freedom fighters (sometimes they are 
killed afterwards, sometimes they are incarcerated). At the end of the novel, 
one of the resistance fighters (Peter) realizes that “[h]is way ends here” (i.e. 
in front of a wall) - even if “events are [by now] moving in favour of the 
living” (and the occupation army is going to give up its stronghold very soon) 
(Vessas 1976: 282).9
8 “Like fram til den loynde midten gär den laynde boringa” (Vessas 1945: 31).
9 “Vegen hans vil ende her.” But “[o]ver einstad brest det i det ladde huset. Men gär mot det 
levande” (Vesaas 1945: 339).
10 On the relationship between these two genres or modes see also Peter Cersowsky, “Allegory 
and the Fantastic in Literature: Poe’s ‘The Masque of the Red Death’ and Alfred Kubin’s ‘The Other 
Side,’” Sprachkunst. Beiträge zur Literaturwissenschaft, Vol. 13. 1. Halbband (1982): 141-42.
According to Tzvetan Todorov in his famous study The Fantastic: A Struc­
tural Approach to a Literary Genre (1973, an English translation of his Intro­
duction à la littérature fantastique, 1970), allegory is more or less diametrically 
opposed to poetry (and both are opposed to the fantastic proper). However, it 
may nevertheless be argued that allegory - in some respects - also bears a cer­
tain resemblance to the fantastic (The House in the Dark, with its Kafkaesque 
underpinnings, could also be characterized as a fantastic novel).10 However 
this may be, a novel like William Goyen’s House of Breath (1949) to a certain 
extent likewise belongs to two different (generic or modal) fields, i.e. it is both 
a fantastic narrative (focusing on the dream of flying) and an example ofpoésie 
pure. Eve La Salle Caram (2004: 36) in her article “From the Earth Itself: The 
Yearning Voices of The House of Breath" comments on the elemental lore of 
The House of Breath, ending up with a reference to “the yearning lyricism that 
seems to come out of the earth itself in all the voices.” What she focuses on 
in the passage just quoted is the multivocal or polyphonic set-up of the novel 
as such (pace Mikhail Bakhtin).
But of course, as the very title of the novel indicates, air and earth appear to 
be competing forces within the poetical universe of the novel. We may likewise 
notice a subtle dialectic between the heights and the depths in this novel, where 
David Cowart (1997: 9) has noticed a remarkable downward urge (associated 
with the house topos, cf. Bachelard’s reflections quoted earlier), insofar as “the 
archetypal descent into the depths - whether of well, river, or cellar, whether 
of self or time - is something not unique to the sensitive narrator [i.e. Boy]. 
Granny Ganchion [the grandmother] descends into her cellar to commune with 
Old Fuzz the worm.”
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Postmodernism and Its Discontents: From Stacey Levine’s Dra- (1997) to 
Mark Z. Danielewski’s House of Leaves (2000, 2001)
The American critic Matthew Stadler (1997: 1) notices in his review in The 
Stranger (March 9, 1997) that in Stacey Levine’s Kafkaesque novel Dra- 
(1997) “the nondescript heroine of this grim, hilarious fiction, might have 
fallen through the same hole as Lewis Carroll’s Alice, only now, 130 years later, 
there [’]s no time for frivolity, just the pressing need to get a job.” However, the 
female applicant (Dra-) very soon loses her way inside the monstrous, oversized 
building, where the Employment Office is situated, for its architectural ground 
plan appears to be almost impossible to chart. When Dra- at a certain point in 
the development of the plot has got access to the roof of the building (we may 
bear in mind that this turned out to be impossible for those who frequented 
Tarjei Vesaas’s House in the Dark), even this place turns out to be infinitely 
more convoluted and impossible to survey than one should have thought:
The dark, miles-long roof was covered by another roof and so on, the top roof 
being unreachable in all ways; and as she walked towards the elevators, she passed 
a small niche that contained an open-walled guard station, though it did not contain 
a guard, but instead two figures struggling unpleasantly beneath a cloak, and she 
turned away. (Levine 1997: 60)
The bureaucratic weightiness (and density) of the whole place is obvious:
Despite the silence of these halls, there were, she knew, thousands upon thousands 
of employees everywhere, not visible now, but hard at work instead, gathered in 
small stifled work centers, basements, and sub-basements; night stations, corridors, 
and portable and permanent work areas; work vaults, niches for special projects, 
and training hutches connected by hallways just inches across that stuttered in one 
direction then another before widening into empty classrooms lined by shelves full 
of sheets and old surgical equipment. (Levine 1997: 13-14)
The convoluted spaces and claustrophobic atmosphere of this building, with 
its “hallways just inches across that stuttered in one direction then another,” 
remind us of classic Gothic scenarios with their winding, subterranean corridors 
and secret passages, their hidden vaults and prison-cells placed down below 
(we are also reminded of Kafka’s The Castle, 1924, and Borgesian narratives 
like “The Library of Babel,” 1941).
We notice the intertextual set-up of Dra-; in accordance with the poeto- 
logical premises of postmodernist fiction it always refers to other texts. This is 
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stressed in an even more spectacular manner in one of the most recent examples 
of the playful use of the house topos, namely Mark Z. Danielewski’s highly 
experimental portmanteau novel House of Leaves (2000, 2001). In this novel 
the house literally spreads out and takes up all available space (and a little more 
than that): the house in question continually expands, attempting to swallow up 
lodgers and visitors alike in the process. The complicated narrative structure 
of the text (an ingenious Chinese box system) presents us with a whole series 
of (heavily loaded) meta-textual or meta-fictional appendixes (offshoots from 
the main narrative, if there actually is such a fictional core). According to Will 
Slocombe, the text itself is not only indebted to the American Gothic tradition, 
but also to Derridean reading strategies, and
[t]his reading method can entail anything that leads to a deferment, whether mirrors, 
ghosts, echoes, supplements and annotations, or absences [... and] [wjhile House 
of Leaves is full of such tropes, and could thus be read as a deconstructive text, it 
is important to realize that while House of Leaves uses deconstructive strategy, its 
primary aim is to undo the violent hierarchy of its own existence. The House, both 
as house and text, seeks to unwrite its own creation, and this reflexive destruction 
of its own axioms demonstrates an important aspect of nihilism and the primary 
difference between deconstruction and nihilism. (Slocombe 2005: 92)
The murderous house in House of Leaves certainly reminds us of similar houses 
in Poe and Lovecraft (the House of Usher, the priory in “The Rats in the 
Walls,” etc.). According to Will Slocombe (2005: 104), “this nihilistic space 
functions in the manner akin to a black hole, seeking to absorb all traces of 
[Heideggerian] Being with which it is presented [...] As the nihilistic space 
of the House expands, it kills [the protagonist] Navidson’s brother, Tom [...] 
‘literally’ swallowing him.”11
11 According to N. Katherine Hayes (2004: 779), the palimpsestic characteristics of House of 
Leaves are obvious: “Rather than trying to penetrate cultural constructions to reach an original 
object of inquiry, House of Leaves uses the very multilayered inscriptions that create it as a physical 
artifact to imagine the subject as a palimpsest, emerging not behind but through the inscriptions 
that bring the book into being.”
Whatever is on the agenda here, the Lovecraftian characteristics of 
the House are pretty obvious, and this becomes quite clear when the ex- 
plorer/filmmaker Navidson appears to be locked up within this claustrophobic 
structure for good:
As he sits on the edge, he beholds a strange and very disconcerting sight. No 
more than twenty feet below is the surface of an incredibly clear liquid. Navidson
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presumes it is water though he senses it is somewhat more viscous. By some 
peculiar quality intrinsic to itself, this liquid does not impede but actually clarifies 
the impossible vision of what lies beneath: a long shaft descending for miles 
ultimately opening up into a black bottomless pit which instantly fills Navidson 
with an almost crippling sense of dread. (Danielewski 2001: 398)12
12 Actually, this subterranean landscape has been prefigured more than a century earlier in one 
of Roderick Usher’s paintings: “A small picture presented the interior of an immensely long and 
rectangular vault or tunnel, with low walls, smooth, white, and without interruption or device. 
Certain accessory points of the design served well to convey the idea that this excavation lay at 
an exceeding depth below the surface of the earth. No outlet was observed in any portion of its 
vast extent, and no torch, or other artificial source of light was discernible; yet a flood of intense 
rays rolled throughout, and bathed the whole in a ghastly and inappropriate splendor” (Poe 2000: 
405-6).
Kristevan abjection (usually associated with the secretions of the human body) 
is here combined with a more classic vertige de I ’abime - and apart from obvious 
allusions to Poesque and Lovecraftian chasms we are reminded of Heidegger’s 
well-known comment upon such an abysmal ontology in An Introduction to 
Metaphysics (1953, 1959): “Man embarks on the groundless deep, forsaking 
the solid land. He sets sail not upon bright, smooth waters, but amid the storms 
of winter” (Heidegger 1959: 153). Danielewski’s characters ultimately find it 
extremely difficult to come to terms with this House of Fear.
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Myth and Reality: Points of Departure 
in American Literature and Culture 
in the Nineteenth Century
In Chapter 21, “A Hard Case,” of Herman Melville’s The Confidence-Man, 
there is a dialogue between the Missourian and the herb-doctor, who tries to 
sell his quack medicines on a Mississippi steamboat. Declaring his lack of 
confidence in everything from herbal remedies to boys and men working his 
land, the Missourian states that he is planning to dispense with human labour 
because he has decided to “get me some kind of machine to do the sort of work 
which boys are supposed to do” (Melville 1989: 93). A discussion on distrust 
follows, which, in turn, leads to an argument in which the concepts of nature 
and scientific progress clash. The herb-doctor rounds on the Missourian:
“[...] Now, can you, who suspect nature, deny, that this same nature not only 
brought you into being, but has faithfully nursed you to your present vigorous and 
independent condition? Is it not to nature that you are indebted for that robustness 
of mind which you so unhandsomely use to her scandal? Pray, is it not to nature 
that you owe the very eyes by which you criticise her?”
“No! for the privilege of vision I am indebted to an occulist, who in my tenth year 
operated upon me in Philadelphia. Nature made me blind and would have kept me 
so. My occulist counterplotted her.” (Melville 1989: 93-94)
This dialogue encapsulated the debate that Americans were conducting 
from quite early on in the nineteenth century concerning the effects of tech­
nology and scientific progress on human beings, and, by extension, on the 
natural landscape. That natural defects could be counterbalanced by man-made 
intervention sums up the way people thought and wrote about the rise of mech­
anisation in American society and its impact on a pastoral way of life. The 
Missourian can see because of an operation; he can also dream of doing away 
with human beings by introducing machines on to his land.
It is interesting that Henry Adams (1973: 345), in his Education of Henry 
Adams, states that “the whole mechanical consolidation of force ruthlessly 
stamped out the life of the class into which Adams was bom,” and, of course,
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he was of Boston Brahmin stock. As with all strata of society, mechanisation 
was to bring profound changes. Adams also points to the upheaval wrought 
by rapid industrialisation, especially after the Civil War, and the spread of 
urbanisation that accompanied it.
Herman Melville, too, looked at the results of such means of production 
on the lives of those who went into the factories and tended machines. In the 
second part of his story “The Paradise of Bachelors and the Tartarus of Maids” 
(1855), Melville describes the pale-faced factory girls, with eyes “supernatural 
with unrelated misery,” who have become mere adjuncts to the machine that 
can produce foolscap paper in nine minutes. The narrator asks if the “great 
machine” ever gets jammed and is informed that “machinery makes it go just 
so; just that way, and at the very pace you there plainly see it go” (Melville 
2007: 84). The machine is infallible. It cannot jam; it just goes reliably on and 
on. Looking round him, the narrator concludes that the female factory workers, 
all single, because more reliable than married women, are confined to hell - 
Tartarus - and fear grips him:
Something of awe now stole over me, as I gazed upon this flexible iron animal. 
Always, more or less, machinery of this ponderous, elaborate sort strikes, in some 
moods, strange dread into the human heart, as some living, panting Behemoth 
might. But what made the thing I saw so specially terrible to me was the metallic 
necessity which governed it. [...] Before my eyes there, passing in slow procession 
along the wheeling cylinders, I seemed to see, glued to the pallid incipience of 
the pulp, the yet more pallid faces of all the pallid girls I had eyed that heavy 
day. (Melville 2007: 84)
This perspective on factories and the regimes they imposed on the hands 
who worked in them is well-brought-out by Melville’s story and it is an example 
of the cultural and literary enquiries that have been made into the uneasy 
connection between nature and industrialisation, so much so that this obsession 
and anxiety has been a major concern in writing for the last two centuries 
and continues into the twenty-first. Long before he reaches the paper mill, the 
narrator has descended into a valley, which is called “the Devil’s Dungeon,” so 
that movement through the natural world antecedes his arrival at the infernal 
region of Tartarus.
What Melville’s story shows is that in the nineteenth century, American 
writers were already fascinated, both excited and worried, by the advent of 
technology. What technology brought with it was the rise of the exceptional 
individual, be he inventor, factory owner, or entrepreneur in what was supposed 
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to be a republic of equality. The ascendance of this individual through the 
manipulation of the metallic necessity would also result in the control of those 
who would operate the very wealth-making machines. As the mill owner puts 
it, “[w]e want none but steady workers: twelve hours to the day, day after day, 
through three hundred and sixty-five days, excepting Sundays, Thanksgiving, 
and Fast-days” (Melville 2007: 84). It is ironic, too, that Melville bases his story 
round the manufacture of paper, because every conceivable form of writing 
“would be writ on those now vacant things,” and the blank sheets would 
eventually be put to “strange uses,” some of which would be the writings 
considered in this paper, including Melville’s own story.
The paper-mill owner in “The Tartarus of Maids” demonstrates the idea 
of the exceptional man very well. Ralph Waldo Emerson had put forward the 
idea of the outstanding individual in his series of lectures collected as Repre­
sentative Men (1850). There is, of course, an extraordinary ambiguity in what 
Emerson writes in his essay on “Napoleon, or, the Man of the World” and what 
he wrote in such essays as “The Transcendentalist,” “Nature,” “Self-Reliance,” 
and “The Over-Soul,” which preached individualism, whilst grounding them­
selves in a democratic vista of a new America. True, the “Napoleon” lecture 
shows Napoleon to be a flawed and ambivalent figure, but he is also a man 
who is shown to be “thoroughly modem.” It is this modernity, which is at 
the centre of the essay. Napoleon, we are told, “comes to be a bureau for all 
intelligence, wit, and power, of the age and country” (Emerson 1983: 729). 
There is, indeed, the hint of a certain disapproval in the attempt to place 
Napoleon as the focal point of the modem world, because Emerson’s open­
ing words on the two antagonistic classes in American society point to the 
conflict between old money, represented by the conservatives, “the idea capi­
talists,” and the “young and poor,” the democrats who are eager to make money. 
Napoleon, here, stands for the new democratic element, which is “selfish also, 
encroaching, bold, self-relying, always outnumbering” the conservatives, who 
are selfish, timid, illiberal, and who loathe innovation. And it is innovation 
that is at the heart of American modernity. In many ways, a representative of 
the hide-bound conservatives is the family from which Henry Adams sprang 
and which would be no longer dynamic for Emerson, tying the “interests of 
dead labor” up in stocks, property, and land. Napoleon, on the other hand, 
is the “incarnate Democrat” (Emerson 1983: 727). If the rising generation 
of young entrepreneurs push selfishly in their self-reliance, however, there is 
an inconsistency running through Emerson’s argument, because in his essay, 
“Self-Reliance,” he had already hinted at the self-reliant youth with approval, 
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“for he cumbers himself never about consequences, about interests: he gives 
an independent, genuine verdict. You must court him: he does not court you” 
(Emerson 1983: 261).
Napoleon, for Emerson (1983:727), was a representative of that democratic 
class which “desires to keep open every avenue to the competition of all, and 
to multiply avenues; - the class of business men in America, in England, in 
France and throughout Europe; the class of industry and skill.” The dark side 
of all this was that Napoleon was “destitute of generous sentiments” and was 
both “egotistical and monopolizing,” as well as a “boundless liar.” Emerson’s 
list could go on and on and his essay could act as a mirror to what he saw as 
the dangers of the American scene in the mid-nineteenth century. To an extent, 
the essay underpins a strand in the period’s writing, in which the reliance on 
and worship of nature is set against the development of industrialisation and 
the belief, so prevalent in the century, of an unbridled and unbounded progress. 
If Napoleon has no generosity and stands for the ultimate egoist, Emerson has 
also directed us to what he did not like about the United States and its future. For 
him, Napoleon was not a gentleman, and so a cad, in other words. He becomes 
an imposter and a rogue, fully deserving “the epithet of Jupiter Scapin, or 
a sort of Scamp Jupiter” (Emerson 1983: 744). In one form or another, others 
would take this up in the context of American technologists and innovators. 
Napoleon represents the social engineer, the engineer of human souls, in that 
phrase attributed to Stalin: the engineer makes and adapts machines; the writer 
makes and adapts the human being.
For Emerson (1983: 744), both the conservative, representing the old, and 
the young democrat will converge, as the younger takes on the atrophying 
attributes of the previous generation, “because both parties stand on the one 
ground of the supreme value of property, which one endeavours to get and the 
other to keep.” The ultimately pessimistic tone of the work would be taken up 
by those writers contemporary with, and following on from, Emerson’s ideas 
on American democracy. Napoleon as “cipher” was a theme in the essay, and 
by extension the democratic, innovative imperative in his modem America 
is one in which original thought is replaced by an immersion in and total 
absorption of the surrounding world, so that Napoleon, as the man of the world, 
is a “ciphering operative [who] knows what he is working with and what is 
the product” (Emerson 1983: 730). It is in the nature of the modem world 
for Emerson that all human beings are turned into operatives and because of 
Napoleon’s knowledge of minerals, machines, and men, “the old, iron-bound, 
feudal France was shaped into the young Ohio or New York.” Nevertheless, 
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Napoleon’s system was founded on military power and the middle class lives 
on such military imperatives, especially in America:
I call Napoleon the agent or attorney of the middle class of modem society; of the 
throng who fill the markets, shops, counting-houses, manufactories, ships, of the 
modem world, aiming to be rich. He was the agitator, the destroyer of prescription, 
the internal improver, the liberal, the radical, the inventor of means, the opener of 
doors and markets, the subverter of monopoly and abuse. (Emerson 1983: 742)
Emerson, then, despite all his doubts about the rise of technology in the country, 
fixes the figure of Napoleon into a peculiarly American theme, one in which 
praise and respect are directed, albeit grudgingly, towards the engineer, whether 
he deals with machines or manipulates human beings. Underlying Emerson’s 
essay, despite himself, is a contradiction, because there is an acknowledgement 
that the mechanic and the opportunist are representative men in the country, 
even if this appreciation of the “can-do” mentality is tinged with uncertainty and 
anxiety about the questionable morality of such people. Emerson (1983: 738) 
himself uses technological images for Napoleon’s energy: “this strong steam- 
engine does our work,” because “we feel the air purified by the electric shock.” 
The first of these images - the steam-engine - is, of course, typically iconic 
of the nineteenth century in its portrayal of power thrusting forward, while the 
second will flow through the words of many writers up to and including Elenry 
Adams. Force and energy are combined. As Eric Mottram (1989: 93) observes, 
Melville imagines Captain Ahab as a man moving along rails:
Once Moby-Dick is imagined as “the modem railway” and Ahab’s energy as 
electricity, the Pequod crew become subservient to capitalist technology. It is a short 
step to the bridge, the tunnel, and the plane together comprising “the gigantic 
powerhouse” for Hart Crane in The Bridge (1930), and to the industrial war machine 
of Moloch that is the focus of damnation in Allen Ginsberg’s Howl (1956).
Walt Whitman praised technology in his celebration of the opening of 
the Suez Canal and the connection of the main American railways (“Passage 
to India,” 1871), the two events having taken place in 1869. Both Whitman 
and Emily Dickinson have poems in praise of railway locomotives, though if 
Dickinson was thrilled to see a railway engine “lap the miles” and Whitman took 
pleasure in its “[fjierce-throated beauty,” then Emerson had voiced his anxieties 
as early as 1846, in his “Ode to W. H. Charming,” because he had always worried 
over where control lay, with human beings or with the machines themselves:
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The horseman serves the horse,
The neatherd serves the neat,
The merchant serves the purse,
The eater serves his meat;
’Tis the day of the chattel,
Web to weave, and com to grind;
Things are in the saddle,
And ride mankind.
The “Ode to W. H. Channing” glosses Emerson’s “Napoleon” essay in a way 
that emphasises the negative aspects of technological progress, though forty 
years later, many Americans believed that if engineering had not completely 
overcome nature, then it had gained the upper hand and had subdued it. Many 
had, nevertheless, resisted the forces of technology, as Melville had in “The 
Tartarus of Maids” and in Moby-Dick itself. As Tony Tanner (1988: xiv) writes, 
commenting on a passage in Chapter 114, “The Gilder,” when the Pequod 
is becalmed:
Here the loom of the book weaves together some of the deepest organising and 
engendering concerns of the book. These include the destinationless circularity of 
all human efforts - a dis-teleological vision which ran exactly counter to nineteenth­
century versions of unilinear Progress and Evolutions.
Progress and (mechanical/industrial) evolution had their literary and social de­
tractors and there are varied and common instances of “a machine (railroad or 
steamship) bursting on a peaceful natural setting [, which] represented a sym­
bolic version of the trauma inflicted on American society by unexpectedly 
rapid mechanization” (Trachtenberg 1982: 39).
Opposition to mechanical progress became evident in the number of strikes 
that took place in the boom-and-bust years between 1873 and 1896. In 1873, 
there had been a series of coal strikes, railway wagons derailed, and coal-tips 
burned. The employers sent in the Pinkerton Agency, which resulted in the 
conviction and execution of nineteen ringleaders in 1877. In that year, the great 
railway strike led to civil war between railway strikers and the Pennsylvanian 
state militia, which caused twenty-five deaths and millions of dollars’ worth of 
damage. Order was only restored when federal troops were sent in, and what 
has been called the first national American strike only added to the fears of 
those who had written about the rise of technology. As industrialisation and 
urbanisation accelerated in postbellum America, the self-reliant individual, so 
beloved of, say, Emerson and Thoreau, was submerged. Alfred North Whitehead 
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was later to state what was already becoming true in the late nineteenth-century 
that “The self-sufficient independent man, with his peculiar property which 
concerns no one else, is a concept without any validity for modem civilization” 
(qtd. in Matthiessen 1979: 77).
Henry David Thoreau saw the rise of the engineer as not only dangerous, 
but inevitably trivial. If Whitehead saw the independent man as irrelevant to 
modem society, Thoreau (1983: 95-96) saw aspects of mechanical progress as 
diminishing rather than enhancing American relations or communications:
We are in great haste to construct a magnetic telegraph from Maine to Texas; but 
Maine and Texas, it may be, have nothing important to communicate. [...] We are 
eager to tunnel under the Atlantic and bring the old world some weeks nearer to 
the new; but perchance the first news that will leak through into the broad, flapping 
American ear will be that Princess Adelaide has whooping cough.
Two hits here for the price of one, of course, one aimed at Europe and the 
other directed at the significance or otherwise of progress. The “broad, flap­
ping American ear,” (Thoreau 1983: 95), however, remained deaf to Thoreau’s 
enjoinments and American culture was to be governed by two large images - 
the Civil War, which was the first modem war, total and technological, and the 
Machine. To be sure, Nature continued to play its part, but the Civil War and the 
Machine were inextricably linked. The war itself was to be seen in industrial 
terms, as when Stephen Crane (1983: 105), for example, described the conflict: 
“The battle was like the grinding of an immense and terrible machine to him. 
Its complexities and powers, its grim processes fascinated him. He must get 
closer and see it produce corpses.” Robert Hughes (1997: 271) reminds us that 
if warfare was compared to a machine, then it was further documented by other 
machines because it was “the first American conflict to be described by the 
modem art of photography.”
Europe, stretching back to Crevecoeur and others, and moving through the 
nineteenth century, was usually seen as having an unmodified feudal system, 
which was built on tyranny and superstition. Engineering technology could 
be the instrument of change and would conquer the Old World. The rise of 
American industrial power transformed the nation in dramatic ways: the image 
of the machine was complex and its symbolic status had contradictions built 
into it. As we have seen, Melville’s response in “The Tartarus of Maids” was 
decidedly bleak. Alan Trachtenberg (1982: 38-39) points to this aspect of an 
evolving way of life:
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If the machine seemed the supreme cause of the abundance of new products chang­
ing the character of daily life, it also seemed responsible for newly visible poverty, 
slums, and an unexpected wretchedness of industrial conditions. While it inspired 
confidence in some quarters, it also provoked dismay, often arousing hope and 
gloom in the same minds. For, accompanying the mechanization of industry, of 
transportation, and of daily existence, were the most severe contrasts yet visible in 
American society, [...] which seemed to make a mockery of the republican dream, 
a haunting paradox.
A case in point is the Centennial Exposition held in Philadelphia in 1876 to 
celebrate the republic’s first century of independence. Viewing the objects on 
display, some thought machinery had gone out of control, as did the economist, 
David Wells. Mechanization was for him like one of America’s vast rivers burst­
ing its banks and flooding the surrounding land (Trachtenberg 1982: Chapter 2).
For most visitors, though, the wonders of technology represented the future. 
The Corliss Double Walking-Beam Steam Engine powered the whole exhibi­
tion, whilst a gigantic electrical pendulum clock controlled twenty-six “slave” 
clocks. The Exposition, with its newly-invented typewriter, Bell’s telephone, 
and other labour-saving machinery heralded the dawn of the American engi­
neer as hero. Walt Whitman’s “Song of the Exposition” is a paean to American 
inventiveness and an exhortation to the classical Muse to leave behind the Old 
World for the newer America:
Come Muse migrate from Greece and Ionia,
Cross out please those immensely overpaid accounts,
That matter of Troy and Achilles’ wrath, and Aeneas’, Odysseus’ wanderings, 
Placard “Removed” and “To Let” on the rocks of your snowy Parnassus, 
Repeat at Jerusalem, place the notice high on Jaffa’s gate and on Mount Moriah, 
The same on the walls of your German, French and Spanish castles and Italian 
collections,
For know a better, fresher, busier sphere, a wide, untried domain awaits demands 
you. (Whitman 1976: 226)
America is the “fresher, busier sphere,” which becomes the centre of a geo­
graphical space made new by invention. In its celebration of invention and 
building, this poem also has an element of reconciliation because the poet re­
members what he witnessed in the Civil War. The Exposition, and by extension, 
the maker or engineer, is identified not with war and violence, but with a peace 
in which technology would allow Whitman to erase the memory of the maimed, 
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dead and dying in battle. Crane’s later simile of war being like a machine is 
here reversed into pacific hopefulness, in which even Thoreau’s contempt for 
telegraphic communication is subsumed into Whitman’s “delicate cable.” He 
is ebullient and wishes to abolish “themes of war,” replacing military might, 
so that “in its stead speed industry’s campaigns,/With thy undaunted armies, 
engineering” (Whitman 1976: 230). For Americans by the 1880s, as Robert 
Hughes (1997: 279) has shown, homo artifex was indispensable: “the factory, 
the bridge, the dam, the dry dock were all parts of the Cathedral of Making, as 
the Grand Canyon was the temple of Nature.”
Mark Twain’s story “My Watch - An Instructive Little Story” illustrates the 
darker side of this belief in what Europeans were coming to call “the American 
System.” Written in 1870, “My Watch” prefigures^ Connecticut Yankee in King 
Arthur s Court (1889) in its concern for things mechanical. The narrator’s new 
watch runs down and it is taken to a jeweller’s shop, so that the narrator can set 
it to the right time by one of the clocks there. The result is advice and tinkering 
by a number of watchmakers; all this leads to various calamities, in which 
time slows and speeds up until the watch “would reel off the next twenty-four 
hours in six or seven minutes, and then stop with a bang” (Twain 1985: 64). 
Two themes run through this story, one being a reflection on changes in the 
concept of time itself during the century and the other the unreliability of the 
various watchmakers’ (and, by extension, mechanics’) skills. Although a slight 
piece in itself, “My Watch” represents a meditation on the age of engineering 
and time management modifying industrial practices: “My uncle William (now 
deceased, alas!) used to say that a good horse was a good horse until it had 
run away once, and that a good watch was a good watch until the repairers 
got a chance at it” (Twain 1985: 64).
This is the age of Frederick Taylor’s time-and-motion studies and the 
development of his theory of “scientific management.” Again, Trachtenberg 
(1982: 69) notes:
Frederick W. Taylor, a foreman at the Midvale Steel Company in Pennsylvania, 
inaugurated in the 1880s his famous “time study” experiments, aimed at the elim­
ination of waste, inefficiency, and what he called “soldiering” on the part of the 
workers. With his stopwatch - a further encroachment of time on physical move­
ment - Taylor proposed to systematize [...] the absolute subordination of “living 
labor” to the machine. [...] In The Principles of Scientific Management (1911), 
Taylor made explicit the heart of his program: to take possession for management 
of the “mass of traditional knowledge” once possessed by the workers themselves. 
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Taylor’s intentions of reducing the human being to that of an adjunct of the 
machine can be seen, of course, in Melville’s writings and leads us to Hank 
Morgan in Twain’s A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court (1889), who 
is a foreman at the Colt factory in Hartford. American know-how engineering 
is then transported to Arthurian England. What Hank Morgan attempts to do 
is what Taylor introduced into the factories of North America. Twain uses the 
technique of looking backwards in order to cast light on the contemporary 
scene. A Connecticut Yankee is a parody of the romance genre and it tackles the 
complex themes of agrarianism and industrialisation, primitivism and progress. 
Twain’s own feelings about the past and the present were ambiguous and in 
the course of the novel what emerges is a highly ironic pastoral. The book is 
not only a critique of mediaeval England, in which sixth-century superstition 
and monarchy are confronted by modem technology, but is also a reaction to 
Thoreau’s pastoralism and the worries of Hawthorne and Melville.
Hank Morgan, is not only a foreman - the “head superintendent,” as he calls 
himself- “with a couple of hundred rough men” under him at the Colt factory, 
but he has “learned to make everything - guns, revolvers, cannon, boilers, 
engines, all sorts of labour-saving machinery” (Twain 1981: 39). Morgan is 
an all-purpose mechanic of the new order, an adaptable man and one of the 
new kind of employees bom into the era of mass production. Twain’s initial 
setting is important, too, because the Colt factory in Hartford, where Morgan 
learned and carried out his “can-do” skills, had grown from making revolvers 
into a major centre of scientific and technological research and invention, where 
the latest manufacturing techniques were enhanced by the growth of precision 
machinery and the latest managerial methods. Samuel Colt had himself been an 
inventor and the revolvers that “won the West” were considered on the Frontier 
to be levellers: “God created man; Colonel Colt made them equal” (this slogan 
has various unclear origins, but the safest attribution seems to come from an 
early Colt Manufacturing advertisement, thought up by Samuel Colt himself). 
Nevertheless, it does focus attention on Hank Morgan, because he is the very 
opposite of those who grew up in an agrarian world, being a recent urban 
variation of man. Thomas Jefferson may have wanted Americans to be farmers, 
but Hank Morgan illustrates the late century’s reversal of the pastoral dream.
Morgan is transported to Camelot after being hit on the head by one of 
his “rough men” and A Connecticut Yankee replaces the quest for the Holy 
Grail with the establishment of a colony in England, in which Morgan attempts 
to bring “the civilisation of the nineteenth-century booming.” In his “Man 
Factories,” he plans to turn “groping and grubbing automata into men” (Twain 
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1981: 159). What Morgan introduces in his managerial revolution is the idea of 
self in competition, and to these ends he uses social and technical engineering. 
If, as noted earlier, Emerson’s modem man was incarnated in Napoleon, then 
Morgan is an extension of this idea, because he believes that “training is all 
there is to a person. We speak of nature; it is a folly; there is no such thing as 
nature” (Twain 1981: 161). Hank’s peaceful revolution is engineered through 
a number of machines, which manipulate and modify men. In addition, he 
introduces American baseball, which he believes will democratise the feudal 
population in an especially American way and train everyone for team labour. 
His very American hopes are used with a deepening irony, however, because 
Twain, very much an enthusiast for engineering progress, had come to have his 
own doubts about the turn industrialisation was taking in America.
A Connecticut Yankee began as a comic satire and was initially directed 
against Arthurian chivalry. It was aimed at removing European feudal instincts 
and replacing them with the practical language of America, but as Twain con­
tinued to write it, the tone became darker. Morgan had begun his modernisation 
with dynamism and enthusiasm. It is appropriate that his schools are known as 
“Man Factories,” and his introduction of newspapers, telephones, and industrial 
production are attempts at eliminating backwardness and turning attention to the 
progressive future. At the same time, however, we increasingly become aware 
that underneath the comic bravura there is something blinkered and manic in 
Hank Morgan’s struggle to engineer an American republic in Camelot. Having 
started his project by organising the Knights of the Round Table for practical 
purposes and having turned them from chivalric elitism, the lone hero is finally 
defeated by the Church and chivalry. “The Boss,” as he has come to be known, 
retreats to a defensive barrier with his chief supporter, Clarence, and “fifty-two 
fresh, bright, well-educated, clean-minded young British boys” (Twain 1981: 
391), who have been left untainted by what he sees as religious superstition.
The defensive base is fortified and, as “The Boss” tells Clarence, “We 
shan’t have to leave our fortress, now, when we want to blow up civilisation” 
(Twain 1981: 386). His armoury includes an electrified fence, thirteen Gatling 
guns (invented in 1861), and “glass cylinder dynamite torpedoes” (invented 
in 1864), whilst Merlin’s cave is used to generate electricity. A Connecticut 
Yankee ends with a technological holocaust: “I touched a button and set fifty 
electric suns aflame on top of our precipice” (Twain 1981: 404). If Huck Finn 
does not want anyone to “sivilize” him and lights out for the Territory, Hank 
Morgan’s experiments in modernisation leave him trapped behind an electric 
fence, surrounded by the bodies of slaughtered enemies that his war machines 
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have dealt with. Mark Twain’s ambiguity about industrial ingenuity can be 
summed up in Merlin’s words. Disguised as an old woman, he has infiltrated 
the encampment: “Ye were conquerors; ye are conquered” (Twain 1981: 407).
A Connecticut Yankee contains anxiety about the sinister manoeuvrings of 
the new technology and the underlying argument questions whether human be­
ings will benefit from the engineering imperative or will be ultimately destroyed 
by it, as “The Boss” is in the final sequence of the book. In Life on the Missis­
sippi, written in 1883, Twain had looked back nostalgically to earlier days and 
portrayed the riverboat pilot, Horace Bixby, as hero in complete control of the 
technology at his command and who works for the benefit of others. Pilotage, 
we are told, is “a science” and in learning his craft, the pilot’s eye changes. 
Natural beauty gives way to a precise reading of the river, whilst the engines of 
the boat (the machine) take on great importance. Twain (1984: 122-23) makes 
an important comment on the style and functions of a pilot on a riverboat:
The moment that boat was underway in the river, she was under the sole and 
unquestioned control of the pilot. He could do with her exactly as he pleased, run 
her when and whither he chose, and tie her up at the bank whenever his judgment 
said that course was best. His movements were entirely free; he consulted no 
one, he received commands from nobody, he promptly resented even the merest 
suggestions. Indeed, the law of the United States forbade him to listen to commands 
and suggestions, rightly considering that the pilot necessarily knew better how to 
handle the boat than anybody could tell him.
The difference between Hank Morgan and Horace Bixby is not only that 
of fiction and reality, but also because in one sphere work is done with care in 
the natural world, whereas in the world of Camelot, Morgan is “an ancestor of 
the Vandal with sidearms and a marketing plan” (Powers 2005: 523). In Bixby, 
the reader is presented with the notion of the highly-skilled man whose abilities 
are founded in the Emersonian notion of self-reliance. What Morgan wished to 
do to Camelot was becoming grim reality during the later years of the century 
because the new immigrants to the urban, industrial centres were to be rapidly 
moulded into the “scientific management” model of industrialisation. The new 
discipline demanded conformity and rationalised behaviour. The slavery of 
work depicted in Melville became fact because factories demanded clock­
based and regularised attendance, both of which brought with them repetitively 
ordered work patterns. A booklet produced to teach English to Polish labourers 
at the International Harvester Corporation illustrates this clearly:
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Lesson One. I hear the whistle. I must hurry. I hear the five-minute whistle. It is 
time to go into the shop. I take my check from the gate board and hand it on the 
department board. I change my clothes and get ready to work. The starting whistle 
blows. I eat my lunch. It is forbidden to eat until then. The whistle blows at five 
minutes of starting time. I get ready to go to work. I work until the whistle blows 
to quit. I leave my place nice and clean. I put all my clothes in the locker. I must go 
home. (qtd. in Guttman 1976: 15)
So, who imposed the discipline? Fictional characters like Hank Morgan in A 
Connecticut Yankee, or, real-life figures like Frederick Taylor, men who raised 
themselves within the hierarchical system of which they were part. Owner­
ship, direction, and labour were separated, unlike in earlier rural American 
communities.
Yet, whilst all this was going on in America, the last years of the century 
also saw an element of utopian fiction, of which the most popular was Looking 
Backward, 2000-1887 by Edward Bellamy. It was published in 1888, a year 
before A Connecticut Yankee, and gives the reader a technological interpretation 
of a mechanised America, organised to “the unbounded possibilities of human 
nature” (Bellamy 1888: 126). Bellamy is saying that there is hope in the future. 
Looking Backward gives a portrait of a future world, which is highly indus­
trialised, though Bellamy’s early readers were able to draw out the potential 
(and hopeful) tendencies already taking place in 1887 and in so doing reach 
conclusions about the Boston of 2000.
Bellamy’s protagonist, Julian West, is transported into the future, but while 
Twain’s Morgan is hit on the head, West has become sick - unable to sleep, he 
sends his servant for a mesmerist and falls into a 113-year coma in a sealed room 
in the bowels of his house. West is, in fact, suffering from “the nervous tension 
of the public mind” (Bellamy 1888: 11). George M. Beard’s pioneering work, 
American Nervousness: Its Causes and Consequences (1884), had likened the 
human nervous system to a machine suffering from the strain of contemporary 
life and Bellamy’s West is a product of this stress. As West’s guide and mentor 
in the new world explains, “riches debauched one class with idleness and riches 
of mind and body, whilst poverty sapped the vitality of the masses by overwork, 
bad food, and pestilent homes” (Bellamy 1888: 98).
Julian West is a latter-day Rip Van Winkle, but whereas Rip wakes up a new 
American man, West wakes up to a nationalised state in which the means of 
production have been taken over by the state and where consumerism overarches 
everything. Bellamy’s utopia is highly structured and regimented, and, as Dr 
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Leete, the guide, explains, the “principle of military service” is applied to the 
world of work. Labour is controlled and there is a hierarchy of workers, based 
on merit; this in turn leads to the consumption of goods, which can be bought 
in what West sees as warehouses. Shopping has disappeared and trade credits 
are issued for goods already ordered. As Robert Wiebe (1967: 70) observes:
Because the government, which had replaced private owners in industry, oversaw 
the distribution of labor and goods, a later generation would find ominous hints of 
totalitarianism in Bellamy’s message. But his contemporaries understood. Govern­
ment returned to the people in a society attuned to the moral laws quite literally 
eliminated government as a distinct institution.
The American world no longer has any private enterprise and the state controls 
the means of production and directs the work force, but happiness becomes 
entirely dependent on leisure and consumption, because after a period of com­
pulsory labour service, everyone is given up to pleasure. There would be a future 
for an industrialised landscape in the United States. It is interesting that this 
city-world was to be rejected by William Morris in Britain and was to be 
rejected by many dystopian writers in America.
Ignatius Donnelly, the agrarian senator from Minnesota, despaired of both 
the governing classes and the capacity of the masses for leadership, and these 
ideas fed into his Caesar’s Column (1891), where the underground organi­
sation, the Brotherhood of Death, reacts against and challenges the “gigantic 
abnormal selfishness which ruins millions for the benefit of thousands” (Don­
nelly 1891:68). In Caesar’s Column, technology makes the future problematic 
and class war is fought with the machinery of mass destruction. Civilisation 
collapses into civil war: “an age of bribery terminates in one colossal crime 
of corruption” (Donnelly 1891: 172). War results in a holocaust akin to Hank 
Morgan’s apocalyptic end and the narrator can “see, like a great black rain 
of gigantic drops, the lines of the falling bombs against the clear-blue sky” 
(Donnelly 1891: 172). The future lies in Africa, where the nucleus of a new 
pastoral civilisation, strangely ignorant of the present inhabitants, will found 
a new order. The group is saved from the ruins of New York by a hovering 
aircraft, which is given the ominous name, “Demon.” “We stood on the deck. 
The engineer touched the lever of the electric engine: the great bird swayed 
for an instant, and then began to rise, like a veritable Phoenix from its nest of 
flame, surrounded by its cataracts of sparks” (Donnelly 1891: 197).
Despite the fact that this electric dynamism was so embedded in the period, 
the new society envisaged by Donnelly in Africa is definitely ««technological: 
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“We do not give any encouragement to labor-saving inventions, although we do 
not discard them. We think the end of government should be - not cheap goods 
or cheap men, but happy families. If any man makes a serviceable invention the 
state purchases it at a reasonable price for the benefit of the people” (Donnelly 
1891: 210). Donnelly’s book is filled with the negative aspects of technology 
and argues for a return to an earlier rural society, where large urban conurbations 
are forbidden, and where people live in agricultural communities of the kind 
described by earlier pastoral writers. Eric Mottram (1989: 111-12) remarks 
that Caesars Column,
tries to convert “metallic necessity” into an agrarian Phoenix state in which “the 
ingenuity of man,” which had “conquered the forces of steam and electricity,” is 
applied to “the great adjustments of society, on which the happiness of millions 
depends.” The result is a class-structured isolationism, “a garden of peace and 
beauty” with a distinctly Jeffersonian intentionality. History repeats itself for the 
nth time as nostalgic utopian fiction.
For Henry Adams, the avoidance of the anxieties considered above would 
only come out of unifying the comprehension of what constituted energy, both 
electrical and sexual. Americans could only develop when they discovered that 
morality had to be combined with knowledge of science and technology. In 
addition, they would have to understand the historical and future role of women 
in society, as well as what power politics meant. If they did not come to an 
understanding of all these, American life would be continuously disastrous: 
“The new American must be either the child of the new forces or a chance 
sport of nature. The attraction of mechanical power had already wrenched the 
American mind into a crab-like process” (Adams 1973: 501).
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Michael Hamburger’s Crusade against Ignorance 
and Prejudice: German Poetry 
and the United States
Preliminaries
In his obituary for Michael Hamburger, published in The Independent in June 
2007, Iain Galbraith (2007) expresses the view that with Hamburger’s death 
“the English language takes leave of one of its most gifted and gently influential 
poets as well as the twentieth-century’s most distinguished and prolific translator 
of German poetry.” But where does one start when analysing the influence 
one individual person has exercised on the reception of German Literature in 
America? Every critic must be conscious of the fact that in most cases he 
has only access to insignificant external characteristics, such as reviews in 
specialised magazines which, more often than not, have nothing to do with the 
actual reception of a book among the reading public, and letters to the editors 
of such magazines. Remarks in autobiographies or books of criticism may give 
some impression of the particular influence a writer or a book of translation 
has had on the career of an individual colleague. If fortunate, one may even 
persuade publishers to look up their statistics, if available, and provide hard 
facts such as print-runs and sales figures. Nonetheless, these superficialities do 
not throw light on the reception process that takes place between a book and its 
readership. A writer’s reputation in a country other than his own depends almost 
entirely on the ability and taste of his translators, provided that this particular 
author’s work is selected for translation in the first place. A translator not only 
influences the reception process by the way in which he translates a text, but 
also by what he considers worth translating. The smaller the market - the 
number of translators and translations - is, the greater the extent the influence 
of particular translator-editors can be felt, which may result in false heroes 
and strange gods, i.e., an overrepresentation of particular authors in foreign 
countries, which does not correspond with the real stature of their work. On 
the other hand, translators may even resurrect authors from oblivion, as is the
442 WOLFGANG GÖRTSCHACHER
case with Hamburger and Franz Baermann Steiner (1992a: 38-39 and 1992b), 
never recognized in the German-speaking countries. The authors selected by 
Hamburger have been fortunate in their translator.
Hamburger’s Various Artistic Masks: Translator-Editor and Critic
Hamburger seems to have influenced the American reception of German Liter­
ature on various levels: as translator, editor of anthologies, critic, and poet. His 
first major book to appear in the States was Beethoven: Letters, Journals, and 
Conversations, which was published by Pantheon Books (New York) together 
with the London press Thames & Hudson in 1951. The former publishing house 
was directed by Kurt Wolff, an eminent German émigré publisher, who in 1961 
founded his Helen & Kurt Wolff Books imprint, which he edited as a special­
ist list within the big Harcourt Brace Jovanovich publishing conglomerate. In 
1953, Wolff published Hamburger’s first Hölderlin collection to appear in the 
States entitled Hölderlin: His Poems, whose British edition had been issued by 
Harvill Press one year earlier. It was a revised and enlarged edition of Poems 
published in 1943, of which Hamburger said that it
came out far too early, when I was too young. All I had was enthusiasm, but 
no knowledge. I did not even understand the metres of Hölderlin’s poems and 
so I translated them into free verse. When I was in the army from 1943 to 1947 
I reworked these translations and added new ones as well. First I found the Harvill 
Press, who published it in England. As I was already in touch with Wolff I must 
have mentioned it to him that this book was coming out and he took it over.
(Hamburger 1998)
Hölderlin: His Poems, with prose translations below the original, was 
reviewed by Lisel Mueller, a poet and translator, in the January 1963 issue 
of Poetry (Chicago). In this very favourable review the critic stresses that 
Hamburger “presents us with a fair and generous selection of Hölderlin’s poems 
[...] including] all the famous expansive poems from the middle period [...]. 
It is in these poems that the diction [...] becomes extremely difficult with 
its inverted syntax, incremental appended clauses, and ambiguous usage of 
single words” (Mueller 1963:289). Fourteen years later University of Michigan 
Press at Ann Arbor published Hamburger’s - once again - revised edition 
entitled Poems and Fragments. This happened through the mediation of the 
poet Donald Hall, who had, together with his co-editors Robert Pack and 
Louis Simpson, included some of Hamburger’s own poems in the anthology 
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New Poets of England and America (Cleveland: Meridian, 1957). Many of the 
revisions included in the Michigan Press edition had already been incorporated 
by Hamburger into Penguin’s Selected Poems published in 1961.
The same year the Bollingen Foundation published Hugo von Hof­
mannsthal’s Poems and Verse Plays, edited by Hamburger, in their Bollingen 
Series. In .4 Mug’s Game: Intermittent Memoirs 1924-1954, Hamburger reports 
the following about the difficulties involved in the publication of this volume:
Early in the new year [1951] 1 got down to work on the Beethoven book. At the 
same time Stephen Spender telephoned, suggesting that he and I collaborate over the 
Hofmannsthal translations he was doing for the Bollingen Foundation. A line-by­
line collaboration proved impossible. Each of us translated different works. After 
complications of various kinds, and the lapse of nearly a decade, the editorship 
was offered to me. Since that was a way of breaking the deadlock, I accepted, with 
Stephen’s generous consent. (Hamburger 1973: 251)
Both Spender and Hamburger contributed translations to the volume, which 
finally included twenty-three lyrics and six verse plays, mostly written during 
Hofmannsthal’s early youth, in the 1890s, with complete German texts facing 
the English, and a preface by T. S. Eliot. In her review published in Poetry 
(Chicago), Lisel Mueller pays attention to the American readers’ ignorance of 
Hofmannsthal and provides useful background information to the period cov­
ered by the volume. But she also refers to particular difficulties Hofmannsthal’s 
translators had to face up to:
The various translators do an able job with the unrhymed material, but often run 
afoul of rhyme and metre, when they try to reproduce it in English. Hofmannsthal 
frequently uses rhyming verbs, and since the verb, in German, normally occurs at 
the end of a clause or sentence, this works out well, but carried over into English, 
it produces an effect of awkward inversion and “poetic” rhetoric. Then, too, in 
a perfectly scanning translation, there is always the need to add words to fill out 
the line - German words generally requiring more syllables than the corresponding 
English ones - and these extra words, usually adjectives, are at least superfluous 
and sometimes confusing. (Mueller 1963: 289-90)
In 1963 the Bollingen Foundation published another Hofmannsthal volume 
edited by Hamburger entitled Selected Plays and Libretti, which contains three 
plays and three libretti: Electra (trans. Alfred Schwarz), The Salzburg Great 
Theatre of the World (trans. Vernon Watkins), The Cavalier of the Rose (trans. 
Christopher Holme), Arabella (trans. Nora Wydenbruck and Christopher Mid­
dleton), The Difficult Man, which Edwin Muir “had wanted to translate before 
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he became ill” (Hamburger 1973: 252) and was finally translated by Willa 
Muir, and Hamburger himself contributed his rendering of the sombre tragedy 
The Tower. Both volumes were distributed by Pantheon Books, who - as was 
already mentioned - published Hamburger’s first book of translation in the 
States. In 1970 Princeton University Press published the editor’s introductions 
to the two volumes of Hofmannsthal’s Selected Works separately as a critical 
book entitled Hofmannsthal: Three Essays, which, Hamburger stresses, was 
taken quite seriously by Hofmannsthal scholars.
Günter Grass, the novelist, was introduced to the American audience with 
Ralph Manheim’s rendering of The Tin Drum, published by Pantheon in 1963. 
Although John Simon, in his review for Partisan Review, considers Grass’s 
novel a German approximation of Ulysses, he slaughters Manheim’s translation:
It is to be deplored that The Tin Drum comes to English readers diminished by 
Ralph Manheim’s translation: in length, by well over a hundred pages; in quality, 
inestimably. Much that was either too difficult, or seemed too elaborate or obscene, 
has been flattened out, abridged, or omitted. On almost every page constructions, 
jokes, meanings are weakened, disregarded, or missed. None of which, however, 
has kept the translation from being extolled by literary and academic reviewers 
alike. (Simon 1963: 452)
His American reputation as a poet, however, Grass almost exclusively owes 
to Hamburger and Middleton. At a time when Grass had only published two 
collections of poetry, Die Vorzüge der Windhühner (1956) and Glasdreieck 
(1960), Hamburger and Middleton collected their translations of Grass’s po­
ems to be published as Selected Poems by Helen & Kurt Wolff Books (New 
York) in 1966. Four of Hamburger’s translations had been included in Modem 
German Poetry 1910-1960: An Anthology with Verse Translations, issued by 
New York’s Grove Press in 1962. Hamburger did not approach Grass when 
arranging the latter’s bi-lingual Selected Poems'. “It would not have been any 
good sending him the early translations, because I do not think he knew any 
English to speak of at the time. Now he knows a bit of English, but even so 
I do not think he would want to be bothered with checking the translations” 
(Hamburger 1998). Anthony Hecht, who reviewed it for The Hudson Review, 
welcomes its publication, describing Grass as “an excellent poet,” who
deals with fantasy, irony, humor, and of his predecessors seems most to resemble 
Erich Kästner and Bertold Brecht, though his irony is less savage and crude than 
Brecht’s. The translations [...] should not have been remarkably difficult to do, for 
Grass writes in a rather free form, and none of the poems included here employ
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rhyme; and on the whole the translators seem pretty well to have succeeded, though 
there are moments of odd awkwardness. [...] Even so, Grass is a pleasure to read, 
even in translation. (Hecht 1966: 338)
In her review for Poetry (Chicago), Lisel Mueller (1968: 338) states that 
Grass “falls into the category of poets who “work” in English, and Michael 
Hamburger and Christopher Middleton prove so in their translation.” She char­
acterises Grass’s poems as “structures of specific, concrete, everyday speech 
imposed on bizarre backgrounds.” Mueller goes beyond Hecht’s categoriz­
ing by calling him “witty, brilliant, angry.” To the American readership she 
introduces Grass as
the moralist exposing our cupidity and stupidity, but he does it playfully, by showing 
us grotesqueries, odd juxtapositions. Folding chairs embody homelessness and 
dislocation; spoons are the curved shape of experience; situations that have been 
surrounded by sentiment are suddenly, and shockingly, seen in a vacuum. His 
surrealism can be obscure, but more often it comes frighteningly close. And he is 
capable also of the bitterly plain and brief statement [...]. (Mueller 1968: 338)
At the time Middleton had, more or less, dropped out as Grass’s trans­
lator, and this is why the later collections, with one exception, have been 
translated by Hamburger exclusively. In 1969 it was again Helen & Kurt 
Wolff Books who published the bi-lingual collection New Poems, Hamburger’s 
translation of Grass’s third collection Ausgefragt {Questioned). R. H. W. Dil­
lard (1969: 426-27), in his review for The Kenyon Review, found the col­
lection “as interesting and admirable as the earlier Selected Poems." In the 
reviewer’s opinion, “the book does achieve a dawn, a March in its own 
way, but its journey is bleak and surprising, as blunt as the fist Grass drew 
to burst from the dust jacket. Its poetry is as vital as Eberhart’s, as hon­
est as McAfee’s.” In April 1977 the same press published In the Egg and 
Other Poems, which included on its 143 pages most of the older and some 
new translations by Hamburger and the handful of Middleton’s translations 
from Grass’s first American volume. Since then they have issued Drawings 
& Words 1954-1977 (1982) in Hamburger’s and Walter Arndt’s renderings 
and Etchings & Words 1972-1982 (1985), which only contains translations 
by Hamburger. In April 1996 Harvest Books printed Novemberland: Selected 
Poems 1956-1993, its title deriving from a sequence of thirteen sonnets first 
published by the literary magazine Agenda in its “German Poetry Special Is­
sue” in summer 1994. It is noticeable that this bilingual volume which contains 
fifty-four poems was published in both a hardback and a paperback edition. In 
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1999 Faber & Faber, whose American headquarters are in Boston, published 
Grass’s Selected Poems 1956 to 1993, with translations by Hamburger ex­
clusively.
In addition to Grass, there are many other German-language authors that 
Hamburger either first introduced to American readers or whose American re­
ception and reputation are considerably dependent on his translations. Among 
them are Albrecht Goes, Nelly Sachs, Adolf Muschg, Giinter Eich, Hans Mag­
nus Enzensberger, and Paul Celan. Enzensberger, Hamburger recalls, most 
probably initiated the publication of Poems for People Who Don’t Read Poems 
by New York’s Atheneum Press in 1968. The volume contains translations by 
Hamburger, Jerome Rothenberg, and Enzensberger, and was also published in 
Great Britain by Seeker & Warburg and Penguin the same year. According 
to Hamburger,
these translations should not have appeared in a single book, because the two 
languages - American and English - cannot be mixed. So that was really a mistake. 
At that time one could still just about get away with English translations in America, 
but nowadays people would just say, this is some foreign language. Even when the 
early translations of mine appeared in America, the eminent poet Kenneth Rexroth 
said in a review quite angrily, he uses these idioms which are British and do not 
mean anything to us. (Hamburger 1998)
The welcome this collection received from Michael Benedikt, as “Critic 
of the Month” in Poetry (Chicago), was not warm at all; quite the opposite. 
Not only does he accuse Enzensberger of “a weak style of political critique,” 
“slip[ing] from accurate, objective criticism into mere personal complaint,” of 
“massive rhetorical denunciations” and “a general style of grievance” (Benedikt 
1968: 210), but he also criticises Rothenberg’s translations for misrepresenting 
the German poet by “talking down:”
The trap into which he has fallen is that of feeling he has to supply the German poet 
with the public touch, which he has further erred by identifying with the Common 
Touch. Three lines from a later section of “Foam” are: “o fire-eater with the heat 
turned off slip me some skin / o mummy in your mummy-cloth of pink-tinged foam 
god bless you / deliver your bubbling gullet to my kow-tow. ...” Such phrases as 
“slip me some skin,” “gullet,” and “kow-tow” are not suggested by the German 
original and are, to say the least, inappropriate. It is as if Enzensberger showed up 
to read some political poems in the United States wearing a zoot suit.
(Benedikt 1968: 210-11)
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If one reads the original alongside Rothenberg’s translation, one easily recog­
nises that the reviewer is wrong with regard to “gullet.” Benedikt stresses, 
however, that Hamburger and Enzensberger avoid “talking down.”
Bloodaxe published Selected Poems in 1994 and Kiosk in early 1997, both 
of them being distributed in America by Dufour Editions in Chester Springs, 
Pennsylvania. Hamburger translated the majority of the poems published in 
Enzensberger’s recent collections, to the latter the author added six translations 
of his own. The American author Lawrence Joseph, reviewing Kiosk for Jacket 
4 (July 1998), an Internet quarterly edited by the Australian poet John Tranter, 
stresses Enzensberger’s exceptional “vocal range and range of subjects” as 
well as two constants in his work: “his preoccupation with how a poem sounds 
[...] and an acute, sophisticated sense of how these voices can be constructed 
in a poem. Often, a poem will switch, or seem to switch, speakers; we’re 
in aesthetic realms similar to those of Gertrude Stein, Samuel Beckett, John 
Ashbery” (Joseph 1998).
Paul Celan, whom Hamburger first met at Erich Fried’s in London in 1952, 
was first introduced to a wider American readership by the inclusion of four 
poems - “Fugue of Death” and “The Jugs” in Middleton’s renderings, “Shib­
boleth” and “In Memoriam Paul Éluard” translated by Hamburger - in the 
anthology Modern German Poetry 1910-1960. In 1971 it was again Dutton 
who took Celan’s American reception history one important step further by 
publishing Speech-Grille, and Selected Poems in Joachim Neugroschel’s ren­
dering. In November 1972 Hamburger was awarded The Levinson Prize, which 
is presented annually by Poetry (Chicago), for his eleven translations of Celan 
(Dec. 1971) and sections IV and V of Travelling, published in the magazine 
between October 1971 and September 1972. The next year Jerry Glenn’s 174- 
page book entitled Paul Celan, the first important study in the field of American 
Celan-criticism, appeared in Twayne’s World Authors series. Persea Press in 
New York has been the main outlet for Hamburger’s Celan-translations. They 
published the bi-lingual collections Poems (bought from Carcanet) in 1980, 
Poems of Paul Celan (bought from Anvil Press) in 1989, and an enlarged 
and revised edition in 1994, but, as Hamburger stressed in the interview, they 
triggered off hardly any response in America.
Hamburger’s American reputation as editor and translator is usually asso­
ciated with the publication of three mammoth bilingual anthologies: Modern 
German Poetry 1910-1960 (with Middleton), East German Poetry, each being 
the first substantial collections of their sort to appear in America, and German 
Poetry 1910-1975. The reason why the first was published in 1962 by Grove 
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Press, New York, was that Hamburger had already established a strong associ­
ation with them. In spring 1957 he contributed an essay to the inaugural issue 
of their magazine Evergreen Review; later in the same year they published his 
first book on German literature, Reason and Energy, its revised edition enti­
tled Contraries being issued by Dutton fourteen years later. For this anthology 
Hamburger and Middleton collected up what translations each had done, put 
them together and then decided that “there were certain gaps and poets that 
neither of us had translated, but who ought to be in the book. Then we found 
other translators for those. We knew who was translating whom, since we both 
lived in London at that time and things were much more centralised than they 
are now” (Hamburger 1998). The anthology comprised 163 poems by fifty-five 
poets; in addition to the two editors, nine poets, among them Eva Hesse, Vernon 
Watkins, and David Luke, contributed twenty translations, which makes up only 
12 per cent of the content. One third of the anthology is given over to poems by 
only six poets: Rainer Maria Rilke, Gottfried Benn, Georg Trakl, Georg Heym, 
Alfred Lichtenstein, and Bertolt Brecht. According to Hamburger, it sold pretty 
well both in America and in Britain, where it had to be reprinted three times.
Many critics have misunderstood the creative relationship between Ham­
burger and Middleton. They first met in London in 1955 when Hamburger 
was teaching at University College and Middleton held a post as lecturer in 
German at King’s College. They co-operated on various translation and edito­
rial projects until 1966 when Middleton emigrated to America to take up the 
chair of Germanic Languages and Literature at the University of Texas, Austin. 
Hamburger emphasised the fact that many critics misinterpreted the nature of 
their collaboration, thinking that: “we translated together. We never translated 
together, we put together our translations. Even when I did a written interview 
a couple of weeks ago, I was asked to tell the interviewers about my supposed 
collaboration with Christopher Middleton over translation” (Hamburger 1998).
The only text Hamburger and Middleton ever collaborated on is the 24- 
page Introduction to Modern German Poetry 1910-1960, which is a discussion 
of Expressionism and of the modem style in German poetry it initiated. They 
characterise the contents of the anthology by listing the poets omitted, who 
fall into six categories:
(1) those Naturalists, Impressionists and Symbolists whose work is either anchored 
in nineteenth century conventions, or not directly modem in style or outlook (e.g., 
Liliencron, Dehmel, George); (2) those poets whose work appeared well into this 
century but who were not affected by modernist techniques (e.g., Schroder, Bor-
MICHAEL HAMBURGER’S CRUSADE AGAINST IGNORANCE ... 449
chardt, Carossa); (3) those poets who anticipated Expressionism in certain poems, 
but whose style or outlook is not central to it (e.g., Mombert, Dauthendey); [...] 
(4) poets of those bizarre, demi-prophetic, quasi-religious or otherwise quixotic 
groups which may be typical of the epoch but do not invariably claim attention as 
sources either of its best or even of its more charactered writing (e.g., Pannwitz, zur 
Linde, Derleth); [...] (5) those, like Elisabeth Langgasser or Nelly Sachs, whose 
work resisted translation, (Hamburger and Middleton 1962: xxi)
and (6) with the exceptions of Brecht and Huchel, no East German poets are 
represented in the anthology, because, “when we were choosing and trans­
lating poems, we had not read enough of their work to enable us to choose 
representative poems” (Hamburger and Middleton 1962: xlii).
David Galler’s review of the anthology published in Poetry (Chicago) was 
full of nationalist arrogance, implicit chauvinism, revenge, hatred, prejudice, 
and, perhaps, the sort of political correctness required at the time in some 
literary circles in America. Obviously, Galler had not read the anthology, but 
wanted to get rid of his anger bottled up over the years:
Rilke, George, a few dozen poems by others, needed translating and received it. 
These “others” - Trakl and Benn among them - were given a thorough treatment 
next; though many of their poems weren’t worth it, one could accept the translators’ 
love and effort. Hamburger and Middleton have overshot that mark with their an­
thology. What becomes painfully clear is the extent to which Hitler’s regime stunted 
German poets of all ages, silencing many, truncating a tradition by forcing many to 
write secretly with no immediate masters and no means for public expression. The 
Germans, however, are a stubborn people; this anthology shows how, despite Hitler, 
most of them persisted right on through in writing poems with autotelic imagery 
enough to make one shudder. Small poetic progress in this country for over half 
a century! (Galler 1964: 264)
With the next project, his bilingual East German Poetry anthology, which 
was begun under the auspices of the New York State Council for the Arts 
when Hamburger was Visiting Professor at State University of New York, 
Buffalo, in 1969 and finally published by Dutton Press in 1972, Hamburger 
tried to remedy one of the shortcomings of the first anthology. In this first major 
anthology of East German poetry to appear in the States, Hamburger collected 
one hundred and eighteen poems by twelve poets, with renderings by seven 
translators, among them Middleton, Ruth and Matthew Mead, and Christopher 
Levenson. Hamburger himself contributed more than half of the poems printed 
in the anthology, with the sections on Brecht, Heinz Kahlau, Reiner Kunze, 
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Wolf Biermann, and Kurt Bartsch comprising translations made by Hamburger 
exclusively. In the Introduction the editor stresses that “it is not a representative 
anthology in terms of the political division, since that would have called for 
the inclusion of the sort of verse most in favor with the ideological directors of 
the régime - exhortatory, self-congratulating pep-verse, antiquated even by the 
standards of the eighteen-nineties and subliterary in its complete subordination 
of the medium to the message” (Hamburger 1972: xv). Among the criteria 
for inclusion Hamburger lists “commitment to the truth of [the poets’] own 
perceptions, feelings, and convictions,” and a preoccupation “with moral and 
social problems to a degree rare among non-communist poets,” which, he 
thinks, “is another reason why their work is, or should be, of special interest 
to American and British readers with no direct experience of an almost totally 
collectivized society” (Hamburger 972: xv). He would have liked to include 
work by Stefan Hermlin, Erich Arendt, and Peter Gosse, but their diction and 
verse forms “proved too remote from the practice of their English-writing 
contemporaries” (Hamburger 1972: xvi).
Originally, this anthology was to be published first in America by a press 
in Buffalo - whose name Hamburger could not remember in the interview 
I conducted with him - but they let him down and nothing came of this. Then 
he sent it to Michael Schmidt, who accepted it and thereby started Hamburger’s 
Carcanet career in Britain, which lasted until the early 1990s when Hamburger 
broke with Schmidt, who - according to Hamburger - subsequently ordered all 
his books to be scrapped. Dutton, who had already published the revised edition 
of Reason and Energy as Contraries in 1971, took it over from Carcanet. In 
1977 Carcanet published Hamburger’s 500-page bi-lingual anthology German 
Poetry 1910-1975, whose co-publisher should have been Urizen Books, but it 
was finally withdrawn. According to Hamburger,
there was a terrible disaster of the American edition. It first went to the translator 
Michael Roloff of Urizen Books, who was an eminent businessman on the New York 
publishing scene. They must have set it separately, because obviously the Carcanet 
edition was all right. I remember that I corrected the proofs, but then the book came 
out in his form and not in mine. It was withdrawn and the man disappeared from 
the publishing scene. Years later I got a summons to New York to go to bankrupt 
proceedings. I was supposed to claim money from him for compensation for the 
damage, but I did not go and I just let it go. (Hamburger 1998)
Inter Nationes in Bonn bought three thousand copies for worldwide distri­
bution, which enabled Schmidt to reprint it. In 1981 Schmidt sold the anthology 
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to Persea Press in New York. Although Hamburger compiled work by ninety- 
five poets in the anthology, he stresses that “the contents of the anthology do 
not represent the whole of German, Austrian, and Swiss poetry written over 
a period of sixty-five years” (Hamburger 1977: xxxii-xxxiii). However, it con­
tains “good and remarkable poems of as many kinds as I could respond to as 
a translator” (Hamburger 1977: xxxiii). Hamburger asked Middleton whether 
he wanted to collaborate again, but he turned down the offer: “The reason is 
that by that time we were much more aware of how different the two of us 
were” (Hamburger 1998). According to Hamburger (1977: xxv), the anthology 
“sprang out of two needs: to collect scattered translations done over the decades 
and to replace the earlier anthology Modern German Poetry 1910-1960,” which 
both had both out of print and out of date for some years. In 1978 Hamburger 
was awarded the Schlegel-Tieck prize for German Poetry 1910-1975.
The publicity campaign for this anthology received additional impetus 
thanks to Hamburger’s guest-co-editorship for TriQuarterly 35.2 (Winter 1976), 
which contained sections dedicated to German (edited by M. Hamburger), 
American (edited by Michael Anania), and French poetry (edited by Paul 
Auster). Hamburger was asked by the magazine’s editor Elliott Anderson to se­
lect work from his - then - forthcoming anthology; the final selection, however, 
was made by Anderson himself, who printed twenty-seven poems by sixteen 
poets, such as Peter Handke, Günter Kunert, Reiner Kunze, and Jörg Steiner.
The widespread ignorance of literatures in German that Hamburger referred 
to when characterising the British (non-)reading public in the 1940s and 1950s in 
his talk entitled “The translator as an intermediary between two cultures,” which 
was given in Amsterdam in March 1993 at the Foundation for the Production 
and Translation of Dutch Literature, holds true for today’s situation in America:
As for mediation, 1 could not rely on translations alone even with German-language 
writers as securely established in their own cultures now as Goethe, Hölderlin or 
Büchner. When my work began, in the 1940s, not only was there a strong prejudice 
against all things German in Britain, but an ignorance that extended to the most 
well-educated and sophisticated circles. (Hamburger 1993: 10)
Hamburger took the offensive by initiating an educational crusade by way 
of complementing all his translations with “critical writings, books of essays 
and obligatory introductions to the works and authors I translated” (Hamburger 
1993: 10). In an essay published in a special volume of the influential Ger­
man magazine Text und Kritik, Ruth Klüger painted the same dreary picture of 
the US-reception of German literature in the early 1990s. If one asked Amer- 
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icans with an average education about twentieth-century German literature, 
they would most probably mention the names of Sigmund Freud and Franz 
Kafka. Intellectuals of the 1960s’ generation might even know Thomas Mann’s 
and Hermann Hesse’s novels. Some may even have read Günter Grass’s The 
Tin Drum. In her opinion, only small coteries in New York appreciated Pe­
ter Handke’s and Thomas Bernhard’s works, whereas US-feminists were quite 
keen on Christa Wolf. According to Klüger, Rilke’s poetry was widely known 
and appreciated (Klüger 1995: 132-35).
Against this context we have to appreciate the invaluable service that two 
US-presses - Harcourt, Brace & World and Dutton - performed by publishing 
Hamburger’s critical books The Truth of Poetry: Tensions in Modern Poetry 
from Baudelaire to the 1960s (1970) and Contraries: Studies in German Lit­
erature (1971) respectively. The latter is the revised edition of Reason and 
Energy, which had been published by Grove Press in 1957. At the same time, 
i.e., in 1970, Princeton University Press issued Hofmannsthal: Three Essays, 
which basically consists of Hamburger’s introductions to the two volumes he 
edited for the Bollingen Foundation. Out of these three critical studies, The 
Truth of Poetry - where Hamburger provides his readers with a panorama of 
American and European poetry allocating German poetry its appropriate place 
- “had most impact and is the only one that is still in print again, having been 
out of print for a long time” (Hamburger 1998). “Michael Hamburger’s richly 
concrete study,” the critic M. L. Rosenthal wrote in Poetry (Chicago):
is as intelligent a reconsideration of what has happened as one can find. [...] It is 
most useful in its overview of contemporary developments in Europe of some of 
the chief theoretical emphases of our day, all without arbitrariness if not without 
conviction, and is just one more sign of the awakening in the past few years of British 
criticism to the question of redefining “modernity.” Apart from Hamburger’s great 
specificity, I particularly like his understanding of the real, but protean, elusive, ever 
shifting and disappearing and reappearing connection between the mind’s search for 
knowledge and practical wisdom and its entrancement by imagination, by aesthetic 
disinterestedness, and by the plastic possibilities of language.
(Rosenthal 1971: 103-4)
Hamburger started a second US-crusade in the mid- 1980s with the publica­
tion of A Proliferation of Prophets: Essays on German Writers from Nietzsche 
to Brecht and After the Second Flood: Essays on Post- War German Literature. 
“The prose books were my attempt to bring into print all of Michael’s durable 
essays in a kind of ‘collected’ edition,” Michael Schmidt (1998) of Carcanet 
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Press told me by e-mail. St. Martin’s Press, New York, was not Carcanet’s 
co-publisher, but “simply bought in 400-750 copies of our editions.” (Schmidt 
1998) However, they did not seem to go down well with the American reading 
public. Hamburger holds that “they did not sell at all. [...] Somebody I know in 
America tried to buy one of those books. He could not get it from a bookshop. 
They were a complete flop.” (Hamburger 1998).
Hamburger’s role as critic is not restricted to the publishing of books. 
Between the mid-1950s and the early 1980s he also played an active role on the 
American little magazine scene as reviewer for prominent magazines, Chicago 
Review and Poetry (Chicago) among them. An excellent example of Hamburger 
the reviewer is his early review-essay on Erich Heller’s The Disinherited Mind: 
Essays in Modern Literature and Thought, which was published in Chicago 
Review in spring 1958. The following extract is a good example of seriousness 
of Hamburger’s approach to literature:
[Professor Heller’s criticism] expresses a discomfort which many have felt, but few 
have dared to voice. Though personally I am in favour of what Professor Heller 
calls “spiritual timidity” in dealing with a matter at once so momentous and so 
slippery as the theme of this book, it is something to have the courage of one’s 
despair. My own reaction to so extreme a claim for the philosophical approach to 
literature happens to be a recoil in favour of poetry; but then I have long ceased to 
live by a gospel compiled out of quotations by my favourite poets; and I have never 
been able to regard art, or any human activity whatsoever, as unrelated to all other 
human activities. (Hamburger 1958: 80)
Another interesting example is his well-argued review-essay on David 
Young’s translation of Rilke’s Duino Elegies, which at the time of its publication 
was acclaimed by several prominent poets as the American rendering of Rilke’s 
text, because Young’s approach to translation - an attempt to make the text more 
contemporary, more American by breaking up Rilke’s lines in the manner of 
William Carlos Williams’s “variable foot” - runs counter to Hamburger’s ethos:
If it were really necessary for literary works, even works as recent, relatively speak­
ing, as the Duino Elegies, to be thoroughly modernized, “updated,” in every regard 
whenever they are newly translated, the implication would be that a contemporary 
work in English, The Waste Land, for instance, calls for similar treatment if it 
is to remain “alive” and “urgent.” This makes the assumption not only false but 
insulting, since it would mean that readers have become incapable of the slightest 
effort to adjustment to conventions and periods other than their own. That there 
are such readers, that there is a trend that way - even among professors who have
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ceased to believe in what they profess - leaves no doubt as to where that assumption 
leads. (Hamburger 1979: 236)
Instead of a Resume
Finally, some comments on the subtitle of my essay: the reason why I would 
like to describe Hamburger’s translations as “celebration of German literature” 
is connected with his ethos, which he sums up at the end of his Introduction to 
German Poetry 1910-1975, when he says, “Like all my translations, these take 
no more liberties than are needed to come as close as possible to the original 
texts, that is their tone, gesture, tension, dynamic of feeling as much as their 
surface ‘meaning.’ My hope is that they will convey something of the quiddity 
of each poem, not of my quiddity [...]” (Hamburger 1977: xxxiii).
Hamburger’s influence as translator of German literature is adequately 
summed up by the British poet Rodney Pybus in a judgment which, I believe, 
also holds true for many American readers: “Everyone who has been reading 
poetry in English in recent decades (especially those without German) is in 
Michael’s debt, for opening so many windows into German literary culture” 
(Pybus 1994: 5).
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